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INTRODUCTION
The institutionalization of ecological attitudes in highly industrialized societies is the 
main interest of this study. Analyses of national politics often underestimates the 
competing and partially latent interests which are voiced by different political 
pressure groups. Therefore, I am interested in the response of the workers' 
movement to the ecological challenge. Although the labor movement does not 
support the cruder forms of ecologism such as no-growth claims, of all established 
political actors it is the most open to these demands. This is so because the 
ecological politics offers an utopia for a modern society. The labor movement has 
also the aspiration of being a socially progressive force of society that aims for social 
change. Most directly, the left-wing parties have to compete with other parties that 
attract the post-material electorate. However, the policy and strategy of working- 
class parties are not independent of trade union policy. It is self-evident that 
politicians of social democratic parties consult trade unions in order to formulate their 
political goals. But also on the national policy level, unions are often consulted in 
order to obtain a broad alliance for some political decisions. All these examples 
should illustrate that trade union policy and standpoints concerning the development 
of society are important for the better understanding of the political outcomes of 
society. Yet traditional union policy - and also trade union research - tends very 
much to generally ignore politics: "Unions are involved in a major way in a very 
significant activity - the political life of the country - and yet there is considerable 
evidence that they do not take that activity very seriously". (Crouch, 1982: 192) (1]
Trade unions represent working-class interests better than, for instance, parties on 
the left, since they are determined by the social stratification of their members. 
Furthermore, trade unions are one of the most important vital resources for the 
workers' movement. With both these aspects, trade unions provide an excellent 
opportunity for research on the adoption of new politics by the labor movement.
Modern society is constantly changing. Structural, occupational, technological etc. 
changes ail have their impact on trade unions. Trade unions are obviously challenged 
by the expansion of white collar employment and individualized living and working 
conditions. These challenges imply changes in the working-class consciousness.
Even more important for the survival of the organization and the mobilization of 
workers, they create or can reveal latent heterogeneity, or even antagonism between 
particular groups of employees. The conflict on ecological issues may be a case in 
point for the general character of conflicts in post-industrial society. This conflict 
may create new tensions within the labor movement, or it may reinforce older 
cleavages.
I wish to focus on trade union policy in Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany 
over the last two decades. Both countries are highly interesting concerning their 
labor movement and environmental policy. Sweden enjoys a long social democratic 
tradition and is often taken as a case in point when it comes to the analysis of 
Western working-class policy. Some writers see in Swedish industrial relations and 
the favorable power position for the working-class the seed for a transition to a new 
kind of socialism. Analyzing Swedish trade union policy means looking at that 
Western capitalist country in which labor movement ideology is furthest developed, 
established and closest to societal transition. In the manner that this dissertation 
considers the major blue-collar and white-collar unions in Sweden, it hopes to give a 
more comprehensive picture of trade unions in modern society than analyses which 
concentrate on the coherence of the Swedish labor movement by focussing mainly 
on the blue-collar unions [2]. West Germany, on the other hand, is of special interest 
here because of its strength in new social movements, and the Green Party which 
has led the eco-ideological debate for more than one decade (see, e.g.: Brand (ed.), 
1985; Klandermans (ed.), 1989; Muller-Rommel (ed.), 1989; Dalton and Kuechler 
(ed.) 1990).
The analytical focus lies on the adoption of elements of new politics by trade unions 
in Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany. Elements of new politics are 
deduced from the literature on new politics. They are analytical concepts which build 
upon cognitive perceptions. These perceptions are expressed in political discourse 
and steer collective action (see, e.g: Touraine, 1988; Gamson, 1988; Snow et al., 
1986; Kitschelt, 1984; Lewin, 1984; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). Instead of 
focussing on a wide range of new politics issues, I decided to analyze the trade 
union debate on nuclear energy during the last two decades. Even if this issue has 
some special features which may distort conclusions referring to new politics in 
general, it provides a good account of the contradiction between economic and 
ecological interests. However, this way of reducing complexity opens the analysis for 
a specific bias of the issue. It would have been desirable to include further issues in 
the analysis, but this was impossible because of limited research resources. Although 
nuclear energy is the empirical subject of the analysis here, I am particularly 
interested in references made in the debate on nuclear energy which stress aspects 
of different attitudes concerning the development of society. It should be made clear 
that it is not the interest of this study to analyze the debate on nuclear energy itself 
[3] but rather to use this issue for conclusions concerning new politics in trade 
unions.
A special feature of this investigation is the concentration on organizational 
cognitions and communication. In fact, the dependent variable is operationalized at
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the semantic level. Often I even speak of organizational behavior when I actually 
mean organizational expressions at the congress or in trade union newspapers. 
Although verbal and written assertions are on a pre-action level, they may determine 
organizational action:
If a decision maker is heavily constrained to keep his assertions and actions consistent with each 
other, then he may not only monitor his assertions (to keep them sincere), but he may also monitor his 
actions (to keep them consistent with his assertions). To the extent that actions are monitored to keep 
them consistent with the assertions, the assertions themselves constrain action. Because in certain 
contexts actions and assertions can be mutually constraining, the use of suitable documentary material 
from which to derive a cognitive map promises to be fruitful in understanding not only the assertion 
themselves but also the actual choices of the decision maker. (Axelrod, 1976: 253)
Studies on social conflict stress the importance of collective symbolic struggles in 
modern society (Habermas, Touraine, Pizzorno, Gamson, etc.). Communication in 
organizations can be considered as the cement that holds organizations together and 
enables them to interact with the organizational environment (Rogers and Agarwala- 
Rogers, 1976). In order to grasp the organizational semantics, I apply a quantitative 
content analysis on congressional material and trade union newspapers over the time 
period from 1973 until 1989. As a frame of reference I use approaches of 
organization theory. Besides applying aspects of established organization theory 
(structural contingency), I also refer to organization theoretical approaches, which 
stress the importance of social processes instead of structure. These approaches 
(institutionalization, resource dependence, evolution and process theory) have 
increased in importance over the last decades. These approaches are particularly 
helpful in explaining social change. However, the analysis has been conducted in a 
manner that the individual trade unions remain in the focus of the analysis. In 
contrast to most quantitative analyses, I wish to avoid considering organizations just 
as suppliers of testable relations of variables. In order to achieve this aim, I orient my 
analysis on the logic of modern comparative method (Ragin, 1987).
I mainly use the data of a research project which I conducted at the departments of 
political science and sociology at the universities of Gothenburg (Sweden) and 
Paderborn (Germany) between 1988 and 1990. This investigation was made possible 
by research grants of the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research 
(ForskningsrSdsnSmnden) and a scholarship of the Swedish Institute. The German 
part of the empirical work was supported by the Ministry of Research and 
Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany [41.
The dissertation consists of six chapters. In the first chapter, I wish to outline the 
theoretical implication of social development in terms of new and old politics. This 
chapter should provide evidence that their is a new cleavage structure in society that
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adds to the already established cleavages. On this level, the role of trade unions will 
be discussed in the historical context of old and new politics. Chapter two serves to 
prepare and specify the empirical study of the content analysis of trade union 
newspapers and congress protocols. Elements of modern organization theory will be 
introduced and operationalized in analytical terms.
Part two consists of chapter three that describes the stands trade unions expressed 
on nuclear energy and new politics at the union congresses and in the trade union 
newspapers. This chapter documents the stands in a chronological manner. Since the 
analysis is conducted on a high aggregate level, I include a detailed appendix on the 
congressional expressions on new and productionist politics of all analyzed trade 
unions.
Part three addresses some special aspects which might influence the perception of 
new politics by trade unions. It is divided into three chapters which focus on 
organizational characteristics and the organizational environment. Chapter four 
analyzes the impact of organizational characteristics such as union membership, 
sector, and organizational structure. Chapter five summarizes some of the more 
central concepts of the alternative approaches of organization theory. The individual 
unions (nine German and eleven Swedish) are analyzed in respect of their 
organizational potential for new politics, the manner of the organizational 
communication and the intra-organizational conflicts between productionist and new 
politics. Chapter six, finally, refers to aspects outside the trade union organizations. 
Such aspects refer to the development of the national energy demand and the 
economy. In particular, socio-political aspects are given attention to. These aspects 
concern the socio-political importance of environmental questions and the status and 
character of new social movements and Green Parties in Sweden and Germany. 
Differences in party systems are also a major aspect of this chapter.
The analysis comes to the conclusion that Swedish and German unions are 
substantially different in their standpoints and behaviors concerning new politics. 
Structural aspects such as membership characteristics, organized sectors, etc. have 
less influence on union stands than expected. Cognitive processes are much more 
important. Particularly, the trade union ideology is responsible for the standpoints 
towards new politics.
The study focuses on the analysis of the period between 1973 through 1989. That 
means that trends in Germany resulting from the unification of the German 
Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany could not be taken into 
account. However, the analysis focuses on institutionalization processes which are
- 4 -
not easily changeable. Therefore the results of this study are also relevant for the 
future Germany.
- 5 -
Footnotes:
1 This finding is also confirmed by works on the other side of the Atlantic: see for instance 
Masters and Delaney, 1987.
2 Almost all studies that stress the extreme strength of the Swedish labor movement and trade 
unions take very little account of this fact. They analyze almost exclusively the blue collar trade unions 
in Sweden. This view is certainly not appropriate for the present analysis.
3 Studies on Swedish and German trade unions that focus more directly on the debate on nuclear 
energy are for instance: Micheletti, 1985; Siegmann, 1985; Grumbach, 1986.
4 I wish to thank the students who were employed in this project for the data collection: Gunilla 
Augustsson and Gunnel Vessman in Gothenburg and Doris Wilting, Stefany R. van Scoyk and Volker 
Eidchoff in Paderbom.
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PART ONE:
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS, APPROACH, AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Part one prepares the ground for the empirical analysis. First of all, the theoretical 
implications should be spelled out. In order to do that, I refer to the concept of new 
politics, interest representation, and political opportunity structure in social sciences. 
Most of the examples refer to the two countries under investigation: Sweden and 
Germany. Although these debates cannot be comprehensive, they should serve as an 
orientation and specify the focus of this analysis. Chapter one concentrates on the 
role of trade unions within the framework of new politics and interest representation. 
It is argued that trade unions have good reasons to be responsive to new politics but 
that they may have as many good reasons to ignore or oppose it.
Chapter two describes the analytical and empirical aspects of this investigation. 
Mainly referring to theories of organization and trade unions, the chapter outlines 
propositions for the empirical analysis. Furthermore, I operationalize the semantics of 
productionist and new politics, in order to apply it in a quantitative content analysis 
of congress material and trade union newspapers.

CHAPTER ONE:
TRADE UNIONS AND NEW POLITICS: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The starting point of this analysis has to do with the new social cleavage 11] around 
new and productionist politics that has emerged in most of the advanced Western 
societies in recent years. New politics is characterized by simultaneous stressing of 
(new) social issues such as environmental pollution, peace, participation right, etc., 
(new) modes of collective action like demonstrations, boycotts, spontaneity, etc., 
(new) values of self-realization, personal autonomy and identity, and new social 
actors that are young, highly educated, and rather distant from production, gathering 
in new social movements, and organizing in Green parties, etc. In political science, 
these aspects have enjoyed great attention in the last decade in the context of party 
research. However, there has already been a lengthy theoretical debate in sociology 
which may explain some of the roots of new politics. To this aspect, I will turn in the 
first section of this chapter. The second major element of the analysis focuses on 
organizations. Organizations are not only a subject of change but they create, stabi­
lize or change political processes in modern societies. They define to a large degree 
the political opportunity structure for social change in general, and new politics in 
particular. Therefore, the view at the organizational level is essential in order to 
understand the possibility for political change. However, since the investigation of all 
societal organizations is a huge task, I wish to concentrate on specific organizations: 
trade unions. Trade unions are one of the major organizations of the labor movement 
(beside left wing parties). The labor movement and its organizations started out to 
transform capitalist society. However, after more than one century since its emer­
gence the conflict between capital and labor has been institutionalized (Dahrendorf, 
1959; Touraine, 1971) and trade unions have been integrated into (neo-) corporative 
politics in many countries (Schmitter, 1974). Nevertheless, the labor movement pro­
claims to be a social progressive force in current society that strives for the impro­
vement of the material-living conditions for employees and for equality, emancipa­
tion, democracy, etc. If that is so then the question arises which place trade unions 
(and the labor movement) take within the new social conflict that is mainly promoted 
by other social actors such as new social movements (Touraine, 1988).
The last implication of this analysis takes it for granted that politics in general and 
organizational politics in particular is not a coherent result. There are a lot of compe­
ting views on different issues and within each societal unit (organization, state, 
society, etc.). Therefore, the interest here lies in the intra-organizational diversity of 
trade unions concerning new politics.
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1. THE FEATURE OF NEW POLITICS AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGE 
In a cross national study on 16 West-European countries, Lane and Ersson conclude: 
"The only traces of the emergence of new politics is found in the rise in the score for 
ecological and public sector issues." (Lane and Ersson, 1987: 272) [2] As we can 
also see from this study Sweden and West Germany score among those nations in 
which ecology issues play an important role. For these countries new politics have 
become a reality [3]. Although my investigation is an empirical study on trade union 
policy, the thesis is drawn from theoretical debates on new social conflicts which 
have increased in importance during the last decades and which certainly do not 
have their roots in the analysis of the labor movement. One can trace this tradition 
back to the works elaborating on the term post-industrial society. Daniel Bell (1973 
and 1976) and Alain Touraine (1971) use this notion in a quite different manner. The 
former, from a more conservative standpoint, analyzes the structural shifts in the 
economic system of society from goods production towards service production, the 
predominance of professional and technical classes, the primacy of theoretical 
knowledge, and planning of technology. These changes have fundamental conse­
quences for the social and cultural system. Bell (1976) evaluates the cultural out­
come as boundless entitlementarism or even hedonism. However, Bell postulates 
great changes and problems for trade unions through theses changes (Bell, 1972). 
Alain Touraine interprets the consequences of the structural changes in post-indu- 
strial society in another light. He goes along with Bell in the sense that he views 
knowledge and education as dominant resources of post-industrial society, but, in 
addition, he identifies the new social conflict among certain social actors: after the 
traditional class antagonism has weakened (because of the dissolution of determined 
life situations, the institutionalization of class conflict, and the ideological function of 
economic growth), there arises a new social cleavage between bureaucrats and 
technocrats who promote production and economic growth, on the one hand, and 
parts of the population that wishes to defend their individual and collective identity, 
on the other. Instead of exploitation (conflict between labor and capital), alienation is- 
the crucial factor for a countervailing identity. Already in the late 1960s, Touraine 
labels the actors of social change by their occupational status: employees in large 
service organizations, academics, engineers, technicians, and scientists. In later 
works, Touraine et ai. (1983) sees in the anti-nuclear movement the actor of social 
change (i.e. the collective entity in which the heterogeneous "anti" groups meet).
Like other French observers of the labor movement (Gorz, 1982), he dismisses the 
working-class as actor for social transition.
Jurgen Habermas (1973) analyzes social crises in late capitalism. In his elaborated 
concept of the development of capitalism, he concludes that a system crisis will o n l^
be perceived as such, when it goes along with a crisis of people's identity [4]. Later, 
Habermas (1981) elaborates his reflection on late capitalism in his analysis of the 
social development of modernity, when he speaks of the eroding of normative ele­
ments by formalized principles. He describes in detail this dynamic process as the 
colonization of the 'life world' by the 'system' [5]. The latter principle prevails and 
penetrates in more and more life areas. This social process has been supported by 
both labor and capital, and is inherent in socialist and bourgeois ideology. Habermas 
identifies the social conflicts in modern societies at the link between system and life 
world. As Habermas puts it, the new social conflicts do not revolve around distribu­
tion problems but rather around questions of the grammar of life styles. These con­
flicts, according to Habermas, occur in the area of cultural reproduction and they are 
not channelled by parties and associations (Habermas, 1981: 576; Habermas, 1973; 
see also Berger et al. 1973 for similar arguments). Habermas goes even further and 
postulates that the ideology of both the Left and the Right have no social utopia to 
offer anymore. That leads him to the conclusion of a 'New Obscurity' and 'the 
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies' (Habermas, 1986).
In this context, the concept of post-modern society as a complement of post-indu­
strial society enjoys an increasing attention in social sciences. Ulrich Beck attempts 
to fill the prefix "post” with meaning (Beck, 1986: 12; Beck, 1987). He presents an 
inspiriting concept of social development in terms of Risikogesellschaft (risk society). 
The basic point in his argumentation is the changing character of risks: in the 19th 
century risks were associated with certain social groups, and risks were locally and 
socially limited. In present risk society, however, risks are global. The production of 
wealth implies as a by-product the creation of risk. Risks, in this analysis, are histori­
cal products of social action and of certain actors in the industrial society (above all 
capitalist and the working-class!). Risks receive a social quality in modern societies 
and accidents cannot be avoided in the long run (Perrow, 1984). Beck points out 
that risks in modern society cannot be limited in place, time, and to social groups 
(see also Kuechler and Dalton, 1990: 281).
Since risks and even ecological catastrophes often cannot directly be perceived by 
human senses (such as radioactivity, acid rain, ozone hole), the personal effec­
tiveness is based on personal conviction. Fear [6] is a basic concept in this analysis 
which even has the power of creating a solidarity of otherwise individualized mem­
bers of society (7]. The special cleavage of a risk society divides into winners of 
risks and losers of risks. This is a cleavage between sectors, branches, firms, 
regions, and even nations. Higher productivity of one actor results more or less 
directly in disadvantages for another. For instance, the higher production of one 
industry increases the pollution in one region and directly aggravates the living
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quality that might be important for other industries in this region (tourism, housing, 
etc.). Often these conflicts cannot clearly be identified, since there might be a time 
lag or the actor causing the worsening situation is not to be made out (e.g. too 
many, too far away). The cleavage cuts across otherwise coherent social units. For 
instance, it sets capital against capital, branches against branches, sectors against 
sectors, and firms against firms. The new cleavage does not halt for the labor 
movement: it sets labor against labor and also unions against unions. Ulrich Beck 
summarizes the dilemma of modern society: the minimization of conflict through 
economic growth is eroded by the intensification of conflict through an increase in 
endangerment (Beck, 1988: 239). In this sense, one may speak of a politicization of 
industrial production (Kitschelt, 1985; Beck, 1986: 300-74).
The fact that unions compete against each other is not a new phenomenon. There 
were always conflicts among unions to organize the same kind of employees, etc. 
However, these traditional conflicts could be overcome by arrangements among the 
unions. The new cleavage between unions has another quality: the advantage for 
one union (or its membership) is simultaneously the disadvantage for another. A 
similar conflict may be seen in the international trade union movement. National 
unions are not sufficiently able to limit the international competition among labor. 
Self-restrain of wages, or the relinquishment of environmental protection is often 
justified by the competitive situation of the world market. This often stops unions 
from claiming reasonable demands such as shorter working-hours, balancing of pro­
ductivity, and environmental friendly production.
In an empirical study, Stephen Cotgrove and Andrew Duff (1980; 1981) compare 
environmentalists, industrialists, trade unionists and the public, and they demonstrate 
that trade unionists differ considerably in their preference for productionist aspects 
from the public and environmentalists. The authors see in the environmentalists a 
form of middle-class radicalism that is an expression of a "counter-paradigm" to the 
development of economic growth oriented industrial development:
Environmentalists are opposed not simply to the way industrial societies go about achieving the goal of 
wealth creation: they are opposed to its central and dominant economic and material values. ... The 
goal of environmentalists is to realize a society in which alternative values and institutions can take 
root. Post-material values are the values which they want to see made real in some future utopia. 
(Cotgrove and Duff, 1981: 99)
Most theoretical studies of social change in the field of new politics stress the impor­
tance of two aspects: first, that the new social cleavage is intermediated by compe­
ting world views and, secondly, that collective identity determines these world views 
(see for instance the works by Touraine, Melucci, Pizzorno, Bourdieu, Gamson). 
Bourdieu (1987) stresses the importance of the making of a social class by daily
- 10-
social actions which in turn is a condition for social power that is translated into poli­
tics by mediating interest groups [8].
New politics can be placed on a dimension that competes with the traditional 
left/right dimension between labor and capital. This new dimension may be called 
ecology versus growth dimension (Vedung, 1980) or technology/ecology dimension 
(Korpi, 1980: 16 and 1983: 142-52; see also: Petersson, 1979: 174). I wish to use 
in the following the terms new versus productionist politics.
On the semantic level, new politics consist of values that favor a decentralized and 
small-scale organization of society, and opposes the aims of established work-orien- 
ted politics. Human aspects, the defence of alternative life-styles and the protection 
of the environment have a higher priority than the improvement of material-living 
conditions. In particular, economic growth and technical progress are the negative 
symbols of productionist politics. Productionist politics consists of "industrial values" 
and the belief in work, in man's power over nature, in austerity and moral rigor, in 
progress, and in the link between industrialization and social and moral liberation 
(Touraine, 1987; 1988; Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990).
Although the new/productionist political dimension does not replace the left/right 
dimension, it adds to the old political conflict and increases in importance. As the 
research on social cleavage structures indicates, it cannot be the point to stress 
keenly that one dimension dominates over the other [9]. More interesting is the fact 
that different cleavages are always relevant which erode or counteract against al­
liances on other cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Kitschelt, 1985).
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2. INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN MODERN SOCIETY
In the first section, I attempted to outline the social cleavage between new and pro­
ductionist politics. Now I wish to look at the societal reaction to this cleavage. One 
may argue that society will not react to the environmental issues at all. Niklas 
Luhmann (1986: 40-50 and 218-26), for example, points out that social systems can 
only react to environmental stimuli according to the mode they perceive the world 
(codes). He uses the term resonance for further clarification. There may be reasons 
why systems cannot deal with new problems: there might be too little resonance, i.e. 
the problem as such is not important enough for the social system to consider or 
does not fit into the available codes of the system. On the other hand, there may be 
too many resonance, i.e. the problem demands too much or fast adaptations etc. 
from the system. After looking at the codes of relevant social sub-systems
(economy, law, science, politics, religion, and education), he concludes that modern 
society cannot react to the ecological challenge within the framework of established 
codes. In contrast to Luhmann, one might argue that normative elements are more 
receptive for irrational aspects and that these life-world elements may erode rational 
elements (Berger, 1982, see also Gotsch, 1987 for a critical review of the literature).
In modern society, organizations play a decisive role in how society develops. They 
create, stabilize and change social and political processes in modern society [10]. As 
Charles Perrow puts it at the end of his book on complex organizations:
... it is through organizations (...) that classes are constituted and reproduced, stratification systems 
created and stabilized (and changed in some cases), political processes tamed and guided, and culture 
itself shaped and molded. (Perrow, 1986: 278)
Although the social development leaves room for more or less unpredictable power 
struggles, it is important to specify which standpoints social organizations take on 
ideas about the societal development in general and on controversial issues in parti­
cular. However, this assumption does not exclude that impacts for social change can 
come from other sources (e.g. social movements, charismatic leaders, catastrophes). 
But even in these cases, the social impacts on practical politics are filtered by organi­
zations.
In modern society, the interest representation of capital, labor and the state have a 
prominent place. This is the premises of neo-corporatism (e.g.: Schmitter, 1974; 
Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979; Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982). Empirical studies 
confirm the importance of interest organizations for the countries under investigation 
here. In his analysis of "democratic corporatism” in small states where Sweden is 
one object of investigation Peter Katzenstein points out: "Politics is of great impor­
tance, but it is important within interest groups, determining which issues get on the 
public agenda and setting the parameters of political choice.” (Katzenstein, 1985:
33; in the context of energy policy see also Sahr, 1985: 173-75) And more specific 
he notes for West Germany:
West Germany's political economy is founded on political inclusion of business and unions as well as 
conservative and progressive political parties. The Federal Republic favors the principle of market com­
petition and international trade. The country's postwar experience, moreover, illustrates why democra­
tic corporatism need not necessarily be considered anathema by Social Democrats who associate all 
corporatism with the repression or exclusion of labor. West Germany comes closer than any other 
large industrial state to the logic by which political life in the small European states is organized. [
(Katzenstein, 1985: 31; added italics D.J.)
However, Claus Offe analyses the consequences of the attribution of public status to 
interest organizations in detail. I would like to illuminate two aspects in this context: [
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first, the interest representation in corporatist societies is conducted by the most 
powerful interest groups that settle their conflicts at the expense of social categories 
(groups and issues) that are poorly organized (Offe, 1981: 128/9). In this context, it 
is important to be aware of two functions of the corporative politics:
The advantage of corporatist modes of interest representation over democratic representative ones re­
sides in the potential of the former for depotiticizing conflict, that is, in restricting both the scope of the 
participants in conflict and the scope of strategies and tactics that are permitted in the pursuit of con­
flicting interests. (Offe, 1981: 141)
Second, as will be described in more detail for trade unions below, economic growth 
obtained a crucial status for de-politicization. Economic growth served as an ever 
growing pie from which capital and labor obtain ever bigger pieces.
Both sides [capital and labor; D.J.] have an interest in continuous economic growth, one, because it is 
the precondition for capital accumulation, and the other, because it is a requirement for successful 
interest representation. ... both employers and unions have a common interest in the preservation of 
the capitalist mode of production, the former for obvious reasons and the latter because that mode of 
production is the basis for their organizational existence, and with its transformation their fate would 
be uncertain or they would become superfluous altogether. (Erd and Scherrer, 1985: 120)
In this way, economic growth served indirectly other societal goals such as employ­
ment, monetary stability, demand stimulation, and even social equity (Schmitter, 
1988: 503). Both capital and labor could win in this game. However, Philippe 
Schmitter (1989: 70) sees in the fact "... that the substantive content of interest 
conflicts (and, hence, an important measure of policy attention) has shifted away 
from class-based lines of cleavage towards a panoply of discrete issues focusing on 
consumer protection, quality of life, gender, environment, ethical and other problems, 
each with their respective movements" the main reasons why there may be no return 
to corporatism in the form as we have known it. The growing protest against the 
corporative compromise from outside the "growth coalition" is best described by the 
politicization of industrial production (11]. Josef Esser gives empirical evidence that 
German trade unions perceive membership interest selectively according to the 
achievement orientation in the tradition of "economic and technological progress 
fetishism" (Esser, 1982: 264/5). For the German unions, he concludes that the poli­
tics of trade unions lead to a fragmentation of the working-class between privileged 
groups such as male, industrial workers in stable employment positions in the 
primary industry sector, on the one hand, and women, foreigners, and other under­
privileged occupational groups in the secondary industrial sector and those without 
work, on the other (see also: Offe, 1985e). Furthermore, he postulates the incapacity 
of integrating and channelling interests which are caused by social structural mobil­
ity, new social movements, etc. into the established political system (Esser, 1982:
47). A common pattern for this development is that trade unions' concentration on
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material aspects above all wage policy (or other easily quantifiable issues) by simul­
taneous neglecting of societal political issues.
The second aspect stressed by Perrow is that organizations reproduce classes. How­
ever, there are several studies that indicate that the labor organizations tend to 
change their ideological core and the mission of the labor movement. In his classic 
study of the "iron law of oligarchy", Robert Michels demonstrates how secondary, 
organizational goals replace the mission of the labor movement and Lenin criticizes 
the defensive productionist "trade unionist" character of the labor movement. Alain 
Touraine and co-workers elaborate on the role of trade unions in present society. In 
their analysts of the labor movement they divide analytically the development of the 
workers' movement, on the one hand, and the trade union organization, on the 
other. The former lost its mission while the latter could establish themselves as 
formal organizations in society:
Unions may remain important, but what appears to have declined permanently is the "labor movement* 
as such - the capacity of organized labor to challenge the system of social and economic organization. 
Trade unionism was, at a given time, a social movement; it is now a political force that is necessarily 
subordinated to political parties and to governments because it tends to defend specific interests... 
Gone is the link between unions and alternative images of a reconstructed society. (Touraine, 1986: 
172-3)
The described process is best seen in its historical development. In order to clarify 
this process for trade unions, I wish to place them within the conceptual framework 
of 'old ' and 'new ' politics or paradigms..
3. TRADE UNIONS IN OLD AND NEW POLITICS
'Old politics' and 'old paradigm' are terms which describe the established mode of 
political performance. The former term emphasizes the social cleavage of established 
politics, the antagonism of working-class and bourgeoisie or the left-right dimension 
(Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Hildebrandt and Dalton, 1979). The latter term refers to a 
comprehensive model of what politics is about: the social base of actors, issues, 
concerns, values and mode of action such as power and distribution relations 
(Raschke, 1980; Offe, 1985c). Old and new politics are concepts that refer to 
historical periods but as mentioned above also to semantic forms, social actors, 
issues, concerns and values, and modes of action. In this section, I wish to stress 
the historical aspect in more detail. This is important because interest groups of old 
politics are still the most important groups in present society (Micheletti, 1989). They 
transfer their values and attitudes of the period of their formation [12] on issues and 
ideologies of the present time.
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Old politics and trade union policy: from antagonism to consensus 
There are two periods within the framework of old politics (Sabel, 1981). The first 
apparently extends from about the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of 
the twentieth. This was the time of the formation of the trade unions' "new collec­
tive identity" {Pizzorno, 1978):
During this early period of capitalism, the division of labor was such that work relations bound workers 
together on the job and fused their relations at work with their lives at home. Work thus gave rise to 
an all-embracing community. Implicit in the idea of community is the idea of solidarity; and the institu­
tional face of solidarity in a working community was the trade union. In this period, membership in 
trade unions was thus more a sign of a particular social identity than the result of a calculation of 
expected economic benefits. The leaders of these organizations were not plagued by the free-rider pro­
blem, because paying dues was a moral obligation, not an investment. (Sabel, 1981: 224)
%
In this first period of old politics, there was a well-defined antagonism between the 
social actors: capital and labor. With the exception of Luddism, both classes believed 
in social progress through technical progress. "Class conscious workers", Alain 
Touraine (1986: 152) notes, "accept the basis cultural values of an industrial society 
(such as belief in progress through improved industrial productivity) but see them­
selves as victims of the social control of economic activities." This conviction consti­
tuted the normative ground of the post war consensus, the second period of old 
politics [13].
Economic progress subverted the workers' commitment to the union. The normative 
ties of the membership to the organization were replaced by instrumental ones and 
the gap opened between specific organization self-interests and membership interests 
(Pizzorno, 1978). This development was determined by socio-structural changes 
such as social mobility, which resulted in the dissolving of the traditional working- 
class milieu (Mooser, 1984; P.A. Berger 1986; Lindhagen and Nilsson, 1970). One 
measurement of the trade unions' ability to insure organizational strength and survi­
val in this situation was the formation of alliances with capital. In this period, con­
sensus politics and economic growth obtained an ideological status (Sabel 1981: 
209). This was the unquestioned prerequisite for social welfare. Capital and labor 
formed an alliance whereby "... capitalism as a growth machine was completed by 
organized labor as a distribution and security machine." (Offe, 1985c: 822)
In this logic, trade unions can be analyzed as intermediary organizations (see also 
chapter two). Walther Muller-Jentsch (1985; 1988) traces the historical lines of the 
evolution from 'classical' to 'intermediary' unions. The classical union emphasizes 
the role of unions as a social movement and expression of the socio-economic inter­
ests of their members. The struggle within the wage system and against the capita-
list order were the main points of reference. To consider trade unions as intermediary 
organizations takes account of changes which took place in the second period of old 
politics. Unions' "... politics are the result of the pragmatic resolution of differences 
between interests of capital on the one hand and labour on the other”. (Muller- 
Jentsch, 1985: 4; for some empirical developments along these lines see for 
Sweden: Fulcher, 1988: 131; for West Germany: Bergmann et al., 1976; Esser, 
1982). This pragmatic resolution of differences between the interests of capital and 
labor had fundamental consequences for trade unions as organizations. The formula­
tion of interest shifted from antagonistic class interest towards general and compati­
ble interests with the capitalist system (general welfare expectations and growth of 
profits through economic growth politics).
Since solidarity has faded, latent interest-diversity among the members could not be 
counteracted by an appeal on common normative grounds. In this way, the de­
coupling of industrial values from the ideology of class antagonism and class struggle 
during the consensus policy made the heterogeneity of the working-class become 
acute. The heterogeneity consists of sectoral, industrial, even non-work oriented 
interests and resulted in organizational weakness:
Under the influence of growing heterogeneity, or even antagonism between the interests of particular, 
increasingly differentiated groups of employees (resulting from cultural, economic and organizational 
processes of differentiation), the chances of realizing employee interest will lessen to the degree that 
the level of effective solidarity among the membership base shrinks, that is, in so far as these tenden­
cies toward differentiation and division cannot be successfully counteracted. (Offe, 1985b: 164)
The replacement of normative ties by instrumental ties makes the labor movement 
and its organizations vulnerable to the ”free-rider” problem (Olson, 1965). Further­
more, and more important fo the investigation here, are the organizational and ideo­
logical problems resulting from social developments which challenge the economic 
growth consensus, on the one hand, and from movements and developments which 
are able to activate and mobilize "normative" resources, on the other [14]. Both con­
ditions are present in the period of new politics.
New politics and trade union policy: the challenge of economic growth consensus 
New politics can be best understood by the use of the concept of the new paradigm, j
Joachim Raschke (1980) speaks of the emergence of the paradigm of "way of life" j
or "mode of life” (Offe, 1985c). He identifies new actors, issues, values, and modes 
of action. I wish to concentrate on the semantics of new politics. New politics 
opposes centralized control, bureaucratization, regulation, and the priority of econo- i 
mic growth, etc. Autonomy and the free development of identity are values that are -i 
important. The "new” values of self-realization, autonomy and identity are not in 1
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themselves new, but they are given a different urgency and priority {Offe, 1985c: 
829). The empirical study by Cotgrove and Duff may clarify the point. They distin­
guish four dimensions: wealth creation versus limit of growth, authority versus parti­
cipation, markets versus non-markets, individual versus collective. Environmentalists 
and trade unionists more or less go along with the authority/participation and 
market/non-market dimension. The fundamental differences, however, are on wealth 
creation/limits of growth dimension, especially concerning economic growth, and on 
the individual/collective dimension. For instance, two percent of the environ­
mentalists give high priority to economic growth as opposed to 44 percent of trade 
unionists (46 percent of the public) [15]. Trade unionists go along with industrialists 
on economic growth questions, but on the dimension of "individual versus collective 
ideals" the public attitudes are closer to those of environmentalists than to the 
opinion of trade unionists. This result indicates the problem faced by trade unionist 
who take a stand together with industrialists on productionist issues against 
environmentalists, but take a stand against industrialists on other dimensions. New 
social movements, as a representative example of new politics, are most distin­
guished from other social actors because of their ideological stand (Melucci, 1989: 
38-57; Offe, 1990; Kuechler and Dalton, 1990: 278-82) [16].
New social movements reject the major cultural values of industrial society with 
which the workers' movement is still largely identified. In particular, the challenge of 
the economic growth consensus between labor and capital by the new social 
movements erodes the established modes of interest representation in modern 
society (Offe, 1985c). Even if trade unions and the labor movement do not belong to 
the actor of social change in respect to new politics, they can hinder or promote 
social change in the way how both movements cooperate with each other:
The workers' movement can provide the nascent social campaigns with the image of a social 
movement, and in so doing can help them develop and discover their own identities. (Touraine et al., 
1987: 294)
4. TRADE UNIONS AND THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
Because of the status of trade unions as both a relevant political actor in the system 
of interest representation and of belonging to the labor movement, trade unions are 
part o f the political opportunity structure for political issues in general and environ­
mental questions in particular [17]. The reaction of traditional political actors may be 
classified either as an absorption or exclusion of new political movements 
(Nedelmann, 1984: 1040-44). More appropriate, however, is to shift the level of 
analysis from social actors towards semantics and meanings (Eyerman and Jamison, 
1991). This perception of social processes comes close to Melucci's approach that
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focuses on collective identities, which in turn are not coherent, but results from a 
permanent negotiation process. By doing so, we can overcome the static dichotomy 
of absorption and exclusion and analyze more thoroughly the subtle intra-organiza- 
tional changes within both movements. Most recently, research on new social 
movements stress the importance of the social context: "Social movements organi­
zations develop out of existing networks of organizations which are necessary both 
to generate and to maintain them." (Klandermans, 1990: 123). And the impact and 
identity of collective actors can be supportive or opposing. The labor movement is a 
particularly important actor in this context (Tarrow, 1990).
As I have outlined above, economic growth and technological progress have been 
defined as a desired social outcome because they may satisfy the (material) needs of 
the members of society. In this way, technology itself has been perceived as politi­
cally neutral. An often stated argument is that decisions cannot be taken against the 
"natural power of technology". On the other hand, scientific judgement has often 
replaced political assessment which Habermas (1971) refers to as the 'scientisation 
of politics'. However, it is most likely that technological decisions are always connec­
ted to interests of certain societal groups. Therefore, it is fruitful to consider the poli­
tical opportunity structure as determining the power of definition of political relevant 
issues. Beck (1988: 211-226) sees in the definition relations (in contrast to produc­
tion relations) the crucial arena of political struggle in modern society (18].
Definition relation may fluctuate with changes in perception of relevant political 
actors. The conditions for change may be objective, such as structural changes, or 
subjective, such as changes of values. The incentives for change can come from 
outside but also from inside the organization. However, the basic point for changes 
in the definition relations is a social struggle of relevant political actors: "Sustained 
collective action involves a symbolic struggle.” (Gamson, 1988: 219)
The Potential for Political Alliances
The description of the new social cleavage and the status of unions in society sug­
gests that the response of unions can range from neglect to rejection to adoption of 
elements of new politics. The cultural heritage of union origin leads to the conclusion 
that trade unions are rather reluctant to cope with new politics. However, changes in 
the occupational structure and the aspiration of being part of an innovative social 
progressive force may facilitate the openness of trade unions to new politics 
(Cotgrove, 1982: 112-4). Furthermore, the labor movement does not act in isolation 
but is dependent upon alliances with other societal actors. Hypothetically, there are 
two alliances possible for the labor movement. I wish to refer to Claus Offe's model:
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Figure 1-1.: A Triangular Model of Political Cleavages anci 
Potential A lliances
NEW SOCIA^ MOVEMENTS AND ALLIED POLITICAL PARTIES
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We are here interested in the alliances of the labor movement with elements of the 
new social movements (alliance III) and with the conservative-liberal right (alliance II). 
As suggested by Michael Minckenberg and Ronald Inglehart (1989: 90), alliance III 
may be labelled as new politics and alliance II as old politics. In Sweden, the "red- 
green" alliance between the agrarian Center Party and the labor movement is a form 
of alliance II. This alliance realized the Swedish welfare state of today (Esping- 
Andersen, 1985). In West Germany, the party coalition (alliance II) of Social 
Democracy was based on Liberals (Katzenstein, 1987: 35-45). In both countries, this 
era seems to be at an end and new or redefined alliances are needed. The new 
middle strata are crucial for the future of the labor movements:
... the social democratic road to power will depend almost entirely on the chances of a coalition with 
the white-collar middle strata. (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 38)
Gdsta Esping-Andersen analyzes the new class alliances on the terrain of Social 
Democratic policy. My investigation focuses on the potential alliances of the labor 
movement on the ground of new politics. An alliance between the traditional left and 
elements of the traditional right would stress the importance of wealth creation by 
the mean of economic growth and social welfare. It is - more or less - a continuation 
of the "growth coalition". Its policy would aim to actively de-politicalize the concerns 
of new social movements, point out their illegal status, and irresponsibility and ir­
rationality. Environmental protection and new energy resources would be seen as 
possibilities for high-technology growth industries. Paradigmatic changes and sub­
stantial claims of changing the industrial development in the sense of the 'old para­
digm' would be neglected, marginalized, and forced to be articulated outside the 
institutional way of politics. In this alliance the new social movement represents a 
threat to well-known and popular political procedures and habits.
An alliance between elements of the traditional left and elements of new social 
movements would build on the left-orientation of some new middle class elements:
Thus, a highly ‘ modem" social democratic party may hope to compensate for the losses resulting from 
its weakening roots in the working class by establishing links with the new middle class constituency 
of the new social movements.... such an electoral realignment is not easy to accomplish unless very 
basic changes in the strategic priorities of social democratic parties are adopted, changes which would 
reconcile the interests of the industrial working class and unions, on the one side, and, on the other, 
the concerns of the new middle class movements (including parts of the "peripheral" clientele of new 
middle class human service professions) on a strategic (rather than tactical, electoral, and ad hoc) 
level. (Offe, 1985c: 865)
There are two driving forces for this alliances: first, the new middle class elements 
within the labor movement which has increased in the post war period could support 
this alliance. Second, this alliance could also revitalize the dying ideological sources 
of a left utopia (Habermas, 1986) by means of a "transfusion of new blood” from the 
new social movements. However, there are also a lot of reasons to avoid this 
alliance. For instance, the economic crisis may lead to concentrate more on "bread 
and butter" issues like economic growth. In fact, alliance III would mean to slip out 
of the "growth coalition” and endanger political successes of the past.[19]
Trade unions may not respond coherently to the challenge of new politics. Partly 
they are responsive, partly they look for other alliances in society. The form of this 
diversity reveals cleavages within trade unions along the new cleavage line. How­
ever, even if this process appears to be new, it may revitalize old conflicting 
positions within trade unions [20].
Interest Diversity and Trade Union Unity [21]
Increasing heterogeneity deprives unions (and all other intermediary organizations) of 
the resources for mechanic solidarity upon which grounds it is possible to reach 
organic solidarity for the organization (Streeck, 1987: 477). With the "extinction of 
the regular customers" (das Aussterben des Stammkunden) as Streeck (1987: 474) 
puts it the latent conflicts among employees become acute. This is especially the 
case if there are new actors who can formulate an alternative ideology and utopia for | 
social development and by doing so threaten and compete with old and disillu­
sionized ideologies (Rammstedt, 1981).
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Being responsive to the elements of new politics may lead to intra organizational ten­
sion in trade unions. Amatai Etzioni considers the position of the labor movement as 
advantageous, when he sees the possibility of de-coupling productionist and non- 
productionist aspects by the division of labor (organization of interest) by trade 
unions and left parties:
We may say that the compliance division between party and union allows the labor movement as a 
whole to maintain the commitments of three types of members: those who are more oriented to the 
asacreda (or normative) side will be more attracted to the party (e.g. non-working population groups 
such as teenagers, the aged; intellectuals); those who are more 'profane* (or calculativo) in their orien­
tation will be more attracted to the unions (e.g., the majority of blue-collar workers); and those who 
wish to fulfill both psychological needs in the labor movement but do not wish to mix the sacred with 
the profane can also be satisfied, through both organizations. (Etzioni, 1975: 424/5) (22]
Etzioni concedes that unions have also to combine normative and calculative aspects 
but certainly he underestimates the conflicts which may emerge out of competing 
demands of "profane" and "sacred" needs. Although Etzioni puts a lot of effort into 
analyzing the tension between utilitarian and normative aspects, he never raises the 
question what would happen if both factors conflict in an antagonistic manner. That 
is to say, when sacred and profane interests exclude each other as it is the case in 
the new cleavage structure.
One cleavage that may be reinforced through the new cleavage is the one between 
blue collar workers and white collar workers. Colin Crouch expects three different 
developments among Western European unions in this context. He summarizes the 
succeeding problems of the expansion of white collar workers for the labor 
movement as follows:
”... there are three possibilities (here): (a) in those countries where unions fail to recruit an increasing 
proportion of the new work force, they will be better able to retain their old sense of direction, but will 
represent a declining minority of the work force; (b) where the new categories join unions but in sepa­
rate white-collar or professional confederations, as in Scandinavia, the old social democratic compo­
nent of organized labour will gradually cede dominance to ‘bourgeois’ or non-partisan unions; or (c) in 
those countries where manual and non-manual workers are successfully organized within the same 
confederation (i.e. Austria, the UK and increasingly West Germany), the main confederation themselves 
will be vulnerable to change in character." (Crouch 1986: 6/7)
Another similar cleavage line that may be reinforced is the one between the private 
and public sectors. The private, competitive sector may be more in favor of produc­
tionist politics whereas in the sheltered public sector some sympathy for new politics 
may arise.
Furthermore, the new cleavage can reinforce and create ideological cleavages be­
tween the unions. As I have argued above, productionist politics is often associated 
with class compromises between labor and capital. This compromises have often
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been criticized within the labor movement. In this sense, there can arise a conflict 
between - let us call them - "radical unions" and "moderate unions".
The new cleavage line may also imply qualitatively new conflicts within the union 
movement. First, groups of employees take a stand on issues which are not at all 
relevant for their own work area, but which they feel concern their living conditions. 
Second, unions which are by no means involved in the issue become obliged to take 
a stand on it, e.g. teachers' unions are obliged to take a stand on nuclear power 
questions. Third, union policy becomes obstructed by unions of other sectors, e.g. 
unions which organize nuclear power plant workers are criticized by service sector 
unions and vica versa. Fourth, central confederations, and even boards of some 
single unions, have to compromise on this conflict and cannot rely on a separation of 
tasks according to sectors and occupations. They are placed in the center of the 
conflict.
In its plainest form, the new cleavage line can create a new dividing line within the 
trade union movement between "new politics union" and "productionist unions". 
Empirically speaking, a mixture of established cleavages and additional aspects of the 
new cleavage may modify the policy of the trade unions. In the future, the new 
social cleavage can increase in importance for trade unions because of two factors. 
First, ecological problems become more and more obvious and catastrophes will hap­
pen in the future (Perrow, 1984). These accidences may vitalize elements of new 
politics. Second, the groups who value elements of new politics more highly increase 
in numbers and the more committed core of the working-class (blue collar workers) 
will decline in numbers. This development has fundamental consequences for the 
content and form of trade union policy in the future (Schmidman, 1979; Visser,
1990: 207).
5. CONCLUSION
In highly industrialized societies, a new cleavage has emerged that cuts across esta­
blished organizations and political alliances. However, it is difficult to estimate 
whether or not society can respond to the challenge of new politics. Trade unions 
are one of the important actors of the institutionalized system of interest represen­
tation. Although the historical development of the labor movement gives little hope 
that unions may respond to new politics, there are also other indicators that unions 
may be open to new politics. In particular, changes in the occupational structure and 
the search for new alliances speak for the latter possibility.
- 22 -
The interest of this analysis is whether and how trade unions take up the issues and 
semantics of new politics. It is particularly interesting which stand the labor 
movement in form of trade unions takes in this conflict, since its role may have shif­
ted from the actor of change to an object of change. Another interest lies in the que­
stion whether the change of new and productionist politics leads to intra-organiza- 
tional conflicts within the labor movement. Trade unions are well suited for the 
analysis of cleavages within the labor movement because they are determined by 
social stratification of their members (Korpi, 1978).
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The new social cleavage may create conflicts within trade unions which may run 
along the lines of their membership, societal coalitions, and ideological standpoints. 
As always in social research, these organizational factors may be altered by socio­
cultural, political, economic, and situational factors. The question which of these fac­
tors play a decisive role is an empirical one.
Footnotes:
1 Different cleavages are always relevant and erode or counteract against alliances on another 
cleavage line (Upset and Rokkan, 1967; Kitschelt 1985). Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersaon define clea­
vages:
A cleavage is a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups or organizations 
among whom conflicts arise. The concept of cleavage is thus not identical with the concept 
of conflict; cleavages may lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by 
conflict. (Lane and Ersson, 1987: 39)
The authors also stress the importance of distinguishing between latent and manifest cleavages. This 
distinction is important in order not to perceive cleavages as either dominant or absent. Seymour Upset 
and Stein Rokkan in their classic study emphasize the historical aspect of cleavage structures. They, 
too, stress the importance of different cleavages (center-periphery, state-church, land-industry, and 
owner-worker). However, they may change in importance over time (Upset and Rokkan, 1967: 6). 
According to this view the present analysis looks at the interplay among both the left/right and the 
ecolpgy/growth cleavages as other investigations stress other conflicts such as the relevance of the 
religious cleavage in the union movement, etc. For the Western party systems Upset and Rokkan 
(1967: 46) note that *... the interaction of the ‘ center-periphery,* state-church, and land-industry 
cleavage tended to produce much more marked, and apparently much more stubborn, differences 
among the national party systems than any of the cleavages brought about through the rise of the 
working-class movements. That means that old cleavages have fundamental impacts on current social 
conflicts. For instance, the ecology/growth cleavage • or as I will call it here the new/productionist poli­
tics cleavage - is strongly debated in terms and ideologies of older cleavages.
2 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson employ two different techniques in order to identify major 
issues. On the one hand, they check what various newspapers have focussed on in Keesings Contem­
porary Archives. This indicator has as a target public opinion activities. On the other hand, they iden­
tify those decisions in parliament that have or could have been the cause of shifts in government or in 
coalition patterns according to national specialists (Lane and Ersson, 1987: 255-276, and 359). In 
particular in Sweden, West Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Norway, and Switzerland the ecological 
issue (nuclear energy, pollution, zero-growth politics) plays a dominant role. Furthermore, they find out 
that the ecology ana public sector issues are highly correlated to each other (Pearson's r = .62; p.
273, table 8.1) and as the only issues are positively related to affluence (ecology: r *  .75, and public 
sector: r = .45; p. 275 and table 8.2).
3 The major empirical and analytical contribution in the research of new politics stem from Ronald 
Inolehart (1977) who has conducted surveys in Western societies for more than the last two decades 
which indicate a value change from material towards post-materialist values. Also studies on political 
form and participation indicate a change of participation patterns (Barnes and Kaase, (ed.) 1979; 
Hildebrandt and Dalton, 1979) or even the political culture of Western societies (Baker et al., 1981; 
Gibbins, (ed.) 1989). In election research, changes are discussed under the heading de-alignment re­
alignment etc. or in social and political theory under legitimation crisis, discontinuity, fragmentation and 
overload. One outstanding empirical indicator are Green or Ecological parties which changed the party 
systems of a lot of Western (and partly Eastern) countries after several decades of stability (Poguntke, 
1987; Müller-Rommel, 1985a; 1989; vedung, 1980; 1989). New social movements (ecology, anti- 
nuclear, women, peace movements, etc.) probably show best the protests of new politics beyond the 
established channels (Brand et al., 1986; Brand, (ed.) 1985; Roth and Rucht (eds.), 1987; Muller-
Rommel 1985b; Off«, 1985c; Kriesi, 1989«; Klandermans (ed.), 1989; etc.). For an overview of recent 
trends see also Dalton and Kuechler (ed.), 1990. These are just some examples of the vast literature in 
this field.
4 Habermas builds heavily upon Lockwood's concept of crisis. Lockwood considers two aspects 
as important: the system integration and the social integration. One can only speak of a crisis when 
both factors come together. However, later Habermas develops a more sophisticated concept of inte­
gration and crisis (Habermas, 1981: 212-28).
5 As an empirical socio-historical analysis for the colonization of a traditional sector by an indu­
strial sector in Germany see Burkart Lutz. He points out that the post war prosperity in Europe eroded 
the precondition for the reproduction of the type of worker that realized this prospenty (Lutz, 1984: 
250-54).
6 fear or worry is a central aspect in the evaluation of social action in the context of the 
reactions to ecological problems. Some, aa Beck, see in the fear against certain technologies and 
developments a common dominator that can lead to collective action even If that action is not rational 
in the conventional sense of the word. Others cannot see die possibility that fear might lead to social 
action on society level (Luhmann, 1986: 237*48, in particular 246-48).
7 Beck (1983; 1986: part 2) takes a lot of efforts to clarify the process of individualization in 
modem society. In particular, the dissolving of class relations and class reproduction have fundamental 
consequences for trie labor movement. Furthermore, Beck postulates that those groups feel most 
affected by risks which are mostly individualized (Beck. 1988: 93). However, I cannot go into more 
detail here and wish to refer to some empirical work in this context (Mooser, 1984; P.A. Berger, 1986; 
Lindhagen and Nilsson, 1970).
8 Since the following quotation summarizes this argument I wish to quote Bourdieu in some 
length:
Thus, alongside the individual struggles of daily life in which agents continually contribute to 
changing the social world by striving to impose a representation of themselves through stra­
tegies of presentation of self, are the property political collective struggles. In these struggles 
whose ultimate aim, in modem societies, is the power to nominate held by the state, i.e., the 
monopoly over legitimate symbolic violence, agents - who in this case are almost always spe­
cialists, such as politicians - struggle to impose representation (e.g., demonstrations) whicn 
create the very things represented, which make them exist publicly, officially. Their goal is to 
turn their own vision of the social world, and the principles of division upon which it is based, 
into the official vision, into nomos. the official principle of vision and division.
What is at stake in symbolic struggles is the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social 
world and of its divisions, that is to say, symbolic power as wondmakmg power ..., the 
power to impose and to inculcate principles of construction of reality, and particularly to pre­
serve or transform established principles of union and separation, of association and disas- 
sociation already at work in the social world such as current classifications in the matters of 
gender, age, ethnicity, region or nation, that is, essentially, power over words used to 
describe groups or the institutions which represent them. Symbolic power, whose form par 
excellence is the power to make groups and to consecrate or institute them (in particular 
through rites of institution, the paradigm here being marriage), consists in the power to make 
something exist in the objectified, public, formal state which only previously existed in an 
implicit state, as with the constellation which ... begins to exist only when it is selected and 
designated as such. When it is applied to social collective, even one which is potentially 
defined in the manner of the cloud, the performative power of naming, which almost always 
comes with a power of representation, brings into existence in an instituted form, i.e., as a 
corporate body, what hitherto existed only as a cereal collection of juxtaposed individuals.
Here one would need to pursue more fully the implications of the fact that the symbolic 
strugale between agents is for the most part earned out through die mediation of profes­
sionals of representation who, accounting as spokes-persons for the groups at whose service 
they place their specific competence, confront each other within a closed, relatively autono­
mous field, namely, the field of politics. (Bourdieu, 1987: 13-14)
9 Walter Korpi wishes to stress the fact that the new political dimension does not replace the 
left/right dimension. In order to demonstrate this fact he uses doubtful empirical evidence. However, 
also Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter (1985) stress the fact - although in another research 
interest - that different models of social order lead to the emphasis of different cleavage structures 
which all may be of relevance. Even within these different models they explicitly distinguish between 
principal and other relevant cleavages.
10 In fact that organizations are basic elements for society is mentioned in most of the major 
introduction texts on organizations. For convincing examples see for instance: Scott, 1987: 1; Perrow, 
1986: 278; Thompson, 1967: 3.
11 Terms like disorganized capitalism (Offe, 1985a; Lash and Urry, 1987) also focus on this 
aspect although they have a wider process of disorganization in mind. The term growth coalition has 
been used by Ulrich von Alemann (1983) and Josef Esser (1982). Also Ralph Danrendorf gives an 
example of utis alliance and the consequences for new politics:
(The ecologists represent]... a force for a new quality of life which the administrators of the 
social-democratic consensus fear for good reasons. This force cannot only cost the consensus 
parties votes, but it aims at their very core, at the assumptions on which the consensus is 
baaed. It is about changing the subject and the quest for something new - small wonder that
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Rovemments and opposition, trade unions and employers are united in condemning it! Dahrendorf, 1979: 114; quoted from: Lauber, 1983: 340)
12 Stinchombe (1965) postulates that organizations keep to the values of their formative years 
For organizations of old politics, these values can be described as industrial values as outlined in text.
13 The ground for this consensus was shaped as early as the 1930s and 1940s in most of the 
corporatist countries (Katzenstein, 1985: 210). For Sweden it is even possible to identify tripartite 
constellations at the turn of the century (Johansson, 1989; Strdth, 1990)
14 For Sweden, an empirical study on the public affinity with social movements shows that new 
social movement are perceived more positively than old movements. On a scale form 0 to 10 new 
social movement score highest (peace movement: 5.8, and environmental movements: 5.6). The 
workers' movement obtains onlya middle rank (3.8) while temperance (2.6) and Free Church 
movements (1.3) score lowest (Petersson et al., 1989: table 4.15).
15 In an international survey associated to the one of Cotgrove and Duff, the opinion to nuclear 
power was explored. It answereid to the statement: ’There is a need for nuclear power” on a 7-item 
scale in Britain and the USA: 25.5 percent (USA: 30.7) of the public agreed to this statement (only 
item 7) and 11.2 percent (9.3 percent) disagreed (item 1); 6.3 percent (10.3 percent) of the environ­
mentalists agreed and 26.7 percent (34.5 percent) disagreed; 50.6 percent (70.2 percent) of the indu­
strialists agreed and 1.5 percent (1.3 percent) disagreed; 27.9 percent (44.7 percent) of the trade 
unionists agreed and 10.1 percent (14.1 percent) disagreed (Kessel and Tischler, 1981; Fietkau et al., 
1982)
17 As Offe (1990: 233-4) points out this ideology is not concrete one in the sense of anything like a 
historical design or positive utopia but is rather a post-ideological’ or even "post-historical" in nature.
17 Political opportunity structure is normally referred to as concept for the political mobilization of 
new social movements. "Political opportunity structures are compromised on specific configurations of 
resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for mobilization, which facilitate the 
development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others.1 (Kitschelt, 1986: 
58) Sidney Tarrow (1983; 1988: 429/30) distinguishes mainly three dimensions: the degree of open­
ness/closure of formal political access; the degree of stability/instability of electoral alignments; and the 
availability and strategic posture of potential alliance partners. All three dimensions are closely inter­
related. Taken together they provide a concept for the chances for new social movements to influence 
politics. I wish to use the term here mainly under Tarrow's third aspect: the availability and strategic 
posture of potential alliance partners. Hanspeter Kriesi points out trade unions are often indirectly 
related to new social movements, i.e. a hign amount of their members are also members or sympathi­
zers of new social movements (Kriesi and van Praag, 1987). However, for the Dutch peace movement 
he finds out that in particular white collar unions, above all those which organize officials and social 
workers or teachers have closer relations to the peace movement (Kriesi, 1989b: 308, see also 
Klandermans, 1990: 122-36).
18 In the context of the resource mobilization of the (Swedish) working-class Walter Korpi comes 
to a similar conclusion:
Perceptions of what is just, fair and reasonable vis-a-vis other groups of citizens are largely 
dependent upon the power relations between these groups. Weak groups often learn, or are 
taught to accept, circumstances which stronger groups would consider unjust. Strong actors 
also tend to develop more long-range definitions of their interests than weaker groups. (Korpi, 
1983: 18)
19 Bert Klandermans (1990) analyses the multi-organizational field of social movements in terms of 
alliance systems, consisting of groups and organizations that support the movement, on the one hand, 
and of conflict system, consisting of social actors that oppose the movements.
20 Empirical party research stresses the intra-organizational problems of left-wing parties which 
may also be true for trade unions or has a least substantial spill-over effects: ’ In most European coun­
tries, the socialist party's rank-and-file members as well as the party elite split into two groups: those 
with a traditional left-wing outlook who are concerned with the security of the working class and eco­
nomic stability (the Old Left), and those with a New Politics orientation who rather emphasize the 
quality of life, the nature of economy, and the extent of democracy (New Left). The ’ New Left" in 
socialist parties stands in competition with New Politics parties regarding "new voter", while the "Old 
Left* is still fighting along the old cleavage dimension. The socialists are, therefore, trapped between 
two cultures... . whatever the socialist parties might be able to gain from the New Left, they risk 
losing from among the Old Left Voters. Consequently, the only viable strategy for the socialists is to 
attempt some reconciliation of Old Politics (in order to integrate the majority of the Socialist party's 
voters) and a moderate version of New Politics (in order to attract New Politics parties' voter. A radical 
realization of "New Politics issues" is beyond the reach of the socialist parties." (Muller-Rommel, 1990: 
229/30) Neil Carter (1991) describes also this tension within the British Labour Party.
21 This headline has been borrowed from an article by Claus Offe (1985b). Even if his scope of 
analysis is much wider, I think that the theme describes perfectly well the intra-union processes I wish 
to consider here.
For an analysis of the cleavage structure of national union movements in a comparative perspective see 
Visser, 1990; above all chapter 6.
22 For the analysis of the changing ideological roles and relationship betw een trade unions and 
political parties in West Germany see: Messeleken, 1970.
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Chapter Two:
APPROACH, METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter outlines the general frame of reference of the analysis and its methodo­
logical translation. The research interest is to understand the conditions under which 
trade unions adopt elements of new politics, on the one hand, and to which intra- 
organizational tension the conflict between new and productionist politics may lead, 
on the other. For the analysis of these questions I decided to use comparative organi­
zation theoretical approaches. Modern organization theory has rapidly developed over 
the last decades. Today it is a mean to combine the analysis of structure and beha­
vior. Furthermore, organization theory is one of the few branches in the social 
sciences that is well suited for the analysis of change (Touraine, 1988: 37). Finally, 
organization theory provides guidelines for identifying and operationalizing crucial 
variables and processes. The second aim of this chapter is to specify the semantics 
of new and productionist politics for the empirical analysis. For this purpose I 
developed concepts for a quantitative content analysis in this field.
1. ORGANIZATION THEORETICAL APPROACHES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF NEW 
POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS 
Modern organization theory has rapidly developed during the last decades (for com­
prehensive overviews see for instance: Pfeffer, 1982; 1985; Perrow, 1986; Scott, 
1987). In simple terms, perspectives shifted from focussing on structure and rational 
action and moved toward approaches that emphasize social process and the unpre­
dictability of action (Zey-Ferrell, 1981; Türk, 1989). Scott (1987: chapter 5) points 
out that the individual perspectives of organization consist of various paradigms that 
acquire different theories, methods, and standards. He concludes that the differing 
assumption underlying these paradigms may be replaced but they cannot be 
disproved. The consequence of this is that I will not attempt to test these different 
organizational theories but rather I wish to remain within the logic of each paradigm 
and see what we can gain from it for the explanation of our theses. Each approach 
asks various questions and gets different answers. Furthermore, the different per­
spectives will be combined with some findings in the trade union research and serve 
as frame of reference for the present analysis. The following presentation of the dif­
ferent theories should not give a comprehensive overview of the individual theories 
but rather serve to isolate propositions and variables for the empirical analysis and 
make suggestions concerning the method.
The organizational approach that has become most prominent in the tradition of 
"rational" approaches (purposive, intentional, goal directed, rational emergent) is
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structural contingency theory [1]. Structural contingency theory is most explicit 
about the relevant variables for the analysis [2]: organizational size, structure, tech­
nology and the environment are the major variables. The methodological approach is 
the comparative variable analysis [3]. Although the structural contingency theory is 
clear about the procedures of analysis, it is more problematic to deduce concrete 
explanations from it. Most explicit is Claudia Bird Schoonhoven about the theoretical 
status of structural contingency theory:
... contingency theory is not a theory at all, in the conventional sense of theory as a wen-developed set 
of interrelated propositions. It is more an orienting strategy or metatheory, suggesting ways in which a 
phenomenon ought to be explained. ... Although the overall strategy is reasonably dear, the substance 
of the theory is not dear. (Schoonhoven, 1981: 350; quoted from Pfeffer, 1982: 162; see also Scott, 
1987: 228-32)
The clear cut rational deterministic relationship has often been questioned on the 
ground of its insensitivity to cognitive limitations of individuals and organizations [4]. 
However, in global terms the basic variables in the structural contingency approach 
are: technology, the environment, size, and structure.
To make sure, technology is not used here in its commonplace sense of machines or 
devices for achieving higher efficiency, but in its generic sense of the study of tech­
niques and tasks. Charles Perrow (1986: 140-155) stresses the importance of the 
technology of organization in order to clarify the differences between complex 
organizations. Technology has no coherent concept in organization theory (Scott, 
1987: 210-239), although all organizations possess technologies. However, organi­
zations vary to the extent to which techniques are understood, or routinized, or effi­
cacious (Scott, 1987: 18/9). In order to elaborate these important organization theo­
retical concepts, Perrow takes as a starting point two characteristics that might pro­
vide a basis for a typology of technology: raw materials (things, symbols, or people), 
which are changed and tasks, or techniques of effecting transformation. Both types 
of technology vary in a number of ways above all from uniformity, stability and sim­
plicity, on the one hand, and heterogeneity, flexibility and complexity, on the other.
In Sweden and West Germany, the technology of trade unions is interest intermedia­
tion [5]. Interest mediation is first of all dependent upon the character of the trade 
union membership. From this we may formulate the first proposition:
Proposition A1: Character of Membership
The stand on new and productionist politics is dependent on the stand of the trade union membership 
in this question.
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Alt the outlined propositions in this chapter will be specified and operationalized in 
the following empirical chapters. Perrow develops an interesting concept of the tech­
nology of organization. He elaborates on two dimensions which illuminate the effec­
tiveness and safety of a social system. In Perrow's terms technology can have linear 
or complex interaction, on the one hand, and a loose or tight coupling, on the other. 
We can assume that both dimensions are on a continuum but for reasons of simplifi­
cation, we will work with these two dichotomies. For trade unions, the task to repre­
sent membership interests makes the interaction dimension. In this way, interests 
can be uniform or antagonistic. We may assume that homogeneous interests cor­
respond with a linear interaction and heterogeneous interests correspond with com­
plex interaction. As Thompson points out: "Homogeneity facilitates coordination 
because one set of rules applies to all positions in the group; and when changes in 
rules are necessary, one set of changes applies to all." (Thompson, 1967: 59)
A membership that has a more homogeneous attitude towards new politics (no mat­
ter weather pro or con) has a linear interaction; a union with a membership dis­
agreeing on these questions has a complex interaction. With that we come to the 
second proposition:
Proposition A2: Homogeneity of Membership
Trade unions that have a linear interaction (homogeneous membership in terms of new and produc­
tionist politics) have no intra-organizational conflict in contrast to trade unions that have a complex 
interaction.
The other dimension of coupling grasps the organizational aspect in how far sections 
of a system are buffered. That means if a change of a one part or subsystem of the 
system causes the whole system to change, the system is tightly coupled. If the 
disturbance can be kept in one or a few subsystems of the system it is loosely 
coupled. We may refer this dimension to the individual trade union confederations. 
That means if one union organizes employees with positive and negative attitudes 
towards environmental protection this union is tightly coupled. If both kinds of mem­
bers are organized in different organizations the interests are loosely coupled. This 
proposition is also valid for confederations organizing trade unions with differently 
complex membership interests:
Proposition A3: Coupling
Trade union confederations which are tightly coupled suffer under intra-organizational conflict while 
loosely coupled trade unions are buffered from intra-organizational conflicts.
Tight coupling is desirable for organizations since it saves energy and material costs, 
and avoids waste of resources. It promotes rapid decision-making, centralized deci-
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sions, prompt schedules, rapid change where appropriate, and immediate response to 
deviation. The result of the interaction of both dimensions is pointed out by Perrow 
(1986: 148): "This is the basis of a serious organizational dilemma: tight coupling 
requires centralization, but interactive complexity requires decentralization, and it is 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to have both simultaneously."
The concept of organization environment is not typical for the different organization 
theories. The organizational environment in the tradition of structural contingency 
can be further specified. Although the whole environment has an impact on each 
organization (Thompson, 1967: 28), organizations do not react to the whole envi­
ronment to the same extent. As Thompson points out, their major environment is 
that what has to do with the organizational task: the task environment. On the one 
hand, the task environment of trade unions are the sectors in which their members 
are employed. On the other hand, the task environment is the national economy, the 
state and other important actors. The task environment determines the domain of the 
organization. The domain consists of the claims the organization makes with respect 
to its technology. These claims immediately relate it to a number of other organiza­
tions and actors. The domain determines the other actors which the focal organiza­
tion has contact to (Thompson, 1967: 25-38). In connection with new and produc­
tionist politics, the task environment is the sector (nuclear energy, energy, private, 
public, etc.) in which trade unions organizes their members.
Proposition A4: Task Environment
The stand on new and productionist politics is dependent on the sector in which trade unions organize 
their members.
Proposition A5: Economy
The stand on new and productionists politics dependent on the national economy.
It should be clear that the organization of interests is determined by both the mem­
bership and task environment of the organization. This fact has been taken as a star­
ting point for the perception of organizations as intermediary organizations.
Trade unions are in many ways intermediary organizations [6]. Walther Muller- 
Jentsch (1988) points out that unions mediate between state and society, on the 
one hand, and the individual on the other. Furthermore, they mediate between the 
interests of capital and labor. Finally, they mediate between different levels of 
interest representation. In particular the first two levels are crucial for the present 
analysis. It cannot be the purpose to review the huge amount of literature on 
intermediary organization here. However, some aspects in this tradition are useful for
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further specification of the empirical study. Analytical contributions in the tradition of 
intermediary organization focus - among others - on the partly competing dynamics 
of membership interests and requirements from the task environment and domain. 
Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck conceptualize these decisive organizational 
constraints in terms of a logic of membership and a logic of influence (Schmitter and 
Streeck, 1981; 1985; Streeck, 1987, Schmitter, 1989: 63).
The normative bounds of the membership of trade unions has eroded through pro­
cesses of structural differentiation, formalization, and professionalization. Causality is 
becoming increasingly complex, organizational action, increasingly difficult. In this 
situation, Wolfgang Streeck (1987: 483/4) points out, the best that intermediary 
organizations can do is to "muddle through" or even better pursue a policy of "non­
decision-making". However, there is a paradox: on the one hand, trade unions are 
becoming increasingly involved in more and more areas of politics, and as a conse­
quence more and more is potentially possible to be influenced by the organization. 
This leads, on the other hand, to a dysfunctional result that less and less can be 
accomplished because each action implies feed back loops that may meet 
disagreement either in terms of the logic of membership or in the logic of influence. 
The vicious circle continues if the incapacity of action weakens the loyalty to the 
organization and also decreases a clear cut identity of the organization. In Streeck's 
view inter-organizational interlocking is the macro-societal functional equivalent for 
the increasingly micro-societal deficiencies of membership organization. The conse­
quence is that organizations cooperate and exchange information, support, 
consensus, loyalty, etc. with other social actors. They sacrifice a good part of their 
autonomy in order to gain (limited) possibilities to act (Streeck, 1987: 488) [7].
Proposition A6: Non-decision-making
Trade unions tend to "non-dedsion making* in the context of new and productionist politics when 
membership interest is divided in this question or when the demands of the task environment are in 
contradiction to membership interests.
There are two further variables that have a prominent place in structural contingency 
theory: the size of organizations and the organization structure. However, size alt­
hough easy to measure is a quite ambiguous variable. Blau and Schoenherr (1971) 
stress that size is the major explanation variable concerning the formal structure of 
organizations. According to Pfeffer, the basic arguments of the "size literature" are 
that size leads to increasing structural differentiation, formalization and administrative 
components, and that size is negatively correlated to centralization. The formal struc­
ture of organizations has often been a dependent variable of structural contingency 
theory and an independent variable for organizational behavior. The limitation of
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available data make direct hypothetical assumptions difficult. However, there may be 
two competing impacts of size and union behavior which are intermediated by 
organizational structure:
Proposition A7: Size end Structure I
Large size may obstruct organizational flexibility and the responsiveness to demands of new politics 
through processes of formalization and administrative rationalization.
Proposition A8: Size and Structure //
Large size may promote organizational responsiveness to the demands of new politics through 
processes of structural differentiation.
In most of the empirical studies in the tradition of structural contingency theory, the 
variables have been analyzed by the mean of a comparison of organization. This 
means that organizations are needed that vary to a significant degree in terms of the 
presented variables (see below).
The alternative approaches are rather heterogeneous. They differ considerably in the 
degree they stress organizational behavior as externally constrained and controlled, 
random, and dependent on process and social construction. I wish particularly to 
refer to three different traditions: resource dependence theory, institutionalization 
theory, and organizing as social process.
All theses alternative approaches give more attention to social processes in organiza­
tions and the mutual exchanges between organizations and their environment. By 
doing this they stress different variables and apply different methods than structural 
contingency analyses. Particularly, Karl Weick's concept offers a good framework for 
my analysis. This, above all, for two reasons: first, he suggests a concept for quanti­
tative empirical research (Bougon et al., 1977; Bougon, 1983; Weick and Bougon, 
1986). He refers to Axelrod (1976) who constructs causa! maps or cognitive maps 
of decision-makers. According to Pfeffer (1982: 215-18), there are two dimensions 
that might be used to characterize causal schemata: they can show how 
differentiated and complex a social actor perceives an issue, and ”... causal maps 
can permit the diagnoses of organizational problems arising from disagreement about 
organizational operations (Pfeffer, 1982: 217). Second, Weick gives an insight into 
the social process of organizing (Weick, 1979). For this purpose, he offers an evolu­
tion theoretical model of organizational development which can be applied to our 
topic [8]. As we can see from figure 2-1 the key elements are: ecological change, 
enactment, selection, and retention.
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Figure 2-1.: Karl Weick's Model of the Organizing Processes
(Source-. Weick, 1979: 133)
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The whole organizational process of evolution is one of reducing ambiguity. The pro­
cess of selection and retention reduces equivocality by applying inferred recipes 
(assembly rules or causal or cause maps) to new problems. Ecological changes pro­
vide the raw material for sense-making. It is the enactable environment (Weick,
1979: 132) Enactment is intimately entwined with ecological change and is the only 
process, where the organization directly engages an external environment. Enact­
ment provides the equivocal raw material which will be selected in the next step. The 
raw material of ecological change could be anything, but it must - in one way or 
another - be in the communication logics of the organization [9]. This means that 
issues of new politics must enter into the trade union in a language it can understand 
and respond to [10]. For the focal organization, the process of enactment is crucial. 
Since there are many differently perceived environments there are a lot of problems 
in the process of enacting with the environment. The purpose of the selection pro­
cess is the reduction of equivocality. The end-product is an accepted interpretation 
of reality. Retention involves the storage of successful sense-making which in turn 
determines the enactment and selection process for future events. Organizational 
retention is much more complex than those of individuals so that individuals can 
never fully understand the organization they interact in [11].
This frame of reference may be referred to the analyzed topic in the following way: 
ecological change has occurred through the emergence of new politics in modern 
society. The first step consists of the ability and willingness of trade unions to enact 
elements of new politics. Trade unions must develop an organizational potential for 
new politics, i.e. they must debate social issues in terms of new and productionist 
politics. As a next step they might select elements of new (or productionist) politics 
for their official world-view. This process I will call the adoption of elements of new 
politics. It is operationalized as the approved and established worldview of a trade
* 33 -
union (indicator are approved motions, newspapers stands, etc.; for further details 
see below). As pointed out, the retained world views (retention) are crucial organiza­
tional selection mechanisms for the interpretation of new issues and situations. For 
trade unions the trade union ideology serves as complex retained world views. We 
may formulate now some propositions in the tradition of organization theory that 
stress the importance of social processes. The mentioned concepts will be specified 
in the following empirical chapter:
Proposition B1: Organizational Potential
A precondition of the adoption of new politics of trade unions is the ability or willingness to enact ele­
ments of new politics.
Proposition B2: Trade Union Ideology
The trade union ideology is a crucial determinant for the process of adopting elements of new politics.
Besides the organizational aspects, the adoption of elements of new politics is also 
dependent on the organizational environment. In this context resource dependence 
and institutionalization theory shed some light. Resource dependence theory stresses 
that organizations are externally constrained but "... argues for greater attention to 
internal organizational political decision-making processes and also for the per­
spective that organizations seek to manage or strategically adapt to their environ­
ments." (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976: 79) While the structural contingency theory 
considers the environment to be a hostile alien element against which the organiza­
tion must protect itself, resource dependence theory conceptualizes the environment 
as a pool of vital resources for the focus organization. This does not mean that this 
interaction is without its problems. The environment constrains and controls organi­
zational action. But instead of conceptualizing environment and organization as two 
separate units where organizations must fight and buffer themselves against their 
environment, the resource dependence model emphasizes the interactive relationship 
between the organization and the environment 112]. This leads to it that in the tradi­
tion of resource dependence theory, organizations are perceived as coalitions [13] 
and groups (see also: Cyert and Marsh, 1963; Thompson, 1967: 126-128) which 
gain their power through their interaction with the environment. The intra-organiza- 
tional processes are strongly connected with power relations. Instead of considering 
the efficiency of organizations (how well things are done) the interest lies in the 
effectiveness (what is done): "The effectiveness of an organization is its ability to 
create acceptable outcomes and actions." With this thought, Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978: 11) stress the political aspects of organizations: "The effectiveness of an 
organization is a sociopolitical question.”
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In these terms, trade unions strive for the normative resources. One aspect of norma­
tive resources of political trade unions is the offer of a social utopia for a better 
society. New social movements attempt to offer exactly the same, and in doing so 
they compete with unions for this resource. This point brings us to another tradition 
of organization theory: institutionalization theory (Selznik, 1948; 1949). Pamela 
Tolbert argues for the combination of the resource dependence perspective with the 
institutional school. She points out "... that dependency relationships can, over time, 
become socially defined as appropriate and legitimate." (Tolbert, 1985: 1; see also 
Zucker, 1987: 447)
One important aspect in the institutionalization theory is the interplay between the 
manifestation of social action in the form of institutionalized rules and its changes 
through social action [14]. There is evidence that people express beliefs in order to 
make the situations more understandable and they construct plausible interpretations 
no matter how bizarre the situation. For that purpose people use socially determined 
typifications to make sense of a specific situation (Sproull, 1981). However, the 
social actions become objective constraints by the process of institutionalization:
While these accounts are socially created, they function as objective rules because their social origin is 
ignored. At the same time, ready-made accounts define the possible - institution makes dear what is 
rational in an objective sense. Other acts are meaningless, even unthinkable. (Zucker, 1977: 728) (15]
In this investigation, the comparison of national differences serves as distinctively 
different institutional environments concerning new and productionist politics.
Proposition B3: Institutional Environments
The institutional (national) environments have a crucial influence on the responsiveness of trade unions 
concerning new politics, the more pronounced the elements of new politics are in the organizational 
environment the sooner the organization wilt adopt to the environmental demands.
Proposition B4: Resource Dependence
The dependency of ideological resources is a crucial factor for the responsiveness to elements of new 
politics. The higher the resource dependence the higher the adoption of elements of new politics.
Proposition B5: Process of Institutionalization
Adopting elements of new politics is a "historical* process of institutionalization.
As mentioned above, resource dependence theory postulates that external resources 
have intra-organizational consequences in form of organizational coalitions and con­
flict. Faced with conflicting demands, the organization must decide which groups or 
world views to pay attention to and which to ignore or reject. Since trade unions 
need a big membership base and stabile relations to other social actors, they may try
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to match the different demands. However, that becomes difficult when interests 
become antagonistic. Conflicts, however, are important for the social evolution of 
organizations because their reference to different cause maps is a way to enhance 
variety and a way to register more of the possibilities that are present in the world 
[16]:
Proposition B6: Conflict
The responsiveness of a trade union concerning new politics is dependent on intra-organizational 
groups and results of intra-organizational conflicts and struggles. Intra-organizational conflict is a 
crucial precondition for the adoption of elements of new politics in trade unions.
To understand organizations as the result of shifting and changing coalitions implies 
that we have to consider power in organization, a neglected element in organization 
theory (Pfeffer, 1981: 9-18). Without going deeper into the discussion of the 
concept power, one may conclude that power is the capability of one social actor to 
overcome resistance in achieving a desired outcome (Dahl, 1957; Emerson, 1962: 
32). Power in organizations is power over goals (Perrow, 1986: 259). This per­
spective leads to the consideration of union democracy in the contest of new and 
productionist politics (Lipset et al., 1956; Hemingway, 1978). Alessandro Pizzorno 
stresses the importance of democratic decision-making in organizations when the 
goals are diverse:
H the goals are multipie ... the decision to participate and the expression of consent do not necessarily 
coincide. They coincide even less when the organization enjoys something close to representational 
monopoly. In this case, in order to have a democratic organization, or even to obtain enough informa­
tion for efficiency, "voice* - the vote, protest, or other ways of expressing opinions on part of the 
members • must be guaranteed. (Pizzorno, 1981: 258)
As mentioned above the analysis of causal maps reveals how complex an actor per­
ceives an issue. This implies that there are different cognitive ways of organizing 
interests. In order to specify this aspect I wish to refer to two classical understan­
dings of trade union policy and elaborate on the concept of different logics of collec­
tive action.
The classical exponents may be Lenin, on the one hand, and Perlman, on the other. 
In What has to be done? Lenin (1973: 397-440) points out that the labor movement 
left by itself would only create trade unionism that focuses on material aspects and 
which would be "working-class bourgeois politics”. Trade unionism itself is con­
centrated on economic aspects and would, therefore, need the party control in order 
to enlighten the proletariat about its historical interest. Even when Lenin's interest 
focused on specific aspects of communist ideology, one can conclude that he stres­
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sed the importance that trade unions should overcome their "economism" and 
include societal and political aspects in their perception and communication of social 
issues. Perlman (1966; first 1928) opposed this concept of trade unionism. In his 
classical critique of Lenin's approach in A Theory of the Labor Movement, he points 
out that the genuine interest of workers are job interests. Revolutionary ideology is 
mainly a alien invention of intellectuals that disregard the true needs of the workers. 
Perlman points out that "job consciousness" is the basis for trade union interest and 
that this interest is not at all in conflict with industrial society. He is very much in 
favor that trade unions improve the working and living conditions of the working- 
class, but preferably through reforms and cooperation with the employers than 
through revolutionary concepts. Trade unions should concentrate on their genuine 
tasks that is the improvement of material conditions, and that they should protect 
themselves from the influence of intellectuals and other seductive influences. How­
ever, Perlman does not reject the importance of the class conflict, but he believes 
that the contradiction between capital and labor is unnatural and will, in the long run, 
fade.
In the contemporary debate on trade union economism some evidence has been 
given that trade unions narrow their interests on material aspects:
In terms of the structural conditions under which the social identity of a union member is defined and 
experienced, unions have undoubtedly become narrower in 'scope' ...: they are more than before part 
of the institutional system at the work-place, but their presence in and their significance for their mem­
bers' other spheres of life has declined. Unlike the 'social movement' that they were at the time of 
their origin, unions today appear very much as one functionally specialized organization among others, 
no longer aspiring to embrace their members as persons, but rather limiting themselves to offering spe­
cific services at market prices. In this sense, modern unions are much more secular institutions than 
they were in the past: much more impersonal, abstract, instrumental, and much less normative and 
'moral'. (Streeck, 1982: 73)
However, even when the social development has placed emphasis on material 
aspects, unions still have a socio-political feature. This has been pointed out by 
Richard Freeman and James Medoff (1984) when they analyzed the consequences of 
the American unions in terms of two faces of trade unionism: a monopoly face and a 
collective voice/institutional face. I wish to elaborate on this aspect in terms of the 
dichotomy of monological and dialogical strategies of collective action (Offe and 
Wiesenthal, 1980). Monological strategies are those that build upon only one or a 
few established and accepted dimension or aspects of a given problem. The use of 
monological strategies is based on clearly defined fixed outcomes and only a limited 
number of aspects is taken into account [17]. Actions that build on dialogical interac­
tions, in contrast, refer to strategies which may be differently interpreted and can 
always be discussed or questioned. This implies that dialogical communication is not
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attached to a special dimension of a particular issue, but that all aspects are poten­
tially relevant. Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal (1980: 75! postulate that trade 
unions, in contrast to business organizations (18], are more likely to apply dialogical 
strategies since unions organize "... the entire spectrum of needs that people have 
when they are employed as wage workers." Instead of applying this concept to diffe­
rent kinds of organization, as intended by the authors (see also: Streeck, 1990; 
Traxler, 1991), I wish to distinguish the monological and dialogical logic of collective 
action among different trade unions.
In empirical terms, we may conclude that the communication on issues of new poli­
tics in trade unions lies on a continuum reaching from monological (or as I wish to 
call it here, pragmatic) levels of communication to dialogical or complex levels of 
communication (see for further details: Jahn, 1988b). Pragmatic communication may 
obstruct the communication on new politics issues and, hence, lead to an un­
responsiveness to new politics. This process is reinforced since complex communica­
tion may lead sooner to intra-organizational conflict which, in turn, may lead to grea­
ter responsiveness to new politics.
Proposition B7: Level of Communication
The level of communication influences the degree of organizational conflict and by doing so also the 
adoption of elements of new politics. Dialogical or complex communication leads to intra-organizational 
conflict and monological or pragmatic communication avoids conflict.
Theoretically, there are possibilities to reduce the conflict on two dimensions. On the 
one hand, diverse interests can be organized in a way that interest conflict is minimi­
zed. This aspect has been discussed in the context of unions' technology in terms of 
(coupling). On the other hand, there may be strategies available which reduce the 
expression of heterogeneous interests:
An organization develops a set of concepts influenced by the technical vocabulary and classification 
schemes; they permit easy communication. Anything that does not fit into the concept is not easily 
communicated. (Perrow, 1986: 125)
That means the one in the power position of an organization controls the communi­
cation process. Consciously or not, they may steer the communication process on 
dimensions they wish or which favor them. For example, the communication of new 
politics issues may be exclusively led on the ground of technological or economic 
aspects or even be neglected.
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2. THE COMPARATIVE METHOD
The comparative method in social science (Ragin, 1987; Berg-Schlosser and Muller- 
Rommel, 1987) attempts to reach a quasi experimental status by comparing social 
phenomena in a systematic manner. However, there are a lot of problems in selecting 
cases, variables and making them fit for comparison. The most profound decision to 
make is whether to follow a "qualitative” research design by looking at one or a few 
cases and the other possibility is to base the research on "quantitative" analysis by 
correlating variables. Both research strategies have certain implications - advantages 
and shortcomings * which cannot be reviewed here in detail (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 
1990). In short, one may conclude that there is a trade-off between precise, but not 
representative case study research, on the one hand, and representative but rather 
formalized and inflexible variable-oriented research, on the other hand. In the latter 
approach the results "... are biased towards simplifying complexity through assump­
tions because the assumptions are often built into procedures themselves. Thus, 
these techniques do not decipher causal complexity but eliminate perplexing 
elements of it.” (Ragin, 1987: 32). For comparative studies, the shortcomings of 
both strategies seem to be unavoidable and fatal: case study research - if systemati­
cally conducted - has fundamental limitations in the number of possibly manageable 
cases [19). Variable based studies, however, have the fundamental problem of sepa­
rating the characteristics of a case or research object (into variables) and deduce 
conclusions based on the relationship of variables instead of empirical entities 
(cases). I will orient my analysis to the qualitative comparative analysis. Charles 
Ragin (1991: 5) points out that this method is particularly suited for "... a better 
balance between discourse on variables and cases in comparative work. It allows 
holistic comparative analysis on cases, treating each case as a combination or confi­
guration of conditions, and cases are compared as configurations."
I try to approach this dilemma by applying a "middle of the road" method. On the 
one hand, I will equally concentrate on some - for the theoretical implications - rele­
vant cases. This means that I will not be able to go very deep into latent specialities 
of each case but rather follow a formalized and systematic research method. In parti­
cular, informal processes which are undoubtedly important in the context of this 
investigation must be neglected. I can only rely on official sources that are relatively 
easily accessible in order to do equal justice to all cases. On the other hand, the 
number of cases is not enough to generalize without limitations. However, the 
advantage of this method is that it is possible to get systematic insights into the 
standpoints of crucial trade union organizations of the two countries. Furthermore, 
the applied analysis of social discourses or cognitive maps (for these terms see
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below) is an alternative to case studies as a means to analyze the social construction 
of reality (Pfeffer, 1985, 385; Weick and Bougon, 1986: 124).
The comparisons made in this study are based on differences between countries, 
over time, and above all between individual unions. The prior research on new poli­
tics and trade unions is very rare. In fact apart from one study by Heinrich Siegmann
(1985) who analyzes the relationship between labor and environmentalism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United States there is no comprehensive 
research focusing on new politics in trade unions. However, there are some studies 
with different research interests that focus on the stands of trade unions on (nuclear) 
energy. Since the debate on nuclear energy in trade unions is the issue for use in my 
analysis, I would like to refer to the findings of some of the major works in this field 
in order to specify my hypothesis (see appendix 1 for a more detailed overview over 
the literature).
Time
The time period of this analysis is oriented at the period of the interruption of 
continuity of the post World War II energy policy which was mainly caused by 
dramatic price increases of oil by the OPEC-states, on the one hand, and the period 
of the politicization of industrial production which took place in most Western coun­
tries in the 1970s, on the other. For both aspects, it is reasonable to take the year 
1973 as the starting point for the analysis and to conduct the analysis until the pre­
sent day (in this case the end of 1989 when the data collection for this project 
ended).
This analysis uses the comparison over time in order to identify processes of the 
adoption of elements of new politics by trade unions rather than to understand 
agenda setting processes. Nevertheless, the ups and downs of the issue are impor­
tant and may disturb a clear analysis of the adoption processes.
The impact of time may be rather difficult to estimate. It is possible to distinguish 
two substantially different time effects. On the one hand, one may postulate that 
new politics increased more or less continuously in importance over the last two de­
cades. That would mean that elements of new politics became also more dominant 
within trade union organizations (Proposition B5). Particularly Jürgen Grumbach
(1986) postulates that the German trade unions adopted some standpoints of the 
new social movements by participating in expert groups and establishing energy ex­
perts and task forces. On the other hand, the responsiveness to new politics may be 
dependent on other factors, above all the economic development (Proposition A5).
- 40 -
That would result in it that trade unions are more open to elements of new politics in 
periods of economic prosperity while they stress productionist politics in time of eco­
nomic hardship (Siegmann, 1985: chapter 3).
Countries
The emergence of new politics has some similarities but also some fundamental diffe­
rences within Western societies [20]. Therefore, a cross-national comparison is very 
helpful. Although it would be desirable to include as many nations as possible into 
the investigation, this finds its limitation in the research organization and resources. I 
ended up with the comparison of two nations which are especially interesting in the 
light of both new politics and the labor movement: Sweden and the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Above all, there are two reasons why a comparison of Sweden and 
West Germany is highly interesting concerning new politics and trade union policy: 
the power position of the Swedish labor movement, on the one hand, and the 
strength of the German new social movements and Green Party, on the other [21].
Sweden is of analytical interest here because it can be viewed as that country where 
the labor movement was most strongly able to shape national politics in the highly 
industrialized Western world. In particular, the blue collar labor movement and the 
Social Democratic Party in Sweden have such a power base that some observers see 
Sweden as the model of a third way of societal development (e.g.: Adler-Karlsson, 
1973; Stephens, 1979; Himmelstrand et al., 1981; Korpi, 1983; Milner 1989; Tilton, 
1990). Social Democratic hegemony is rooted in Sweden's history and political cul­
ture. Some short descriptions should illustrate this point. Sweden has enjoyed a 
Social Democratic government since 1932, only interrupted by a bourgeois [22] 
government between 1976 and 1982. Even in this parenthesis, bourgeois policy was 
more "Social Democratic* than Social Democratic policy in other countries as, for 
example, in West Germany (Webber, 1985; Nedelmann, 1986; Hinrichs, 1988; 
Swenson, 1989) [23]. Many Swedish writers emphasize that Sweden is the country 
where the labor movement could best realize and fulfill its ideology (Adler-Karlsson, 
1973; Korpi, 1983; Himmelstrand et al., 1981) [24]. Less evaluative, Heclo and 
Madsen stress the fact of Social Democratic hegemony. They argue that the national 
identity and the Social Democratic movement have tended to merge into one and the 
same thing (Heclo and Madsen, 1987: 44). Hence, it is possible to consider Sweden 
- and even more the Swedish trade union movement - as an ideal case for a study of 
the politics of a strong labor movement. Sweden will be a test case whether or not 
the labor movement is actively promoting new politics.
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Furthermore, Sweden is interesting for this study because a lot of analysis conclude 
that the established Swedish policy-makers are exceptionally open to new demands, 
such as alternative life styles, non-productionist politics, and citizens' protest 
(Kitschelt, 1986a). This has also been supported - or has even been inspired - by 
studies on (nuclear) energy policy which have proclaimed that Sweden may be pre­
pared to give up the productionist way of high energy consumption (Lindberg, 1977; 
Kitschelt, 1983; Sahr, 1985; Gottweis, 1986). Henry Milner attempts to combine 
Social Democracy tradition and environmental responsiveness. An additional principle 
of modern Social Democracy, he notes, is "... respect for the environment. Through 
creative decentralized planning, social democracy protects and enhances the natural 
environment as vital to human existence.” (Milner, 1989: 5). However there are 
some socio-cultural indicators suggesting that the reverse trend may be true. For 
example, Donald Hancock quite outspokenly points out that economic production 
scores quite high among Swedish values:
Underlying shared elite attitudes supportive of parliamentarism and pluralism are common beliefs in the 
libertarianism and socio-economic progress. With origins in ancient legal codes, judicial and constitu­
tional guarantees of individual liberties are firmly sanctioned by centuries of tradition in Sweden. Fun­
damental civil liberties - freedom of speech, assembly, publication, and religious dissent - comprise an 
integral component of the modem Swedish political system, as witnessed by the virtual absence of po­
litical prosecution and official censorship. Belief in cumulative material and technological-scientific pro­
gress is exemplified by the willingness of political and organization leaders to promote continuing ef­
forts to attain greater prosperity and a more rational allocation of physical and human resources. 
(Hancock, 1972: 69/70)
Even if Hancock's conclusion was written two decades ago the postulated impacts 
of Swedish traditions may still be valid today. This gives doubts that there may be a 
substantial change in Swedish energy policy (Burns, 1985; Jahn, 1988a; Jamison 
and Eyerman, 1990; Flam, 1991). Substantial changes would mean that politics do 
not only change on the surface but implies that longlasting changes according to the 
concept of new politics take place. However, all the mentioned studies are mainly 
based on data of global national energy policies. It seems to be very reasonable to 
argue that in a country where organizations - and more specifically labor movement 
organizations - have a very high impact on politics the standpoints of these organiza­
tions are important to better understand what is behind this policy shift.
While Sweden is relevant for this study because of its strong labor movement and - 
supposed - responsiveness of established politics to new politics, West Germany is 
an interesting case because of the pronounced feature of new social movements and 
a relatively strong Green Party. New social movements have been present in West 
Germany for the last twenty years. The German new social movements can be 
considered as one of the strongest in modern society [25]. More often than not
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demonstrations were violent and met the resistance of established political institu­
tions. One reason for that may be the relative unresponsive behavior of German poli­
tical organizations to new demands (Kitschelt, 1983; 1986a; Katzenstein, 1982; 
1987) [26]. West Germany is therefore a case in point to study the impact of strong 
new social movements on the labor movement. In contrast to the actively policy 
shaping Swedish labor movement the analysis of the German unions focuses on the 
reactive promotion of new politics by the labor movement.
Transferring the findings of conducted analysis of the national politics to the organi­
zational level we may specify the proposition on the institutional environment (B3) in 
both countries: First, one may expect that Swedish trade unions are by and large 
more open to the demands of new politics because of the open political opportunity 
structure for political alternatives (B3a: Swedish responsiveness). That by no means 
will say that trade unions are especially open to new politics but only that Swedish 
unions may be more open to it in relative terms than their German counterparts. The 
competing hypothesis would be that Swedish unions are formally open but that they 
do not adopt elements of new politics because of the traditional Swedish values that 
build upon productionist preferences (B3b: Swedish unsponsivness).
Also for Germany we may come to similar competing hypothesis. On the one hand, it 
can be assumed that German unions are reluctant to adopt elements of new politics 
because they are part of a closed political opportunity structure (B3c: German unre- 
sponsivness). In contrast to that the opposite hypothesis may be also plausible. The 
German unions are open to elements of new politics because the German new social 
movements are more pronounced and formulate a stronger counter-ideology against 
the established (most conservative and liberal) power holders (B3d: German re­
sponsiveness) which is also attractive for trade unions. The hypotheses which are 
deduced from national features need to be qualified by organizational characteristics 
of the individual trade unions.
Trade Unions
The individual trade union organizations provide the major important variables in this 
study. Before specifying the reasons for the inclusion of the individual trade unions I 
would like to make some general remarks on the different trade union systems in 
Sweden and Germany. However, it is impossible to attempt to draw a complete pic­
ture of the trade unions in both countries in this study. The overview should be brief 
and serve as a first approach. If not differently stated all data refer to 1985.
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faß A General Overview of Swedish and German Unions.
In both countries, the industrial union principle seems to dominate (for a comparative 
overview see: Clegg, 1976; Gourevitch et al., 1984; Taylor, 1989; Martin, 1989; 
Visser, 1989; 1990). This means that unions are grouped according to industries. 
However, there are some unions in both countries which are organized according to 
crafts or occupations. This mainly has historical reasons. The major differences be­
tween Swedish and German unions consist of the separation of white and blue collar 
unions in Sweden. In Sweden, there are three big trade union confederations [27]. 
LO, Landsorganisationen i Sverige, is the confederation for the blue collar trade 
unions. In 1985, there were 24 individual unions organized under the umbrella of LO. 
LO is strongly connected with the Social Democratic Party (Socia/demoskratiska 
Arbetarepartiet, SAP). LO has a clearly defined ideological view in the reformist 
Social Democratic tradition (Elvander, 1983). Traditionally, the LO has been open to 
technological innovations and even rationalization (StrSth, 1990; Tilton, 1990). LO 
soon developed an union strategy that builds upon social responsibility for the export 
industry. The Swedish labor movement very soon identified their interest in the 
national economy and, stands in sharp contrast to the German labor movement, 
which was most of the time in opposition to the political power holder.
Another important feature of LO and its member unions is their coherency. This 
results from both organizational factors such as work-place representation and the 
leading role of the LO confederation. The individual Swedish unions organize 
employees at the firm level in so called arbetsp/atsk/ubb. These firm level organiza­
tions form in districts or avde/ningar. This means that Swedish unions, in contrast to 
their German counterparts, also represent their members at the firm level. The 
German trade union system is characterized by its so-called dual representation of 
employees. Workers on the firm level are represented by work councils (Betriebsräteß 
which are not formally connected to a trade union organization. However, unions 
also have there representatives at the firm level in the form of union shop stewards 
(Vertrauensleute).
The trade union confederations differ considerably concerning their status and power 
within the national trade union movements. In the historical development, LO gained 
increasing influence over its unions (Martin, 1984; Swenson, 1989) and determines 
blue collar union policy to a large degree. For instance, LO has the right to conduct 
collective bargaining on its own and agreements of member unions need to be 
approved of by the LO. Often this centralized collective bargaining of LO has been 
taken as a indicator of the Swedish Model of organized capitalism. Even if this 
system may have been undermined in recent years (Rehn and Viklund, 1990), the |
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power of LO in relation to its unions is still an important feature. Nevertheless, the 
big LO unions substantially shape LO politics. This is so because of vital personal 
links between individual unions and LO.
TCO, TjanstemSnnens Centralorganisation, the confederation for the white collar 
unions is much weaker and, in contrast to LO, conducts no collective bargaining.
This is done either by the individual unions or by so called kartells, collective bargai­
ning bodies of groups of LO, TCO, and SACO/SR unions [28]. TCO has 20 single 
trade unions. The organization principle of TCO is similar to the one of LO. TCO is 
much less powerful in relation to its member unions than LO. Two factors may stress 
this point: first, as mentioned above TCO does not conduct collective bargaining on 
its own. TCO is mainly responsible for the coordination of general political questions. 
Second, TCO is officially a non-partisan trade union although there are closer con­
tacts to SAP than to any other party. However, membership orientation and some 
individual union policy is open to liberal ideologies. In this respect, it is possible to 
consider the liberal ideology (and therefore the Liberal Party) as the main competitor 
of Social Democratic ideology in TCO. Since political issues are most often defined 
by political parties, TCO has difficulties in formulating a stand on political questions. 
This vacuum of ideological power gives space to economic power of the member 
unions. The most influential TCO union is SIF, Svenska IndustritjSnstemannafdr- 
bundet, but the other big unions of TCO are also able to shape TCO policy. SIF has 
often challenged TCO (Wheeler, 1975; Fredriksson and Gunnmo, 1985: 148-50) on 
collective bargaining aspects and also in political questions (e.g. ATP, the Pension 
Fond) [29]. The organizational and ideological characteristics make TCO unions much 
more vulnerable to intra-organizational conflicts than LO unions (Wheeler, 1975; 
Micheletti, 1985).
The German DGB, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, is the confederation of seventeen 
(since 1989 sixteen) individual unions [30]. As TCO, the DGB is officially a non­
partisan trade union. This was the price for union unity in the post-war period. How­
ever, the policy of the DGB more often than not is strongly oriented at the policy of 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD, Soziafdemokratlsche Partei Deutschfands). As 
TCO, the DGB does not actively take part in collective bargaining and the individual 
unions have a strong influence over the DGB. Among the most influential unions are 
the IG Meta/I (IGM), Gewerkschaft OffentHche Dienste Transport und Verkehr (OTV), 
and IG Chemie-Papler-Keramik (IGC) which could increase their influence over the 
last decades (Armingeon, 1988: 45-48).
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Concerning the union confederations included in this study, we may conclude that 
the LO is the strongest union confederation with a clear reformist Social Democratic 
ideology. TCO may be characterized as just the opposite: a relatively weak, officially 
non-partisan union. The DGB may be placed between these two confederations as a 
non-partisan but political trade union confederation. This may lead to a specification 
of proposition B2. TCO and the DGB may experience more intra-organizational con­
flict about new and productionist politics than LO because the latter can fill an ideo­
logical vacuum which the other confederations cannot fill (B2a: Dominant Union 
Ideology). Furthermore, one can postulate that Swedish unions, and here above all 
LO, identify themselves with the national economy which may make them more 
reluctant to give up their productionist view (B2: Traditional Productionist View). 
TCO may not fit as well into this picture, but it may still be closer to LO than to the 
German DGB that may more easily formulate an anti-productionist position because 
of its opposition to the conservative power structure in Germany. By and large, TCO 
may follow a policy that supports the national economy. Tommy Nilsson (1985) 
postulates that the ideology of TCO comes increasingly closer to the one of LO. That 
means that also TCO and its unions may favor a more productionist stand. Although 
these conclusions are also applicable to the member unions, they must be qualified 
by analyzing individual trade union organizations.
fb) The Analyzed Trade Unions.
The individual trade unions are the crucial cases in this study. Above all, the selec­
tion of the trade union organizations has been guided by the reflections on the 
aspects of the cleavage structure between productionist and new politics as 
described in chapter one. This means that there should be some unions which are 
most likely to oppose new politics and those which are most likely open to it. In addi­
tion, the new social cleavage may reinforce old cleavage lines. For that, I tried to 
include unions that differ in their organizational feature according to some relevant 
aspects. The following table gives an overview over the specific features of the ana­
lyzed trade unions (for more details see appendix: 2):
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Som ree# and All data refer te IMS ind are tik«n irò*« Oit IMS, »ol.li,no.Si 112-314. MilUr’Jtntaeh, 1909; Vi>nr, lf«< LO, 198«; VarctaiMttòtrltUln of individuai LO unioni referrlng to (lfurti of lMSi TCO V«rliaMriwtaÌr«t 19*5» Nordin, 198li 420; and o*n calculatIona.
• line« |«Mt« (elfil Mrvantal cannot b« coAaldtrad •• elther blu« or whlte rollar workara,thelr percentage fro* thè «Itola ■aabofahlp 1« gi»en In brackete.
• • no « no workera organi*ed la energy eector.♦ • «nlon organitaa ««orIcara In energy eector, or la hlghly dependent uponenergy cooauaptlon, or producea producta for nuclear pianta.♦♦ ■ «nlon organi«ea «*orkere 1« nuclear energy pianta.
*»« s • Social Democratici tech. • technologicali? opt 1*1 atte, prod * producar perpectl»e ortechnologleali? radicai («aa chaptar ee»en).
• ••• Suan rafara to thè eua or tha araraga of tha anlona lncluded lnto thè ln»eatIgatlon reepectlvely.
(a| Tha proportion of «dita collar uorkera la LO «niona haa baan aatlaatad o*i tha baaa that all ■wÉian of tha Ineurance tamloyeea' Union, Coaaaerclal Eaployata' Union, dwalclan Union, and 7S parcant of SF and 3) percent of SRAP ara whlte collar workara (aee wheeler, 19>5/ vlaeer, 19S9).
First of all, unions differ according to the members they organize and the sectors in 
which their members are employed. The most obvious dividing line consists between 
white collar and blue collar unions, on the one hand, and private sector and public 
sector unions, on the other. Since social reality is more complex than analytical con­
sideration, one can only speak of an approximation of these conditions in the empiri­
cal cases. This was easier for Sweden than for West Germany. In Sweden, trade 
unions organize workers according to whether they are white or blue collar workers. 
LO mainly organizes blue collar workers. However, there are some exceptions. Above 
all in Statsanstaf/das Forbund (SF) more than three-quarters of the membership is 
employed in lower-grade white collar occupations. Svenska Kommunalarbetarfdr- 
bundet (SKAF) also organizes some white collar workers (Visser, 1989: 190/1; 
Wheeler, 1975: 9) [31]. TCO exclusively organize white collar employees.
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In the Federal Republic of Germany, unions organize their members more strictly 
according to the industry principle so that a distinction among clearly white or blue 
collar unions is difficult to make (Hartfiel, 1966). Apart from the pure white collar 
unions GEW (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft) and the Gewerkschaft 
Kunst (artists and musicians' union), all unions organize both blue and white collar 
workers 132]. However, the HBV (Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versiche­
rungen,I, ÖTV (Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr1, and the 
Gewerkschaft der Polizei (Police union) can also be viewed as mainly white collar 
unions.
As with blue and white collar unions, the distinction between private and public sec­
tor is much more important in Sweden than in Germany. It would be too much to list 
which of the approximately 40 LO and TCO unions belong to the private or the public 
sector (see for that the characteristics of the included unions). However, the mem­
bership of public sector unions in Sweden has increased in numbers over the last 
decades which may also lead to shifts in the power relation between private and 
public sector unions. The (ideological) domination of private sector unions has been 
challenged in recent years and it is most likely that this conflict will increase in 
importance in the next decades.
Among the DGB unions, the Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner Deutschlands (German 
Railroad Workers' Union), Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (German Postal Workers' 
Union), GEW, and Gewerkschaft der Polizei (Police union) exclusively organize public 
sector employees. With the exception of its members in the private (nuclear) energy, 
private transport and warehouse, the large majority of the membership of ÖTV is 
employed in the public sector (Visser, 1989: 88) [33].
The reflection on the union membership characteristic may lead to a specification of 
the above outlined proposition. White collar employees are more open to elements of 
new politics and influence their unions more to take a stand according to their attitu­
des (A1). This trend may be reinforced when white collar workers are employed in 
the public sector and weakened when they are employed in the private sector. Blue 
collar workers unions are either more in favor of productionist politics or they are 
rather unconcerned with the value dimension of new and productionist politics.
Again, private sector membership may reinforce this trend.
In Sweden opinion pools demonstrate that women are significantly more opposed to 
expansion of nuclear energy than men. This fact leads to the hypothesis that a high
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amount of women membership leads to an union policy that is more open to new 
politics.
In Sweden, four unions organize workers in the nuclear power plants: SEF, SF in LO, 
and SIF and ST in TCO. There are also unions which are strongly related to the 
nuclear industry either because they produce equipment for nuclear plants (Metall), 
or they are highly dependent on energy (Paper Industry Workers' Union, Factory 
Workers' Union) or gain benefits by constructing nuclear power plants (Construction 
Workers' Union). In West Germany, IGM, ÖTV, IGC, IGB, and IGBSE are called the 
"energy unions". This because of the same reasons as there Swedish counterparts. 
However, only ÖTV, IGC and IGM organize workers in the nuclear industry. How­
ever, IGM organizes only workers in one nuclear power plant. This leads to the speci­
fication of proposition A4 that unions organizing members in the energy, energy 
dependent or nuclear energy sectors favor a productionist union politics.
Unions were also chosen because of their ideological stand. That was easier for 
German unions. In West Germany, one can distinguish between accommodationist 
and activist unions and empirical studies have also been conducted along this line 
(Bergmann et al. 1976; Markovits, 1986; Weischer, 1988). IGB and IGC represent 
the former and IGM, HBV, and IGO, the latter group in this investigation. The empiri­
cal studies indicate that activist unions might be rather open for elements of new 
politics in sharp contrast to the accommodationist unions that favor quite outspo­
kenly productionist stands (B2c).
Important in the context of ideological differences among Swedish unions is the 
dominant role of the central confederation LO over its unions, as mentioned above. 
Therefore, we might expect a quite coherent picture of LO unions. However, there 
are some investigations which show that GF may have a slightly different ideological 
attitude among the LO unions (Sandberg, 1984; 1989). The exception of GF might 
modify the "Traditional Productionist View" (B2a).
TCO is a contrasting case. TCO is merely the umbrella organization that formulates 
general political statements for the public. Big unions of TCO have a much stronger 
influence on policy of their confederation than LO unions. Therefore ideological 
standpoints were not decisive for the selection of TCO unions but rather size and 
economic power. Since, to my knowledge, there are no investigations that focus on 
ideological differences among the TCO unions one may presume that membership 
pressure is expressed more directly in TCO unions than in the other unions. This is
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also the result of studies that focus on TCO policy (Wheeler, 1975; Micheletti,
1985).
Furthermore, the selection of the individual unions is guided by the desire to give a 
relatively representative picture of the trade union movements in both countries. 
Therefore the most influential unions were attempted to be included in the investiga­
tion. This is under two aspects: on the one hand, the historically most influential 
unions should be included but, on the other hand, also the biggest unions should be 
considered. Among all these factors, a compromise strategy had to be found (34]. 
Finally, the unions included into this study should make it possible to compare similar 
unions in both countries. This is difficult because unions organize their members in 
respect to different criteria [35].
3. THE DEBATE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AS AN INDICATOR FOR THE ADOPTION 
OF ELEMENTS OF NEW POLITICS 
In this section I wish to clarify how to empirically identify elements of new and pro­
ductionist politics in trade unions. I will use the debate on nuclear energy by trade 
unions. Intense research on one single issue has several consequences which shall 
be discussed in the following section. An issue is a conflict between relevant groups 
in society over substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or 
resources (Cobb and Elder, 1983). In party and election research, issues have played 
an important role for a long time (e.g. Sjdblom, 1968; Janda, 1980; Budge and 
Farlie, 1983). I am not primarily interested in the issue setting and life cycle of an 
issue, but I wish to use an issue in order to reduce societal complexity (Budge and 
Farlie, 1983). Issues reflect the political world on a smaller scale, or as Lane and 
Ersson (1987: 40) put it: "Cleavages crop up in the political system as issues to be 
dealt with by the decision-making structures..." By considering only one issue, I 
reduced the complexity of the topic, but by doing so a bias of the issue influences 
the outcome of the research (e.g. the life-cycle, the development, situational factors, 
and the context of the issue). This seems to be unavoidable and must be taken into 
the account when we interpret the findings.
Gamson (1988: 220/1) suggests that themes or issues should be thought of as 
packages of idea elements in a dialectical manner. There is no theme without a coun­
ter-theme. Packages are relevant patterns of arguments which are shaped by the cul­
tural frames of a society. The different packages constitute the relevant (the empiri­
cally existing) discourse on an issue. Social discourse is "... a particular set of ideas 
and symbols that are used in the process of constructing meanings relevant to the
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struggle." (Gamson, 1988:221) 136]. Collective actors are important in creating and 
modifying the valid (socially legitimated) packages. The social discourse on nuclear 
energy of trade unions reflect the construction of meaning by the trade unions and is 
part of the definition relations as outlined in chapter one.
The debate on nuclear energy very well serves the purpose to identify standpoints in 
the context of new and productionist politics. Nuclear energy is debated very contro­
versially, or as Wildavsky and Tenenbaum (1981: 11/12) put it, it is set in a 
"polarized issue-context" by a variety of politically relevant actors. A polarized issue 
context makes the actual issue less important. In this situation actors perceive all 
other actors with different opinion on the issue as enemies. References to "facts" are 
used to justify one's own policy and conviction. Several authors already used nuclear 
energy as an issue for illustrating the conflicting world-views about the development 
of modern society [37]. Also on the empirical level, findings show a very high corre­
lation between post-material values and anti-nuclear attitudes. In most of the studies 
on new social movements, the anti-nuclear power movement is the movement with 
the highest post-material score (e.g.: Muller-Rommel, 1985a; Inglehart, 1989; 1990). 
Alain Touraine points out that the anti-nuclear movement is ".. the one [movement; 
D.J.] furthest from the assumption of industrial society." (Touraine et al., 1987:
221). Green party involvement and anti-nuclear power attitudes also correlate 
strongly (Pappi, 1989). Cotgrove and Duff demonstrate this point by illustrating the 
close relationship between environmentalists and anti-nuclear attitudes:
Nuclear power stations in particular have come to have a deep symbolic significance: centralized, tech­
nologically complex and hazardous, and reinforcing alt those trends in society which environmentalists 
most fear and dislike • the increasing domination of experts, threatening the freedom of the individual, 
and reinforcing totalitarian tendencies. Opposition to nuclear power is seen for many as a key issue on 
which to take a stand against the further advance of an alliance between state power and commercial 
interests. For the objectors, the material advantages from nuclear power cannot justify the risks 
involved. (Cotgrove and Duff, 1980: 338; italics added, D.J.)
However, the general argument is that anti-nuclear attitudes coincide with the prefe­
rence for a different concept of the societal development. As most of the analytical 
(Cotgrove and Duff, 1980; Kitschelt, 1984; Meyer-Abich and Schefold, 1986; Lewin,
1984) and empirical studies (Fruh, 1981; Holmberg and Asp, 1984; Braczyk et al., 
1985; Asp, 1986; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989) show, there are several relevant 
dimensions when social actors argue about nuclear energy. In particular, Gamson 
and Modigliani point out that attitudes must not be coherent and free of inherent 
contradictions.
For the moment, we may refer to the stand on nuclear energy of the trade unions as 
the dependent variable. However, this needs further specification. I wish to distin­
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guish three elements of the analysis that may be considered on a continuum from 
relatively direct measurements of nuclear energy towards more context bound indica­
tors. The latter focuses more specifically on productionist and new politics aspects. 
First, positive evaluation of nuclear energy may serve as a very rough indicator for 
productionist attitudes. However, nuclear energy may be negatively evaluated by 
actors who favor another energy resource. This negative evaluation would have 
nothing to do with the rejection of a productionist development of society. 
Nevertheless, the evaluation of nuclear energy is an important first step of the 
analysis, because it gives a first clue about more contextually related attitudes. The 
second way of analyzing the dependent variable takes advantage of the fact that the 
debate on nuclear energy is context bound and that different aspects are stressed 
when arguing for or against nuclear power. In order to make this idea accessible to 
empirical research, one can apply a research method that builds on social discourse. 
The basic assumption here is that social perceptions and preferences of reality are 
determined by individual or collective ideologies and socio-political orientations within 
a cultural and situational context (38]. The third indicator elaborates this point and 
builds upon those statements that refer to the semantics of new and productionist 
politics.
I wish to present some aspects of the applied content analyses in this study (for the 
technical aspects see appendix: 3). I use two different methods that complement 
each other: in order to obtain a reliable measure for the evaluation of nuclear energy 
I apply the evaluation assertion analysis as developed by Osgood, Nunnally, and 
Saporta (1956). This method measures intensities of evaluation on a range between - 
3 and + 3. The interpretation of the El-lndex (Evaluation Intensity) is straight for­
ward: empirical values between + /- 0.5 are rather neutral. Until + /- 1.5 the evalua- , 
tion is clear but not extreme. A value up to + /- 2.5 can be considered as rather 
strong and above this level the evaluation is very extreme. The Evaluative Assertion 
Analysis is especially suited to measure intensities of evaluation but neglects all con­
text variables. However, the dimensional content analysis and social discourse 
analysis are in particular suited to analyze the context.
The second content analysis builds upon categories and statements. The categories 
in the debate on nuclear energy can be deduced in several ways. According to con­
ducted content analyses in the field [39] the categories shown in table 2-2 may be 
suited for the analysis of the nuclear energy debate in trade unions. Each category 
consists of several statements. Each statement is formulated positively and negati­
vely in respect to nuclear energy. Statements which are not clearly pro- or anti- y
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nuclear energy are summarized under neutral. All in all, there are approximately 80 
statements for each value.
TABLE 2-2: Categories in the Debate on Nuclear Energy
pro nuclear 
energy con nuclear energy neutral
Technical Aspects
Energy Policy
- Energy Supply
- Nuclear Energy 
and other Energy 
Sources
Economy- Economic Welfare
- Energy Costs
- Price Comparison
Labor Market
- Employment Effects
- Comparison of Employ­
ment effects with 
other sectors
- Work Environment
Security
- Safety- Safety in Comparisonto other Energy Sources- Security Measures- Perception of Risks
.Environment
- Effects on the 
Environment
- Environmental Effects 
of Nuclear Energy in 
Comparison to other 
Energy Forms
Politics- Nuclear Energy as a Political Question and its Legitimations
- Political Procedures
- National and International 
Aspects
- Ideological Aspects
Future Society
- Societal Development
- Organization of 
Society
Others
Both methods of content analysis give a detailed picture of the standpoints on 
nuclear energy. The evaluative assertion analysis measures very exactly the evalua­
tion of nuclear energy and some specific aspects of it (reprocessing, waste storage, 
phasing-out schedules, etc.) but is not able to take this context into the account. The
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latter aspect is exactly the strong point of a quantitative content analysis built on 
statements. However, the statements can only be measured in relative broad 
categories. Furthermore, content analysis building on statements is unable to 
measure intensity. Both content analysis complement one another.
For the analysis at the more abstract and analytical level, I constructed an index that 
builds more directly upon the theoretical aspects of the literature on new politics. In 
this view, productionist and new politics are two competing paradigms concerning 
the development of industrial society: "Paradigms are not only beliefs about what the 
world is like and guides to action: they also serve the function of legitimating or 
justifying courses of action. That is to say, they function as ideologies. ... The strug­
gle to universalize a paradigm is part of the struggle for power." (Cotgrove, 1982:
88) [40] At this point, I wish to illustrate the competing paradigms of productionist 
and new politics in an ideal-typical manner.
The concept of different paradigms has been extensively applied in the field of new 
politics (Raschke, 1980; Cotgrove, 1982; Kitschelt, 1984; Offe, 1985c; Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1989). However, the analysis of world views remains always a bit arbi­
trary. The following classification of the semantic of productionist and new politics is 
based on the findings of the above mentioned works [41]. In order to construct an 
index which may indicate the adoption of elements of new politics, I singled out 
statements which are possible to identify in the empirical material. For that I distin­
guish between three dimensions and twelve subdimensions: first, statements that 
indicate different economic world views; second, statements that refer to the rela­
tionship between social needs and the manner of production; third, statements of 
societal development and political process [42]. The following statements 
represented in table 2-3 serve to identify the semantics of new and productionist po­
litics in the debate on nuclear energy.
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Table 2»3i Dimension* end Indicator* Cor New and Product lonlet Politics In Trad* Unions within the Contest of the Osbste on Nuclear Energy
Dim- Subd l«iene lone ene-ions
PBOOUCTIOW1ST 
POLITICS NEW POLITICS
S t a t e( I n d i e ai e n t •a t o r a)
EconomicConcepts
exclusion of eoclal costs/ business accounts or quanti­fication Into ino ne y terss
Emphasis on social and "Intangible”coets
EconomicAsseesment
of Nuclear Inirgy
Stability of costs Phaeing-out le economics!ly irrational because of high investments
Instability of coete Phasing-out is economicel ly feasible; Inveetswnts 
should «ore strongly focus on alternatives
CoreValuee
Economic growth ie necessary
Preference to iisprove matsrlal living stsndards; without nuclear energy Is «leery
Cconoeiic growth is 
not neceeeary Preference to su in- tain Material living etsndsrdei no mleery without nucleer energy
There are no lisilts to
?rowthheap eneroy ie needed for Improving pro­duction and tUe living etanriard
There ere lleilte to growthExpensive energy ie needed in order to eave resourcee and the envlronsttnt
Knowledge Technological progress solves preeent and future problema
Preference to combine 
alternative techno­logies and nuclear energy
Teclino log leal pro- grees cannot solve preeent and future 
probleeis Preference for 
alternative techno­log lee in order to 
phaee-out of nuclear
Organisation
ofProduct ion
Preference of large- ecale production; 
esull-scale production ie unrealistic Continuation of 
preeent development of energy production
Preference for email- ecele production} 
laroe-ecale production le Inhuman Break-off with the the present development of energy production
Employment 
and the OrgenlzatIon 
ofProduction
High energy eupply creates employment or reducee unemployment
Employment aspect Is soat important in the contest of nuclear energy
There is no deterslnlstlc caueal relatlonehip between eneray eupply and employment; Increaeed energy supply does not reduce unemployment There sre more Important aepects than employment aepecte in the contest of nuclear energyi there are higher goale than employ.
SocietalFreedom Nuclear energy prevents or crsates energy political opt ionsNuclear energy is Important for the well-being of future generations Nuclear energy createe the material bass for
Nuclesr energy determines or limits energy political opt lone
Nuclesr energy endangers future generatlone
Nuclear energy doee not create the sutsrial base
social rsforms « Nuclear eneroy improvee living conditions in d«v«loping countrisa
for social reforme - Nuclear energy endangere conditions snd 
traditions in developing countrlee
Democracy
andTartlclpatIon
- Nuclaar energy does 
not endanger desK>cracy; phaaing-out may lead to sn endang- ermont of democracy- Conatmckloii delayssre dangerous (or future energy eupply or employment
- Nuclear energy endangers 
and leads to a pollce- state (Atometaat, klrn- samhilie)
- Construction delays may open up the possibility of rethinking about nuclear energy
- Paar and worry la unnecesssry and irrational in decision 
processes
- rear and worry ie well- grounded and ahould be taken into conelderation 
in decision processes
RiskAsseesment
If nucleer eneroy ie dangerous we will
(hase out i as long as t ie not proven that nuclear energy is dangerous we continue with It
Rieke of nuclear energy are acceptable; sost rleke we must 
take
Occurred accidents do not prove that nuclear 
energy la too dangerousThere Ie no danger of genetic djusegee; there •re threehold valuee
Ae long ae It is not clear that nucl«ar energy la completely save, we should not construct or use nuclesr energy and we must shut down ealetlno plsnts Rieke of nuclear are unacceptable; nucleer energy hae a another dimension of risks tlt«n other dangers of life Occurred accidents «how 
that nuclear energy Ie too dengeroue
There le • high danger of genetic demagee; there are no threehold valus«) radiation 1« always dangerous
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The following brief description of the dimensions should only give an overview about 
the content of the paradigms of new and productionist politics. The literature men­
tioned above discusses these concepts in greater detail. Particularly Cotgrove (1982) 
and Kitschelt (1984) give a systematic and detailed overview.
(1.) Economy: The discussion on new and productionist politics stresses the fact that 
there are two competing economic concepts. On the one hand, radical productionist 
conceptualize costs by means of business accounts. If social costs are included into 
the business account they enter it in terms of quantified money terms. Proponents of 
new politics stress to a higher degree "intangible" costs (life, traditions, culture, eco­
systems etc.) which cannot be translated into money terms. On the ground of these 
different preconditions, one can identify conflicting economic assessments of nuclear 
energy: on the productionist side, costs of nuclear energy are stable and investments 
are profitable as long as the profitability is not undermined by political action. On the 
other hand, costs of nuclear energy are perceived as unlimited.
(2.) Needs and Production: This dimension stresses different values and needs, on 
the one hand, and different principles of production for the satisfaction of this values 
and needs, on the other. The creation of wealth for productionist is a moral impera­
tive (Cotgrove, 1982: 28). The defining characteristic of new politics is the contra­
sting paradigm or ideology that questions the emphasis on wealth and material well­
being that is prevalent in modern society (Cotgrove, 1982; Kitschelt, 1984: 20-3; 
Dalton et al., 1990: 10/1). Economic growth is a key concept. Considering these 
core values, proponents of productionist and new politics have different perceptions 
of nature and knowledge. Productionists see nature as an ample reserve which 
should mainly serve the needs of humankind and can be exploited by needs of tech­
nological progress. The opposite position stresses the limited resources which 
demands a careful treatment of natural resources. Human knowledge, in particular in 
form of technological progress, is limited and therefore the natural balance should 
not be disturbed. Consequently, both world views are for substantially different con­
cepts of societal productions. Productionists want a continuation of large-scale pro­
duction. For trade unions employment aspects are most important in this concept. 
From the point of view of proponents of new politics a reorganization of societal pro­
duction is necessary that stresses small-scales and human organization of work. In 
this view the results of production are more important than just high employment 
rates.
(3.) Utopias of Societal and Political Development: The last dimension focuses on dif­
ferent perceptions of social development and grounds for decision-making of social
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development [43J. Both world views answer the question about the societal conse­
quence of nuclear energy differently. The notion utopia is not being used here in a 
sense of an unattainable dream: rather it is a set of beliefs about how society should 
really work (Cotgrove, 1982: 46). For productionists, nuclear energy opens up new 
possibilities while it is the opposite in the view of new politics. The rationality for 
decisions are also different. Productionists prefer an instrumental rationality and 
demand a separation of facts and values, and thoughts and feelings. Furthermore 
they are prepared to take certain risks. Proponents of new politics, in contrast, wish 
to integrate facts and values, and rationality and emotions. They are much less pre­
pared to take risk which they also see much higher and severe than productionist.
All the statements of the described dimensions - economic concepts, social needs 
and production, and utopias of societal and political development - are included into 
an index that indicates the adoption of elements of new politics [44]. The index may 
be an indicator for more complex cognitive maps [45]. Technically, the ANPE-lndex 
(Adoption of New Politics Elements) can take values between -100 (absolute rejec­
tion of new politics elements and absolute stress of productionist aspects) and +100  
(absolute adoption of new politics elements and absolute rejection of productionist 
aspects). However, since the index is limited by its potential maximum value, the 
number of cases and the fact that it refers to relatively abstract or extreme concepts 
it can be expected that it scores most frequently around 0 [46]. Unfortunately the 
ANPE-lndex is not as straight forward as the El-lndex. Since the index builds upon 
the fact that statements are mentioned which refer to new or productionist aspects a 
low value can be caused either by a high number of both new and productionist 
statements or by not referring to those arguments. From the empirical distribution it 
is fair to conclude that a score of + /- 8.3 can be considered as containing some 
elements of new or productionist elements (2 statements dominated), up until 20.8 
(5 statements dominated) the direction can be considered to be quite clear. All values 
exceeding this value are extreme for trade unions in this study [47]. However, this 
clear guidelines are only valid for the individual motions, debates or newspaper 
articles. The mean values are often much lower because a substantial number of the 
analyzed material does not contain elements of new and/or productionist politics and 
is therefore 0.
Footnotes:
1 Pfeffer (1982: 1-40, in particular table 1-1, p. 13) distinguishes theories between two dimen­
sions. On the one hand, the level of analysis can either be on the individual, coalition, and other sub­
units or encompass the total organization. Since I am interested in the total organization all theories on 
the other level can be dismissed for my analysis. The other theories that can be subsumed into the 
categories which are purposive, intentional, goal directed, rational. These are beside structural contin­
gency theory, market failures/transaction costs, and Marxist or class theories. The latter two theories 
are not well fitted for the analysis of voluntary organizations. Market failure/transaction cost theories
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have greater relevance for commercial than noncommercial enterprises (Pfeffer, 1982: 134; 
Williamson, 1981: 35) The Marxist approaches are rather relevant for the analysis of the work organi­
zations and the nature of employment relationships than the behavior of voluntary organizations 
(Pfeffer, 1982: 163).
The perspective of the second group of theories is externally constrained and controlled. Here popula­
tion, ecology and resource dependence theory is placed by Pfeffer. The former approach is disqualified 
for my analysis because it can only be applied to populations of organizations. Tne major research 
interest is tne life cycles of organizations. Since we neither consider population of organizations nor a 
time period, where we can make out life cycles, this approach is excluded from this analysis. The third 
set of theories perceive organizational action as emergent, almost-random, and dependent on process. 
It is also social construction. Pfeffer encounters here theories that consider organizations as paradigms, 
decision process and administrative theories, and institutionalization theory. Decision process theories 
such as tne garbage can model are not completely applicable in my investigation because concrete 
decisions are not in the focus of the analysis. However, some elements are discussed because con­
gress decisions are touched upon. I have subsumed as social process theory an approach - besides 
organization as a paradigm and institutionalization theory • that builds upon organizational cognitions.
In particular, Karl Weick s evolutionary approach to organizing as a social process is applicable at the 
organization level as well. For that, however, cause maps, one key element in this theory, must be 
referred to the entire organization instead of individual actors. In conclusion we have one representa­
tive here from all three classes of organization theory: rational theory (structural contingency), external 
constrained theory (resource dependence), and social process theory (institutionalization, social pro­
cess of organizing).
2 The name contingency theory is based on the assumption that one or a set of relatively inde­
pendent variable(s) has a more or less direct effect on another (set of) dependent variables. Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1967) coined the label contingency theory (Scott, 1987: 88) by stressing the fact that the 
environment determines organizational structure and behavior. They conclude: 'Internal attributes of 
organization, in terms of structure and orientation, can be tested for goodness of fit with various envi­
ronmental variables and the predisposition of members.“ (Lawrence and Lorsch. 1967: 209) Perrow's 
concept of technology elaborates on the membership characteristic and puts it in a more sophisticated 
analytical framework. However, Perrow deduces the term contingency theory from the causal relation­
ship between technology and organizational structure and behavior: a0ne merit of the "technological 
school," or contingency theory as it has come to be called, is that, it provides for some independent 
leverage in constructing typologies, because it focuses on something more or less analytically indepen­
dent or structure and goals - the tasks or techniques utilized in organizations.* (Perrow, 198o: 141)
3 It must be noted that these analyses concentrated more on the impact of organizational struc­
ture and/or organizational efficiency. This emphasis on formal or economic factors is not implicrt in the 
approach, but it is also possible to refer it to organizational goals and organizational behavior (e.g. Blau 
and Schoenherr, 1971). However, the argument often goes that technology and environment have an 
impact on organizational formal structure (processes or formalization, bureaucratization, rationalization, 
professionalization, etc.) which in turn has an effect on organizational behavior and orientation.
There has been some work done on trade unions within this tradition. Most explicit, Child and 
Associates (1973) and Wolfgang Streeck employ an organization theoretical approach. The former de­
velops a more general organization theoretical framework for the analysis of trade unions while the lat­
ter investigates the organizational impact of neo-corporatism (environment) on the social structure of 
West German labor unions (administrative rationalization) and its consequences for the organization of 
its membership (Streeck, 1981 and 1982). Axel Hadenius (1976) traces the very organizational deve­
lopment of the Swedish blue collar trade union movement in order to explain the impact of centraliza­
tion of decision-making and integration of organizational units in union representation. For the Ameri­
can context, Delaney and colleagues (1988) attempted to explain political lobbying behavior by em­
ploying a set of organizational variables.
4 Two challenges within the concept of structural contingency theory are of special importance: 
first, Herbert Simon (1957) develops the concept of bounded rationality in which rational benavior is 
oriented at satisfaction instead of goal maximization. The notion satisfaction implies that the process of 
choice is ended when an option is available that satisfies the actors' aspiration level. However, the 
concept of bounded rationality is very time-dependent. As soon as new information is considered the 
basis for satisfaction may erode (Pfeffer, 1982: 5-8; Wiesenthal, 1987: 46-51; Wiesenthal, 1988: 76- 
85). Furthermore, bounded rationality choice recognizes that search is costly and that heuristic factors 
are important for the decision-making process. The other important qualification of the deterministic ra­
tional implication of the contingency theory has been elaborated by John Child (1972). He concedes 
that the relationship between tne variables leaves enough space for "strategic choices" for the leaders 
of organizations. While bounded rationality opens the door for cognitive, situational, etc. interpreta­
tions, the latter makes it possible to look at intra-organizational power relations. Both aspects, how­
ever, are elaborated upon in the framework of the other theoretical approaches. However, for the 
empirical analysis I wish to specify some analytical concepts of the structural contingency approach.
5 The technology of business trade unions as they are more common in the USA is wage. Politi­
cal or social trade unions, however, strive, besides for the improvement of the economic situation of 
their members, also for more abstract goals and they have a broader societal perceptive. Therefore po­
litical trade unions are often caught between the interests of their members, the national economy, so­
cial justice and equality, and reform politics and the transition of society. As a consequence, when the 
interests of the members become diversified and social development is ambiguous, organizations get 
into trouble. This reflection on trade union technology was inspired by a personal conversation with 
Charles Perrow at the Annual Congress of the Austrian, German and Swiss Sociological Associations 
in ZGrich, autumn 1988.
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6 There are two different traditions in the trade union research of intermediary organizations. One 
is based on studies of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt am Main in West Germany 
(Bergmann, et al., 1976; Muller-Jentsch, 1985). Starting from Marx's view of trade unions as revolu­
tionary and Goetz Briefs' analysis of the transition of trade unions from the 'classical* to the 
"institutionalized'' trade union (befestigte Gewerkschaft: perhaps better translated by consolidated 
unions. Institutionalized unions, however, is the translation of Muller-Jentsch) the authors analyze 
trade unions on a continuum from state controlled/yellow unions to revolutionary/syndicalist unionism. 
Intermediary organizations are in the middle of this continuum and reach from cooperative trade 
unionism over 'social contract' bargaining to militant trade unionism (Muller-Jentsch, 1985: 15*19).
The other tradition deduces the term intermediary organization from organization theory and neo-cor­
poratism. In particular, Wolfgang Streeck's work (1981; 1982) on the formalization and professionali­
zation of West German trade unions builds upon the Max Weber's work on charismatic and bureaucra­
tic leadership. He brings together Webers's famous account of the "routinization of charisma” in terms 
of neo-structural organization theory in the tradition of Blau and the neo-corporatist system of interest 
intermediation. He then perceives trade unions on a continuum from social movement to "work organi­
zation". Trade unions move aside from the social movement and are now voluntary organization or 
intermediary organizations, half way towards the work organization (Streeck, 1981: 24-41).
7 That a higher degree of environmental coordination with other organizations etc. is expected to 
decrease the organization's uncertainty but simultaneously increases the dependency is a common ar­
gument of organization theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1987: 129).
8 Weick starts out from a work by Donald T. Campbell who is one of the most important con­
temporary exponents of an evolutionary model adapted to social behavior. In this context, he refers 
above all to tne following work of Cambbell: Natural Selection as an Epistemolooical Model. In R. Naroll 
and R. Cohen (eds.), A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology. Garden City, New York: Natural 
History Press, pp. 51-85 (1970); On the Genetics of Altruism and tne Counter-Hedonic Components in 
Human Culture. Journal of Social Issues, 28 (3): 21-37 (1972); Evolutionary Epistemologv. In P.A. 
SchHij)p (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper (Vol. 14-1). LaSalle, III.: Open court, pp. 413-463
9 March and Olsen distinguish between an access structure (enacted environment) and decision 
structure (part of the selection process) (March and Olsen, 1984: 746). See also Luhmann's (1986) 
concept or organizational resonance and codes in the context of ecological communication.
10 It should be noted that the selected cause maps are used for the selection of enacted environ­
ments. In this way, there is a double selection process: the selection of cause maps (by effectiveness 
criteria), and the selection of elements of an enacted environment (by the selected cause maps).
11 As Weick points out a fact that explains as to why people in organizations seem to act in ways 
that contradict what they say. The same impression I got, when I started with interviews of trade 
union officials on this issue. The development of the DGB to express their opposing attitude towards 
nuclear energy was seen as a result of a long-lasting process that could only lead to the present deci­
sions in the eyes of the interviewees.
12 Another direction of this tradition considers the interrelationship of organizations (Aldrich,
1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Recently. Hannan and Freeman (1988) analyzed the life span and 
mortality of American labor unions from 1836 until 1985 in this tradition.
13 Although the analysts of coalition formation and coalition behavior can start with ideas from 
political science on coalitions, organizational coalitions differ in several basic ways: first, most organi­
zations have much more elaborate control and socialization systems, which means that there exists an 
ideology of an overarching organizational goal and more trust and commonly shared values than in 
legislature. Second, coalitions in organizations have a history which is often not considered in the re­
search of experimental groups, one direction of coalition research in political science. The third diffe­
rence is that organizational coalitions are not rational in the sense of maximization of profit. Instead of 
keeping the coalition as small as possible (but certainly big enough to win) which would guarantee the 
highest win, organizational coalitions normally strive to be as big as possible, a sign of social rationality 
(legitimation).
14 Concerning our research interest, it is interesting to note what Philip Selznick, the "father" of 
institutionalization theory thought about the analyses of organization. Scott concludes: "He (Selznick; 
D.J.] proposes that we will learn more interesting things aoout organizations if we do not attempt to 
examine the satisfaction of all needs of the organism but, like Freud, focus on those needs "which 
cannot be fulfilled within approved avenues of expression" (1948:32) (quoted from Scott, 1987: 65)
15 Lynne Zucker refers in the first sentence to: A. Schütz (1962) Collected Papers I: the Problem 
of Social Reality, in: M. Natason (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Niihoff. In the last sentence she refers to 
an unpublished paper by J. Meyer (1971): Institutionalization, Stanford University.
16 Weick speaks against compromises and in favor of conflict. Compromises take away the re­
source to react because only composites have been retained: "The crucial point is that, in effecting the 
compromise solution, important adaptive responses have been selected against and nonadaptive, 
moderate responses nave been preserved." (Weick, 1979: 220)
17 Since the monological logic reduces complexity to a relatively easily overlooked dimension it 
may be referred to as the logic of the highest common denominator (KevStsalo, 1986: 35-7).
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18 I do not wish to go deeper into the problematic application of the concept of monological and 
dialogical logics of collective action in different interest groups. There seems to be some evidence that 
business organizations also apply dialogical strategies (streeck, 1990; Traxler, 1991). However, this 
concept still seems to be useful for analyzing trade union organizations. It is also compatible to the so­
cial theory of "communicative action" (Habermas, 1981, especially vol.2: 367-452).However, the em­
pirical judgement of the intra-organizational process in trade unions are different. The authors referring 
to (German) trade unions as intermediary organizations (Müller-Jentsch, 1985; Streeck, 1981; 1982) 
postulate that economism of trade unions increases and dialogical dispute fades. On the other hand, 
Claus Offe comes to the conclusion that the replacement of representative democracy by corporative 
decision making leads - at least for the West German case * to an increased intraorganizational and 
noninstitutionaf conflict (Offe, 1981: 150-155). In particular, the former aspect implies that trade 
unions conflict about social issues in their organizations.
19 The number of comparisons increase rapidly with the increase of the number of cases: N of 
comparisons *  (N of cases * (N of cases -1 )/2). That means that a comparison of 19 cases • as in 
this study - leads to 171 possible comparisons. This number is impossible to handle considering the 
aspiration of qualitative research.
20 See for instance: Inglehart 1977; 1981; Brand (ed.), 1985; Kitschelt 1986a; 1986b; Jahn and 
Müller-Rommel, 1987; Poguntke, 1987; Dalton, 1988: MOHer-Rommel (ed.), 1989; Dalton and 
Kuechler (eds.) 1990; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991. These works strikingly demonstrate that one can­
not conclude that all countries experience the same development of new politics. However, the basic 
characteristics, as described above, are more or less the same. There Is cross-national variation con­
cerning the expression and chances of new politics.
21 However, there are some additional points which are helpful for the comparison of Sweden and 
the Federal Republic of Germany because some "variables" are rather similar in both countries. In 
Sweden and West Germany, environmental issues play a relatively important role over the last 
decades. For instance, the Swedish Riksdag (parliament) election of 1988 has been labelled as the 
"ecology election* and also in 1976 and 1979, nuclear energy played a very important rote in the elec­
tion campaigns and public debate. In West Germany the electoral success of the Greens is the most 
obvious indicator for the significance of environmental issues over the last decade. Furthermore, both 
countries have nuclear power plants. Additionally, Sweden and West Germany have simitar trade union 
systems • a more research pragmatical reason of a comparison of Swedish and West German unions • 
which makes a comparison at aU possible. Finally, both countries have trade unions which perform 
guite well in comparison to declining unionism in most other major industrial societies (Katzenstein, 
1987: 28).
22 The terms, socialist and bourgeois, are accepted for differentiating between the socialist parties 
(Social democratic party and Communist party) on the one hand, and the Liberal, Center, and Conser­
vative parties on the other. This distinction, therefore, is used in a neutral sense.
23 Douglas Webber argues that in the 1970s the labor market policy of the bourgeois government 
in Sweden had more Social Democratic features than the labor market policy of the German Social- 
Liberal government. Birgitta Nedelmann compares the cultural institutionalization of the commitment 
towards full-employment in both countries. She concludes that in Sweden even bourgeois governments 
have to obey to the 'cultural milieu" that has been shaped for more than half a century by Social 
Democrats. An important element within Swedish politics is the common sense or samförstSnd 
(Henningsen. 1986: 227-230). The People's Home, fo/khemmetis another important concept in this 
connection that was introduced by Per Albin Hansson in 1928. That means that all members of Swe­
dish society should live equally. It is possible to see in this concept a first loosely defined social 
welfare program that aimed to improve the living conditions of ordinary citizens (Hadenius, 1985: 41) 
This cultural common sense and the welfare program of the Social Democratic Party was the base for 
the Saftsjöbaden agreement between Social Democrats, LO and the Swedish Employers' Confederation 
in 1938. One can easily refer the solidaric wage policy to these cultural roots as well. The solidaric , 
wage policy attempts to decrease the wage drift on the labor market. This concept is the key element 
of Swedish (blue) collar trade union policy (Meidner and Hedborg, 1984). Walter Korpi (1976: 74/5) 
stresses the importance of the homogeneity of Sweden which facilitated the realization of these con­
cepts. He encounters the following factors: racial and ethnic homogeneity, relative weakness of the 
church and religion, the late and rapid industrialization. Certainly geographical (rough climate, relatively 
peripheral) and historical factors (early centralization and administrative system) played important roles 
in shaping Sweden to the country which it is today.
24 However, this positive appraisal has also been counter-balanced by authors who stress the 
totalitarian character of Sweden (Huntford, 1972; see for a debate Henningsen, 1986). Particularly 
interesting is the changing opinion of Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. He wrote a "creed* for the functional 
socialism, a third way between capitalism and socialism in the late 1960s. In his later writings he criti­
cizes die material world picture of the Swedish way. This finds its expression in the writing of the 
Strangulation of Culture in Sweden by the same author (Adler-Karlsson, 1983).
25 Comparative analysis of new social movements and Green Parties stress the fact that Germany 
plays a model in this respect. See for instance: Brand, 1985; Müller-Rommel (ed.), 1989; Chandler and 
Siaroff, 1986; Poguntke, 1989a; Dalton et al. 1990: 4/5.
26 New politics was first analyzed in the West German context. This is also an indicator of the im- 1 
porta nee of the Federal Republic of Germany for this analysis. The basic consideration in terms of new | 
politics have been elaborated upon in the late 1970s (Dalton and Hildebrandt 1979; Baker et al., 13 
1981). That Dalton and Hildebrandt published their article two years before in a German political | J
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science journal may also be an indicator that also American scholars first preferred to express their 
ideas in the German context. Ronald Inglehart also found most support for his thesis of a value change 
in West Germany and Chandler and Siaroff connect value change and party politics and conclude that 
the Green Party in the Federal Republic of Germany is "... the first successful postmaterialist party." 
(Chandler and Siaroff, 1986: 305)
27 For an overview see: Andersson, 1975; Forsebäck, 1977; Elvander, 1983; Martin, 1984.
28 SACO/SR, Sveriges akademikers centra/organisation/ StatstjSnstemSnnens riksförbund, which 
will not be analyzed here, is the trade union organization for academics and high ranking white collar 
employees. Whereas LO and TCO often cooperate SACO/SR frequently goes its own way in stressing 
achievement aspects over solidaric aspects. While LO unions organize more than 2 million members 
and TCO unions more than 1 million, the 26 SACO/SR unions come to about 200 000 members.
29 There is also often a conflict between SALF, Sveriges Arbetsledareförbund (Swedish 
Association of Supervisors) and SIF and TCO. However, SALF is not a constant member union of TCO.
30 Beside the OGB and its unions, there are three smaller union confederations which I will not 
analyze in this study (Markovits, 1986; MiHce and Vilmer, 1983, from where the following data stem). 
While the DGB organizes about one third of the employed population or more than 80 percent of the 
organized work force, the white collar workers' unions in the Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft. 
DAG, organizes two percent (or around 5 percent of ail organized employees). The DAG opposes the 
unitary union system. The Deutscher Beamtenbund, DB8, or German Civil Servants' Federation orga­
nizes civil servants opposed to the unitary union system. It organizes 3.5 of the workinapopulation 
(8.7 percent of all organized employees). Finally, there is a small Christian trade union. Christlicher 
Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschlands, CGB with 1.2 percent of the employed population (3 percent of all 
organized employees).
31 Bain and Price (1980) classify three LO unions as non-manual: FörsäkringsanstWdas förbund 
(Social Insurance Employees), HandelsanstSlldas förbund (Commercial Employees) and the Musikerför- 
bundet (Musicians). However, some other unions may also have small numbers of white collar em­
ployees among their membership.
32 For Germany, I consider Arbeiter as manual or blue collar workers and Angestellte (employees 
or clerical staff) as white collar workers. However, there are also Beamte (tenured civil servants for 
whom collective bargaining is prohibited; see for a glossary of the terms: Markovits, 1986), a group of 
employees that is made by its status. Beamte can be both blue or white collar workers.
33 Almost half of the membership of the Gewerkschaft Gartenbau, Land- und Forstwirtschaft 
(Horticulture, Agriculture and Forestry Workers' Union) is employed in the public sector (Visser, 1989: 
88).
34 Since the selection of the individual unions had to take place relatively early in the research 
process insights which have been obtained in the research process were not available in the beginning. 
However, the selection of the unions seems reasonable to me. There is always the temptation to 
include one or more additional trade unions. In particular the construction workers' unions in both 
countries or a white collar union in the social and commercial sector in Sweden. Furthermore, a union 
exclusively organizing workers in the public sectors - apart from the teachers union - would have been 
desirable tot West Germany (e.g. Postal Workers' Union or Railroad Workers' Union). However, this 
was prohibited by lack of further research resources.
35 The comparison between two countries is also a difficult undertaking because union structures 
in two countries - even though relatively similar in both countries • are quite different. Alone the fact 
that LO organizes 24 unions (as of 1989 23) and TCO 20 and the DGB just 17 (as of 1989 16) makes 
it extremely difficult to pick corresponding unions. For instance, to find a counterpart for HBV would 
have led to the inclusion of three TCO unions (Union of Commercial Salaried Employees, Swedish Bank 
Employees' union, and the union of Insurance Employees). On the other hand, also in this research 
design several compromises had to be made. For instance SF and ST organize railway and postal 
workers which in turn are two individual unions in the Federal Republic of Germany.
36 See also: Gamson, 1990; Habermas, 1981; van Dijk, 1985; Gamson, 1988; Galtung, 1989. 
Jurgen Habermas describes at length the communication process in society. However, important in the 
context of social discourse is that understanding always refers just to a part of the actors world view 
and that all pre-understanding remains latent in the communication situation (Habermas, 1981:
149/59, vol.: 1).
37 See for instance Touraine et al., 1983; Kitschelt, 1983; 1984; Meyer-Abich and Schefold,
1986; Vedung, 1980; Lewin 1984; Gamson, 1988; Häusler, 1988; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; von 
Oppeln, 1989.
38 The analytical framework can be based on inter-subjective procedures (van den Berg and van 
der Veer, 1989), cultural frames (Gamson, 1987; 1988; Gamson and Modilgiani, 1989) or • as 
proposed here - deduction from analytical and theoretical concepts. The latter approach may be seen 
as superior because it is connected to social theory or at least to social scientific debates.
39 The conducted content analyses that have been used for the categories here are: Braczyk et al., 
1985; Früh, 1981; Kitschelt 1984; Holmberg and Asp, 1984; Lewin, 1984; Grumbach, 1986; Meyer- 
Abich and Schefold, 1986. However, I adjusted these categones for the analysis of the nuclear debate 
in trade unions. That means that labor market arguments have an individual dimension because this is
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the major domain of trade unions. Furthermore, most empirical content analyses (Braczyk at al., 1985; 
Früh, 1981; Holmberg and Asp, 1984) do not include analytical aspects concerning my research que­
stion. Analytical analyses (Vedung, 1980; Kitschelt, 1984; Meyer-Abich and Schefold, 1986) often 
refer to very abstract and complex aspects which are not easily accessible for empirical research. 
Compromises also had to be made because a large scale data collection needs to Be clear enough for 
coding assistants who are not familiar with the lengthy and often difficult debates on the topic. The 
data collection of social discourses is based on "intelligent* coders who also read between the lines 
(the latent content of a text). This requirement increases the validity, but decreases the reliability.
In each country two independent native speaking coders worked on the material. The reliability lies by 
about 80 percent (all valid codings divided by all in valid codings). However, this reliability score refers 
to the individual statements. Combination of statements in levels, dimensions, and indices increase this 
value since confusion most often exists between similar statements. At this point I wish to thank 
Gunilla Augustsson, Eva Bemdtsson, Gunnel Vessman, Volker Eickhoff, and Doris Wilting who 
collected the data in a thorough manner.
40 The concept paradigm builds on the pioneer work by Thomas Kuhn (1970). Kuhn was struck 
by the fact that science does not progress by subsequent steps where the next discovery follows the 
former. In contrast he found out that some aspects of science undergo a revolutionary change. Sub­
sequent researchers perceive some area of scientific phenomena within different frameworks. "Facts* 
become different meanings and significants. Examples for this process are the combustion theory of 
oxygen which displaced phlogiston theory, and the plate theory of continental drift.
41 However, partly substantial modifications and adjustments had to be made particularly in the 
more abstract dimensions, because authors base their indicators on a qualitative content analysis or 
questionnaires. Although Kitschelt points out that his analysis may serve as a starting point for a quan­
titative content analysis (Kitschelt, 1984: 23) his analyzed statements are too abstract and ambiguous 
for direct application. Furthermore, in order to obtain ideal-typical classifications, the authors rely on 
extreme standpoints and statements by clearly identifiable proponents and opponents of new politics, 
etc. With trade unions I have to deal much more with a "mixed type* (Kitschelt 1984: 146; Cotgrove,
1982: 47/8, 91 /3) and therefore I need another calibration of my instrument which has to be based on 
more concrete concepts.
42 In addition, the literature on new politics often refers to the left orientation: new politics goes 
along with left attitudes and productionist politics with a preference for market economy (Kitschelt
1984: chapter 4; Poguntke, 1989a: 1989b; Dalton, 1988; etc.). These dimensions, however, are sup­
posed to be relatively independent from the evaluation of nuclear energy by trade unions. This is 
reason enough to exclude the left/right dimension from the calculation of trie index.
43 Although this dimension builds heavily on Kitsche It's work it includes different aspects as well. 
This because of two reasons: firsts Kitschelt summarizes in his dimension "Politik und Gesellschafts­
visionen in der Energiekontroverse arguments which are very much removed from the direct debate on 
nuclear eneroy and which can hardly be found in verbal statements but refer to a lengthy chain of 
arguments. An analysis of these argumentation chains would need a more thorough analysis of diffe­
rent social actors and their ideological and philosophical standpoints. A task a quantitative content 
analysis cannot fulfill in such a detail. As Khschett points out his analysis concentrates on extreme 
actors concerning the nuclear question. For instance he confronts statements of energy enterprises, on 
the one hand, with statements from anti-nuclear power movements, on the other hand. Furthermore he 
also includes scientific contributions such as articles and books which obviously concentrate stronger 
on ideological and philosophical aspects than political actors do in their programs and daBy politics. 
Second. Kitschelt focuses more on political than societal aspects. By doing so he neglects arguments 
that address concepts of societal development in the nuclear energy debate.
44 For the construction of indices see for instance: Friedrichs, 1980: 165-72; Krippendorff, 1980: 
40-2. The advantage to apply an index consists of the fact that it reduces complexity and increases re­
liability.
45 h is clear that this measure represents the concept of cognitive maps on a very aggregated 
level. However, the index is based on the fact that actors express causal relationships.
46 The ANPE-lndex is an index that takes into account the conflict between elements of new and 
productionist politics. Therefore it builds upon a NP-lndex (Elements of New Politics) and a PP-lndex 
(Elements of Productionist Politics). Both indices are put into relation to their theoretical maximum 
value and the number of cases. The index is calculated according to the equation below:
ANPE-lndex -  NP-lndex - PP-lndex
NP-lndex = E ((x / n) / N) * 100
PP-lndex = E ((x* / n') / N) • 100
x = number of all statements referring to new politics 
n = number of potential (maximum possible) statements referring 
to new politics
x' *  number of all statements referring to productionist politics 
n' « number of potential (maximum possible) statements referring 
to productionist politics 
N -  number of cases taken into consideration
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Since there are 24 statements for new politics and also 24 statements for productionist politics the 
index reaches +100 only when there are all 24 new politics statements mentioned but no produc­
tionist politics statement. Each statement scores 4.1/  on the ANPE-scale.
47 The distribution and statistics of the ANPE-lndex is given below:
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ADOPTING AND DISSEMINATING ELEMENTS OF NEW POLITICS BY SWEDISH AND 
WEST GERMAN TRADE UNIONS
PART 2
Part two consists only of one chapter that attempts to empirically specify the adop­
tion and dissemination of elements of new politics in Swedish and German trade 
unions. The presentation of the empirical data is conducted in this chapter on a very 
aggregated level. However, the method of content analysis allows for documentation 
of the processes in greater detail. Since the more detailed presentation may distract 
from the general argumentation I document the congressional debates in a chronolo­
gical manner in appendix 4.
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CHAPTER THREE:
ADOPTING AND DISSEMINATING NEW AND PRODUCTIONIST POLITICS AT THE 
TRADE UNION CONGRESSES AND IN THE TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
NEWSPAPERS
In this chapter, I wish to clarify the dependent variable', to what degree did trade 
unions adopt elements of new politics? The indicator for the adoption of elements of 
new politics relies basically on two aspects. First, I will analyze the adoption of new 
politics at the trade union congresses. Second, the disseminated picture of new and 
productionist politics in the trade union newspapers will be investigated. Both indica­
tors together are used for a classification of trade unions as rather open or closed 
towards elements of new politics. In particular I will concentrate on the national dif­
ferences so that we will get a preliminary answer to the above formulated 
hypotheses (B3) whether German or Swedish unions are more open to elements of 
new politics. The second question that will be considered in this chapter is: if  trade 
unions have adopted elements of new politics is this a continuing process 
(institutionalization) or is it ad hoc, situational or unsystematic (B5)?
Before I analyze the adoption of elements of new politics at the trade union congres­
ses and in the membership newspapers I wish to give a brief account of the invol­
vement of trade unions in decisions on nuclear energy in Sweden and Germany.
1. TRADE UNION INVOLVEMENT IN DECISIONS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY 
As has been outlined in chapter one, trade unions shape the political process, stabi­
lize present conditions or promote social change. This they do not do only by open 
intervention but rather by defining what can and should be done in society. 
Therefore the ideologies, values and beliefs of interest organizations constitute to a 
large degree the underlying power structure of modern societies. This is also true for 
energy policy (Lonnroth et al., 1977; Sahr, 1985). Apart from other interest groups, 
trade unions have been represented in the decision-making committees on nuclear 
power since the 1950s in both countries.
In Sweden, trade unions belong to those actors that have the most frequent contact 
with government agencies (Petersson, 1989: 112-36). Even more important, LO 
could influence the energy policy through its close relationship with the Social 
Democratic Party. TCO has also debated the nuclear power issue since the beginning 
within the advisory council IngenjdrsrSdet (Council of Engineers) in which among
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others SIF, ST, and SKTF participated [1]. TCO was also represented In several deci­
sion-making and advisory bodies and gave a substantial number of remiss replies 
(Micheletti, 1985: 54/5). For instance both LO and TCO were represented in the 
board of delegationen fdr energiforskning (DFE; Committee of Energy Research) 
(Wittrock and Lindstrom, 1984).
In Germany, the DGB was involved in nuclear energy policy-making through its later 
chairman Ludwig Rosenberg. Ludwig Rosenberg was a member of the Deutsche 
Atomkommission (DAtK; German Atom Commission) and the Kernreaktor Bau- und 
Betriebsgese/lscbaft GmbH (KBB, a private enterprise for construction and operation 
of nuclear power plants) and also chaired the DGB Committee on Nuclear Energy. 
The OTV had personal connections with the nuclear industry (DAtK and RWE, one of 
the biggest enterprises in the energy sector, and Bayerwerke AG) (Radkau, 1983: 
430-34; Grumbach, 1986: 99-148).
Although trade unions were not the major promoter of the nuclear power programs, 
they were still fascinated by the technological potential of an energy resource that 
would make it possible to reach an independent and unlimited national energy sup­
ply. This fascination went together well with the (socialist) values of technological, 
industrial and social progress. By and large, these values remained unchallenged until 
the early 1970s.
For the analysis of the adoption of elements of new politics it is necessary to find 
sources that can be systematically analyzed over time. Expression of official opinion 
can take various forms. The most formalized and momentous opportunity for trade 
unions to express their opinions are of the trade union congresses. However, trade 
unions can also state their opinions and exercise their influence, for example, 
through press releases, reports, especially-written policy declarations to the gov­
ernment and other relevant political actors, speeches, interviews and debate articles 
in newspapers and magazines. Another opportunity for expression is participation in 
governmental bodies and expert committees, personal networks and other lobbying 
activities. But for the symbolic conveyance of trade union attitudes to a larger 
audience and in particular to the membership, the trade union newspaper is the 
essential medium. Trade union newspapers promote intra-organizational communica­
tion and dissent trade union attitudes to their members, the public and other relevant 
political actors. Trade union newspapers are one of the major means in the symbolic 
struggle of trade unions.
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For the study of the adoption and dissemination of elements of new politics, I con­
centrate therefore on the analysis of trade union congresses and trade union news­
papers. First, I present the adoption of elements of new politics at the union con­
gresses and in the union newspapers respectively. After that I summarize this fin­
dings in form of a typology of different union behaviors.
2. NEW POLITICS AT THE TRADE UNION CONGRESSES
The periodical trade union congresses, which take place every three to five years, 
are the supreme policy-making bodies of all analyzed Swedish and German trade 
unions in this investigation. Nuclear energy has been dealt with at the trade union 
congresses of all observed trade unions in this analysis. Of course, this differs from 
congress to congress and union to union in varying degrees. In some unions, deci­
sions have been explicitly made on nuclear energy. In fact, it is only correct to speak 
of a decision on nuclear energy when it was the major issue of a motion. Nuclear 
energy was often only mentioned in the context of other issues such as energy 
policy, economic policy, or environmental policy. However, my major concern is to 
identify typical argumentations referring to new and productionist politics within the 
framework of the nuclear energy debate in trade unions. Therefore I also attempt to 
include motions that treat nuclear energy as just one aspect among others. What we 
can see from the decisions on motions which do not deal mainly with nuclear energy, 
is how unions act with motions which evaluate nuclear energy in a different manner. 
Since the context of argumentation is important, we may find some interesting regu­
larities here. These regularities will serve as indicators for the stands on new and 
productionist politics. Before we have a closer look at the adoption of elements of 
new politics at the trade union congresses, I wish to address a few words to the 
congressional procedures of Swedish and German unions which might have an 
impact on the overall treatment of the issue 12].
In contrast to the German unions, all members in most Swedish unions are eligible to 
propose a motion to the trade union congress. However, motions are often formula­
ted by local districts, the board or other union subgroups. Each motion is available at 
the congress in printed version along with a comment of the board. This comment 
(styre/sens utiStande dver motionerna or fdrbundsstyreisens yttrande) plays a crucial 
role for the following congress procedures. The comment may summarize different 
motions and gives advice on how the congress should decide on the motions. There 
normally follows a debate on the motions. The final decision is then made on the 
recommendation of the board rather than the motions. In TCO unions the board of 
the local district often gives a comment on the motions of members of its district
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(avde/ningsstyrelsens yttrande), before the central union board expresses its recom­
mendation. These may often only be the approval but it can also be a longer 
statement. At the TCO congress the role played by the local district boards is taken 
on by the boards of the individual member union from where the motion is proposed.
In German unions, motions are usually formulated by official organs such as local and 
district sections, the youth and women's departments and, of course, the executive 
committee (Geschäftsführender Vorstand) itself. At the DGB congress, most indivi­
dual trade unions frequently propose motions. A very important "motion commission* 
<Antragskommission) attaches its recommendations to every motion, urging the con­
gress delegates to approve, reject, or alter the proposal. The recommendations of the 
German union motion commissions are similar to the statements of the union boards 
in Swedish trade unions. The work of the motion commission consists also of the 
summarizing of several motions into one general motion {Entschließung). This general 
motion is often a compromise of different opinions which attempts to soften conflic­
ting issues by framing them into a broader context. Similar to the Swedish unions, 
the delegates receive a booklet of all motions, Entschließungen and the recommen­
dations of the motion commission. After there has been a debate about the issues 
that have been defined by the motion commission, the delegates vote on the motion 
commission's recommendation [3]. A simple majority decides the fate of all motions 
except those which address aspects of unions by-laws.
In both countries, the decisions of the union congresses are often difficult to esti­
mate and are far from being clear. Besides clear-cut acceptance and rejection of a 
motion, there are other more equivocal decisions. For instance, motions are supple­
mented to others. As a consequence that means that the motion loses importance 
without being rejected. This procedure has often been used in order to compromise 
standpoints. It can happen that motions with very different standpoints are supple­
mented to another motion. A softer way of rejecting motions is to consider them as 
responded to. This means that the congress considers the claims of the motion as al­
ready fulfilled either by the acceptance of other motions, by political steps already 
taken or other circumstances. As a consequence, the congress gets rid of the motion 
without an open rejection.
The union debates on motions are often as well very difficult to estimate. It can hap 
pen that the debate comes to new conclusions before unknown arguments have 
been introduced which could have had fundamental impacts on the final decision.
The most usual case, however, is that debates revolve around congressional proce­
dures or express general solidarity for union standpoints, the board, or other
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speakers. In this investigation, all debate contributions have been analyzed that refer 
to the motions which are concerned with nuclear energy.
The pure quantitative view at the trade union congress motions concerning nuclear 
energy reveals that the issue had not at all the same status of importance for 
Swedish unions as for their West German counterparts. However, there are some dif­
ferences between the Swedish unions, especially between LO and TCO. The confe­
deration of the white collar unions, TCO, had a much more obvious congressional 
treatment of nuclear energy than LO. However, in comparison to German unions the 
amount of TCO congressional treatment is still rather modest.
Table 3-1: Frequencies and Context of all Congressional Notions and Debate Contributions on 
Nuclear Energy of DGB, LO and TCO Unions frop 1970 to 1989.
Union
Notions
Frequency Percent
Debate
Context
Nuclear Energy Ecology others ional
Congress- Frequency Percent
Notions and Debate
(•u p )
Frequency Percent
DGB 24 10.3
Energy
8
Policy
14 2
Decisions* 
Y«* (1) 21 13.4 45 11.5IGN 41 17. 6 28 8 3 2 no 30 19.1 71 18.2ICD 30 12.9 - 24 - 6 no 8 5.1 38 9.7ICC 19 8.2 14 3 - 2 yes (2) 11 7.0 30 7.7ÖTV 71 30.5 31 32 - 8 y«« (3) 47 29.9 118 30.3HBV 23 9.9 6 15 1 1 yes (l) 19 12.1 42 10.8IGD 17 7.3 10 7 - - V  (1) 21 13.4 38 9.7GEW** 8 3.4 8 “ " yes (3) “ - 8 2.1
Su p 233 100.0 105 103 4 21 (11) 157 100.0 390 100.0Average: 29.1 13.8 12.9 .5 2.6 22. 4«** 48.8
Notions Debate Notions and Debate 
(sin)
Union Freq. Percent Context Congress- Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
(a) (b) Nuclear Energy Ecology others ional (•) <b) («) (b)Energy Policy Stand*
LO 6 7.1 20.0 1 5 - no 21 11.2 28.0 27 10.0 25.7
SEF 4 4.8 13.3 - 4 - no 21 11.2 28.0 25 9.2 23.8Neta11 9 10.7 30.0 4 5 - no 8 4.3 10.7 17 6.3 16.2SF 8 9.5 26.7 2 6 - no 11 5.9 14.7 19 7.0 18.1SKA F 1 1.2 3.3 - 1 - no 1 .5 1.3 2 .7 1.9GF 2 2.4 6.7 2 no+ 13 7.0 17.3 15 5.5 14.3
Su p 30 35.7 100.0 9 19 - - 75 40.1 100.0 105 38.7 100.0Average : 5.0 6.0 1.5 3.2 - - 12. 5 6.7 17.5 6. S
TCO 29 34.5 53.7 3 25 1 - y«s ( i ) 23 12.3 20.5 52 19.2 31.3
SIF 9 10.7 16.7 5 3 - 1 no 8 4.3 7.1 17 6.3 10.2
ST 11 13.1 20.4 3 7 1 - y«s (1) 70 37.4 62.5 81 29.9 48.8
SKTF 4 4.8 7.4 - - 4 - no 10 5.3 8.9 14 5.2 8.4
SL 1 1.2 1.9 1 - • “ no 1 .5 .9 2 .7 1.2
Su p : 54 64.3 100.0 12 35 6 1 112 59.8 100.0 166 61.3 100.0
Average: 10.8 12.9 2.4 7.0 1.2 0.2 22.4 12.0 33.2 12.3
TotaI:
Su p : 84 100.0 21 54 6 1 187 100.0 271 100.0
Average: 7.6 1.9 4.9 0.5 O.i 17.0 24.6
Explmnstions: .For the Swedish unions percentages refer, on the one hand, to all analyzed Swedish trade unions (a) and, 
on the other hand, to all LO or TCO unions respectively (b).
+ Notions have been submitted to LO or SAP for further action.
* Congressional stand on nuclear energy aeans that the potion had nuclear energy as the eajor subject
and the congress approved of this potion. In brackets the frequencies of congressional stands are given. 
ICC accepted two potions in 1988, &TV three in 1988, and GEM three: one in 1977, one in 1980, and one 
in 1986.
•* No congress debate was available.*** The average of the debate contribution is calculated on the basis that GEW was excluded froa the nupber of
unions*
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The individual TCO trade unions also had a more lengthy congressional treatment of 
nuclear energy than their blue collar counterparts. This is in particular true for ST, 
the public sector union that organizes members employed in nuclear power plants 
and also in public services. However, when we look at the subject matter of the 
motions [4] we can see that most motions deal with nuclear energy in the context of 
energy policy. This is closely related to the fact that - with the exception of TCO and 
ST - no Swedish union analyzed in the research took a congressional legitimated 
decision on nuclear energy [5]. A congressional decision on nuclear energy is 
exclusively here a concrete decision on a motion that has nuclear energy as the 
major issue. ST was also the union that most strongly debated nuclear energy at the 
congresses. However, in Sweden the highest amount of motions were proposed at 
the TCO congresses. SIF also debated the nuclear energy issue but the debate was 
not of much significance. SKTF and SL did not debate nuclear power to any larger 
degree.
The general level of the debate was much weaker in LO unions. LO, SEF, Metall, and 
SF are the LO unions that most frequently debated the issue among the analyzed LO 
unions. The debate in GF also was rather strong. Although GF only proposed a few 
motions dealing with nuclear energy, they had some extensive debates about the 
issue. Outstanding is the low congressional treatment of nuclear energy by SKAF.
German unions debated the issue much more than the Swedish unions. Of all the 
unions, OTV and IGM had nuclear energy most frequently as an issue at the union 
congresses. The other unions - perhaps with the exception of GEW 16] - also debated I 
the issue extensively. The nuclear power issue was also much more in the center of 
the debate. While in Swedish unions, nuclear energy was debated mainly within the 
framework of energy policy, for German unions the issue received more special 
attention. Apart from IGM and IGB all analyzed DGB unions explicitly made a con­
gressional decision on nuclear energy. Some unions, such as OTV, GEW, and IGC 
even revised their decision on nuclear energy. Surprising is also the fact that HBV 
and IGD debated the issue as much as the energy unions IGB and IGC. This is in par­
ticular true when we consider the high amount of debate contributions.
The following section will describe the debates on nuclear energy of the individual 
unions in greater detail. However, the focus is on the arguments of new and 
productionist politics.
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Adopting Elements of New Politics at Trade Union Congresses 
Adopting elements of new politics can be analyzed as a social process. Social pro­
cesses are complex interactions of different actors, organizational environments and 
situations. However time may be one of the most prominent factors. In order to sim­
plify the analysis in this section I do not refer to substantial changes of the organiza­
tional environment, etc. (see for that chapter six). Instead I concentrate on the que­
stion whether trade unions in Sweden and Germany increasingly adopted elements of 
new politics from the beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s or whether 
there are no special effects from this period to identify. For the analysis of time 
periods I classify the entire time period into four different phases. First, there is the 
initial time period up to 1975 before the nuclear issue reached trade unions to a large 
degree. Second, we may look at the time period between 1976 and 1980, as the 
time when trade unions first took a congressional stand. The years in the first half of 
the 1980s led to some re-assessments. The last time period starts in 1986, after the 
reactor accident at Chernobyl, and lasts until 1989 when the empirical analysis of 
this study ended.
For the analysis of trade union stands on new and productionist politics, we can 
distinguish two different kind of stands: on the one hand, we can consider the stand 
of all congress motions and all debate contributions of the congress participants.
This is the (representative) congressional stand. On the other hand, this 
congressional stand is not the final approved stand of a trade union. Therefore I also 
analyze the official stand as well. For the official stand I analyzed the approved 
motions. Approved motions are one of the most important guidelines for political 
orientation. The determination of motions and political action may not be complete 
since strategic factors play an important role when formulating motions. However, in 
the context of party policy, it can be shown that party programs and government 
declaration are good predictors for government policy (Hofferbert and Klingemann, 
1990). Therefore we may expect a relatively high correlation between approved 
motions and trade union policy. If no motion was approved of, the debate 
contributions of trade union board members served as an indicator for the official 
stand. For the Swedish trade unions, I included in this case also the statements of 
the boards (utfitande 6ver motionerna) about the motions. Debate contributions of 
trade union chair persons and members of the board are another indicator for the 
official policy of a union. From their hierarchical status in the organization, they 
function as multipliers of ideas. Furthermore, it is very seldom that motions are 
approved of against the will of the "union elite”. One can also conclude that 
approved motions are moderated through the board members who finally put the 
motion into practical policy.
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As we have already seen in the section above, trade unions in Sweden and Germany 
debated nuclear energy to very different degrees. This is not only true in quantitative 
terms but also in terms of new and productionist politics. The first union that did 
debate nuclear energy at its congress was the German dTV. At the congress in 1972 
a motion was approved of that stressed strongly productionist politics and evaluated 
nuclear energy clearly positively [7].
Table 3-2: Trade Unions Stands on Nuclear Energy and New and Productionist Politics (1970-1975)
Congress iona1 Stand Official Trade Union Stand
EI ANPE HP PP El ANPE NP PP YEAR
ÖTV
ST*
1.90-1.53
-25.0
12.5
. 0
9.9
25.0
2.1
1.90 -25.0
1.89 -8.3 .0 25.0.0 4.2 19721975
* No notion were approved of at the congress. For these unions the stand of the union board has been taken as an indicator for official union 
stand.
In contrast to 0TV which did not at all consider elements of new politics, ST at its 
first congress in 1975 was the first union to discuss nuclear energy in terms of new 
politics. However, even when the general congressional standpoint was anti-nuclear 
energy and open towards elements of new politics the official union policy stresses 
productionist politics and positively evaluated nuclear energy.
From the mid 1970s to 1980, most of the other unions took a stand on nuclear 
energy or had at least a congressional debate on the issue. Only Metall and SF did 
not debate the issue at their congresses and additionally SIF and SL did not express 
an official stand.
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Table 3-3: Trade Unions Stands on Nuclear Energy and New and Productionist
Politics (1976-1980)
Congressional Stand Official Trade Union Stand
El ANPE NP PP El ANPE NP PP YEAR
DBG .23 -7.3 5.0 10.8 1.18 -20.8 2.1 22.9 1978
IGM -.11 .7 4.7 4.2 .78 -10.4 2.8 9.7 1977/78
IGB .02 -8.3 .0 2.8 .31 -8.3 .0 2.8 1980
IGC -.13 1.6 5.4 4.2 1.78 -8.3 4.2 12.5 1980
ÖTV -.28 .5 4.7 4.4 1.30 -8.3 2.1 6.3 1976/80**
HBV -1.23 7.0 6.3 2.3 -1.00 - .0 .0 1980
IGD -1.09 4.4 4.6 1.4 -.30 .0 2.1 2.1 1977/80**GEW -2.35 19.2 16.7 .7 -2.38 37.5 20.8 2.1 1977/80**
LO* -.22 2.1 2.1 1.4 1.15 -4.2 .8 1.7 1976SEF 1.75 -8.3 .0 1.2 1.50 -8.3 .0 8.3 1976MET
SFSKAF* 1.50 -4.2 .0 4.2 1.50 -4.2 .0 4.2 1978
GF* -.72 7.6 8.9 2.4 -.81 4.2 6.9 2.8 1978
TCO -.81 1.0 5.1 4.4 1.70 -16.7 .0 11.1 1979SIF 1.07 3.1 2.1 1.2 - - - - 1978
ST* -.72 3.1 4.1 2.4 1.10 -4.2 .0 1.7 1979SKTF* -1.27 .0 .5 .5 -1.00 • .0 .0 1980
SL -2.78 25.0 14.6 2.1 - - - - 1977
* See table 3-2.** Two congresses have been combined.
It becomes clear that some unions are quite open for elements of new politics. This 
is particularly true for both teacher unions and to a minor degree also for both printer 
unions and HBV. However, when we turn to the approved union stands, it is only in 
GEW and to a much lower degree in GF that elements of new politics dominate. All 
other unions that took a stand in this period express their preference for produc­
tionist politics. Particularly, TCO, the DGB but also IGM belong to the vanguard of 
productionist politics. In the first half of the 1980s this picture did not change drama­
tically. The lower score of the productionist value result mainly in the fact that the 
issue was less strongly debated than before.
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Table 3-4: Trade Unions Stands on Nuclear Energy and New and Productionist
Politics (1981-1985)
Congressional Stand Official Trade Union Stand
El ANPE NP PP El ANPE NP PP YEAR
DGB .30 -.5 2.1 2.4 .97 -4.2 .0 2.8 1981/82**IGM -.57 4.2 6.3 2.1 1.00 -4.2 .0 4.2 1983
IGB -.75 4.2 .4 .0 - - - - 1984
IGC 2.00 -8.3 .0 8.3 2.00 -8.3 .0 8.3 1984ÖTV* -.66 6.1 9.0 3.5 1.38 -8.3 1.4 9.7 1984HBV - - - - - - - - -
IGD - - - - - - - - -
GEW — — — — — — — — —
LO* -.66 2.1 2.1 1.4 1.33 .0 2.8 2.8 1981
SEF* .62 -2.1 .5 1.0 1.18 -4.2 .0 .6 1981
MET* -.26 1.8 2.8 1.4 -.46 .0 2.1 2.1 1981/85**
SF* -.26 -2.1 1.8 3.6 -.46 .0 2.1 2.1 1985
SKAF - - - - - - - - -
GF* -2.69 4.2 4.2 .0 2.38 4.2 4.2 .0 1982
TCO* -1.00 4.2 3.2 .5 -.75 2.1 2.1 1.0 1982/85**SIF* • 91 -4.2 .0 1.4 -1.50 - .0 .0 1981
ST -1.23 1.1 3.3 2.6 -2.05 8.3 16.7 8.3 1981/83**SKTF -1.50 • .0 .0 - - - - 1984
SL - - - - - — - - -
For * and ** see table 3-2 and 3-3.
There is only a change in TCO and ST. Both unions moved more to the new politics 
side. This move is rather ambiguous for TCO since the expressions are very vague 
and infrequent. That is also documented by the fact that the data rely entirely on 
statements of board members and that no new congressional decision was taken. 
However, for ST we may postulate a change of standpoints. At the congress in 
1981, ST approved of an energy program that evaluated nuclear energy very 
negatively. In the context of this program, several elements of new politics were 
adopted. However, in this program productionist aspects are present as well 
although they are a minority. We may conclude that until 1985 only the GEW, GF 
and ST adopted elements of new politics in their official politics. The question now is 
how the period after the catastrophe of Chernobyl may have affected the standpoints 
towards new and productionist politics?
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Table 3-5: Trade Unions Stands on Nuclear Energy and New and Productionist
Politics (1986-1989)
Congressional Stand Official Trade Union Stand
El ANPE NP PP El ANPE NP PP YEAR
DGB* -1.41 2.4 8.0 5.8 -1.25 .5 7.1 6.7 1986
IGM -1.88 6.6 5.0 .1 -1.40 12.5 12.5 .0 1986
IGB -.83 4.2 1.8 .4 -1.33 - .0 .0 1988
IGC -1.75 9.7 8.3 1.0 -.19 -4.2 1.4 2.8 1988ÖTV -1.53 8.2 6.4 1.2 -1.97 14.6 11.8 2.1 1988
HBV -2.52 12.5 10.7 • 0 -2.07 16.7 16.7 .0 1988
IGD -2.17 12.1 7.4 .3 -2.60 12.5 6.3 .0 1986GEW -2.44 16.7 16.7 • 0 -2.32 16.7 16.7 .0 1986
LO* -.65 -.7 4.2 4.8 -.70 1.4 4.2 3.1 1986
SEF .97 -3.6 1.3 3.8 .40 -8.3 .0 8.3 1986
MET* .81 -1.7 3.6 4.8 -.64 -4.2 2.1 4.2 1989
SF .09 -5.6 .9 4.6 1.50 -4.2 .0 2.1 1989SKAF - - - - - - - -
GF* -1.76 20.8 3.5 .0 -2.16 20.8 10.4 .0 1986
TCO • « - - - — - - 1988
SIF - - - - - - - - 1987
ST -1.50 « .0 .0 - - - - 1988SKTF - - - - - - - - 1988
SL - - - - - - - - 1986/89**
For * and ** see table 3-2 and 3-3.
As we can see from table 3-5, in Germany, a kind of polarization between certain 
unions took place. Most analyzed German unions changed with their re-evaluation of 
nuclear energy also their standpoints towards new and productionist politics. Apart 
from IGC and IGB all German unions in this analysis changed standpoints and favored 
elements of new politics. This is particularly true for GEW, HBV and IGD. But also 
the more influential unions IGM and OTV adopted elements of new politics. However, 
for the OGB this re-orientation is not as clear as for the unions above mentioned. The 
1986 DGB congress was very special because it took immediately place in the light 
of the reactor accident of Chernobyl (see appendix: 4). For LO unions we can see a 
return to productionist politics. SEF and SF both made congressional decisions that 
favor productionist politics, although their evaluation of nuclear energy is rather neu­
tral. Metall and GF did not take a congressional decision but the statements of the 
board members indicate that Metall favors productionist politics and GF quite clearly 
favors elements of new politics.
The other interesting finding is that TCO and its unions entirely refrained from con­
gressional treatment. Virtually no motion or debate contribution on nuclear energy
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contained any element of new or productionist politics. Even more interesting is that 
nuclear energy was hardly ever a subject in a motion or contribution at TCO 
congresses after 1985.
From this chronological analysis we can conclude that - with the exception of IGB 
and IGC - all German unions adopted elements of new politics. At the beginning of 
the 1970s, all unions favored productionist politics. Therefore it is fair to conclude 
that unions open to new politics, institutionalized this stand over time. For Swedish 
trade unions this is only true for GF and perhaps ST. All other Swedish unions did 
not institutionalize elements of new politics. For LO unions we can even postulate a 
return to productionist politics. For the further analysis in the succeeding chapters, I 
wish to summarize the last congressional stand for all trade unions.
The Last Official Congressional Standpoints
The last official stand of a trade union serves here as part of the indicator whether 
trade unions have adopted elements of new politics or whether they are hostile to 
new politics. The last official stands of trade unions often date back several years 
ago. Therefore each table also shows the date when the last congress took place at 
which elements of new and productionist politics were debated. Table 3-6 reflects 
the last official stand of trade unions towards nuclear energy and the adoption of 
new and productionist politics. With the exception of SIF, SKTF and SL, all unions 
took an official stand, in terms defined above, after 1986. However, for IGB the 
1980 official congressional decision was taken because in a later congress in 1988 
no political statements in terms of new and productonist politics were mentioned.
- 7 6 -
Table 3-6: Last official Stand on Nuclear Energy and
New and ProductionistPolitics
El AN PE NP PP YEAR
DGB+ -1.25 .5 7.1 6.7 1986 *
IGM -1.40 12.5 12.5 .0 1986
IGB** .33 -8.3 .0 2.8 1980
IGC -.19 -4.2 1.4 2.8 19886tv -1.97 14.6 11.8 2.1 1988HBV -2.07 16.7 16.7 .0 1988IGD -2.60 12.5 12.5 .0 1986GEW -2.32 16.7 16.7 .0 1986
LO* -.70 1.4 4.2 3.1 1986
SEF .40 -8.3 .0 8.3 1986
MET* -.64 -4.2 2.1 4.2 1989
SF 1.50 -4.2 .0 2.1 1989
SKAF* 1.50 -4.2 .0 4.2 1978GF* -2.16 20.8 10.4 .0 1986
TCO 1.70 -16.7 .0 11.1 1979SIF* -1.50 - .0 .0 1981
ST -2.05 8.3 8.3 .0 1981
SKTF* -1.00 - .0 .0 1980
SL — — — —
* No notion were approved of at the congress. For these unions the stand 
of the union board has been taken as an indicator for official union 
stand.
** Last stand with statements on new and productionist politics
+ Approved notion and debate contributions of union board nembers because 
of the special situation of the congress.
Table 3-6 shows clearly that DGB unions have been most open to elements of new 
politics. In particular GEW, HBV, OTV, IGD and IGM are among the six unions most 
open to elements of new politics. They were only overruled by the extreme pro new 
politics stand of GF. However, GF's standpoint is based on statements from the 
boards and not on approved motions. In contrast to these unions, IGC and to a 
greater extend IGB are both in favor of productionist politics. The DGB may also have 
adopted some elements of new politics. The standpoint of the DGB is difficult to 
judge at this moment since the congress took place in the middle of the aftermath of 
the Chernobyl reactor accident. Motions submitted to the congress were formulated 
several month before the congress and the debate was particularly affected by the 
impressions of reactor accident. Therefore the data are based on approved motions 
and the debate contributions of board members.
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In contrast to the DGB unions, the LO unions favor productionist politics at their 
congresses. This is particularly true for SEF but productionist elements also dominate 
in Metall, SF, and SKAF. LO, although more open to elements of new politics than 
most other LO unions scores lower than the mean (3.4) and may also be classified as 
a productionist union. As mentioned above, GF is the extreme exception of the LO 
family. However, apart from SEF and SF no LO union took a stand in terms of an 
approved motion. Stands came only in the form of expressions from board members. 
This pattern of "non-decision-making" is even more true for TCO unions. No TCO 
union took a positive decision on a motion on nuclear energy and no TCO board 
member expressed a statement that contained elements of new or productionist poli­
tics after 1981 [8J. Therefore all the TCO unions' stands date back to the turn of the 
1970/80s decade. In this analysis I also included the decisions from congresses 
which date back in time, because one can take it for granted that a non-revised 
decision is still valid today.
Among TCO unions we can identify three different patterns: first, there is the TCO 
confederation that favors clearly productionist politics. This congressional stand 
dates back from the very turbulent congress in 1979 (see for details: appendix 4).
The congress immediately took place after the reactor accident at Harrisburg (Three 
Mile Island). Many union members expressing their opposing opinion of nuclear 
energy were against the manner in which TCO dealt with this issue (Micheletti,
1985). However, the outcome resulted in the approval of extreme productionist 
motions. In the early 1980s TCO softened its assessment but it never took any real 
steps to revise the attitudes from 1979. Even if the ANPE-lndex in table 3-6 may 
overestimate the productionist stand of TCO, it is fair to conclude that TCO sticks to 
a rather productionist stand. The second pattern of TCO unions is represented by ST. 
However, like GF among LO unions, ST may be an exception among TCO unions. In 
its energy program from 1981, ST changed its then productionist stand and expres­
sed their sympathy for elements of new politics. Between these two rather extreme 
patterns, we can identify the third and most common pattern among TCO unions.
This consists of a union behavior that tries not to get involved in party-political 
issues which are controversial. In our sample, this is particularly true for SKTF and 
SL. Often outspokenly, union members expressed their wish that their union should 
not take a stand on politically controversial questions.
3. THE DISSEMINATION OF NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS NEWSPAPERS 
A concentration on the trade union newspapers has the methodological advantage 
that they are relatively easily accessible and allow a systematic analysis over time.
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However, there is disagreement to what extent trade union newspapers represent 
the opinions of official trade union policy. Before I address this question, I would like 
to turn to the unique character of the analyzed trade union papers.
The Character of Trade Union Newspapers
Trade union membership newspapers aim to combine organizational and membership 
interests [9]. Union papers write about current events mainly from the perspective of 
their members as wage earners. Being a wage earner is an important fact in a society 
that is built upon work. Therefore, a trade union paper supplies the member with a 
very special world view: a world view in the interest of a specific worker or em­
ployee. The interests of the wage earner are more diversified than ever which also 
affects the stand on current issues. The example of nuclear energy may illustrate this 
point very well. For one group of workers, nuclear power means a job or a work­
place with all implication that they may have for identity, self-esteem, social rela­
tions, social status and economic income, etc. (Jahoda, 1979). Other groups may be 
more indirectly effected because their job is highly energy consuming. For others 
again, nuclear power is just a threat and has nothing to do with their individual job 
situation. Union newspapers have also political and organizational functions. One 
may distinguish three major functions in this respect: they promote the intra organi­
zational communication', they make the trade union attitudes public; and they are a 
counter-power to the bourgeois press which dominates in both countries. These aims 
are stated by the trade unions themselves and they are also mentioned in the studies 
on the union press (Juhe, 1977: 7-10; Kniesburges, 1984; Wallander, 1982; 
Hadenius and Weibull, 1989: 86-113; Metall 1989: 257/8). These three aims, how­
ever, are often not easy to combine.
That the trade union press is very important for the trade unions is documented by 
the large amount of money which is spent in order to run the membership news­
papers (for German unions see: Juhe, 1977: 43-46). Normally, each member re­
ceives a copy of the paper and the newspapers are distributed to several other 
individuals and organizations. Studies on readers' behavior show that more than 
three-quarters of the membership regularly read the paper (e.g.: Weibull, 1977; GF, 
1978; Wallander, 1982: 34; SKAF, 1988; Infas, without date; Infas, 1977/8; 
Kniesburges, 1984: 61-63; Bang, 1989: 12). The status of trade union newspapers 
can be easily seen by reviewing some numbers that may illustrate the importance of 
the "forgotten press". More than 3.5 Mio. people in Sweden (almost half of the 
population) and 7.6 Mio. in West Germany receive their trade union membership 
paper. A number that is even difficult to reach for general mass media.
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However, there are some important differences among the analyzed papers. The big­
gest difference exists between the membership papers of the individual trade unions, 
on the one hand, and the newspapers edited by the confederations, on the other, 
which are mainly designed for the trade union officials. The confederation papers 
also differ in the rate they are distributed. The papers of LO and TCO appear weekly 
and bi-weekly respectively. LO-tidningen addresses many more daily political issues 
than the TCO-tidningen. The DGB paper, Die Quelle, appears only once a month and 
contains much less but longer articles. Of course all confederation papers address 
trade union issues and the policy and problems of the individual trade unions.
The appearence of individual membership newspapers differ considerably among the 
unions and this has also changed over time. They have a large format or a small one. 
They have a daily newspaper design with a lot of important news on the front page 
or they look more like weekly magazines. They appear either weekly, bi-weekly, or 
monthly. Although all papers focus on the concerns of their membership, some 
report and debate more general events and topics and other are more narrow in 
scope.
In particular, the teachers' unions in both countries run newspapers that deal mainly 
with the immediate concerns of their members. General political issues that have 
nothing to do with school education, wages or the union organization are rarely pre­
sented in these membership papers. As a consequence of this both papers of the 
teachers' unions have not been included in the analysis [10). Also the papers of SEF 
(E/ektrikern) and SKTF (SKTF-tidningen) frequently contain less general political 
information than the other union papers. On the other hand, apart from TCO- 
tidningen, the confederation papers are more comprehensive. This is particularly true 
for LO-tidningen that covers a huge range of general political issues beside the union 
concerns. Die Quelle still with a rather broad coverage is more directed to "union 
insiders" and contains more expert information than LO-tidningen. TCO-tidningen is 
more designed for the "public" than the other confederation papers. Apart from 
union concerns (that includes economic issues of course), TCO-tidningen is not so 
much concerned with politics in general, but more frequently stresses entertaining 
issues. The only membership union paper that is more open to general issues is the 
paper of the IGM metall.
All the differences of the papers certainly influence the picture presented of the indi­
vidual trade union newspapers. Important in this study, however, is the representa­
tion of new politics of the trade union papers (inference from medium to sender). The 
newspapers have been chosen because they react more directly to political events
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and contain more information and evaluations of political actors and events than 
expressed at the highly formalized trade union congresses. Therefore, trade union 
membership newspapers are especially suited for longitudinal analysis.
The Presentation of New Politics in the Trade Union Membership Newspapers 
This section is guided by the theoretical work done on organizational evolution and 
learning, especially in the tradition of cognitive theories of organizations (e.g.: Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Weick, 1979; Weick and Bougon, 1986; Hedberg, 1981; Kieser,
1985). The crucial question here is how the trade unions adopted elements of new 
politics in their newspapers. Just as important as the learning process is the process 
of "unlearning" (Hedberg, 1981) or erasing of obsolete elements of the retention 
section. Also in this chapter, I will rely on the indices developed in chapter two.
In what follows, I will review whether or not trade union newspapers in Sweden and 
West Germany adopted elements of new politics or focused more strongly on pro­
ductionist aspects. For that, I will analyze the trade union newspapers in a chronolo­
gical manner and only the more distinct aspects will be mentioned [11]. The presen­
tation of these aspects will be done in turn for the three different trade union 
movements (DGB, LO, TCO). In treating each union movement as a whole, we may 
identify the unions which welcomed elements of new politics more, those that 
adjusted more hesitantly, those that tried to avoid the adoption of elements of new 
politics and those that fought against elements of new politics by stressing more fre­
quently productionist politics (see for a similar classification of organizations: Miles, 
et al. 1978). Since I am interested here in the enactment process of new politics in 
general, I will include all types of articles into the analysis.
(a) DGB Unions
In the first period from 1973 to 1976, productionist aspects quite clearly dominated 
among the trade unions which published articles with a stress on productionist or 
new politics elements. While 1973 is dominated by IGC's productionist articles 
(ANPE: -8.3 and -12.5) in 1974, also IGB and OTV published articles that contain 
elements of productionist politics. Although the productionist aspects dominate in all 
mentioned unions, some elements of new politics are also voiced. For IGB a letter to 
the editor pointed to the importance of elements of new politics. In particular, OTV 
represented both sides by two articles (ANPE: -12.5 and 8.3 respectively). OTV's 
endeavor to present both sides of the coin can also be seen by an article of a guest 
author (expert). Although very positive to nuclear energy (El = 2.33), this contribu­
tion contained substantial aspects of both productionist and new politics (MP = 16.7
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and NP = 12.5). However, in particular in letters to the editor productionist aspects 
were heavily stressed in the OTV paper. In 1975, apart from IGB that published an 
editorial article that contained a heavy stress on productionist aspects, the articles in 
the papers of IGC and OTV were not very profiled in terms of our analytical cate­
gories. Nevertheless, partly extreme positive evaluations of nuclear energy 
dominated. In 1976, the picture did not fundamentally change. IGM also joined IGB, 
IGC, and OTV with rather productionist articles (ANPE up to -12.5). In particular, an 
article in the paper of OTV scored as high as -41.7. Taking all analyzed publications 
of DGB unions, we can conclude that in the beginning productionist aspects 
determined the view of West German unions (mean of ANPE = -8.3). However, a 
certain controversial debate took place in this period (STD of ANPE = 12.2) [12].
In 1977, the DGB unions participated rather actively in the "symbolic struggle” con­
cerning nuclear power. As outlined later (chapter six), anti-nuclear protest of citizen 
initiatives and partly violent anti-nuclear demonstrations but also pro-nuclear protest 
of concerned work councils brought the nuclear issue to the daily agenda. The pro­
test reached a new, more controversial dimension which should not end until 1980. 
An indicator for this is that in the period from 1973 to 1976, 16 articles were 
published that contained a substantial amount of elements of productionist and new 
politics but 64 alone in 1977. More unions also took part in this period. In addition to 
the unions that had already printed articles before, the HBV and the DGB paper also 
published articles. Both "newcomers" clearly expressed a productionist opinion. The 
three articles published in HBV's paper had an ANPE mean of -9.7 and the DGB 
paper was even clearer (ANPE mean: -21.8). IGB also belonged to the "productionist 
hard-liners” at this time. Even if the other unions mentioned some elements of new 
politics, these aspects were alien to IGB. If political aspects were raised at all in 
IGB's paper, they favored a productionist view (ANPE mean = -13.1). But also in 
IGM, IGC and OTV, the productionist picture dominated. However, all three unions 
debated the issue and critical letters to the editor were responsible for the publishing 
of elements of new politics. The comparison of the amount of productionist politics 
between all articles with and without the letters to the editor makes this point clear. 
For instance, in the IGM's paper elements of new politics dominated when taking the 
letters to the editor into consideration (ANPE mean = 2.6; without letters -3.5). But 
also for 6TV and IGC, the letters to the editor played a crucial role for the presenta­
tion of elements of new politics (ANPE mean for all articles without the letters to the 
editor and including the letters to the editor: OTV: -9.6 and -3.9, IGC: -15.5 and ■ 
8.3). Particularly during the time of the work councils' protest, which considered the 
DGB policy as too hostile against nuclear energy, the publications of the DGB unions 
extremely stressed productionist aspects.
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In summation: in 1977 when the issue of nuclear energy was politicized the papers 
of DGB unions took a stand that clearly favors productionist aspects (ANPE mean: -
6.9). Although some unions debated the issue controversially in their paper, the most 
critical voices were expressed in letters to the editor. This is true above all for IGM, 
but also for IGC and OTV. Excluding the letters to the editor, the picture turns quite 
clearly towards the productionist side (ANPE mean = -12.9).
In 1978 and until the reactor accident at Three Mile Island, the debate in the papers 
of the DGB unions was not so extensive as before. However, the articles published in 
the unions papers of IGM, OTV and IGB left no doubt that the outcome of the first 
politicization would result in a clear productionist stand of those DGB unions (the 
mean over all DGB unions is: -12.5). In particular, IGM (ANPE = -20.8) and OTV 
(mean of ANPE: -19.4) left no doubts that DGB unions favored a productionist policy 
at that time. There is the only one exception of IGD. Although IGD took a rather pro­
ductionist stand at their congress in 1977, the druck und papier published quite criti­
cal articles against nuclear power that challenged the positive relation between 
nuclear power and employment and used harsh words like "Nuklearfaschismus" 
(nuclear fascism) (ANPE = 12.5).
The publications of the DGB unions in 1979 reconfirmed their productionist stand 
(mean of ANPE: -6.9; also the evaluation of nuclear energy remained all in all 
positive). Again OTV was most extreme in its productionist stand (ANPE mean: -
21.9). But also IGM (-11.1) and IGB (-8.3) favored productionist politics during that 
year. IGC also published an article that favored nuclear energy but by including the 
letters to the editor this impression changed (mean of ANPE: 0). HBV joined the posi­
tive assessment of productionist politics (ANPE: -2.1) leaving again IGD as the only 
DGB union with a preference for elements of new politics (ANPE: 8.3). Remarkable 
was also the publication in the DGB officials' paper. Apart from an article that 
favored productionist politics, the paper published an interview with a board member 
and energy expert of the French union confederation C.F.D.T. This interview did not 
only give a negative impression of nuclear power but also introduced some 
arguments of new politics to the readership of Die Que/Je. However, apart from this 
interview and the publications of the IGD paper their is no indication that the DGB 
unions would have changed their productionist attitude as an immediate conse­
quence of the Harrisburg accident.
1980 can be seen as the beginning of change concerning attitudes among some DGB 
unions. The constellation described in the following section remained until the
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Chernobyl accident and created the base for a cleavage among the trade unions in 
terms of new and productionist politics. Nuclear power was strongly discussed in 
1980 and 1981. After that the debate gradually faded, however, without losing the 
same polarizing fronts. It is therefore possible to summarize the unions' attitudes as 
expressed in their membership papers from 1980 until 1986 before the Chernobyl 
catastrophe. All in all, the German unions were still in favor of productionist politics 
and evaluated nuclear energy positively (mean of El and ANPE respectively: .37 and -
1.9). However, some important qualifications must be made. IGM is the most 
remarkable example for a trade union that changed its attitude. In 1980, metall 
published articles on nuclear energy that contain a substantial number of elements of 
new politics (mean of ANPE: 18.8). With that IGM left the camp of the productionist 
unions as HBV did (mean of ANPE: 12.5). Other unions did not follow this way. 
Above all, IGB exclusively published positively about nuclear energy and favored pro­
ductionist politics (mean of ANPE: -13.0). The same is true for OTV (mean of ANPE: 
-11.9). However, OTV had a very lively discussion in its paper, and as before in 
metall most letters to the editor introduced elements of new politics into the trade 
union. Taking the letters to the editor into account, the dominance of productionist 
politics becomes rather small in OTV magazine (mean of ANPE: -1.5). The DGB, IGC 
and IGD did not discuss the issue in its paper during the whole time period.
The constellation before Chernobyl can be summarized as follows: some unions, 
among them IGB, OTV, IGC, and the DGB favored productionist politics. However, 
OTV and the DGB also presented aspects of new politics. IGC completely refrained 
from a discussion of the issue. This is surprising since IGC organizes workers in the 
nuclear sector. On the other hand, we find that IGM, HBV, and IGD which favor ele­
ments of new politics. In particular, the two former unions shifted from a produc­
tionist politics which they represented in their papers until the end of 1979 towards 
more openness to elements of new politics. The IGD's paper has already shown 
since 1978 its sympathy for elements of new politics.
Chernobyl had an extreme impact on the population in West Germany. Essential for 
the DGB unions was the fact that the DGB congress took place only four weeks 
later, while the impact of Chernobyl was still fresh in the minds of the members.
Daily media attention and new information about the consequences of Chernobyl ac­
companied the congress. 1986 was the peak year of trade union publications on 
nuclear energy in West Germany. It is most interesting that the same pattern that 
existed before Chernobyl prevailed. HBV, IGD, and IGM stressed elements of new 
politics (mean of ANPE: 14.6, 10.2, 6.8 respectively). Striking is also the fact that in 
opposition to former years the letters to the editor revised the impression towards
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more productionist politics. This is in particular true for IGM that is more open to 
elements of new politics when we do not take the letters to the editor into the ac­
count (ANPE: 9.4). IGB still favored productionist politics (ANPE: -12.5) and IGC 
published a balanced article that contains as many productionist as new politics 
aspects. An article by an energy expert of the DGB and other publications show that 
the DGB paper distributed articles with elements of new politics (ANPE: 20.8).
It is astonishing how stable the attitudes towards productionist and new politics 
remained in the trade union newspapers. With the exception of the publication in the 
DGB paper, the unions expressed more or less the opinion, which had existed before 
Chernobyl. However, it must be recalled that the analysis here is based on 
statements concerning new and productionist politics. This analysis is not the same 
as the analysis of the evaluation of nuclear power as such. This is also important for 
the analysis of 1987 to 1989. All German unions verbally express their negative atti­
tude towards nuclear energy. However, they differ clearly in the degree to which 
they reject nuclear power. IGD (El = -2.86), IGM (-2.04), and HBV (-1.67) are most 
strong in their rejection while OTV (-1.53) and DGB (-1.27) are less radical. IGB (- 
.13) and IGC (-.05) only express a very moderate criticism of nuclear energy. In 
terms of new and productionist politics, IGM shows a stable preference for elements 
of new politics (mean of ANPE: 8.3). IGB in contrast favors productionist politics (• 
4.2). In the OTV paper, elements of new politics are mainly expressed in letters to 
the editor. The other articles are rather moderate in their stress of elements of new 
politics (6.3). The publications in the DGB paper after 1986 gradually contained fe­
wer and fewer arguments concerning new politics (mean of ANPE: 6.3). IGC, IGD, 
and HBV did not publish articles with a higher stress on new and productionist poli­
tics from 1987 to 1989.
(b) LO Unions
The Swedish public dealt earlier with the nuclear energy issue than what the German 
public did, and that was also the case for the trade union newspapers. Although 
SEF, SKAF, LO and Metall published articles on nuclear power in 1973, it was only 
Metall that debated it in a political respect. While the paper itself favored 
productionist aspects, a letter to the editor stressed new politics aspects. This is 
even more true for 1974, when the debate on nuclear energy reached the LO unions. 
While the letters to the editor contained a substantial amount of elements of new 
politics (Mean of ANPE: 13.5), the Metall union paper illuminated mainly production­
ist aspects in their reports and news on nuclear energy (Mean of ANPE: -8.3). LO, 
SEF, SKAF, and SF also debated the issue more extensively. It is highly interesting 
that a rather critical attitude dominated when all LO unions' publications are taken
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into account (El mean = -.5) and that the aspect of new politics dominated in this 
initial period of time (ANPE mean = 6.0). Apart from critical letters to the editor 
which are also responsible in LO for the high new politics score, it is surprising how 
comprehensive unions like LO, and SKAF had already presented the issue in 1974.
The intensive period of opinion-making came to concrete terms for the Swedish LO 
unions in 1975. Although the number of publications in the trade union press 
remained high in the years to come, a stable productionist stand among most of the 
LO unions can be identified. Therefore, it is reasonable to summarize the years from 
1975 to 1978. However, it is important to note that some LO unions allowed an 
intensive readership debate in the form of letters to the editor. For instance, the 
score for all LO unions in this time period is considerably lower when taking the let­
ters to the editor into account than excluding them (ANPE: -4.2 and -8.5, respecti­
vely). In particular, Metall's paper had an extensive debate and LO, SKAF, and SF 
published membership opinions. Since the letters to the editor express deviant 
opinion from the more general union stand, I will present both figures when they are 
substantially different.
The LO unions which most clearly stressed productionist aspects in the nuclear 
power debate are SEF (ANPE: -13.0), SKAF (-12.5), SF (-11.5) and Metall (-8.3). 
During these years, GF also had a preference for productionist aspects of nuclear 
energy (-4.2). All these unions, except SEF, published letters to the editor that were 
quite critical of productionist politics and moderated the reported scores substantially 
or as in the case of GF, where even the general picture were changed (SKAF: -8.3; 
SF: -7.5; Metall: *1.7; GF: 5.8). LO itself published articles that were rather balanced 
in their emphasis on productionist and new politics (LO: -3.2). In particular, a report 
of a guest author about the demonstration at the Barsebáck nuclear power plant con­
tains many aspects of new politics (ANPE: 37.5). This article was the only one article 
in which elements of new politics dominated to a larger degree. All other publications 
in LO-tidningen preferred productionist political aspects over new politics and by 
excluding this article LO's paper also fits into the scheme of productionist politics of 
the other LO unions (-8.3). All in all, it is impressive how coherent the productionist 
stand on nuclear energy has been in this time period among all the LO unions, 
including GF.
The accident at Three Mile Island caused a strong political response in Sweden. 
Demands of a referendum of the anti-nuclear power movement has always been 
rejected by the Social Democrats (SAP) and other influential parties and groups. 
However, immediately following the Three Mile Island accident, the party leader of
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the SAP, Olof Palme, suggested conducting a referendum on this issue. The blue 
collar trade union movement formulated a so-called working-class line together with 
the Social Democrats. All unions but GF supported this line and the spokesman of 
this line 2 was Rune Molin, a board member of LO.
LO unions were engaged in the nuclear energy issue in periods when it was 
politicized (see also chapter six). However, it is difficult to measure the public atten­
tion on the Harrisburg issue at the point when it turned into a party-political issue 
rather than just a news item. This fact may legitimate an analysis of both years 
simultaneously. Particularly in 1979, there might be a bias in the data that nuclear 
energy was more critically perceived only for the fact that the trade unions reported 
of the accident itself. The ANPE-lndex documents that the attitudes of Swedish blue 
collar trade unions remained relatively stable. Again the extensive membership 
debate in some union papers make it necessary to report the index once in reference 
to all union publications, including letters to the editor and once without the letters to 
the editor. Without the letters to the editor, we see a clear dividing line between GF, 
on the one hand, and all other LO unions, on the other. As mentioned above, GF did 
not support the "working-class” line but the more radical line three against nuclear 
power. The letters to the editor in Grafia, however, moderated the quite strong 
openness to new politics (all articles: 9.4; without letters to the editor: 13.9). This 
means that also GF had a controversial debate in its paper during the time of the 
Harrisburg accident and referendum but that the letters to the editor favored more 
productionist politics than elements of new politics. However, GF is the only LO 
union in this sample that clearly revised its stand. As we could see from the analysis 
of the congresses, this shift had already occurred before the accident of Three Mile 
Island. GF's anti-productionist - and also anti-nuclear • stand was reinforced by this 
accident rather than being initiated by it. The other LO unions stuck to their prefe­
rence of productionist politics, particularly when we exclude the letters to the editor 
from the analysis. Again, as all the years before, SEF quite clearly favored elements 
of productionist politics (-11.5). This time also SF, the other LO union that organizes 
members in the nuclear power plants expressed much sympathy for productionist 
politics (-11.5). The other organizations were less strongly committed to pro­
ductionist politics as SEF and SF but were clearly on the productionist side (SKAF: - 
5.6; LO: -4.4; Metall: -4.2). As mentioned above, letters to the editor in most of LO 
unions favored elements of new politics over elements of productionist politics 
(ANPE mean for all publications in the period of 1979 to 1980 are: LO: -3.6; SEF: -
11.5; Metall: -.3; SF: -3.8; SKAF: -2.5; GF see above). Particularly in Metall, SF, and 
SKAF, the membership could express its disagreement on the official trade unions 
stands. However, there can be no doubt that the influential forces in LO and its
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unions favored productionist politics during the period of the Harrisburg accident and 
the referendum campaign.
After the referendum, nuclear power disappeared from the political agenda. The 
union publications concerning nuclear power were very rare between 1981 and
1985, and only Metall, SEF, GF, and SF published articles with political elements. 
The general picture remained unchanged. Metall expressed its productionist opinion 
(-8.3) but again letters to editor expressed the opinion of the opposing side. SF (-6.9) 
stuck as much to their preference of productionist politics as GF favored elements of 
new politics (10.4). How will the trade union papers report about the Chernobyl 
catastrophe? Again I will not attempt to draw a comprehensive picture of the union 
publications but concentrate on the analytical aspects.
First of all, it is important to recall that the Chernobyl accident did not get as much 
media attention in the trade union press in Sweden, as it had in former years during 
the time of the reactor accident at Three Mile Island and the referendum campaign. 
Chernobyl had an impact on the trade union publications though. However, the gene­
ral pattern also remained in 1986 but with some interesting aspects. SEF (-12.5) and 
GF (12.5) are the two trade unions that expressed the expected opinions towards 
new and productionist politics. Metall and SF, however, are neutral in the news­
papers (mean of ANPE for both: = 0). For both unions, one can say that the imme­
diate reaction to Chernobyl was an expression of new politics elements and that later 
elements of productionist politics dominated again. In the papers of LO (3.5) and 
SKAF (8.3), however, elements of new politics dominated. The high score of Kom- 
muna/arbetaren (SKAF's paper) is based on a rather critical editorial by the chief 
editor. Most interesting, however, is the fact that SKAF and also Metall did not give 
much attention to Chernobyl in their papers. This even led to it that both papers did 
not publish articles on nuclear energy after 1986 and until 1989, when this investiga­
tion ended. In particular for Metatlarbetaren, it is most astonishing that the debate on 
nuclear energy completely disappeared after 1986.
Interesting is now to see whether the critical attitude of LO-tidningen prevailed 
during the years following Chernobyl. The period from 1987 to 1989 experienced a 
gradual disappearance of the nuclear issue in the Swedish media in general. Other 
environmental aspects dominated. In 1988/9 the debate on the phasing-out scenarios 
started and a slowly increasing debate on nuclear energy was revitalized within the 
Swedish unions. However, the union press neglected the issue with the exception of 
the LO confederation. The overall assessment of productionist politics became more 
positive over the years again (mean of ANPE from 1987 to 1989: .-3; only 1989: -
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4.9). GF's few publications confirmed the union's stand against nuclear energy 
(12.5). SEF (-4.9) and SF (-1.2) expressed their preference for productionist politics 
in their papers also in the period between 1987 and 1989. The low score is due to 
the fact that LO unions did not debate the issue any more in a political manner. As 
we could see above, the frequency of articles in the post-Chernobyl period is rather 
moderate indeed. This is highly interesting taken the fact that LO planned and 
initiated an extensive attack on the parliamentary decision to start the phasing-out 
program in the mid-1990s. This again gives an indication that energy policy in LO is 
an affair on the elite level and congressional legitimation or membership debate and 
information is not viewed as very important. Secret collaboration with the SAP is the 
more successful way for LO to push through its energy policy.
(c) TCO Unions
Three TCO unions also took up the nuclear issue in 1973. All of them debated it in 
terms of productionist and new politics. SIF published an interview with a natural 
scientist that leaves a positive impression of nuclear energy and stressed also the 
productionist aspects. TCO and ST in contrast, introduced elements of new politics 
to their readership. However, the TCO media attention was rather modest. Instead of 
joining the public debate on nuclear energy as had been done by the LO unions, TCO 
unions refrained from a lengthy discussion in their papers. This holds true until 1977. 
In this time, productionist aspects dominated in the paper of TCO (mean of ANPE in 
the period between 1974 to 1976: -8.3) and SKTF (-2.1) the only two unions that 
debated the nuclear issue in a political manner. However, when the issue was politi­
cally controversial and determined the political agenda as it did at the 1976 election, 
TCO unions refrained from political statements.
In 1977 and 1978, TCO attempted to formulate a stand on nuclear energy together 
with LO. It was also the time, when individual TCO unions tried to take up the issue 
in their membership papers. Similar to the LO unions, the TCO unions also stressed 
productionist aspects at this time. All unions were rather similar in this (means of 
ANPE for TCO: -7.7; SIF: -9.7; ST: -6.9; SKTF: -8.3). However, letters to the editor 
in TCO's paper emphasized new politics elements.
1979 and 1980 were the years when the number of articles on nuclear energy was 
at its highest in the papers of TCO unions. Elements of new politics were more fre­
quently presented in TCO papers, although productionist aspects still dominated.
This is in particular true for TCO (-4.2) and SIF (-8.3). ST published more frequently 
elements of new politics in their paper than the other TCO unions (7.5) [13].
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Elements of new politics were mentioned particularly in the context of the Harrisburg 
accident. In 1980, the TCO unions returned to a presentation in which productionist 
aspects dominated again (ANPE mean for all TCO unions for 1979 and 1980 respec­
tively: -1.8 and -3.0). It seems to be fair to say that TCO unions kept their rather 
productionist world view on nuclear energy. ST might be an exception of that in 
1979.
From 1981 to the accident of the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl, no publication but 
one contained sufficient numbers of productionist or new politics. The exception is a 
publication in ST's paper that quite strongly stressed elements of new politics (12.5). 
SKTF even refrained completely form publishing on nuclear energy after 1980I In
1986, all other TCO unions published articles in which elements of new politics 
dominated. In particular, ST was outstanding in that (18.8). SIF (3.6), or the other 
hand, was less open to elements of new politics, leaving TCO (8.3) somewhere in 
the middle [14]. Most interesting, and typical for TCO unions, is the fact that the 
publications were very rare. This is also true for TCO after 1986. This is in particular 
interesting because the debate about the realization of the phasing-out plan started in 
Sweden in 1988/89. There are some indicators that TCO refrained from taking up the 
issue because it would again diversify the members (this argument has been con­
firmed through conducted interviews). Only the two energy unions (SIF and ST) pre­
sented some articles on nuclear energy to their readership in 1987 through 1989. 
Surprisingly, however, the articles in SIF's paper contained a substantial amount of 
elements of new politics (9.7) while in ST's paper productionist elements dominated 
(-6.3). The strong productionist score in the ST paper results mainly from articles 
about the working conditions in Swedish nuclear plants.
In summation: both LO and TCO unions started the debate on nuclear energy rather 
openly in the early 1970s. Most unions considered elements of new politics besides 
productionist ones in the initial period between 1973 and 1974. In 1975 LO unions 
more strongly emphasized the productionist aspects. This stand was consolidated in 
the latter years in the mid 1970s. TCO in contrast did not take up the nuclear issue 
in their paper during the time when it was controversial in the realm of party politics. 
Only at the end of 1976 and in 1977 and 1978 TCO, formulated a common stand 
with LO on Swedish energy policy. This was also the time when other TCO unions 
increased the number of articles on nuclear power in their paper. While TCO unions 
and in particular the TCO paper published most frequently articles on nuclear energy 
in times of nuclear accidents, LO unions increased its publication during political 
events. This was true at the "nuclear energy election" in 1976 and also during the 
referendum campaign in 1980. However, unions of both union confederation took a
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clear productionist stand in this time. ST's and GF's publications might be a kind of 
exception.
In terms of the theoretical elements outlined above, we can conclude that the unions 
in both countries adopted elements of new politics in the initial period. These aspects 
were often expressed in the letters to the editor that functioned as a promoter for 
elements of new politics in this period. But in the mid-1970s productionist stand­
points were taken by all Swedish and German trade unions. In the late 1970s, some 
unions - above all the printer unions in both countries • revised their retained produc­
tionist world views. Other unions followed slowly. In Germany, IGM and HBV, in 
addition to IGD, may be considered to be the most open unions for elements of new 
politics. A union that revised its stand more hesitantly was OTV and the confedera­
tion DGB behaved in the same way. For Sweden, only GF and ST can be put into this 
category. LO, although productionist, was relatively tolerant concerning elements of 
new politics. SEF and SF in Sweden and IGB in Germany were unions opposing all in­
fluences of new politics. They strongly stressed productionist aspects in their argu­
mentations. Most other Swedish unions and IGC tried to avoid a lengthy debate in 
their papers. However, the reactor accident of Chernobyl helps to clarify the stands 
of the trade unions. Most Swedish unions - with the exception of GF and perhaps SIF 
and ST - manifested their productionist stands. IGC and IGB superficially changed 
their evaluation of nuclear energy, but they did not revise their productionist stands. 
Chernobyl had a strong impact on unions that were hesitant in adopting elements of 
new politics. In particular OTV conducted a substantial shift from productionist to a 
moderate preference of new politics. DGB also falls into this category.
For Germany, it is even possible to conclude that a cleavage in terms of new and 
productionist politics occurred between the unions during the early 1980s. This pic­
ture was also valid after the Chernobyl accident. Although all German unions 
changed their official positive attitude towards nuclear energy, some unions (IGB and 
IGC) remained committed to productionist politics. Other unions such as OTV and the 
confederation DGB changed their stand but only the unions which had already 
shifted attitudes in the early 1980s "unlearned” productionist aspects. That means 
that in these unions productionist aspects fade away while elements of new politics 
remain. These unions - IGM, IGD, HBV - are unions which dissented a rather 
unambiguous positive picture of new politics. In Sweden, it is not possible to identify 
a similar trend. However, there are some exceptions such as GF, and perhaps SIF 
and ST. Important is the fact that Swedish unions never unlearned the productionist 
elements of politics.
- 91 -
The Dissemination of New Politics in Trade Union Newspapers in 1986-89 
In order to estimate the current dissemination of elements of new politics, I focus on 
all articles published after the reactor accident at Chernobyl in May 1986 with excep­
tion of letters to the editor. For this analysis I consider and combine two related but 
different aspects. First, the mean of the ANPE-lndex of the articles published be­
tween May 1986 and December 1989. Second, the frequencies of elements of new 
and productionist politics in the mentioned period. For this procedure, I standardized 
the papers' appearances as if  the respective papers would appear weekly.
The two different indicators measure two aspects. On the hand, some unions 
published articles that contain a relative high amount of elements of new politics in 
each article. These are in particular GF, HBV, and IGD. In contrast, SEF and IGB 
published rather substantial numbers of elements of productionist politics in the indi­
vidual articles. On the other hand, unions frequently publish articles that contain ele­
ments of new or productionist politics, but each article contains only a few political 
arguments. This can be documented by the summation of all elements of new and 
productionist politics over the period 1986-89. Particularly, IGM frequently publishes 
articles with only same political arguments. The average number of elements of new 
politics brings IGM's paper only up to rank four, while it by far outnumbers all other 
papers when we look how frequently metall refers to elements of new politics. The 
same but weaker trend is also true for DGB's and ©TV's paper. GF's paper is an ex­
ample for the opposite. Although articles in Grafia contain a lot of elements of new 
politics in each article, there are very few articles published. Both indicators, how­
ever, correlate significantly (r = .64*).
In order to combine both indicators to one index, I set the highest values equal 100. 
All other values are in relation to this value. The advantage of this procedure is. that 
we can combine both indicators without losing the interval scale of the data. Table 
3-7 documents the mentioned data.
< ^ 0
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Table 3-7: The Adoptation of Elements of New and Productionist Politics 
in Trade Union Membership Newspapers between 1986 and 1989
Average 
ANPE of 
each Article
Rank Frequencies Rank Combined Rank
of of ANPE of Index (5)
(1) (3) (1 and 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DGB 21.20 10 36. 13 4 39.42 7IGM 4 5.44 4 100.00 1 100.00 1IGB -32.24 16 -26.44 15 -40.35 15IGC 8.32 11 9.42 11 12.20 12ÖTV 25.68 7 47.12 3 50.06 5HBV 83.36 2 25.92 6 75.13 4IGD 75.36 3 54 .45 2 89.25 2GEW • • • • - •
LO 8. 16 12 13.09 9 14.61 11SEF -31.36 15 -82.46 16 -78.26 16Metall 6. 64 13 1.57 13 5.65 13SKAF 22.24 8.5 5.24 12 18.89 10SF .40 14 .52 14 .64 14GF 100.00 1 21.20 7 83.34 3
TCO 28.56 6 10.73 10 27.02 9SIF 36.40 5 35.86 5 49.69 6ST 22.24 8.5 20.68 8 29.51 8SKTF . . . . * #
SL • • • • • •
The total index shows that the IGM paper most strongly disseminates new politics 
elements. At the second and third places there are the printer unions, fourth comes 
HBV's and fifth OTV's paper. A bit surprising is the relatively high score for S/F-tid- 
ningen. The three papers of the union confederation are in the middle range: firstly 
DGB's paper and already below the mean (29.8) TCO's and finally LO-tidningen. 
Extremely productionist are the papers of SEF and IGB, but also SF's, Metall's and 
IGC's paper score at the end of the scale.
4. ADOPTING NEW POLITICS
In the last section of this chapter, I wish to summarize the findings of the sections 
above and to develop an index that estimates the overall adoption of elements of 
new politics by trade unions. For this I rely on both the assessment of new and 
productionist politics at the union congresses and the world views concerning new 
and productionist politics disseminated in the trade union newspapers. The idea be­
hind this procedure is that the symbolic struggle in modern society is dependent on
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both formal decisions and the disseminations of world views. The former aspect is 
reflected by the analysis of the last official stand at the trade union congress and the 
latter aspects is reflected by the world views disseminated in the trade union news­
papers. However, before I will turn to this point I wish to analyze the connection 
between official congressional stand and the dissemination of new politics in the 
trade union newspapers.
New Politics in Trade Union Newspapers and Congressional Stands 
Considering all 54 analyzed congresses and comparing the assessment of new and 
productionist politics in the membership newspapers at the year of the congress and 
the years before and after the congress, we can conclude that there is a stable cor­
relation (r = .69). This correlation is stronger for LO unions (r =.80) and lowest for 
TCO unions [15]. In order to specify the high relation between official and newspaper 
stands, I compare the latest official stand at the union congress with the assessment 
of new and productionist politics in the trade union newspapers after the Chernobyl 
reactor accident (1986 through 1989).
For the last official stand, I use the data from table 3-6 above. However, all data are 
related to the maximum value as described above. Table 3*8 shows the data for all 
analyzed unions [16].
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Table 3-8: The Current Stant on New Politics at the Trade Union Congresse the Trade Union Newspapers
Last
Congessional
Stand
(1)
Newspaper
Stand
1986-89
(2)
Differences 
between 
1 and 2 
(3)
DGB 2.40 39.42 -37.01IGM 60.10 100.00 -39.90
IGB -39.90 -40.35 .44
IGC -20.19 12.20 -32.39ÖTV 70.19 50.06 20.14HBV 80.29 75.13 5.15
IGD 60.10 89.25 -29.16
GEW 80.29 • •
Mean DGB* 36.66 46.53 23.64
LO 6.73 14.61 -7.88
SEF -39.90 -78.26 38.36
Metall -20.19 5.65 -25.84
SKAF -20.19 18.89 -39.08
SF -20.19 .64 -20.83
GF 100.00 83.34 16.66
Mean LO* 1.04 7.48 24.78
TCO -80.29 27.02 -107.31
SIF . 49.69 •
ST 39.90 29.51 10.39SKTF • • -
SL • • •
Mean TCO* -20.19 35.40 58.85
Mean all unions* 16.20 
STD all unions 84.99
29.80
12.43
28.74
* mean for column (3) is based on the absolute sums.
Unions most open to new politics in their last congressional stand also print articles 
which contain elements of new politics in their union paper (r = .76). However, they 
vary to a rather high degree. GF, HBV, IGD, and IGM print articles that contain the 
most elements of new politics. SF, Metall, and IGC give relatively little attention to 
new politics and SEF and IGB even stress productionist politics more than new poli­
tics. Comparing DGB, TCO, and LO unions, we can conclude that the DGB unions 
published the highest amount of elements of new politics followed by the TCO 
unions, while the LO unions are last. However, the rather high value for TCO unions 
must be qualified. First of all, SKTF is omitted from the calculation, because it has 
not published any article on nuclear energy since 1985. The other TCO unions and 
TCO itself also did not publish a lot on the issue after 1987, so that the data may 
overestimate the real amount of the presentation of new politics. In general, one can
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conclude that the index scores more positively towards the new politics side because 
a lot of articles stem from the time of the reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1986.
Column three shows the differences between the official congressional stand and the 
assessment of new and productionist politics in the trade union newspaper. A posi­
tive value means that the congressional stand is more open to new politics than the 
assessment in the union papers. Particularly OTV was much more open to new poli­
tics at its last congress than in its paper. The same is true for GF and much less so 
for ST and HBV. TCO is the extreme opposite. The congressional stand is much more 
negative towards new politics than the assessment in TCO-tidningen. This may be so 
since the congressional decision dates back to 1979. The same trend is true for IGM, 
SKAF, DGB and IGC. However, all these unions are within the range of the standard 
deviation [17]. With the exception of the TCO unions' papers, it seems to be fair to 
conclude that trade union newspapers reflect the opinion of the official union policy, 
when it comes to new and productionist politics. The deviant behavior of TCO unions 
can be seen from the average of the absolute sums of the differences. In so far, we 
can confirm that union newspapers represent the opinion of the official stands 
although they also represent diversified opinions. Methodologically that means that 
trade union papers are well suited for an analysis of trade union standpoints.
Adopting, Opposing and Neglecting New Politics: A Typology of Trade Unions 
In this final section of the chapter, I wish to present a total index for the adoption of 
elements of new politics. As mentioned above this index includes both the last 
official stand at the union congress and the dissemination of new politics in trade 
union newspapers. The total index is based on the sum of the relative values of the 
last congressional stand and newspaper stand between 1986 and 1989. As the other 
values, this total index is also put in relation to the maximum value. Table 3-9 
summarizes this index:
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Table 3-9: Hew and Productionist Politics inSwedish and Geraan Trade Unions (Total Index)
Index Rank
DGB 22.81 8IGM 87.32 2
IGB -43.77 15
IGC -4.36 11ÔTV 65.59 6
HBV 84.77 3
IGD 81.46 4
GEW* 80.29 5
Mean DGB unions 46.76 6.8
LO 11.64 9SEF -64.45 —Metall -7.93 12SKAF -.71 10
SF -10.67 13
GF 100.00 1
Mean LO unions 4.56 10.2
TCO -29.06 14
SIF • —
ST 37.86 7
SKTF • —
SL •
Mean TCO unions 4.4 10.5
-- ------------ -- --------------- ---- ——-----
Mean all unions 25.67 8.5
STD all unions 52.18 4.7'
* Index is based on congress Motions only.
GF, IGM, HBV, and IGD are unions that clearly adopted elements of new politics 
[18]. Even if OTV is not as decisive as the mentioned unions, it clearly belongs to the 
unions that are open for elements of new politics. ST and the DGB are also above 
the mean. However, their openness for new politics is not as clear as for the others. 
This is also supported by the fact that ST did not take any decision towards nuclear 
energy after the early 1980s. The low DGB score results from the special character 
of the 1986 congress as mentioned above. Taking the mean as the dividing line for 
new and productionist politics, we can conclude that LO, SKAF, IGC, Metall, SF, and 
TCO are productionist unions. IGB and, above all, SEF are extreme examples of pro­
ductionist unions. GEW can also be counted to the unions open to new politics. GEW 
fell out of the analysis because it did not publish any articles in their newspapers. 
However, in sharp contrast to the other unions that are in this category, GEW took a 
decisive pro-new politics stand at their congresses. Therefore, it is fair to subsume
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GEW into the category of unions open to new politics. The other unions without 
clear stands on new or productionist politics form an own category: this are unions 
which avoided to take a stand or to express their opinion. These are all TCO unions 
(SIF, SKTF, SL). Although this pattern is rather usual for Swedish unions, it took on 
extreme forms in this unions (see appendix 4 for an illustration). It needs to be men­
tioned that among the Swedish unions only SEF, SF and ST took clear congressional 
decisions. The first two unambiguously in favour of productionist politics. ST took a 
congressional decision in favor of new politics. Nevertheless, also ST refrained from 
taking clear stands - in both the newspaper and at the congresses • in the second 
half of the 1980s. GF, the other Swedish union that is open to new politics, never 
clearly approved of a motion that contained elements of new politics. Instead all 
these motions were handed over to the LO confederation or the Social Democratic 
Party. This also shows the difficulties for Swedish unions to take a stand on contro­
versial political issues. The following figure attempts to place the trade unions within 
three dimensions of new politics, productionist politics and neutral stand.
Figure 3-1: A Triangle Model of Union Decision 
on New and Productionist Politics
NEW POLITICS PRODUCTIONIST POLITICS
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5. CONCLUSION
The findings of this chapter indicate that there is a substantial difference between 
German and Swedish trade unions in respect to their ability and willingness of adop­
ting and disseminating elements of new politics. By and large, German unions are 
open for elements of new politics while Swedish unions are rather closed. That 
means that the findings of the analysis confirms the hypotheses B3b, B3c and reject 
the hypotheses B3a, B3d. However, these findings need further specification concer­
ning the impacts of the organizational environment. For the moment, we can summa­
rize the results of this chapter in what follows. The unresponsiveness of Swedish 
unions takes two forms: on the one hand, they stick to productionist politics. This 
standpoint is most common to LO unions. On the other hand, Swedish unions are un­
responsive because they neglect the issue; i.e. they do not debate nuclear energy or 
do not take any congressional decision on the issue. This congressional behavior is in 
sharp contrast to the involvement of trade unions in the political process in Sweden. 
Although the "non-decision" behavior is most common among TCO unions it is also 
true for LO unions. Congressional legitimized decisions on nuclear energy have only 
been taken by SEF, SF, and ST in Sweden.
In both countries there are exceptions. In Sweden GF and ST are "deviant" cases. 
Both unions adopted elements of new politics. The exceptions in Germany are IGB 
and IGC which did not adopt elements of new politics. While it seems for Sweden 
that these two unions are more or less the only representatives of ”new politics" 
unions for Germany the two "exceptions" may be representatives for a broader 
group of trade unions.
Concerning the second question about the institutionalization (B5) of elements of 
new politics there are four points to make: First, there are nine trade unions that 
have not changed their stand on new and productionist politics during the last two 
decades. GF and GEW have always been open to new politics, although the decision 
of GEW was taken rather late in 1980. In the GF newspaper we also find some indi­
cators that productionist politics played an important role until 1978. On the other 
hand, there are the devoted productionist trade unions, which did not change their 
standpoints: IGB and SEF. SKAF, SIF, SKTF, and SL are the unions which attempted 
avoiding any stand on new and productionist politics. Secondly, we can distinguish 
those trade unions that shifted towards a more positive attitude towards new poli­
tics. With the exception of ST, they are all DGB unions: IGD, HBV, IGM, OTV and the 
DGB. Thirdly, there is TCO that changed from a productionist policy to a more neu­
tral stand. TCO took a clear productionist stand in the late 1970s. In times of 
increasing ecological awareness, however, TCO very carefully expressed some sym-
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pathy for environmental concerns. However, it never addressed substantial aspects, 
but only paid some lip-service that environmental factors are important and should be 
taken into TCO's policy. Fourthly, there is a trend among the most influential LO 
unions that indicates that productionist politics are more highly valued in the most 
recent years than in the 1970s. To these unions belong LO, SF, and Metall.
The unions that adopted elements of new politics can be divided into two groups.
For the first group the adoption of elements of new politics was a lengthy process 
(IGD, IGM, HBV, GEW, GF and ST). GF re-assessed it stand before the turn of the 
1970/80 decade and GEW never took a productionist stand. The other unions men­
tioned changed their position in the early 1980s. The other group, consisting of ÓTV 
and the DGB, re-assessed their stand of new and productionist politics after 1986. 
This was not so much a lengthy process but can rather be interpreted as an ad hoc 
decision in face of the aftermath of the Chernobyl reactor accident. A long lasting 
adoption of elements of new politics can only be postulated for the first group of 
unions that institutionalized these elements over a longer time period. An indicator 
for this deep-rooted processes is that no union of the first group has still a substan­
tial amount of elements of productionist politics in their congressional or newspapers 
stand. ST is an exception in this. ST has not unlearnt elements of productionist poli­
tics. This is documented in the fact that the ST paper contains also currently ele­
ments of productionist politics and that ST refrained - in sharp contrast to the other 
unions in this group - from congressional decisions in the mid and end 1980s.
In the following chapters in part three I wish to focus on some aspects that might be 
of special importance for the different trade union behaviors. I distinguish between 
organizational characteristics, intra-organizational processes, and organizational 
environments.
Footnotes:
1 The other unions were: the Union of Commercial employees (HTF) and the Union of Civilian 
Employees in the Defence Force (FCTF).
2 However, there may be some deviations from the general pattern described here (Bergmann, 
1979; Markovits, 1986; Lewin, 1980).
3 There are some congressional procedures in several unions that support the standpoint of the 
motion commission. For instance, even if only minor changes of one motion are suggested it is neces­
sary to vote down first the original motion in order to vote for the new one (which is an altered mo­
tion). Since this procedure is very time consuming and confusing it is often rejected by delegates.
4 The coding of this classification was guided by the headlines of the motion. This could be 
partly misleading. Particular in the case of the 1979 TCO congress, it would be fair to say that nuclear 
energy was much more in the center of the congress motions than suggested by the data here.
5 According to Michele Micheletti (1985: chapter 4) the only TCO union which took a dear deci­
sion on nuclear energy was the Union of Theatrical Employees (TR. TF expressed its opposition to
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nuclear power. Also the syndicalist union Svariges Arbetaras Centra/organisation (Central Organization 
of Swedish Workers; SAC) had conaressionally decided to oppose nuclear energy. SACO/SR had 
decided not to become involved in tne issue at all.
6 For GEW no debate protocols were available at the DGB archives and also GEW did not 
cooperate with the author in this question.
7 Although there is a clear correlation between El (the evaluation of nuclear energy), on the one 
hand, and ANPE, on the other, the differences are large enough to conclude that we measure two dif­
ferent concepts (Pearson's r = -.73; N of valid cases = 388). The same correlation is for the whole 
congress motions, congress debate, trade union membership papers: r = -.69; N of valid cases =
8 There are some decisions taken on motions that had, beside other issues, nuclear energy as a 
subject. However, these motions (TCO 1985 and ST 1987) did not address elements of new and pro­
ductionist politics.
9 In both countries there is not very much systematic work done on trade union papers. An ex­
ception is the relatively comprehensive overview by Juhe (1977). For more recent information and 
more formal facts, see the collection of productionist by Niedenhoff and Pege (1987: chapter 0) and 
the annual TS-bokan. Furthermore, there exists one analysis for the membership newspaper of the 
metal unions in both countries. Both are dissertations, one at the University of Lund, Department of 
Comparative Literature, and the other at the Department of Social Sciences, University of Gdttingen. 
Kristina Wallander (1982) analyses the literary productionist of the Swedish Metalworkers' union from
1890 till 1978. Maria Kniesburges (1984) looks at the German Metalworkers' Union in order to analyze 
its function in the opinion-making process. Finally, there are some unpublished master's theses: 
Sverinsson, 1984; Svensson and Johansson, 1989; Etiasson, 1989; vessman, 1990. A 
comprehensive study of the Danish trade union press is in progress (Bang, 1989) and to my knowledge 
the only project that systematically analyzes several aspects or the union press (public and union 
membership attitudes towards union press; readership and readership behavior; situation and attitudes 
of journalists in the union press; analysis of the contents of the union paper of LO - the Danish union 
confederation • and several membership union).
For the West German unions, it would have been possible to include newspapers for officials which 
most individual unions run. However, there are no equivalent papers for Swedish unions. Also the 
more general and public feature of membership newspapers gives a more comprehensive picture of a 
union^ world-view than more specialist papers. The same is true for membership papers that address 
only certain occupational groups among the membership. In so far, it is possible to consider the 
general membership newspapers as the most important union publications (JOhe, 1977: 13-18).
10 The teacher union newspapers were analyzed after the reactor accidents at Three Mile Island 
and Chernobyl. The result was that there were no articles that met the coding instruction (headline re­
ferring to nuclear energy). On the base of this impression it was concluded that the papers should be 
excluded from the analysis.
11 In methodological terms, I will only consider those articles that score higher than 8 either on 
the productionist politics (MP), new politics (NP) or ANPE scale. Please recall that the indices in this 
section score from 0 to 100 for the two former and -100 to +100 for the latter index. For a 
documentation of the following interpretation consult table A3-1 and A3-2 in the appendix.
12 The STD for all articles over the period 1973-89 is 10.3. The mean is -.88 by 910 valid cases 
for the variable ANPE.
13 SKTF published a rather small number of articles. The ANPE-lndex scores -8.3 in 1979 and
+ 8.3 in 1980. This judgement, however, is based mainly on letters to the editor which make 80 per­
cent of the publications. Excluding the letter to the editor SKTF scored 4.2 for both years.
14 In 1986 letters to the editor played no substantial role about the assessment of new and pro­
ductionist politics in the papers of TCO. The same is also true for the period after Chernobyl until 
1989.
15 The regression coefficient should not be interpreted here in the crude statistical wav but rather 
heuristically since the data and number of observations are often rather low (for all unions 37; for LO 
unions 13, DGB unions 19). Particularly for TCO unions r = .52 is based on just 5 observations. When 
we consider only the membership papers, i.e. excluding the papers of the confederations, the corre­
lation for TCO unions is even negative (r = -.54) but is based on only 3 observations. In contrast to 
TCO unions, for LO and DGB unions the correlation between the ANPE-lndex at the congresses (official 
stands) and in the membership papers increases when we focus exclusively on membership unions 
(DGB: r « .70, N -15 ; LO: r -  .81, N = 10). For the one who opposes the application of Pearson's r 
here, I refer to table A3-3 that confirms the impression described here.
16 Some unions could not be included in this analysis. This is SL and SIF because they did not 
take a congressional stand in terms defined above. GEW, SL, SKTF could also not be analyzed because 
they did not publish articles on nuclear energy after 1986.
17Excluding the extreme value of TCO from the analysis leads to an increase of r up to .87.
18 All these unions are outside the range of the standard deviation from -29.84 and 73.90.
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SOME DETERMINANTS FOR THE ADOPTION OF ELEMENTS OF NEW POLITICS BY 
SWEDISH AND WEST GERMAN TRADE UNIONS
The following three chapters attempt to give empirical evidence for some factors that 
may influence the adoption of elements of new politics by the trade unions. The 
aspects chosen can be divided into two areas. On the one hand, organizational cha­
racteristics can be responsible for the union perception of new and productionist poli­
tics. In particular, the impact of the union membership, the organization of different 
groups of membership, the organized sectors, and aspects of the organizational 
structure can be relevant. All these aspects are analyzed in the tradition of the struc­
tural contingency approach in chapter four. But organizations are also different ac­
cording to their principles of organizing. The possibility of voicing demands which 
refer to new and productionist politics in the trade unions are substantively different. 
Also the other key variables of modern organization theory such as organizational 
conflict, communication and ideology are analyzed in chapter five. On the other 
hand, I will focus on some relevant impacts of the organizational environment 
(chapter six). In this chapter, the influence of the national energy policy and the eco­
nomic development is analyzed, as well as the impact of the new social movements 
and the public opinion, the political parties and the color of the governments.
The data for the different analysis come from different sources. While the data for 
the organizational characteristics stem from official union statistics which have a 
rather different quality for each union, the data for chapter five result from the con­
tent analysis of the union congresses. The interaction between organizational and 
environmental aspects make it necessary that we have a more flexible measure for 
union perception of new politics than in the other chapters. Therefore, in chapter six 
I will mainly rely on the dissemination of new and productionist politics in the trade 
union newspapers as dependent variable.
The different subjects and analyses also make it necessary that we apply different 
methodological approaches. In chapter four and five, I rely mainly on classical corre­
lation measures, on the one hand, and the analysis of "truth tables" as suggested by 
Charles Ragin (1987), on the other. Ragin proposes that this method is able to "test" 
hypotheses for a low number of cases. This method is in particular suitable for the 
purpose of this chapter because it enables us to identify the cases. That means that 
we can refer the results of the individual trade unions which make it possible to find 
rules and exceptions in relation to specific trade unions. However, hypotheses tests 
in the tradition of this method are not as hard as quantitative analysis claims are
otherwise: "The typical end product of a Boolean analysis is a statement of the limits 
of the causal variables identified with different theories, not their mechanical rejec­
tion or acceptance. ” (Ragin, 1987: 123) Chapter six focuses on interactive and 
rather complex relations. Therefore, I have chosen to apply a more narrative method 
in order to specify the impact of the different organizational environments.
The analyses of the following three chapters are heavily dependent on the quality of 
already conducted research on trade unionism, value change, attitudes towards 
nuclear energy, new social movements and political parties. This research is diffe­
rently developed in both countries. This certainly makes it sometimes rather difficult 
to conduct a stringent comparative analysis. Particularly difficult is the fact that there 
has hardly been any analytical work done in Sweden that includes the entire 
spectrum of Swedish trade unions. Mainly the work focuses exclusively on the blue 
collar unions and, here particularly, on the LO confederation. Although some work 
exists on TCO unions, systematic comparisons of both union organizations have 
hardly ever been conducted. Therefore, most of the independent variables had to be 
gathered within the context of this investigation.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS
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In this chapter, I wish to address some questions concerning the relationship be­
tween organizational characteristics and the unions' stand on productionist and new 
politics. In particular, I will stress factors inherent of the union organization. Although 
it is impossible to isolate external and internal factors of organizations in reality, the 
major emphasis in this chapter is analytically on organizational characteristics that 
are different between the individual trade unions. In doing so I refer to basic ele­
ments of structural contingency approaches. Three sources of influence on trade 
union policy in the context of new and productionist politics should be illuminated: 
first the impact of union membership (Proposition A1, A2, A3); second the impact of 
the task environment of the trade unions (A4); and third the impact of some aspects 
of the organizational structures (A7, A8).
1. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND UNION POLICY
The membership of a trade union organization can have a direct impact on trade 
union policy. In our case, the relationship would be straight forward: if a trade union 
organizes members that typically favor new politics, the trade union will follow a po­
licy that favors new politics. The same relationship can be postulated for produc­
tionist politics. In order to analyze this relationship, I wish to present some data from 
German and Swedish surveys, on the one hand, and derive some conclusions from 
related international investigations on new politics, on the other. However, the mem­
bership/union policy causality is already weakened by the fact that unions never 
organize their workers according to pure analytical categories. Therefore, it is 
furthermore essential to analyze the impact of union membership in the light of their 
homogeneity and heterogeneity concerning new/productionist politics attitudes. A 
further special aspect in this context are the union confederations which organize, 
first of all, union organizations. They are only indirectly concerned with membership 
interest in the sense of individual members. However, confederations are in particular 
responsible for the aggregation of worker interests in more general terms since they 
represent these interests to other social and political actors, etc.
Union Membership Opinion and Union Policy
The membership of a trade union may be the most obvious explanatory variable for 
the trade union policy. W. Richard Scott (1987: 161) points out for organizations in 
general: "Of all the many resources required by organizations, the most vital are the 
contribution of its human participants." Also the research that considers trade unions
as "intermediary organizations" (Muller-Jentsch, 1985; 1988; Streeck, 1981; 1987) 
stresses the importance of the normative ties, personal involvement, and 
commitment of the members to the trade union organization (logic of membership), 
even when these ties are weakening and are partly replaced by external resources.
However, there are some problems concerning the data for an analysis of this rela­
tionship. There are no surveys that have analyzed new and productionist politics on 
the individual level which also included detailed data on union membership. Before I 
describe the German and Swedish cases more specifically, I would like to refer briefly 
to some investigations that strongly stress the link between non-productionist attitu­
des and the occupational structure. "Occupation is generally a good and economic 
indicator of the position in social space ...” (Bourdieu, 1987: 4) and also Claus Offe 
stresses the special feature of service work:
Service labour is, therefore, always located at the intersection of two rationalities: (i) the rationality of 
'industrial economy' based on contractual employment, which entails the detailed specification of 
means and ends, direct vertical control over work activity, little scope for manoeuvre and high levels of 
standardization; and (ii) the rationality of 'mediation and conciliation' typical of service activities, which 
require room for manoeuvre precisely in order to respond as services to specific situation. (Offe,
1985d: 107)
Most of the empirical studies have their theoretical roots in the hypothesis of 
"middle-class radicalism" as first outlined by Parkin (1965). For instance, Stephen 
Cotgrove and Andrew Duff analyze the British environmentalist movement and com­
pare the values of environmentalists, trade unionists, industrialists and the public. 
They found that environmentalists are significantly more often employed in service, 
welfare and creative occupations (3.15 times more often than the public) and much 
less so in clerical commerce and industry occupations (0.46) (Cotgrove and Duff, 
1980: 340-3). The authors postulate that ”... the new politics cuts across the trade 
union economism... " and "... will present a serious challenge to the parties of the 
left to come to grips with conflicts of values and beliefs which run deeper than sim­
ply a reordering of priorities". (Cotgrove and Duff, 1981: 344 and 348). A French 
analysis by Monique Dagnaud and Dominique Mehl (1983) elaborate the argument by 
connecting structural and occupational changes and societal conflict. Going out from 
a premises of different capitals developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1983) they start their 
argument by stating:
The possession of a certain amount of cultural capital is gradually becoming the key that opens the 
door to the corridors of power. At the same time, the number of people included in the wage-earner 
middle strata is expanding at breathtaking speed as a result of an equally breathtaking expansion of the 
educational system. The intelligentsia is losing its monopoly of expertise and of intellectual discourse 
which is spreading to new occupations and penetrating into every corner of society. (Dagnaud and 
Mehl, 1983: 817)
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They distinguish between elite, sub-elite and counter-elite. The elite are the 
established decision-makers who put decisions into effect. Sub-elite and counter-elite 
are relevant social actors, because they possess cultural capital (e.g. education) and 
social capital (e.g. occupations) just like the elite. The counter-elite sympathizes with 
social change, whereas the sub-elite are more motivated to oppose the economic and 
political establishment in order to gain their own place in the existing power 
structure.
In the empirical part of their study, the authors identify the sub-elite in industries that 
rely heavily on technological innovations such as energy, oil, chemicals (827). The 
counter-elite consists of middle management executives in health and social services 
and technicians, and above all teachers. The first group is more motivated to fight 
the economic and political power of the establishment and to demand its own place 
in the existing power structure. It acts mainly on issues of social power and feels 
closer to the technostructure and the bourgeoisie. The second group is more 
concerned with cultural change and ”... would appear to be inspired by counter-cul­
tural issues and to feel themselves closer to wage-earners or "the masses"... " 
(Dagnaud and Mehl, 1983: 838/9). Trade unions are an important agent for social in­
fluence for both sub-elite and counter-elite. The former group attempts to establish 
its ideas through trade unions representation at the firm level. The latter group 
considers trade unions to be an actor for social change for an alternative society. 
Needless to say that both interests can be in sharp contrast.
The last investigation which I wish to mention in this context analyzes the Dutch 
social movements (ecology, peace, anti-nuclear, women's, and squatter's 
movements). In my presentation here, I will focus on the data of the anti-nuclear 
movement. In the search for the class base of new social movements in the Nether­
lands, Hanspeter Kriesi (1989a) conceptualizes the mobilization potential for new 
social movements on a scale which reaches from 0 (no potential) to 20 (all members 
of these group are potentially ready to engage in new social movement actions).
Using Wright's class concept his results show that "Wright's new middle class" is 
very diversified in these terms: expert non-managers show the highest mobilization 
potential (9.2) whereas uncredential managers have the lowest (5.2) (Kriesi, 1987: 
table 3). Moving away from ideological implication of class analysis, he applies occu­
pational segments for identifying mobilization potential. Kriesi discovers five distinct 
occupational groups within the new middle class: protective workers, craft spe­
cialists, technical specialists, administrative and commercial specialists, and social 
and cultural specialists. This study also confirms and specifies the findings of the 
investigations above mentioned: teachers and social and cultural workers are most 
likely ready to participate in the Dutch anti-nuclear movement. Their index lies clearly
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over the one of the total population (6.8). For teachers, the index is 9.1 and for 
social and cultural services even 10.3. Furthermore, this study shows also another 
interesting fact. The "classical” working-class is not very enthusiastic about new 
social movements in general and the anti-nuclear movement in particular. While lower 
level employees score similar in comparison to the total population (6.9) skilled (6.7) 
and unskilled workers (5.9) score lower than the general population. The results are 
not only true for the readiness to participate but also for the actual participation in 
the anti-nuclear movement. With some modification, we can conclude that the 
groups which are least penetrated by "... the "new" paradigm are exactly the 
"principle" classes of capitalist societies, namely, the industrial working class and the 
holders and agents of economic and administrative power.” (Offe, 1985c: 835).
Before I apply the results of this studies to the membership of trade unions, I wish to 
present some survey data from West Germany and Sweden. Unfortunately, no sur­
vey has asked the question about specific trade union membership or includes a suf­
ficient number of interviewees so that reliable conclusions would be possible. The 
best we can get are surveys that asked about union membership in general terms. 
However, for the Swedish unions I was able to use the data from the election studies 
conducted by Sdren Holmberg from the University of Gothenburg. However, the data 
does not allow for an in-depth look at the individual union level. First, I wish to pre­
sent some more general data about the attitude towards nuclear energy and occupa­
tional groups that may allow some inference for the trade unions.
- 106-
- 107-
Table: 4-1. The Public Opinion Towards Nuclear Energy of Different 
Occupational Groups in Sweden and the Federal Republic 
of Germany in 1988 (percent).
pro con no
opinion
blank sum
percent N
VÇÆt.. Gernany:
Skilled
workers
12 68 21 - 101 96
other
workers
10 62 29 - 101 53
High-ranking white 21 
collar workers
63 16 - 100 24
other white 
collar workers
11 71 18 - 100 248
Population 11 70 18 - 99 1010
Sweden:
Skilled
workers
40 40 19 1 100 396
otherworkers
32 42 24 2 100 614
High-ranking white 
collar workers
54 37 9 1 101 335
other white collar workers
38 46 15 1 100 769
Population 39 42 17 1 99 2529
Sources and explanations: The data were taken from two surveys 
conducted by the Department of Political Science at the University 
of Gothenburg in the context of the election survey study in 
summer 1988 and the Emnid-Institute in March 1988. The questions 
asked were quite similar in both countries: "There are different 
opinions on nuclear power as a energy source. Are you mainly for 
or against it that nuclear energy is used as energy source in 
Sweden or do you not have any special opinion on that." (Holmberg,et al. 1988: 44) and "Are you basically for the construction of
nuclear power plants - or are you against it - or does it really
matter to you whether nuclear plants are constructed or not?"
(Emnid, 1988 (no. 2/3): 10). More specifically the occupations 
are: skilled workers: industriarbetaren; Facharbeiter. Other 
workers: ôvriga arbetare; sonstige Arbeiter. High-ranking white 
collar workers: h5gre tjânstem&n och storfôretagare; Leitende 
Angestellte and Beamte. Other white collar workers: lëgre 
tjanstemën och tj&nstemân i mellanst&llning; sonstige Angestellte 
and Beamte. For further details see: Holmberg, et al. 1988: 324- 
331.
Table 4-1 indicates one striking difference between Sweden and the Federal Republic 
of Germany. In Sweden, nuclear power is much more accepted by the population 
than in West Germany (Holmberg, 1989a). However, I do not want to elaborate on 
this point here (see: chapter six). Within relative terms, we find striking similarities in 
both countries which are also in agreement with the findings of the reported studies 
above. In both countries leading white collar workers favor nuclear power strikingly 
more than other occupational groups. For Sweden, we can also conclude that this 
group is most determined in their view on nuclear power; i.e. the number of "no 
opinion" answers is relatively low. Only nine percent express that they are indifferent 
to this question. On the other hand, we also identify the same groups which are 
most strongly against nuclear power: other white collar workers. From the Swedish 
data which distinguished lower and middle white collar workers, we can conclude 
that the higher the status of white collar workers the more pro-nuclear the attitude. 
Blue collar workers are also more positive towards nuclear energy the higher their 
occupational status. However, they do not considerably differ from the rest of the 
population. Interesting, however, is the fact that the blue-collar worker (other 
workers) in relation to other occupations is most frequently indifferent to this que­
stion. From the presented data we can conclude that the conflict between produ- 
ctionist and new politics (or more precisely in this case between pro and con nuclear 
attitudes) is more a specific white collar problem. However, it also affects the labor 
movement as whole in particular when one expands the notion of the labor 
movement. Himmelstrand et al. reflect upon the incoherence between industrial 
workers and service workers:
Unemployment is seen as the greatest threat by more industrial workers than service workers; for the 
environmental problems it is just opposite. As we have already pointed out the trade union movement 
has traditionally emphasized problems of employment and production more than external environmental 
problems - a position which now must be re-assessed in a manner which provides the responsiveness 
of the labour movement to new issues arising. (Himmelstrand et al., 1981: 209)
It is frequently stated in the literature that white collar unions have it more difficult to 
bind their membership to the trade union organization (Armstrong, et al., 1986; 
Ericsson, 1983; Carter, 1986). Reasons given for this are that white collar workers 
have a broader spectrum of political opinions, they are less inhibited by occupational 
solidarity and culture, and they have internalized an ethic of professionalism and 
white collar status which limits party-political support. In organizations white collar 
workers are more likely to "voice" discontent and "exit" (Schmidman, 1979: 143; 
Taylor, 1987). However, structural changes such as the increase of white collar em­
ployment may reinforce this process and even affect blue collar unions (Crouch,
1986; P. Berger, 1986).
- 108-
Moving back to the organizational level, one can conclude that the white collar 
worker problem is not only acute in TCO but also some LO unions are "victims* of 
this structural change. As Rune Nordin notes around 80 percent of industrial workers 
vote for the Social Democrats or Communists in Sweden. However, members of LO 
unions that organize members in the service sector (SKAF, SF, Handelsanstallda F6r- 
bund, FdrsakringsanstSlldas Fdrbund) vote significantly more frequently for the bour­
geois parties. Furthermore, he notes that - with the exception of SKAF - these unions 
are careful in formulating their organizational goals because of this. Apart from SKAF 
all these LO unions changed their names in the way that they replaced the term arbe- 
tare (workers) to anstSlldas (employees) (Nordin, 1988: 353-357). A typical way for 
the white collar unions of "solving" this problem is to refrain from politics at all. In 
particular, the Swedish trade union research postulates that the white collar union 
confederation TCO comes most likely into trouble when issues get politicized in 
party-political terms (Wheeler, 1975; Micheletti, 1985). Unfortunately, these investi­
gations refer exclusively to TCO unions and do not include LO unions.
Data from the 1988 election study of the University of Gothenburg support the 
impression that TCO members are more critical towards nuclear energy and that they 
sooner take a stand on that issue. However, for the Swedish unions, we can specify 
this findings. In Sweden, one of the strongest (economic) tensions exists between 
the private and public sector. However, we may also assume that the sector diffe­
rences result in different attitudes towards nuclear power. This in particular when we 
control the differences in attitudes between LO and TCO members by private/public 
sector.
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Table: 4-2. Trade Union Membership Opinion of Nuclear Energy in 
Sweden in 1988 (percent).
pro con noopinion blank
sum
percent N
LO Members 36 44 19 1 100 869
in Private Sector
43 39 17 2 101 502
in Public 
Sector
26 50 23 1 100 359
TCO Members 40 47 14 1 102 549
in Private 
Sector
47 37 15 1 100 272
in Public 
Sector
33 56 11 1 101 274
Population 39 42 17 1 99 2529
Source and Explanation: see table 4-1.
From the data of the survey, we can conclude that union members in the private se< 
tor are mostly in favor of nuclear energy and members in the public sector are more 
critical. This finding is true for both LO and TCO members. However the differences 
are more pronounced for TCO members. LO members, particularly in the public 
sector, are most frequently indifferent to the issue.
It is rather difficult to isolate the effect of public sector members and women mem­
bership. In their study about the referendum on nuclear energy in Sweden, Kent Asp 
and Sdren Holmberg conclude that gender may have an important impact on the 
election behavior although strongly filtered by party affiliation (Holmberg and Asp, 
1984: 338/41). Women voted significantly more against nuclear energy than men. 
This trend is also true for West Germany, although here occupational and age factor: 
have a much stronger impact (Emnid, 1988: A16). However, since I am not able to 
control this factor empirically we should keep it in mind as a reinforcing factor.
For West Germany, it is only possible to compare members with non-members. How­
ever, combining the data about the occupational status and the opinion towards 
nuclear energy may lead to similar conclusion for German union members than for 
their Swedish colleagues. A comparison of the data form 1986 and 1988 shows that 
trade union members most strongly lost their interest in nuclear energy. Shortly after 
Chernobyl, only 7 percent of the union members were indifferent towards nuclear 
power, in contrast to 9 percent of the general public. In 1988, 26 percent of the 
trade union members had no opinion towards nuclear energy in contrast to only 18 
percent of the general public. That means that for trade union members the indif­
ferent opinion increased by 19 percent whereas it increased only by 9 percent for the 
whole population. This shift lead to the consequence that union members less fre­
quently opposed nuclear energy in 1988 than what the general population did (63 to 
70 percent).
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Table: 4-3. Trade Union Membership Opinion of Nuclear Energy in
West Germany in 1986 and 1988 (percent).
pro con no blank sum N
opinion percent
19M :
Union Members 2 3
Non-Members 25
Population 24
70
65
66
7
10
9
100 
1 100 
1 100
124
885
1017
1988:
Union Members 10
Non-Members 11
Population 11
63 26
71 17
70 18
100
100
100
155
842
1010
Source and Explanation: Emnid, 1986: No. 5/6 and Emnid, 1988: No. 
2/3. For 1988 data see table 4-1. In 1986 the questions were 
slightly different. On a card the interviewees could choose: pro * 
"I am sufficiently informed about nuclear energy and I am in favor 
of the further development of nuclear plants in the Federal 
Republic of Germany" and "I am not sufficiently informed about 
nuclear energy but I am in favor of the further development of 
nuclear plants". Con ■ "I am sufficiently informed about nuclear energy and I am against the further development of nuclear plants" 
and "I am not sufficiently informed about nuclear energy but I am 
against the further development of nuclear plants". No opinion * 
"The whole debate about the further development of nuclear energy 
does not matter to me."
From the above investigations and survey data, we may make some inferences on 
the trade union membership opinion of the individual trade unions. Trade unions 
which organize a high number of white collar workers are more likely confronted with 
new politics issues than their blue collar counterparts. This may be the case for 6TV, 
HBV, and GEW in Germany and all the TCO unions in Sweden. However, it is relati­
vely sure to conclude that SKTF and above all GEW and SL have a membership that 
is quite coherently against nuclear energy. Most studies on environmentalism and 
new politics point out that teachers and employees in social and cultural services in 
the public sector belong to those groups that are most strongly committed to new 
values. LO unions are more difficult to classify in terms of blue and white collar 
workers. A number of authors have classified all of the LO unions as blue-collar 
unions, although admitting that some LO unions organize also lower-grade white 
collar employees {Nilstein, 1966; Wheeler, 1975). Jelle Visser (1989) is more con­
crete in the way that he notes that more than three-quarters of the membership of 
SF is in lower-grade white collar occupations. SKAF also has some white collar
members. More than 100 000 members work as nurses and in similar occupations 
[1]. I suppose that it is fair to say that around one-third of SKAF's members are 
white collar workers. Table 4-4 summarizes the arguments so far and refers them to 
the trade union policy.
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Tabi« 4-4.: Aasuaed and Raal Relationship between Haabarahip Opinion and
tha Adoption of Eleaenta of Haw Politica
LaCant Hmmbmrship P o tm n t is l Jntra-Organisational features
High Degree of:
Mhite Collar Public Noaen Indax Voicad Adoption of
Workers Sactor of Latant Haabarahip Nav Politica
Morkars Heabersh. Potantial
Potantial
DGB U n io n *
aaauaad raal aatch aaauaad raal aatch
IOI no no no 0 no soaa % no yas 0ICB no no no 0 no no 1 no no 1ICC no no no 0 no aoaa H no no 1Orv yes yas no 2
1.5
yes yaa l yea yaa 1HBV yas no yas aoaa soae l soae yas «1ICO no no no 0 no soaa H no yas 0GEW yas
Hatch for DGB Unione:
yaa yas 2.5 yaa yas l7» yaa 164
hO O n io n s
SET no no no 0 no no 1 no no 1Natali no no no 0 no soae % no no 1SP yas yaa no 2 yaa soae h yas no 0SKAP soaa yaa yaa 2 yas no 0 yaa no 0GP no 
Hatch for LO Unions:
no no 0 no •cmm %50
no yas 0
40
TOO O n io n s
SIP yas no no 1 no soaa % no no 1ST yas yaa yas 2.5 yes yas 1 yas yaa 1SKTT yas yaa yas 2.5 yes yas 1 yas no 0SL yaa 
Natch for TCO Unions:
Hatch for all Unions:
yaa yas 2.5 yes yas 1
M
72
yas no 0
50
53
E x p lm n s t io n : mssummd Beans tha relational outcoae which ia to ba expected if tha aaaberahip opinion 
would have a direct effect on organisational faaturaa. Aeal rafara to findinga of tha proceeding 
analyaia. Tha index o f nav p o l i t i c s  potantial ia tha sui of vhite collar aeabers, public aactor 
aaabara and voeen. White collar aeahara acoraa 0 (no) when laaa than 25 parcant of union aaaberahip 
ara whita collar vorkera, .5 (aoaa) vhan there ara aora than 25 but laaa than 40 percent, l (yaa) 
aore than 40 parcant. Public aactor acore 0 (no) vhan tha aajority of tha union aaabara ia not 
aaployad in tha public aactor and 1 (yaa) vhan tha aajority of tha aaabara ia eaployed in the public 
aactor. Tha acore for woaen ia .5 vhan there ara aora than 50 parcant faaala aaabara and 0 vhan there 
ara lass. Woaen score only *5, because tha iapact is not so claar and interacts strongly vith tha 
othar factors. Tha mssummd organisational potantial for nav politics scores no if tha indax of 
potantial for nav politics is lover than 1, soaa vhan it scores between 1 and 2, and otherwise yes. 
The organisational potantial for nav politics is no vhan tha indax ia lower than 10; soae vhen it is 
lower 20; and yes when it is graater than 20 (coapare table <-1. for tha valuas). Tha aatch scores 0 
if tha aaauaad and raal feature disagree coapletely (e.g. yea and no; no and yaa)f H if there is aoaa 
aatch, and 1 whan thare ia a coaplete Batch. The suaaary aatehee ara tha percentagaa in relation of a 
coaplate aatch (100 parcant).
In this analysis, I concentrate only on the unions with a membership of individuals. 
That leaves the confederations out of the analysis. It is assumed that a trade union 
has a membership potential for new politics when it has both a high amount of white 
collar workers and public sector employees. If there is a high amount of white collar 
workers or public sector workers and a high number of women, then it is supposed 
that there is some membership potential as in the case of HBV.
First, we can have a short look at the membership potential. It has been operationa­
lized in terms of the expression of elements of new politics by trade union members
either in their trade union or at the congresses of their confederation (compare ap­
pendix: 4). This voiced membership potential is rather strongly correlated with the 
latent membership potential deduced from the union membership composition. In 
approximately three quarters of the cases, unions with a latent membership potential 
(deduced from occupations, private/public sector, and gender) have also a voiced 
membership potential. This is particularly true for TCO (88 percent) where only SIF 
does not fit this assumption because it has more voiced membership potential than 
assumed. It is least true for LO unions (50 percent) where Metall and GF have a 
higher voiced membership potential as assumed and SKAF has a lower. For the OG6 
unions, the relation proved to be correct in around 80 percent of the cases; however 
IGM, IGC, and IGD have a greater voiced membership potential than expected from 
their membership.
Second, the relationship between latent membership potential for new politics and 
the adoption of elements of new politics matches in 53 percent of the cases. It is 
highest in DGB unions where only IGM and IGD do not confirm the hypothesis. Both 
unions adopted elements of new politics although their membership lets us assume 
the opposite. Two TCO unions confirm to the hypothesized relationship: SIF and SL. 
However, the other two - SKTF and SL - did not adopt elements of new politics 
although its membership characteristic would have suggested it. The match between 
assumed and real adoption of elements of new politics is at its lowest for LO unions. 
It matches only for SEF and Metall. The two public sector unions SF, with a high 
amount white collar workers, and SKAF, with a high amount of women membership, 
did - contrary to the assumption - not adopt elements of new politics. The opposite is 
true for GF. Here we would not assume from the characteristic of the membership 
that GF adopted elements of new politics [2].
We may conclude from the analysis of the latent membership potential for new poli­
tics that it has an impact on the voiced membership potential but that the impact on 
the actual union stand is much weaker. Surprising in this context is that latent mem­
bership potential is not only filtered out but, on the contrary, that some unions are 
more open to elements of new politics than the membership characteristic let us 
assume. In the latter case organizational and other factors must work to reinforce 
elements of new politics that cannot be explained by referring to variables of structu­
ral contingency approaches. Before I will come back to this point in the next chapter 
I wish to analyze other aspects that depend on the union membership.
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Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Membership
Trade unions differ fundamentally according to the homogeneity of their membership. 
The major reasons for the degree of membership homogeneity lies in historical and 
traditional reasons. In general, one can say that Swedish unions are more homo­
geneous at the individual union level than German unions. A simple indicator for that 
is the fact that the 17 DGB unions (from 1989 16 unions) organize the whole 
spectrum of employees whereas in Sweden that is divided into more than 40 unions 
when we only consider LO and TCO and into even more than 60 when we include 
also SACO/SR. The diversity between the confederation of white and blue collar 
workers leads to the conclusion that the unions are less diversified in terms of the 
heterogeneity of their members. In organization analytical terms, one can speak of 
the fact that Swedish trade unions are loosely coupled while DGB unions are tightly 
coupled. The major function of loose coupling is that the interests of the different 
trade unions are buffered from each other. Applying the model of Charles Perrow, we 
may conclude that Swedish unions are more stable because of their loose coupling. 
However, also the complexity of the trade unions are different. Complexity, I wish to 
use here, in contrast to the meaning of the term in chapter five, in the way how 
diversified the members of a trade union are in their attitude towards new politics. In 
these terms, a trade union that organizes both kinds of members is more complex 
while unions which organize exclusively either members with pro-nuclear attitudes, 
on the one hand, or anti-nuclear attitudes, on the other hand, are rather homo­
geneous or in organization theoretical terms linear. I wish to analyze these catego­
ries, first, in terms of craft and industrial trade unions and, second, by looking at the 
confederations.
(a) Craft and Industrial Unions
In general, Swedish and German trade unions are organized according to the indu­
strial principle, i.e. everybody employed at the same work-place belongs to the same 
union regardless of trade. However, there are some trade unions in both countries 
that are still quite homogeneous or have a tradition as a craft union. This is particu­
larly true for the printer and teacher unions in both countries and for SEF. IGB comes 
also quite close to these kinds of trade unions, although it has more features of an 
industrial union than the above mentioned unions. Because of the homogeneity 
among the members, we may expect no large intra-organizational conflicts within 
this unions.
With the exception of IGD, all these unions did not suffer under a very high degree of 
intra-organizational conflict (for the operationalization of organizataional conflict see 
chapter five). However, the reasons for this are quite different. SEF and IGB have a
low conflict level, because their membership is clearly not concerned with elements 
of new politics. For 6EW and GF, the low conflict level results from the opposite 
reasons: the members agree on it that elements of new politics are important. SL, 
however, followed the TCO device "not to get involved." Therefore SL avoided intra- 
organizational conflict through measures which do not depend on their membership 
but rather the union's ideology (see chapter five). IGD together with IGB and GEW 
were those German unions among the analyzed DGB unions, which suffered the least 
from intra-organizational conflict. Also in this case the ideological stand may contri­
bute some explanation for this fact as I will demonstrate later. As mentioned above, 
although IGB is an industrial union, it comes rather close to the type of a craft union 
in terms of the homogeneity of its members. This is also certainly true in terms of 
new politics. Miners, the major categories of members, are rather traditional blue 
collar workers who are most likely not penetrated by elements of new politics.
Generally speaking, industrial unions have a less homogeneous membership than 
craft-like unions. However, there is a fundamental difference among the analyzed 
industrial unions. One can distinguish three different kinds of membership influences: 
first, there are those industrial unions which membership is presumably more or less 
coherently non-receptive for elements of new politics. These are Metall, SIF, IGM, 
and IGC. However, attitudes of white collar technical workers which are organized in 
IGM, IGC and SIF are difficult to estimate, but by and large, one can predict that 
these categories of employees are more positive towards productionist aspects than 
towards elements of new politics (see also the conclusion from Dagnaud and Mehl 
above). Second, unions like HBV, SKAF, and SKTF may have a membership that is 
mainly in favor of new politics. Although higher ranking white collar workers may be 
more productionist, the survey results demonstrated that low-grade white collar 
workers are the stronghold of anti-nuclear attitudes. The third group of unions are 
those that are most likely to be very diversified on issues that are concerned with 
new politics because they organize simultaneously members that favor a produ­
ctionist policy or are occupationally effected and those that are most likely opposing 
it. In particular, that should be the case in OTV, SF, and ST.
The group of unions which are presumed to be more or less coherently opposing 
elements of new politics would be Metall, IGM but also IGC and SIF. However, in 
reality IGM is quite the opposite. IGM is a union that seemed to be one of the most 
open unions for new politics and it is that individual union that suffered most under 
intra-organizational conflict. This can certainly not be explained by its membership.
The group of industrial unions that are most likely open for elements of new politics 
HBV, SKTF, and SKAF show a rather different behavior in Germany and Sweden.
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While HBV is open to new politics and in relation to other industrial German unions 
does not suffer extremely from intra-organizational conflict, SKAF and SKTF both 
tend to ignore the issue. They also do not suffer from organizational conflict. In the 
case of SKTF it seems to be likely that potential membership protest was suppressed 
through organizational procedures (see appendix: 4). Interviews with SKAF officials 
give the impression that SKAF does not consider nuclear power as a trade union 
issue at all.
When we look at the unions that organize both groups of employees the hypothesis 
that the membership diversity is expressed through a high level of organizational con­
flict is only confirmed for dTV and ST. These two unions also belong to the ones 
which have most strongly integrated elements of new politics, in sharp contrast to 
that, SF represents the opposite. For a long time, SF attempted to avoid a debate on 
nuclear energy and SF's current stand is rather productionist. The intra-organizational 
level of conflict is also low. This is rather surprising, because SF organizes a mem­
bership that is, on the one hand, most likely to oppose nuclear power (public sector 
employees) and, on the other hand, organizes workers in nuclear power plants.
(b) Confederations
The confederations of trade unions are only indirectly connected with the member­
ship of their trade unions. However, they represent the aggregated interests of all 
their member unions. Union confederations are most likely to be less strongly com­
mitted to the logic of membership in terms of individual employees and most strongly 
to the logic of influence, because their major function is to represent the interests of 
its member unions in relation with other social and political actors. It should be noted 
that this conclusion is valid only in relative terms. The confederation must also 
adhere to the logic of the membership. However, this logic is different from the trade 
unions that represent employees. However, there is the exception of LO which is 
also able to conduct collective bargaining and falls therefore more strongly than the 
other confederations between a classification of union and individual membership.
Confederations are mainly responsible for formulating the political goals of their trade 
unions. In order to fulfill this task, they are constantly exchanging information with 
their member unions and policy stands can be seen as compromises between the 
individual unions and the confederations. In particular, Swedish trade unions often 
refer to the fact that their confederations are responsible for the formulation of politi­
cal stands. This is most obvious for TCO unions. In all analyzed TCO unions, 
statements have been made that the individual union should not deal with political 
issues but that it should be left to the confederation. Concerning this conviction, it is
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surprising that the TCO confederation also was not able or willing to debate this 
issue in a lengthy manner. There was a readiness to deal with the issue in a techno­
cratic manner. But as soon as it came to a political issue, TCO did not feel res­
ponsible for an intra-organizational debate. Many members voiced that TCO should 
refrain from a political stand on nuclear power. And it seems that TCO, after a hot 
and painful debate at the 1979 congress, refrained from an intra-organizational 
debate in the 1980s. The paid lip-service of the importance of environmental aspects 
was never formulated in a manner that practical political decisions could result from 
it. As Wheeler and Micheletti could demonstrate, TCO is not able to take a stand on 
political issues that are not concerned with the work-place or firm, on the one hand, 
and/or party political, heated issues, on the other. Although TCO has an ideology in 
the area of industrial relations which seems not to be so different from LO (Nilsson, 
1985), it has no organizational power to take a stand on general political issues.
By and large LO member unions also have a tendency not to get involved in general 
politics and leave that to LO or the Social Democratic Party. The LO confederation is 
much more powerful in formulating an ideological stand on general political issues. 
However, as the debate on nuclear energy suggests, the board of LO is not so parti­
cularly keen on debating such an issue in its organization or even to take a clear 
congressional stand. Rather LO attempts to influence politics through personal and 
political contacts with the Social Democratic Party.
The DGB is rather different in taking a political stand on controversial issues such as 
nuclear power. Although the DGB is much less powerful than LO in respect to its 
influence over the policy in West Germany, it nevertheless attempts to formulate 
stands on general political issues. It should not be understood that the DGB keenly 
debates general political issues. Union policy is mainly oriented towards economic 
aspects at the firm level (Leminsky, 1977: 288). But in relative terms, the DGB is 
more open for general political aspects as the Swedish unions.
We can summarize that all confederations were an important forum for the debate on 
nuclear energy concerning their member unions. However, the differences between 
the German and Swedish confederations far outnumber the similarities.
2. THE TASK ENVIRONMENT OF TRADE UNIONS AND NEW POLITICS 
The task environment defines the interaction of an organization and is defined as all 
aspects of the environment "... potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attain­
ment ..." (Dill, 1958: 410; Thompson, 1967; Scott, 1987: 211). Although there may 
be some analytical overlapping between the task environment and the characteristics
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of union members, the important analytical difference is the outer-organizational 
orientation of the focal organization. As outlined above, the task environment deter­
mines the domain of an organization. All unions have partly the same domain. As 
Streeck (1982: 57/8) points out, task environments have changed over the last 
decades towards increasing neo-corporative interactions with state agencies. These 
more general changes can be distinguished from more specific task environments 
which vary between different trade unions. These task environments bring trade 
union officials together with their employer counterparts in energy enterprises and 
establish stable relationships and interactions. This process, in turn, creates and 
shapes common interests and values. In the case of trade unions and nuclear energy 
the task environment may be the sector(s) in which the unions organizes their mem­
bers. We can formulate the hypothesis that a union having members organized in th< 
energy sector, highly energy consuming sector or even in nuclear power plants, etc. 
may be more in favor of nuclear energy and may have adopted a productionist 
policy. Unions in the service sector, on the other hand, are less productionistically 
oriented because of their task environment.
In the analysis, I wish to distinguish between the direct involvement of trade unions 
through members that are actually working in nuclear power plants and nuclear 
enterprises, on the one hand, and those unions whose members' work in occupa­
tions that are highly dependent on energy supply, on the other. The latter unions 
may be in favor of cheap energy since it decreases the costs of the products produ­
ced in that sector. Both variables must not be positively correlated as in the case of 
ÖTV, SF, and ST where the members in the (nuclear) energy sector are just a small 
minority.
For German trade unions, the impact of the task environment is rather strong be­
cause of the dual system of industrial relations. In particular, the Gesamtbetriebsräte. 
i.e. joint committees of the work councils of all plants belonging to one company, 
which have been introduced as a consequence of the 1972 amendment of the Works 
Constitution Act, are a powerful factor in the context of workers' representation in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. These bodies do not formally belong in the 
influence area of the trade unions. So it was that in 1977 the work councils of 
nuclear energy enterprises and above all the Gesamtbetriebsrat of a large electricity 
company {Vereinigte Elektrizitätswerke Westfalen, VEW) organized a congress that 
should express the opposing opinion to the official trade unions policy (Grumbach, 
1986: 198-204; Siegmann, 1985: 15-18; see also chapter six). This short remark 
about the pressure of the task environment already gives an account of which way i€ 
may influence the policy of the individual unions. For Swedish unions, the problem 
between the trade union representatives in the work-place and general union policy
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may be smaller. However, the major industries that employ the members of a union 
may have also here a profound impact on the union policy. This is particularly true, 
when employers and unions follow a cooperative strategy as it is true for most 
Swedish unions.
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Table 4-5.: Task Environment and Union Policy
Substantial 
Amount of 
Members in 
Energy Depen­dent Sectors
Members in
NuclearEnterprises
Opposing the 
Adoption of Elements of New Politics
assumed real match
DGB Unions
IGM yes yes strongly no 0
IGB yes no yes yes 1
IGC yes yes strongly yes 1
ÖTV no yes yes no 0
HBV no no no no 1
IGD no no no no 1GEW no no no no 1
Match for DGB Unions: 71%
LO Unions
SEF yes yes strongly yes 1
Metall yes no yes yes 1
SF no yes yes yes 1
SKAF yes no yes yes 1
GF no no no no 1
Match for LO Unions: 80%
TCO Unions
SIF yes yes strongly yes 1
ST no yes yes no 0
SKTF yes no yes yes 1
SL no no no yes 0
Match for TCO Unions: 25%
Match for all Unions: 63%
Explanation: Agreement scores 1 when the assumed and real union 
stand match. The assumed opposition to elements of new politics is 
1 when the union organizes members in energy dependent and/or 
nuclear enterprises and it is 0 otherwise.
Table 4-5 shows that there is a strong match between the assumed union stand and 
the real one among the LO unions. It is less clear among the TCO unions. SIF which 
organizes members in both energy consuming industries and nuclear power plants 
corresponds to the expected relationship that it is not open for elements of new poli­
tics. ST, where members in the energy sector are only a minority does not follow the
opinion of these members in their official policy. Although five out of seven DGB 
unions match the assumed relationship, it is most interesting that this is only true for 
two of the four "energy unions", namely IGB and IGC. OTV does not match and is in 
the same position like ST. Most strikingly, however, is the strong disagreement 
between assumed union stand and the real one in IGM.
We can conclude that the impact of the task environment on the union policy is far 
from being perfect although the matches between task environment and union stand 
are higher than between union membership potential and union stand. The "energy 
unions" of the DGB fit only in two of the four cases. The same proportion is true for 
the TCO unions where one "energy union" matches to the assumed relationship and 
the other does not. Only the LO "energy unions" match completely. However, this 
match may be due to other factors such as the union ideology, which will be outlined 
later. Furthermore, one can conclude that the pure fact that some members are em­
ployed in the nuclear industry must not lead to it that the respective union takes a 
productionist stand. Rather than organizing a minority of workers in the nuclear sec­
tor the more productionist unions are organizing large numbers of workers in the en­
ergy sector. This is in particular true for IGB, IGC, SEF, Metall, and within some limits 
for SIF. Another important factor that may influence trade union policy is the organi­
zational structure.
3. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS 
Social structure influences or even determines organizational behavior was the major 
focus of organization theory until recently. In these studies, the trade-off between 
rational and normative elements have a prominent place in the analysis. Some 
investigations on trade unions applied this model (Child, et al., 1973; Edelstein and 
Warner, 1975; Etzioni, 1975). Two studies concentrated especially on the structural 
development of German and Swedish trade unions respectively. Wolfgang Streeck 
(1981 and 1982) focused on the introduction of computer technology in some 
German unions. In this analysis, the processes of organizational rationalization 
through formalization, centralization and administrative rationalization are stressed. 
Axel Hadenius (1976) analyzed the process of organizational centralization and pro­
fessionalization in LO. Both studies come to the quite similar result that the process 
of centralization resulted in instrumental commitments of the members to the organi­
zations. Normative elements eroded as an incentive for being a union member and 
were replaced by instrumental exchange relations.
Both studies stress the consequences for social integration of the members and the 
democratic processes in trade unions. Direct democracy is replaced by representative
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democracy and political interests are reduced to material ones. A process of structu­
ral de-ideo/ogization has taken place [3]. Axel Hadenius (1976: 190) refers con­
clusions taken from business trade unionism to the development of LO and 
postulates that LO comes closer and closer to this type of unionism. Streeck (1981: 
446-455) goes even further in his conclusion. He notes that ideological interests 
have become irrelevant for trade unions. They are only voiced by "freischwebende" 
(Mannheim) and "wirtschaftsfremden" (Weber) groups such as students, intellec­
tuals, etc. So long, ideological interests do not effect productionist interests they are 
tolerated by the union leaders. However, the contradiction between economic and 
life-style aspects is in the center of radical environmentalism and the adoption of 
elements of new politics be • at least partly - at the expense of productionist inter­
ests. According to Streeck (1981: 450), a revitalization of the social movement of 
trade unionism (from where the trade union has once originated; Streeck, 1981: 24- 
41 ; Touraine, 1986) can only be expressed outside the organization and most likely 
even against it. The organization theoretical approaches that emphasize communica­
tion in organization stress the importance of organizational structure (Rogers and 
Agarwala-Rogers, 1976: chapter four). In this view one purpose of structure is to 
provide stability, regularity, and predictability in the organization:
Generally, the organizational structure limits and guides communication flows. Just by knowing the 
formal structure of an organization we can usually predict a great deal about the nature of com­
munication flows within it. (Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers, 1976: 89)
However, as we have seen above, in relation to Swedish unions German unions 
seem to be still responsive to social issues. Does that mean that Swedish unions are 
more centralized than German unions? Unfortunately, the lack of comprehensive data 
makes it difficult to elaborate on this hypothesis in detail. However, there are some 
indicators for organizational rationalization.
Centralization
An indicator for centralization which is often used in the literature on trade unions is 
the number of departments in relation to the membership size of a trade union 
(Hadenius, 1976; Armingeon, 1988: 68) 14]. When we transfer the results of the or­
ganizational centralization processes to the adoption of elements of new politics, 
then we may conclude that centralized trade unions adopt fewer elements of new 
politics than less centralized trade unions. This hypothesis implies that centralization 
leads to more formal and instrumental relations which, in turn, prevents or obstructs 
the adoption of new ideological elements.
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Table 4-6.: Organizational Structure and New Politics in Swedish and German Trade Unions.
Number of Departments/ Adoption ofDepartments Members New Politics
index of index matchassumed
adoption
DGB Unions
IGM 159 16 057 0 1 0
IGB 19 19 354 0 0 1IGC 67 9 695 0 0 1ÖTV 147 8 023 0 1 0HBV 49 7 576 0 1 0IGD 56 2 513 1 1 1GEW
Average: 82.8 10 536 Match of all DGB Unions: 50
LO Unions
SEF 30 962 1 0 0
Metall 134 3 417 1 0 0
SF 303 692 1 0 0SKAF 55 11 508 0 0 1GF 84 561 1 1 1
Average: 
TCO Unions 
SIF
121.2 3 428 Match of all LO Unions: 40
28 9 886 0 0 1ST 104 1 134 1 1 1
SKTF 253 735 1 0 0
SL 252 293 1 0 0
Average: 159.3 3 012 Match of all TCO Unions: 50
Match of all Unions: 47
Sources and explanations: The data for the DGB unions are from: 
Niedenhoff and Pege, 1987; for IGB from Armingeon, 1988: table 
3.10; the data for LO are from: L0 (1986); TCO: SIF (1985); ST 
(1985); SKTF (1988); SL (without date). For Germany data refer to 
Verwaltungsstellen and in Sweden to avdelningar. All data refer to 
1985, except: IGB 1980, SKTF and SL 1988/89. For IGB, HBV, and IGD 
the data refer to districts (Bezirke) . This unit has been chosen 
by Streeck, 1981: table XI-5 and Armingeon, 1988: table 3.10. It 
excludes local groups (Ortsgruppen, -vereine, and -Verwaltungen).
First of all, it should be noted that the applied indicator for centralization is some­
what ambiguous when it is used in isolation. There are more specific processes at 
work as the historical and analytical studies of the above mentioned authors show. 
Other structural factors must also be considered. For instance, the IGB has a mem­
bership that is very much concentrated to certain geographical regions (mining 
areas). As a consequence, this union may not need so many local departments. 
Swedish unions may also have other organization structural channels for communica­
tion such as the union clubs (Molin, 1985). The indicator reflects the centralization of
a trade union in rather general terms and it was relatively easily to obtain for the dif­
ferent organizations.
It is highly interesting how the departments differ in size. On the average, German 
union departments are around three times bigger than the Swedish. This is not only 
due to the bigger size of German trade unions. The analyzed DGB unions also have 
less departments than Swedish unions in absolute figures. This is particularly true for 
IGB but also the number of departments of HBV, IGD, and IGC is rather modest in 
comparison to Swedish unions. But Swedish unions are also very different in this 
dimension. SKAF of LO and SIF of TCO have few departments and the average 
number of members in each department corresponds very well to the German stan­
dards. On the other hand, there are unions that exceed the number of two hundred 
departments. SF, SKTF, and SL but also GF because of its small size, have a rela­
tively low number of members per department. SEF, ST and Metall have middle-sized 
departments.
From the size of the departments, one could hypothesize that all DGB unions apart 
from IGD, SKAF and SIF are rather centralized, SL, GF, SF, and SKTF are rather 
decentralized, while SEF, ST, IGD, and Metall stand in the middle. This would mean 
that the first group is presumably not open for new politics issues and that the latter 
group is most likely open to them.
However, this relationship does not seem to be confirmed. Highly centralized organi­
zations such as IGM, OTV, and HBV adopted elements of new politics. However, the 
two German "productionist" unions are among the three most centralized unions.
The "decentralized" unions SL, SKTF, and SF also do not fit into the framework. For 
LO unions, only GF and SKAF adopted new politics in the predicted way.
The results show that the indicator for centralization does not explain so much about 
the trade unions' policy. Less than half of the cases match the assumed relation. The 
bleak picture painted by Wolfgang Streeck is not confirmed by my comparison of 
German and Swedish trade unions. German unions are by and large more open to the 
issue of nuclear energy and debate this issue in much broader terms than Swedish 
unions, despite the fact that they are highly centralized.
Size
Size is a variable that is rather closely connected to centralization. However, the size 
of an organization has no unambiguous effect on the formal structure of an organi­
zation and its theoretical status is problematic. The basic arguments from the litera-
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ture on size are that size leads to increasing structural differentiation and is positively 
related to formalization. It is negatively related to centralization. The size of the 
administrative component is also positively related to size of the union, though 
whether there are increasing or decreasing administrative economies of scale is 
unclear. Most interesting is the trade-off between centralization and formalization as 
mechanisms of control (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Pfeffer, 1982; Scott, 1987: 
241-249). Michele Micheletti hypothizes the impact of size on the trade unions' 
debate on nuclear energy very correctly:
The size of an organizational membership can also complicate the definition of member interest and its 
representation by the leadership. Large memberships may be heterogeneous, signifying that groups of 
members are different and have potentially conflicting interests. Another consequence of large organi­
zational size may be complex decision making procedure and structures, signaling that policy making is 
cumbersome, time-consuming, elite-dominated and bound by establish practice. In short, it may be dif­
ficult for new ideas, procedures and participants to enter the policy making process. (Micheletti, 1985: 
143)
German unions are by and large bigger than Swedish unions. According to the hypo­
thesis of organization theory, this should lead to a higher degree of formalization but 
also to decentralization and structural differentiation. Both factors may influence the 
political outcome:
Figure 4-1: A Simple Model of Organizational Size,
S tructure and Organizational Behavior
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In particular, the German unions seem to have reached a size where structural diffe­
rentiation has been conducted. Most German unions established individual depart­
ments such as youth, women, etc. departments. These departments are able to 
develop own infra-structures and in some cases, they organize own congresses. As 
we can see from the analysis of the congresses of the individual trade unions (see 
appendix: 4), these departments were particularly important in promoting elements of 
new politics in the trade union organization. Above all, the youth departments of 
several DGB unions brought elements of new politics into the trade unions since the 
mid 1970s. These departments are also the units in German trade unions which 
aggregate interests and voice it more strongly. Swedish unions are mainly organized 
according to local districts. This is particularly true for LO unions, where even a huge 
union like Metall has no youth or women's department. It has been argued that the 
centralization of LO unions has been counter-balanced by the increasing establish­
ment of union clubs (Molin, 1985). Union clubs are union bodies at the work-place. 
Molin considers the union clubs as partial functional equivalents for the numerical 
decrease of union departments. However, one should keep in mind that work-place 
organizations are more likely to be concerned with job interests or interests more or 
less immediately deduced from work-places. Regional departments are broader in 
scope and political debates in these organizational units - if they take place - are 
more likely to be diversified. One reason for this is the different background of the 
participants. In so far, it seems to me that the "replacement” of local departments by 
union clubs does not serve the purpose that a trade union enlarges its political per­
ception that has been narrowed as described in the literature on the centralization of 
LO.
In conclusion: it is most plausible that the structural differentiation effects the organi­
zational policy. However, it is not possible to make general conclusions since 
Swedish unions have no similar departments and the variable "countries" is too un- 
precise to prove this hypothesis.
4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the impact of some organizational characteristics on trade union po­
licy concerning new politics have been analyzed. It has been demonstrated that the 
latent membership potential for new politics (A1), derived from investigations on new 
politics and surveys on nuclear energy in both countries explain a substantial part of 
the voiced membership potential for new politics. While in LO unions this potential is 
hardly voiced at all, it seems to be filtered out by organizational procedures in TCO 
unions. Only the German unions show a rather clear relationship between general 
membership potential and union policy. However, in German unions, the membership
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potential also is modified when it comes to the adoption of elements of new politics. 
However, the interesting fact for German unions is that the membership potential is 
not eliminated by organizational filters but rather the other way round; unions that 
have been assumed not to have adopted elements of new politics had adopted them.
The homogeneity of the membership (A2) contributes to the explanation of the level 
of intra-organizational conflict. The task environment (A4) of the "energy unions" has 
only a very limited impact on trade union stands. In particular, the German unions do 
not match in this respect. In contrast to the DGB unions, the impact of the task 
environment matches almost perfectly for the analyzed LO unions. TCO unions take 
here a more ambiguous position between the LO and DGB unions.
The degree of centralization seems not to effect the adoption of elements of new 
politics to any larger extent. However, the impact of size is ambiguous. For some 
unions, their large size led to the establishment of special subunits. More important 
than the sheer number of departments (degree of centralization, A7) is the character 
of these units (structural differentiation, A8). Geographical units seem to have a 
limited impact while occupational, status, or other (youth, women) departments 
influence union policy substantially.
Swedish unions are less tightly coupled (A3) concerning the organization of members 
with new and productionist world views than Geman unions. This is so, above all, 
because blue and white collar unions are organized in separate trade unions in Swe­
den. The loose coupling of competing interests buffers LO from challenges of em­
ployees with new politics attitudes. This is particularly important since LO's produc­
tionist (and pro-nuclear energy) stand influences substantially Sweden's energy 
«
policy.
While I concentrated in this chapter on organizational features I will focus on social 
process in the next chapter. With that I will leave explanations drawn from structural 
contingency approaches and turn to aspects of alternative approaches of organi­
zation theory.
Footnotes:
1 These numbers I received as an answer of a letter with specific questions.
2 For the printer unions there may be other explanations for the membership potential for new 
politics such as that traditionally educated craft workers may be more critical ana open to elements of 
new politics. However, this way of arguing is different from the one mentioned above.
3 In particular Wolfgang Streeck combines the organization structural changes and the develop­
ment of neo-corporatism to a functionalist complementary picture. Also in the Swedish context it is 
easily to see that the relation between the neo-corporative policy under a Social Democratic govern-
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merit and Social Democratic (blue collar) trade union movement found its organizational equivalent in 
centralization processes of LO.
4 Another indicator which has been used by Streeck is the number of trade union officials at the 
trade union headquarters in relation to all trade union officials. Unfortunately, there are no data for 
TCO unions and also none for some DGB unions. Furthermore, centralization measured by the 
proportion of departments to members is more appropriate for the analysis of communication 
processes in trade unions. It may give an idea how difficult it is for a member to reach organizational 
attention. One can certainly conclude that it is easier to reach organizational attention when the unit is 
small than when it is large.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
«
CONFLICT, COMMUNICATION, IDEOLOGY AND ADOPTING ELEMENTS OF NEW 
POLITICS: ORGANIZING AS A SOCIAL PROCESS
In this chapter, I turn my attention to the key variables of the alternative approaches 
of organization theory. However, the focus remains on intra-organizational processes. 
The analysis concentrates on subsequential processes: First, it is asked whether ele­
ments on new politics can be voiced in trade unions (B1). The next sections focus on 
intra-organizational conflicts (B6) and different levels of intra-organizational com­
munication (B7). One extreme form of intra-organizational communication is neglec­
ting an issue and non-decision making (A6). This pattern may occur when intra- 
organizational conflict is expected. As outlined in chapter two, retained world views 
may have an profound impact on how new issues are perceived. Trade union ideo­
logy (B2), as a major element of cognitive retention of world views, may be a potent 
predictor for the stand on new and productionist politics in trade unions. Table 5-1 
gives a short summary. The operationalization of the indices and their implications 
are the subject of this chapter:
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Table 5*1: Indicators for the Social Process of Adopting Eleaents of New Politics by Swedish and Geraan Unions
(1) Organisational (2) Organisational (3) Laval of (4) Union Stand
Potential of Laval of Coaaunication
Haw Politics (OPNP) Conflict (OLC)
unions: Rank Value Rank Value Rank Level Value Rank Value Year
0GB 5 36.0 2 70.8 (4) coaplex 3 8 22.81 1978
1GN 7 32.8 1 74.4 (4) coaplex 3 2 87.32 1977
IGB 16 3.3 17 5.1 18.5 präge. -5 15 -43.77 1980
IGC 10 23.1 5 35.4 10 praga. 0 11 -4.36 1980
ÖTV 4 38.5 3 51.0 9 coaplex 1 6 65.59 1972
HBV 9 25.5 6 32.1 7.5 coaplex 2 3 84.77 1980
IGD 6 35.1 7 30.9 (4) coaplex 3 4 81.46 1977
GEW* 3 48.0 11 15.0 (4) coaplex 3 5 80.29 1980
0GB Unions' 7.5 30.3 6.3 39.3 7.6 1.3 6.8 46.76
Average
LO 13 14.4 10 16.5 9.5 praga. -1 9 11.64 1976
SEF 17 2.1 14 9.9 16 praga. -2 16 -64.45 1976Metall 12 19.2 9 20.0 (12) praga. -2 12 -7.93 1981
SF 14 5.4 12 14.7 15 praga. -1 13 -10.67 -SKAF 19 .0 18.5 .0 (12) praga. -5 10 -.71 1978
GF 2 53.7 15 7.5 2 coaplex 3 1 100.00 1978
LO Unions' 12.8 15.8 12.1 11.4 11.8 -1.3 10.2 4.56
Average
TCO 11 20.7 8 28.5 7.5 coaplex 2 14 -29.06 1979
SIF 15 4.2 13 11.0 (12) praga. -1 -
ST 1 74.0 4 46.5 1 coaplex 4 7 37.86 1975
SKTF 18 1.4 16 6.0 17 praga. -4 -
SL 8 29.2 18.5 .0 16 praga. -3
TCO Unions' 10.6 25.9 11.5 18.4 10.7 -.4 10.5 4.40
Average
Average for 24.6 25.02 25.67
all union
All ranks with deciaal point or which ara in brackets indicate that sore unione have the saaa value.
* For GEM all calculations are based eolely on aotions.
•* SF took the first stand on nuclear energy that included eleaenta of new or aaterial politics in 1985. The
score was then 0.0.
1. THE ORGANIZATIONAL POTENTIAL FOR NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS 
The first aspect, which I wish to analyze is the organizational potential for elements 
of new politics. Organizational potential refers to the extent to which elements of 
new politics were voiced at the union congresses of the respective trade unions. The 
crucial difference between latent membership potential and organizational potential is 
that the latter implies that elements of new politics have entered into the trade union. 
When the union deals with elements of new politics, it is - in terms of organization 
theory - an enacted environment. The organizational potential for elements of new 
politics does not mean that elements of new politics dominate in the union. However, 
organizational potential may be the first precondition for adopting elements of new 
politics. Therefore we may conclude that a union with a high organizational potential 
for new politics also adopted elements of new politics. It can be argued that a poten­
tial for new politics may be activated when situations arise which support new poli­
tics. An organizational potential for new politics will be operationalized here as to 
which degree elements of new politics were debated during the entire investigation 
period in the individual trade unions. For this analysis, all motions and debate contri­
butions are included, regardless of the fact they were either approved of or rejected. 
However, all empirical features exclusively refer to the congress material. That 
means that potential expressed outside of the union congress is not included in the 
analysis here. As a consequence, a potential for new politics is not determined by 
membership characteristics etc., but rather by congressional procedures. For exam­
ple, SKTF gives a lot of indicators that there is a potential for new politics among its 
members (through voiced membership protest at the TCO congress, formation of 
groups outside the union, etc. For more details see: Micheletti, 1985). Congressional 
practice and procedures, however, avoid and obstruct open expression about issues 
like nuclear energy that might have an effect on the trade union stand in more politi­
cal aspects. In so far, I will measure a potential of new politics that is filtered by the 
trade union organization [1].
The index designed to measure the organizational potential for new politics is quite 
straight forward. It sums up the average amount of statements that refer to elements 
of new politics of all motions and debate contributions at the congresses of the indi­
vidual union [2].
As we can see from table 5-1, the potential for new politics is different in each indi­
vidual trade union organization. It ranges from 0 indicating that there has never been 
any aspects of new politics mentioned to 74 showing that nuclear energy has been 
debated in terms of new politics. The average of the values and the ranks show that 
the DGB unions are those unions that have the highest organizational potential for 
new politics [31. The TCO unions also rank quite high. The unions in the LO confe­
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deration have rarely dealt with elements of new politics. However, among the unions 
are some interesting differences.
The teachers' union GEW is the union with the highest organizational potential for 
new politics among the DGB unions. SL, the Swedish teachers union, also scores se­
cond highest among the TCO unions. However, ST has the highest score in TCO. As 
mentioned above, ST among others also organizes state employees in the administra­
tive and service sectors and members in the nuclear power plants. At this point, it is 
quite similar to OTV in Germany which also belongs to those unions that have a high 
organizational potential for new politics. We can see from the statistics that the 
potential for new politics is at its highest in white collar unions of social, educational 
and administrative sectors. However, this conclusion needs some further substantia­
ted qualifications. There are the exceptions of HBV and, above all, SKTF. The former 
scores relatively moderate, the latter is at the very end of the scale. This may be so 
for various reasons. HBV mainly organizes administrative services, an occupational 
group that is not so devoted to new politics as white collar workers in the social and 
cultural sectors. As mentioned above, SKTF may have organizational constrains 
which keep the issue latent in the union organization.
The following ranks - 6 and 7 - are taken by two German blue collar unions (IGD and 
IGM). While the Swedish printer union GF is the exception among Swedish blue col­
lar worker unions, IGM differs substantially from its Swedish counterpart. Concerning 
the level of organizational potential for elements of new politics, IGM can be 
considered as a moderately open union for new politics concerns. However, this is 
also true for Metall on a much lower level which is - next to GF - the most open LO 
union. It is essential to note that LO unions score very differently from DGB unions.
In particular, GF is outstanding in their potential for new politics. GF was the only LO 
union that did not support the official policy of LO unions on the nuclear power issue 
in the referendum. In other areas, GF also has another attitude than LO and it is fair 
to say that GF is often in conflict with LO on several political issues. One reason for 
this may lie in the fact that GF is not as committed to Social Democracy as the other 
LO unions. However, on this point we will receive further confirmation, when we 
look at the level of communication in the trade unions. Without GF, LO unions would 
have an average ranking score of 15 instead of 12.8 now. That shows that the 
organizational potential for new politics in LO unions is very low in comparison to 
DGB and TCO unions.
Particularly surprising is the low potential for elements of new politics in the public 
sector unions of LO. Both SF and SKAF belong to those unions that have the lowest
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organizational potential for new politics. SKAF, for instance, did not consider any 
element of new politics at its congresses and SF started relatively late in 1985 to 
debate nuclear energy in some depth. It is also a fact that the municipal trade unions 
in Sweden have no organizational potential for elements of new politics. This is true 
for both the blue collar municipal union SKAF and its white collar counterpart SKTF.
The unions organizing technical white collar workers, also including workers in the 
nuclear industry, probably best represented by SIF and IGC [4] have a very low pro­
file in terms of an organizational potential for new politics. However, this is more tru 
for SIF than for IGC. The two energy unions with a very homogeneous membership, 
SEF and IGB, both score at the end of the scale. For both unions elements of new 
politics do not belong to the congressional agenda.
The three trade union confederations have a quite similar score compared to the 
average of their member unions. In particular, the Swedish unions fit very well into 
that model (rank deviation from the mean of the rank of the member unions is: -.2 
(LO) and -.4 (TCO)). Only the German confederation DGB was confronted with more 
elements of new politics than the average of all analyzed DGB unions ( + 2.5).
In summation: the first look at the organizational potential for new politics gives the 
impression that it is dependent on the membership of each trade union, whether or 
not a union organization includes elements of new politics in their congressional 
agenda. As demonstrated in chapter four, the latent membership potential is transla­
ted into voiced membership potential in three-quarters of the analyzed unions. Latent 
membership potential, however, is translated into organizational potential in only 44 
percent of the cases. This is mainly due to the fact that TCO unions rejected dealing 
with nuclear energy at the congresses of individual unions (the relation between 
voiced membership potential and organizational potential is only true in 38 percent of 
the cases among TCO unions, but 71 for DGB and 80 percent for LO unions). An in­
teresting difference between LO and TCO unions is that latent membership potential 
is not even translated into voiced membership potential, while TCO unions stop 
voiced membership potential from becoming organizational potential for new politics. 
However, if elements of new politics enter into the trade unions, then there is a 
rather high possibility that the unions adopt elements of new politics [5].
Another interesting question in this context is to what extent the organizational 
potential for new politics causes conflicts between productionist and new politics 
within the union organizations. Before I turn to this aspect, I would like to address 
the question of union democracy in this context.
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New Politics and Union Democracy: A Digression
The literature on union democracy often points out that the decision process in trade 
unions are far from being democratic. A major problem of trade union democracy 
consists of the often conflicting principles of administrative and representative ra­
tionality. Administrative rationality is linked to the requirement of trade union effi­
ciency. In order to translate union goals into politics and to gain influence in the poli­
tical struggle, expertise, routinization of operations, specialization of functions, 
directness of communication, and rapid decision-making are necessary. Representa­
tive rationality, conversely, is important for the definition of union goals and requires 
flexibility of operations, duplication of functions in order to put checks and balances 
in union control, a multiplicity of communication, and a lengthier decisional process. 
As Child and his co-workers note:
Conflict between the two rationalities is manifested above all in regard to the source and arrangement 
of power. Administrative rationality speaks for a unified and co-ordinated system of control, in which 
the prime source of authority is located at the top of the organizational hierarchy. Representative ra­
tionality speaks for a division of power and control, for the opportunity of action taken by one party to 
be revised by that of other group. (Child et al., 1973: 78)
Robert Michels' concept of the "iron law of oligarchy” focuses on the dominance of 
administrative rationality, resulting from the very existence of organizations. Michels 
points out that the orientation of organizational needs hinder the "struggle about 
ideas" within parties and unions (Michels, 1970: 343/4). It can also be argued that 
there is a tendency towards an "oligarchy of ideas” at work in organizations. Lenin's 
(1973: 397-440) critique of trade unions for their tendency to focus on the protec­
tion of economic interests at the expense of broader political and social considera­
tions suggested just this. Child et al. (1973: 81) points out that a ”... change in a 
unions environment can have profound effect on the historical progression of the 
union to the axes of administrative and representative effectiveness”. However, 
without going further into the vast field of union democracy [6], we may see the dif­
ferences between official and congressional opinion and organizational potential for 
new politics as an indicator for union democracy. From the eleven unions that pos­
sessed more organizational potential for new politics than the average, only three did 
not adopt elements of new politics. These were IGC, TCO and SL. In particular for 
TCO and SL, we can conclude that both unions tried to suppress the conflict about 
new and productionist politics. As documented in the appendix 4, SL suppressed 
membership protest by referring to the union constitution that does not allow to 
debate societal questions in SL. In TCO it came to a hard intra-organizational conflict 
in 1979, when the board opinion was in sharp contrast to the members' opinion. 
Later TCO was also successful in not letting the issue appear onto the congressional 
agenda again.
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There are also more effective measures for avoiding decisions that cannot be 
measured by the indices here. Only issues that are allowed to enter into the organiza­
tion may be discussed and decided upon. As we could see for SL and also partly for 
TCO, issues can be kept away from the congressional agenda. SKAF, SKTF and SF 
are very successful in this. SKAF officials stated in interviews that the union is not 
the place for political discussions. SF avoided the issue completely until the govern­
ment took actions against nuclear energy. In this period, SF made it clear that it was 
in favor of a continuation of productionist politics.
Non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963) or non-agenda setting (Crenson, 
1971) is difficult to measure and to analyze. However, the comparison between 
German and Swedish trade unions make It doubtful that Swedish unions did not need 
an intra-organizational debate on nuclear energy in their organizations. Other interna­
tional comparisons also seem to support the impression that unions in other countries 
debated the nuclear issue (Touraine et al. 1987; Siegmann, 1985; Logan and Nelkin, 
1980) [7]. The deficiency of intra-organizational democracy also has societal conse­
quences which will be briefly discussed upon in the conclusion.
2. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PRODUCTIONIST AND NEW POLITICS 
New politics can be either rejected, neglected or integrated in a non-conflicting 
manner. Substantial conflict and disagreement may also occur whether or not the 
individual trade union pursues a more productionist politics or adopts the demands of 
new politics. Like the analysis of the organizational potential for new politics, the 
analysis of the organizational level of conflict between productionist and new politics 
is also limited to the expression of this conflict at the congresses of the individual 
trade unions. I am interested here in the degree of conflict between productionist and 
new politics within the individual unions during the last two decades. In order to 
measure the organizational level of conflict, I wish to present an index that sums up 
the degree of conflict as it was expressed at the trade union congresses in the 
motions and debates [8].
Intra-organizational conflict is an important element of organizational learning in or- |
ganization theoretical approaches which emphasize the meaning of social processes i
(Weick, 1979: 220/1). Organizations consist of intra-organizational coalitions w hich  
are loosely connected entities around certain issues etc. (Pfeffer and Salancik. 1978; 
Olsen et al., 1972) Therefore we can hypothesize that unions with a high amount of 
organizational conflict are more apt to adopt elements of new politics than ones with  
a low level of conflict.
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As we can see from table 5-1, German trade unions suffered much more under intra- 
organizational conflicts than did their Swedish counterparts. In particular, IGM, DGB, 
and OTV score very high in this respect. The only exceptions are GEW and IGB. The 
former union is coherent in its positive stand towards elements of new politics 
whereas the latter does not seem to be subject to this conflict because of its 
consistent preference for productionist politics.
In Sweden, TCO unions are more affected by the conflict between new and produc­
tionist politics than LO unions. However, there are substantial differences among 
TCO unions. ST and, to a lesser degree, TCO are rather strongly affected by this 
conflict. SIF and SKTF, on the other hand, do not seem to be exposed to this conflict 
to the same degree. SL had no organizational conflict about new and productionist 
politics whatsoever. As we will see later the level of communication seems to be 
responsible for the low degree of intra-organizational conflict in these trade unions. 
LO unions are not as strongly subject to intra-organizational conflicts as the other 
trade unions. In particular, SKAF, SEF and GF do not seem to suffer from any greater 
conflict. This is again due to very different reasons. SKAF did not have any great 
conflict, because it did not go into a lengthy congressional debate. The issue never 
came up in SKAF. SEF has no intra-organizational conflict concerning new and pro­
ductionist politics because its membership quite uniformly supports the productionist 
politics of its union. The exact opposite is true for GF. GF is rather conformist in 
accepting elements of new politics. The question in GF is only about the degree of 
the adoption. A bit different from the other LO unions are Metall and LO. Metall has 
always controversially debated the issue, although the debate was neither especially 
emotional nor did it divide members in a fundamental way (see appendix: 4). Some 
of these controversies also affected the LO confederation. Rather surprising is the 
low degree of intra-organizational conflict in SF that organizes workers in state 
owned nuclear power plants and employees in the public sector. However, quite 
similar to SIF, SF could avoid that conflict because it rather pragmatically debated 
the issue, as we will see in the following section.
The relationship between a high level of intra-organizational conflict (above the 
mean) and the adoption of elements of new politics is not perfect. Six from the eight 
unions that adopted elements of new politics experience intra-organizational conflict. 
Two unions - TCO and IGC - had intra-organizational conflict but did not adopt ele­
ments of new politics. All in all approximately in two thirds of the cases, there is a 
positive relationship between intra-organizational conflict and the adoption of ele­
ments of new politics [9].
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3. LEVELS OF COMMUNICATION
The level of communication can determine the way in which reality is perceived and 
social problems are handled. Communication, as defined for instance by Rogers and 
Agarwala-Rogers (1976: 9) is "... the process by which an idea is transferred from a 
source to a receiver with the intention of changing his or her behavior. Such behavior 
may encompass a change in knowledge or attitudes as in overt behavior." In order to 
approach this aspect, I first wish to conceptualize different levels of communication. 
In a second step, I will refer to this concept in the individual trade unions. The final 
goal of this analysis is then to see in which respect the trade unions differ in their 
treatment of the nuclear power issue on the communicative level.
With reference to the theoretical works cited in chapter one and two, I will argue 
that it is possible to distinguish between two different levels of communication in the 
debate on nuclear energy in Swedish and German trade unions. On the one hand, the 
level of communication can be oriented on a pragmatic persuasion of trade union 
goals. The pragmatic strategy focuses on concerns rather closely connected to the 
workers or employees. This concept comes rather close to Selig Perlman's concept 
of pragmatic trade unionism as outlined in chapter two. Each trade union has to take 
these immediate concerns into account in order to fulfill its task. Trade unions' im­
mediate concerns are, for instance, negotiations about wages, work time, working 
environment, etc. An issue like nuclear energy affects jobs in a broader way as well. 
Nuclear energy is a technology which has consequences for the whole national eco­
nomy. The trade unions in Germany and Sweden are economically responsible unions 
(Flanagan et al., 1983). This means that within their pragmatic strategy of dealing 
with present issues (national) economic interests also play an important role. Perlman 
(1966) makes this point clear by elaborating on the concept of pragmatic union 
behavior:
Trade unionism, it was then thought, should concern itself only with wages, hours, and watchful scru­
tiny of the operations of the governmental bodies administering labor laws and social insurance. This 
limited conception of the task of the trade union pertaining to shop management revealed itself in the 
very term designating the trade agreement - "wage agreement’ (Tarifvertrag)." (311/2)
And concerning national economic interests:
And as unionism takes more and more of a hand in running the productive process, it comes to depend 
for guidance less and less on a dogmatic anti-capitalist philosophy, but more and more on a pragmatic 
faith in industrial government through co-operation of equally indispensable "functional* classes. (317)
The point here is that a pragmatic union strategy is also communicated in pragmatic 
terms. A pragmatic communication is limited to certain aspects of a problem as the 
terms "monological logic of collective action" (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980) or 
"instrumental communication" and "profane" and "calculative orientation" (Etzioni,
1975) suggest. In empirical terms, the pragmatic communication of nuclear energy in 
trade unions is limited to economic and technical aspects of the problem.
I developed a classification that distinguishes the degree of "pragmatism” on a scale 
from 0 to -6. It is based on the relative amount of statements devoted to technical, 
energy political, economic and labor market aspects. The categories are derived from 
the empirical distributions of the different categories. The higher the relative frequen­
cies the higher the tminus) score for pragmatic communication. The highest value (- 
6) is applied to cases where the trade union absolutely does not communicate the 
issue in a more lengthy manner [10]. This concerns SKAF, SKTF, and SL.
In contrast to the more pragmatic level of communication I will describe a complex 
way of communication. Complex communication is not bound to a certain aspect or 
dimension of an issue. It extensively includes the political and social consequences of 
trade union behavior and socio-technological developments. Lenin was the classical 
promoter of a more complex world view of trade union policy. A complex communi­
cation is closely related to the "dialogical logic of collective action" (Offe and 
Wiesenthal, 1980) and "expressive communication" involving "sacred" or normative 
aspects (Etzioni, 1975). All other aspects that do not belong to the pragmatic ones 
are included in an index that attempts to grasp the degree of complex com­
munication.
The index which has been constructed for the degree of complex communication 
corresponds with the one for pragmatic communication and can vary between 0 and 
(plus) 6. It takes into consideration whether the relative amount of statements of the 
remaining categories exceeds a certain number. The categories that take the value 0 
or 1 are left-ideological, security, and environmental aspects. Since aspects of 
societal and political development are in particular important for this study, this value 
can vary between 0 and 3 (11].
Left-ideological aspects are mainly concerned with the ownership of energy indu­
stries, state intervention, and social equality, etc. In so far, they are more 
"classically" left issues (for a content analytical operationalization in a broader con­
text see: Thomas, 1979: 398-402). An ideological trade union in the more traditional 
sense, i.e. in the left-right dimension would score high in this category.
Security and environmental aspects consider a broader spectrum than just economic 
concerns. They assess the technical and economic development in light of their 
consequences for the security of the population or the environment. In particular, a 
complex technology like nuclear energy can be seen more or less accenting to these
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aspects. (At this point of analysis I do not distinguish whether the aspects are refer­
red to in a positive or negative way concerning nuclear energy.)
Societal and political aspects have more importance in this study. It has been argued 
that the nuclear energy issue represents an issue that divides groups, because it 
stands for a certain future development of society and implies different political con­
sequences. Because these statements play a central role in the analysis, the value for 
this category can vary between zero and three.
The sum of the values makes an index for the level of communication of trade unions 
that ranges from -6 to + 6. Since pragmatic communication is a contrast to complex 
communication, the pragmatic aspects score negatively while the complex aspects 
score positively. This allows to separate pragmatic unions (negative score) from more 
complex unions (positive score). The index refers to the debate in the trade union. It 
includes - as the other indices introduced in this section - all motions and debate con­
tributions. The index says something about complexity of communication within the 
trade union organization but does not tell anything about its formal stand or policy. 
Table 5-2 summarizes the different levels of communication and how they were 
applied by the individual trade unions.
First of all, it is striking that West German trade unions debate the issue of nuclear 
energy much more than Swedish unions. This previously mentioned fact is confirmed 
again, when we consider the levels of communication of the congress motions and 
debate. In this context, it is important to mention that three Swedish trade unions 
score highest in the pragmatic categories because they tend to completely neglect an 
intra-organizational debate on nuclear energy. It is SKAF belonging to the LO confe­
deration and SKTF and SL of TCO. These trade unions did not discuss the issue in 
any lengthy way.
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IGB's pragmatic orientation is outstanding, because it focuses on pragmatic aspects 
up to almost 85 percent. With this score, IGB surpasses unions with a high pragma­
tic communication like Metall (79 percent) and SEF (72 percent). The unions which 
are least likely to limit their debate on pragmatic aspects are mostly German unions. 
Among the seven unions which focus less than 60 percent on pragmatic aspects five 
are German (GEW, HBV, IGD, DGB, and IGM). However, GF takes the fourth place 
and ST the sixth, indicating that non-pragmatic communication is not only limited to 
German trade unions. When we compare the average of the relative frequencies of 
the pragmatic aspects in the DGB, LO, and TCO unions, we can conclude that 
German unions are less strongly bound to these aspects than Swedish unions. LO 
unions stress close to 70 percent pragmatic aspects (with the exception of GF with 
55.4 percent). However, considering the fact that two out of our five TCO trade 
unions entirely neglected the debate, we can conclude that TCO debated the issue of 
nuclear power in a most limited way. However, if we take only those unions into 
account that are not ruled out because they have neglected the intra-organizational 
debate, TCO unions come closer to their German counterparts.
Pragmatic Aspects
The trade unions also differ within the pragmatic categories. Generally speaking, 
Swedish unions stress more the (national) economic aspects and German unions put 
a substantially greater emphasis on labor market aspects.
In terms of energy policy, all LO unions rank quite high. TCO unions also consider 
nuclear energy mainly in terms of energy policy. With the exception of IGB and IGC, 
the DGB unions are not very concerned with energy political or technological 
aspects. However, it should be noted that this conclusion is only true in relative 
terms. In absolute terms, energy political and technological aspects are the most fre- 
quent aspects in all categories for all unions. Even the unions which stress least 
these aspects, use about one-third of their arguments by looking at energy political 
aspects. In particular, the LO unions are very much occupied by energy political 
aspects which are often connected with economic aspects. In terms of economic 
aspects, Swedish and German unions differ most clearly. This is true for both LO and 
TCO unions in Sweden. Only GF and, to a lesser degree ST, give less importance to 
economic aspects. In Germany the unions which organize workers in nuclear plants 
or related industries (OTV, IGC) and HBV also stress more frequently the economic 
aspects of nuclear power than the other unions.
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Table 5-3.: The Pragmatic Level of Communication (percentage of all 
statements).
union Technology and Economic Labor Market Sum N
Energy Political Aspects Aspects per- (100
Aspects cent percent)
Rank Percent Rank Percent Rank Percent
DGB 14 37.3 13 7.7 3 13.4 58.4 470IGM 10 40.9 12 8.0 8 10.8 59.7 435IGB
IGC
1
6
61.3
44.2
11 —  9 8.9~^.9 2-nj 14.5 9.4 84.7 63.5
124
2336tv 12 38.0 7 11.8 4 12.4 62.2 856HBV 13 37.5 8 10.0 13.5 5.4 52.9 280IGD 16 31.4 15 5.8 1 17 .0 -- 54.2 223 * —GEW 15 34.0 14 6.3 5 11.7 52.0 94
DGBunions'
average
10.9 40.6 11.1 8.6 5.7 11.8 61.0 339.4
LO 3 47.9 6 13.0 13.5 5.4 66.3 92SEF 4 47.2 1 20.8 15 3.8 71.8 53Meta11 2 55.9 5 13.2 7 10.3 79.4 68SF 6 43.4 4 15.1 12 7.5 66.0 53SKAF* - 80.0 - 0 - 0 80.0 5GF 5 45.9 16 5.4 16 4.1 55.4 74
LO
unions'
average
4.2 48.1 6.4 13.5 12.7 6.2 67.8 68
TCO 9 41.5 3 16.4 6 11.4 69.3 219SIF 11 40.3 2 17.3 10 7.7 65.3 52
ST 8 43.1 10 9.3 11 6.9 59.3 290
SKTF* - 40.0 - 8.0 - 8.0 56.0 25SL* - 22.2 — 22.2 - 11.1 55.5 18
TCO
unions'
average
9.3 41.6 5.0 14.3 9.0 8.7 64.6 187.0
* Because of a low N of statements (< 50) all these unions are not included in the calculations of the value averages as well as the ranks.
The other interesting finding is that German unions are much more concerned with 
labor market aspects. DGB unions take labor market aspects into account twice as 
much as LO unions. In particular, the DGB, IGB, OTV, and a bit surprisingly IGD quite 
frequently stress these aspects. IGB is very much concerned with labor market and 
employment aspects but also with technological and energy political aspects. The 
emphasis on the latter aspect can be explained by the strong involvement of IGB in 
energy political questions. Most of the arguments stress the important function of 
coal in Germany's energy policy. Much attention is also given to the high tempera­
ture reactor which makes it possible to refine coal processing. As mentioned above, 
coal directly competes with nuclear energy as an energy source in West Germany. In 
addition, the labor market for miners is severely declining so that It is understandable
that IGB is cautious about the employment effects of nuclear energy and the conse­
quences that it might have for the coal industry. More surprising is the high amount 
of labor market statements of IGD. In that, IGD is the only German trade union which 
is not involved in energy policy through its members but stresses labor market 
aspects more frequently than the average. IGC is the opposite. Although involved in 
nuclear energy through its members, IGC does not place very much emphasis on 
labor market aspects.
One reason for the stronger emphasis of German unions on labor market aspects is 
certainly the high unemployment rate that has existed for more thwra decade in 
Germany. Labor market aspects have to be taken into account whether one argues 
for or against nuclear power. In Sweden, this aspect is less relevant. As it has often 
been stated in interviews there will be no unemployment for workers in nuclear 
plants who are skilled and highly qualified.
Complex Aspects
The non-pragmatic aspects are very different in character. They contain all other 
remaining facets of an issue, as outlined above and presented in table 5-2, I will pre­
sent these aspects along the lines of left-ideological, safety and environmental, politi­
cal, and societal aspects. ~ '
fa) Left-Ideological Aspects
In comparison to all other unions, LO unions score highest in terms of left-ideological 
aspects. In particular, the confederation LO extensively included this aspect in their 
congressional motions and debates (14.1 percent). Only GF scores much lower than 
any other union in the LO confederation, but its score is still higher than any one of 
the TCO trade unions which are the other extreme in this respect. This confirms 
again that TCO unions try to refrain from statements which may express their sym­
pathy for any left or right ideology. The German unions score rather moderately in 
this dimension. Although these aspects are included in the argumentation of DGB, 
IGM, IGD, and GEW - the two latter put the most emphasis on the left-ideological 
aspects, - other unions (IGB, HBV, IGC, OTV) concentrate much less on left-ideologi­
cal aspects in the debate on nuclear energy.
(b) Safety and Environmental Aspects
Concerning security and environmental aspects, we can see that German unions put 
much more stress on the former aspects while the Swedish unions put more 
emphasis on the latter. In particular, TCO unions and, above all, SIF stress positive 
environmental aspects of nuclear energy (more than 85 percent of SIF's environmen-
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tal statements are positive). But also Metall notes the positive environmental aspects 
of nuclear power (83 percent of the environmental statements are positive). The con­
federation LO is more critical in its emphasis on environmental aspects (only 43 per­
cent are positive). The only German union that stresses environmental aspects to a 
large degree is IGD. But in sharp contrast to the Swedish unions only one quarter of 
the environmental statements are positive towards nuclear power.
fc) Political and Societal Aspects
By looking at the societal and poHticaf aspects, we can discover-g substarrtiat-diffe=~ 
rence between LO unions, on the one hand, and TCO and DGB unions, an the other. 
LO unions, again with the exception of GF, stress political aspects only half as often 
as TCO and DGB unions. This is particularly true for SEF but also for LO and Metall. 
However, the TCO and DGB unions have exceptions. SIF, for instance, does not give 
a lot attention to societal and political aspects. IGB is the union which least fre­
quently stresses these aspects of all trade unions in this investigation. In contrast,
GF, ST, and TCO include most frequently societal and political aspects when deba­
ting nuclear energy. It is only at the fourth place that the first German union, GEW 
comes. The unions HBV, IGM and OTV and the confederation DGB devote more than 
ten percent to societal and political aspects. IGB, SIF and all LO unions (with the 
exception of GF) include least frequently social and political aspects in their debate 
on nuclear power. A comparison of LO, TCO, and DGB unions shows that the TCO 
unions score highest on the political dimension when we exclude SKTF and SL which 
neglected the whole debate. However, the DGB unions are not far from TCO unions 
in this, and surpass them if we also take SKTF and SL into the account. As 
mentioned above, LO unions give very little attention to social and political aspects.
The index for the level of communication combines the indices discussed above. It is 
the summation of all the applied indices [12]. We can distinguish the two kinds of 
organizational communication: pragmatic and complex-ideological.
With the distinct exception of GF, all LO unions fit into the category of pragmatic 
trade unions. This is most clearly true for SKAF, SEF and Metall. Although the LO 
confederation without a doubt can also be classified as pragmatic, it is the least 
pragmatic of the LO unions. Most likely because more societal and political aspects 
are debated in the confederations rather than in the individual trade unions. GF is not 
typical for a LO union. This may not be limited to its debate on nuclear power. It is 
clearly a complex debating trade union. By dealing with broader social and political 
aspects, it even tends to neglect the domain of LO-ideology: left-ideological aspects.
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For TCO unions, the analysis reveals a fundamental difference. On the one hand, 
there are pragmatic unions like SIF, SKTF, and SL. The two latter unions can be cal­
led pragmatic because they avoid (SKTF) or do not see it as a trade union task to 
deal with political issues (SL). On the other hand, TCO and, above all, ST debate the 
issue of nuclear energy in a rather complex manner. This is less surprising for TCO 
since it is the "political head" of the white collar unions in Sweden and the organiz­
ation where white collar union interests should be translated into politics. However, 
we can also see the limitation of the complex communication of TCO, it is above all 
in the dimension of left-ideological aspects. ST is more interesting. ST is one of the 
most complex debating union in the whole survey. The results of its communication 
level are in sharp contrast to the established view of Swedish white collar unions as 
non-political. However, although ST is not as extreme as TCO and SIF, it does not 
place much emphasis on left-ideological aspects.
For the DG8 unions, we can conclude that all unions except IGC and IGB are com­
plex-ideological. This is particularly true for GEW, IGD, HBV, DGB, and IGM. OTV is 
less complex but it may still fit better into this category than into the pragmatic one. 
IGC and IGB fit much better into the pragmatic category. For this reason, IGC can be 
considered as a less pragmatic trade union when we compare it to the rest of prag­
matic unions in Sweden. IGB, in contrast, represents one of the most pragmatic trade 
unions of the whole survey. ----------  - — -------  -------------
The relationship between the level of communication and the adoption of new poli­
tics is very close. Only in the case of TCO, where the level of communication was 
complex, no elements of new politics were adopted [13] and pragmatic debating 
unions did not adopt elements of new politics (r = .71 *, N = 16). The level of 
communication is not without context. One important aspect here may be the union 
ideology to which I wish to turn now.
4. TRADE UNION IDEOLOGY AND NEW POLITICS
Trade union ideology may play a fundamental role in the stand that trade unions take 
concerning productionist and new politics. Union ideology, in terms of organization 
theory, may be interpreted as worldviews of retained successful sense-making 
(retention). The review of the literature showed that ideology seems to have been 
the best explanatory variable particularly for American unions. Rebecca Logan and 
Dorothy Nelkin (1980) demonstrated that different economic interests of trade unions 
is closely connected to their attitude towards nuclear power. Their conclusion is that 
"business" unions incline to take a pro-nuclear stand and that "social” unions open 
their politics for anti-nuclear influences [14]. Heinrich Siegmann (1985) arrives to
- 143 -
quite the same conclusion when he compares the relationship between labor and 
environmentalism in the USA and West Germany. For Sweden and West Germany, 
however, the dichotomy between business and social unions does not work out for a 
lot of reasons. Unions in both countries are "socially responsible", participatory, 
centralized and have a global influence over national politics (Celia and Treu, 1987; 
Martin, 1989; Taylor, 1989: 18-46). Alain Touraine stresses the importance of diffe­
rent ideological commitments and its impact on the responsiveness of trade unions to 
new politics. He revealed fundamental differences between the two major union con­
federations in France. The Confédération générale du travail (C.G.T), the communist 
trade union federation, is strongly committed to the attitudes of industrial culture and 
distrustful of the anti-nuclear movement. The other French union federation Confé­
dération française du travail (C.F.D.T.) opened its politics more to the new demands 
but it suffered from internal conflicts (Touraine et al., 1987: 209-224).
As outlined above, among other variables the unions have been selected because of 
their different ideologies. In West Germany, one can distinguish between accommo- 
dationist and activist unions and also empirical studies have been conducted along 
this line (Bergmann et al. 1976; Markovits, 1986; Weischer, 1988):
There have always been two main groups o f unions within the DGB, which we have decided to call 
activists and accommodationists, roughly corresponding to the more general notions of 'radicals' and 
'moderates*. This cleavage, based both on political attitudes and on tradition, has been the principle 
axis along which intra-DGB politics revolved throughout the post-Wortd War II period. (Markovits,
1986: 20)
Whereas Andrei Markovits analyses this cleavage by considering the politics of the 
DGB, IGM, IGC, IGBSE, and IGD, Christoph Weischer attempts to trace back the 
historical roots of these traditions to the beginning of the German trade union 
movement. Unfortunately, he does not refer to the political actors in the trade unions 
in a systematic manner but is rather sketchy in his argumentation. The already 
"classical" study by Joachim Bergmann, Otto Jacobi and Walther Müller-Jentsch 
(1976: 173-93) compares the programmatic attitudes of accommodationist 
(systemkonformen or system conformist) and activist (systemkritischen or system 
critical) unions with the example of the German Construction workers' union (IGBSE), 
on the one hand, and the Metall workers' union (IGM), on the other. In order to do 
this, they analyzed the attitudes of unions concerning nationalization, the perception 
of the state, and the role trade unions are supposed to play within capitalism.
Weischer (1988: 233-263) notes that "activist union policy" aims to fight the 
deterioration of the employees by means of shorter working hours, state control over 
research and technology politics, and an extension of co-determination. Weischer 
identifies the radical tradition, above all, in HBV and IGM, the youth departments,
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and education centers. Markovits also sees the strongholds of activist unionism in 
the IGM, IGD, Gewerkschaft Hotz (carpenters' union), and Gewerkschaft Leder 
(leather workers' union) (Markovits 1986: 20/1). To this group, one can also pro­
bably add the GEW which has been strongly influenced by communist traditions.
However, there have been some substantial changes along this line. IGC, once 
belonging to the activist unions became one of the most radical accommodationist 
unions, and the OTV and the Postal Workers' union (Deutsche Postgewerkschaft, 
DPG) steadily drifted to the left within the spectrum of DGB politics. According to 
Weischer, the reformers and pragmatists became so-called "modernizers" in the 
1970s. Above all, the IGC and its leader Hermann Rappe form this wing. But also the 
IGB, /G Bau-Steine-Erden (construction workers' union), and the Gewerkschaft Textil- 
Bek/eidung (textile workers' union) belong to this group. The aim of the accommoda­
tionist unions is to achieve material welfare through means of technological progress, 
improvement of international competition, etc. In order to pursue this goal, they are 
open for cooperation with employers and they try to attract the increasing group of 
technicians.
We can refer to the relationship with the Green party as a first indicator for the 
ideological stand of trade unions concerning new politics. Both types of unions are 
different in their relationship with the Green party and environmental politics. -  
Whereas the accommodationist unions oppose any Green politics, the activist unions 
turn less reluctantly to Green issues such as ecology, critique of economic growth, 
women, and the third world. The latter group has also close contact with Green poli­
tics and new social movements, especially with the peace movement (Armingeon 
and Schmitt, 1986; Swenson, 1989: 228-31). For the relationship between trade 
unions and the Greens, Markovits (1986: 444-446) points out:
Although the activist unions are as hostile to the Greens' forms of no-growth ecologism as their 
accommodationist colleagues, one can nevertheless detect a growing eco-consciousness among certain 
unions belonging to the former group. This in no way implies that the activists have resolved the 
contradictions inherent in the dichotomy between economy and ecology. Rather, one could argue that 
reformers within the unions have been forced to begin a lengthy process of reflection with regard to 
ecology and "new social movements.'' (Markovits, 1986: 446)
For West German unions, one can derive the hypothesis that the most progressive 
unions in a leftish sense are the most open to Green politics, whereas the more 
accommodative unions of pragmatic Social Democracy are the most hostile. For the 
unions in this investigation, we may hypothesize on the basis of their ideology that 
IGM, IGD, and HBV are most open to elements of new politics and that IGB and IGC 
are the most reserved. The remaining unions may take a middle position, where GEW
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and OTV are closer to the activist wing, and the DGB stands nearer the accommoda­
tionist camp.
For the Swedish union movement, it is much more difficult to find indication for 
ideological currents. However, they may exist. As Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen 
(1987) point out, policy and politics in Sweden can only be understood by being able 
to understand the power struggle within Social Democracy. However, it causes sub­
stantial difficulties to find empirical indicators for differences in intra-union ideology 
in Swedish unions, particularly within the big union confederations.
The most obvious ideological difference exists between the two big trade union con­
federations in Sweden: LO and TCO [15]. LO and its unions can be connected with a 
(pragmatic) Social Democratic ideology. TCO, although officially having a neutral 
stand concerning party politics, most often is in agreement with LO positions 
(Elvander, 1983: 379-383). Over time, one may conclude that ideological differences 
between LO and TCO have diminished (Nilsson, 1985). However, since TCO mem­
bers often favor the politics of other parties, above all, the politics of the liberal 
Foikspartiet (fp), TCO tries not to get involved in party politics when issues are 
heated. Nevertheless, on the elite level TCO is clearly oriented towards Social 
Democracy. However, within LO or TCO there are hardly any analyses of different 
ideological groups. The disagreements between Swedish unions exist more in eco­
nomic or organizational conflicts, which above all rise between private and public 
sector unions (Fredriksson and Gunno, 1985: 148-151; Olson, 1989: 137-170; 
Swenson, 1989). In so far, the ideological difference consists of a (pragmatic) Social 
Democratic ideology (LO) and of a heterogeneous or more neutral ideology in political 
parties' terms (TCO).
In his analysis of the internal union opposition in LO, Walter Korpi (1978: 237-269) 
finds that the vast majority can be labelled Social Democrats but it should be brought 
to notice that a Communist faction also exists. This does not exclude the fact that 
there have been disagreements on single issues within the Social Democratic faction 
as well. Unfortunately, Korpi does not analyze these conflicts in a systematic 
fashion, so that we may identify groups or even unions which are more or less Social 
Democratic or committed to Communist ideas. Leif Lewin also exclusively con­
centrates on LO unions and identifies a few stronger Communist groups among some 
local districts particularly in the north of Sweden.
For TCO, there is also no investigation that tries to explain intra-organizational clea­
vages systematically. By specifying the consequences of TCO's neutral stand policy, 
Christopher Wheeler postulates that TCO's political influence is at its greatest as long
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as the issue is kept away from politicization, i.e. taken up controversially by different 
political groups, above all parties. Wheeler illustrates this with the example of the 
dispute on supplementary pensions which took place at the end of the 1950s and 
had its peak around the referendum on this issue in October 1957:
As the tensions created by the heterogeneous political party support among TCO's membership, which 
in turn reflected economic cleavages within the organization, became manifest, there was no position 
which TCO could take which would not offend one or another important segment of its membership. 
Worse yet, the willingness of some of TCO's most important leaders to try to use the organization to 
influence white-collar voters created the preconditions for a total breakdown in organizational cohesion. 
(Wheeler, 1975: 91)
In these cases, TCO and its unions try to formulate a neutral stand. However, that is 
only successful as long as all unions remain neutral and do not change their politics. 
As Wheeler points out that was not the case any more, when SIF, the biggest TCO 
union, made an arrangement with the employers against the official policy of the 
TCO-board. This conflict resulted, after the public political dispute, in a second 
internal conflict that lasted several years following the referendum (Wheeler, 1975: 
88-90). Similar intra-organizational conflicts occurred within the debate on nuclear 
power (Micheletti, 1985). However, neither of the authors connect the particular 
conflict to more general cleavages within TCO and its unions. It seems from these 
analyses that intra-organizational conflict in TCO and TCO unions is predominantly a 
result of membership pressure of different unions and that these different ~ ~  
standpoints are directly related to individual or sectoral advantages or disadvantages 
of certain membership groups.
Another analysis by Ake Sandberg (1984; 1989) may shed some light on different 
trade union strategies concerning attitudes in the context of the introduction of new 
technologies and work-place organization. He classifies attitudes either as 
"technically-optimistic", on the one hand, and as producer oriented or "technically- 
radical”, on the other. The former view is described as follows:
With an optimistic approach to technology, technological development is seen as both necessary and 
desirable. Nothing should be allowed to prevent it, and our task is to promote it give it as much free 
play as possible. (Sandberg, 1989: Ch1, p. 10).
In contrast to the technically-optimistic view, the technically-radical view focuses 
attention on both the products and the production system. This broader approach to 
looking at the introduction of new technology and the work organization also implies 
a socio-political view, while the technically-optimistic view focuses rather on proce­
dures and technical aspects.
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A radical approach involves a critical view of technological development. Such development is not 
good as it stands, but it is possible to get it on to other, alternative tracks. (Sandberg, 1989: Ch1, p. 
10)
While analyzing program declarations of some Swedish unions, he concludes that the 
influential unions such as LO and Metall express the former attitudes and that GF, 
the food processing workers' union, and ST lean more to the latter 116].
Important in the context of ideological differences among Swedish unions is the 
dominant role of the central confederation LO over its unions. This role was shaped 
during the historical process (Martin, 1984; Swenson, 1989). Therefore, we might 
expect a quite coherent picture of LO unions. LO was able to formulate a distinct 
union ideology. The major goals of it are a class-based pursuit of full employment, 
technical progress, solidaric wages, active labor market policy, and collective capital 
formation (Meidner and Hedborg, 1984; Tilton, 1990: chapter nine). In the context of 
LO's historical perception of technical progress, it is important to note that LO expli­
citly supports and even promotes it:
Rationalization must be considered a natural, continuing effort to improve the results of production and 
to enhance the development of human culture. The trade union movement cannot turn itself against 
these efforts. (LO's 15-mannakommitté, 1941: 144; quoted from Tilton, 1990: 191)
LO and the Social Democrats, in general, faced difficulties to match the material 
goals of this strategy with its resulting consequences, trrthe 1960s,-the costs of— ~  
technological progress and the implied geographical mobility for the worker created a 
growing resistance (Martin, 1984; Tilton, 1990: 209-14) [17]. Although the elite of 
LO listened to these complaints and more strongly stressed the qualitative aspects of 
work-life, it did not move away from its technically-optimistic ideology:
The Swedish union movement demonstrates a unique commitment to rationalization and efficiency, 
one that derives from the Social Democratic goal of material abundance, not from an acceptance of 
capitalist imperatives. (Tilton, 1990: 214)
In the context of the perception of technological development, two points are impor­
tant: first, LO supports and even promotes technological progress and is therefore 
strongly committed to the values of industrial society. Second, LO unions do not 
fundamentally differ in this respect - apart from GF.
Officially, TCO does not have such a pronounced ideology on socio-technological 
developments, although it is fair to conclude that also TCO supports technological 
progress. However, the TCO unions exercise a much more independent policy from 
its confederation. This means that more differences may exist between the individual 
TCO unions.
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Concerning the consequences for new politics, one can assume that with the 
exception of GF, LO unions are ideologically rather reluctant to integrate elements of 
new politics into their programs and mainly adopt more or less the standpoint of the 
LO confederation. For TCO, one may expect either a neutral stand - or total neglect 
of an issue that polarizes the membership. A third possibility is that a union stand 
would coincide with its membership. Since the TCO confederation formulates also 
political stands of its member unions, it may be a "bit more political" than its member 
unions. That means that both union confederations in Sweden have g more jepresen- 
tative political function in relation to their member unions while the German unions 
are also political on the individual union level. Furthermore, Ake Sandberg's investi­
gation suggests that ST may be different from other TCO unions. However, he gives 
no suggestions for other TCO unions. It also seems true that ST is more active in 
other field of politics as well. Considering this, one sees that it is different from other 
TCO unions of this investigation. However, the political activities of ST are never as 
pronounced as they are in DGB unions or LO unions.
Figure 5-1 may be an approximation of the results of the reviewed literature. The 
band cutting through the figure indicates the hypothetical openness of the trade 
unions for new politics. Left of the band we may expect a certain openness for 
elements of new politics. The unions at the right of the band may be rather unre­
sponsive to new politics. The unions which are touched by the band may be partially 
receptive due to ideological reasons.
The ideological stand seems to have a fundamental impact on trade union stands to­
wards elements of new politics. All the German activist unions are open to new poli­
tics and also the unions classified as moderately activist have adopted elements of 
new politics. The opposite is true for accommodationist and neutral unions. None of 
the unions classified as neutral or accommodationist have adopted elements of new 
politics. This conclusion is true for both the Swedish and the German types of 
accommodationist trade unionism. Unions classified as less neutral and more activist 
adopted at least some elements on new politics or they are not completely opposed 
to them. All in all, we can see a relatively high correlation between the general ideo­
logical stand of trade unions and their attitude towards new politics [18].
Figure 5-1: ideological Space of Swedish and German Trade Unions
Activist
Unions
^  Accommodationist
Unions
The ideological impact is even higher on the level of communication T191. The less a ~ 
union follows an accommodationist and/or politically neutral ideological strategy and 
the more it favors activist unionism and is technically-radical, the more the union 
communicates social matters in a complex manner. As outlined above, it is rather dif­
ficult to protect a union from the influence of social change once it has left the 
pragmatic level of communication. We may conclude that ideology matters in how 
far German and Swedish unions are responsive to elements of new politics [20].
5. CONCLUSION
The steps which are analyzed in this chapter can be seen as ranging from relatively 
non-filtered membership opinions to strongly filtered organizational standpoints. The 
filters are different organizational factors and can roughly be divided into entry filters 
(which issues come on the agenda), tolerance filters (is it possible to express diversi­
fied opinions), communicational filters (how it is possible to communicate an issue in 
the organization), and decisional filters (which official stand is valid). As we have 
seen from the debates within the trade union confederations and the congresses of 
some individual trade unions in the proceeding chapter, most unions have a voiced 
membership potential. A voiced membership potential for new politics can be
considered as the pure fact that members of individual trade unions express their 
preference for elements of new politics either at the congresses of their union or at 
the congresses of the union confederation. In these terms, only IGB, SEF, and SKAF 
seem to have no potential for elements of new politics, and for LO and Metall it 
seems to be very low. The members of the TCO unions, ST, SKTF, and SL, expres­
sed their concerns quite clearly at the TCO congresses above all in 1979. Members 
of SF also (weakly) expressed some interest of new politics at the LO congress in 
1981. The first organizational filter is the agenda control (B1). In particular, LO 
unions are not very much affected by elements of new politics in their organizations. 
The weak membership potential cannot be translated into an organizational potential 
for new politics. Most striking is the fact that most of the considered TCO unions fil­
ter out membership potential for new politics in the next stage: voiced membership 
potential is not translated into organizational potential (A6). Some TCO unions are 
quite explicit in their expression that political issues have no place at all in their 
organization. In particular, SIF, SKTF, and SL adopted this strategy to eliminate 
further discussions in their organization by pointing out that these issues have 
nothing to do with trade unions' concerns. However, if a union debated the issue it 
has been summarized as the organizational potential for new politics. The next step 
was to identify whether this potential leads to any intra-organizational conflicts (B6) 
about new and productionist politics. Only two unions which had an organizational 
potential for new politics did not suffer from an intra-organizational conflict. Those 
were GF and GEW. Both unions showed a relatively coherent new politics stand 
which seemed to be not fundamentally questioned within the organization. The next 
factor is strongly connected to the former and it is difficult to proclaim any causal 
relationship. One should rather think in terms of an interactive relationship. It is the 
communication procedures in an organization (B7). This means that we can distin­
guish between different levels of communication. I have attempted to find indicators 
for two rather distinct types of organizational communication: a pragmatic type of 
organizational communication and a complex-ideological one. One can conclude that 
all unions with a high organizational potential for new politics apply a rather complex- 
ideological, organizational communication (r = .83). Only IGC tried to limit this 
potential and the organizational conflict by limiting the debate on pragmatic catego­
ries. On the other hand, no union without organizational potential for elements of 
new politics applied complex-ideological communication.
In organization theoretical terms one can say that German unions are much more 
affected by the conflict between new and productionist politics because they deal 
with the issue in a more complex manner, on the one hand, and they are more 
closely coupled, on the other (see chapter four). In empirical terms the first aspect is 
represented by the fact that German unions, in general, take more complex aspects
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into consideration when debating nuclear energy than Swedish unions. Leaving the 
pragmatic level of communications implies the risk that consensus is more difficult to 
reach (Perlman, 1966; Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980). The next chapter will focus on 
the different impacts of the organizational environment.
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Footnotes:
1 I distinguish here between organizational potential for new politics, voiced membership poten­
tial, and latent membership potential. Latent membership potential is presumed to be potential deduced 
from certain characteristics of the union membership {see chapter four). I speak of voiced membership 
potential when union members voice their opinion on new politics. This must not be within the indivi­
dual union but can also be at the congresses of the confederations. However, membership potential for 
new politics must not be expressed in organizational potential. An organizational potential for new poli­
tics must be observable in the individual union organization.
2 More formally the definition of the Organizational Potential for New Politics (OPNP) is the sum 
of the NP means of the motions and the debates for all union congresses:
OPNP = E means of NP (motions) + E means of NP (debate)
Explanations:
OPNP =■= Organizational Potential
of Elements of New Politics 
NP « Elements of New Politics
(see above: NP)
The scale of the index, as all other indices presented in this section, has a point zero but the range of 
the scale is not limited.
3 For a similar analysis of comparing different subgroups by means of ranks see: Katzenstein, 
1985.
4 With some reservations one could also include IGM here. I decided against that because IGM
does not organize members in nuclear energy enterprises to the extent that SlF and IGC do.
5 The correlation is significant: r = .69* (N = 16).
6 For some analysis that stress different aspects of union democracy see for instance: Lipset et
al. 1956; Hemingway, 1978; Lewin, 1980; Jahn, 1988b.
7 However, open opposition to union policy does not seem to be tolerated in Swedish unions.
After describing a number of methods to sanction deviant members by leadership Lewin sums up:
All this adds up to a rather dark picture of the respect for minority rights within the Swedish 
trade union movement. The leadership perceives that influencing membership opinion is one 
of its primary duties and that broad base of support for union ideology is an important objec­
tive for the movement. In the case of the wage policy of solidarity they have often been suc­
cessful. Nevertheless, in the Drocess of influencing opinion, excessively harsh methods are 
sometimes used. (Lewin, 1980: 156)
That also pressure above all in moral terms is used may be true also for other ideological conflicts. In 
this context, Michele Micheletti reports that "Lasse Karlsson, a LO official... was released from some 
of his duties due to his viewpoint on nuclear power.* (Micheletti, 1985: 115). In consideration of these 
reports one may conclude that LO's coherent Social Democratic ideology has quite substantial conse­
quences for diverse alternative ideological standpoints. Leif Lewin's examples of how union leaders 
deal with members who voice disagreement with the collective affiliation of unions local districts with 
the Social Democratic Party reminds of the criminal actions one is used to hear of in American unions:
Concerning how those workers are treated who prefer to remain outside the trade union mo­
vement, 21 percent of the members said that they had noticed harassment directed against 
the outsiders in the form of 'snide remarks and verbal pressure," but even more serious are 
"anonymous letters," "threatened beatings," "verbal abuse and violent actions," and 
"sanctions by the leadership." (Lewin, 1980: 156)
8 More formally the operationalization of the Organizational Level of Conflict (OLC) between pro- 
ductionist and new politics is the sum of the standard deviations of the AN PE of the motions and the 
debates of all analyzed congresses:
OLC = E s td  of AN PE (motions) + E s to  of AN PE (debates)
Explanations:
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OLC = Organizational Level of Conflict between
Productionist and New Politics 
ANPE *  Adoption of Elements of
New Politics (see above: ANPE)
STO = Standard Deviation
9 There is also no perfect relation between latent or organizational potential and intra- 
organizational conflict. However in three quarters of the cases organizational potential is positively 
associated with intra-organizational conflict. (This is only in half of the cases true when we look at 
latent membership potential and intra-organizational conflict). This result means that there is a high 
chance of intra-organizational conflict if elements of new politics are debated in terms of new ana pro­
ductionist politics in trade unions.
10 The assigned values are scaled according the following principle:
Sum of the Relative Frequencies of Assigned
Technological, Energy Political, Value
Economic, and Labor Market Aspects
0 * 49.9 percent 0
50 - 59.9 percent -1
60 - 64.9 percent - 2
65 - 69.9 percent - 3
70 - 79.9 percent - 4
80 - 100.0 percent -5
low degree of communication - 6
A low degree of communication exists when the expressed statements are not higher than 50. In these 
cases, the other values of the complex categories (see below) are not allowed to extend 1 because the 
relative frequencies are not sufficiently reliable. This applies only to the Societal and Political Aspects 
where the value can vary between 1 and 3.
11 The values of the index for the level of complex communication have been calculated in the
following way: the values for left-ideology, security, environment, and societal and political aspects 
have been summed up. The index is in proportion to the index that measures the pragmatic level of 
communication and can score between 0 and 6. Therefore, the whole level of communication varies 
between -6 (pragmatic communication) to +6 (complex communication). The sub-indices are equal to
0 if their relative frequencies are not larger than the displayed values. The ranges for the values are 
deduced from the empirical frequencies:
Aspect Relative Assign
Frequencies Value
Left-Ideology:
O
•
in percent 1
Security 10.0 percent 1
Environment 4 .5 percent 1
Societal and 
Political 18:8 - 11 !? 
12.0
percent
percent
percent
i
3
12 The index comes more or less to the same results whether it is based on the index or the sum 
of the ranks. In the latter case, the rank of the societal and political aspects has been weighted twice 
as much because of the importance of these aspects (the same has been done for the index based on 
the classifications as outlined above). The only substantial difference is that HBV scores higher and 
IGM lower when applying the ranking technigue. However, this affects by no means the classification 
of the trade unions in terms of pragmatic ano complex level of communication.
13 One should not perceive a complex level of communication as an indicator for new politics. An 
argument that speaks against this interpretation is the complex level of intra-organizational communi­
cation in German unions in periods when they still favored productionist politics. In particular, OTV in 
the 1970s is a case in point for a complex but oroductionist trade union. However, the difference be­
tween Swedish and German unions may have fundamental historical reasons. LO has always been 
rather pragmatic and reformist since the beginning of the century. German unions, in contrast were 
always relatively ideological (Perlman, 196o).
14 The classical study in which trade unions were classified - among others - as business and re­
volutionary unions is Robert Hoxie's (1966) study on Trade Unionism in the United States. His 
'business' and 'revolutionary' unionism, translated as 'economic' and 'political' unionism, gained wide 
currency during the period after the Second World War among writers on comparative unionism 
(Martin, 1989).
15 There is also SACO/SR which is not analyzed here. SAC0/SR has no socio-political world-views 
as LO and TOO and differs also in other respects from the two bigger confederations (Elvander, 1983; 
Nilsson, 1985). SAC, on the other hand, is rather radical and open for new politics. For instance, its 
membership newspaper Arbetaren even served as a voice for tne alternative movements in Sweden
(Rubert, 1985: 233). However, it is by far less important than all the other Swedish trade union 
confederations.
16 Sandberg identifies the technicaHy-radical attitude also at the local level of SIF at the Ericsson 
telephone company factory in Stockholm. However, since this conclusion refers only to the local level I 
did not use it here as an indicator for SIF as a whole. GF is also less committed to social democratic 
ideology. This has been stated in conducted interviews with GF officials and is also confirmed by the 
data above.
17 Tim Tilton points out: "Swedes in the northern reaches of the country quipped that AMS, the 
Swedish abbreviation for Labor Market Board, stood for 'All Must [Go] South' ('Alla Mdste Sdderut').
18 The correlation between the openness to elements of new politics measured by the last stand 
and the trade unions' general ideological stand is rather high (r = .82** (N = 16); Eta = .85). The 
ideological stand has been operationalized according to the three dimensions mentioned in the text 
(political versus neutral; activist versus accommodationist; technically-optimistic versus technically* 
radical). The index is documented in table A5-1. Even if this index remains a bit arbitrary because of 
the complex character of union ideology and the lack of available information, it is clear that ideology 
has a profound impact on the adoption of elements of new politics.
19 The correlation between the ideology and the level of communication is r = .83**.
20 A multiple regression with the variables organizational potential for new politics, organizational
level of conflict, leveT of communication, ideology, and last stand comes to an adjusted R Square =»
.60 (R Square *= .71), when the last stand is the dependent variable. When the level of communication 
is the dependent variable the adjusted R Square is .78 (R Square = .84). However, since this statisti­
cal procedure is not really appropriate for tnis data (low number of cases, scaling quality) I did not ela­
borate the argument along this line. However, the substantial results are also confirmed through the 
analysis above.

CHAPTER SIX:
THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
In this chapter about the organizational environment and the assessment of produc­
tionist and new politics of trade unions I wish to analyze the following three aspects: 
economic, socio-cultural, and political. However, even if these aspects are analyti­
cally distinguished, they are interrelated in reality. The empirical analysis relies on 
very global indicators and should therefore not be overestimated but serve as an 
orientation. ~~~ " ' ------— - _
The perception of nuclear energy may be dependent on thenationaT energy'policy 
and the economic development of a country (A5). As it has already mentioned, trade 
unions are cooperative and nationally responsible political and social actors in both 
countries. They were often involved or, at least, consulted in questions of the 
development of the national energy policy, and they also considered the data of the 
national economy when formulating trade union goals. The reference to the national 
economy may lead to it that trade unions favor productionist politics in times of eco­
nomic problems, and if they stress stronger elements of new politics, they do this in 
times of economic prosperity.
The impact of public opinion on trade union policy has toi>e seenirrthe background 
of the national energy policy and economy. However, the general socio-political 
atmosphere may have a profound impact on trade unions, particularly when they 
have political aspirations (B3 and B4). The influence of public opinion and of new 
social movements are analyzed here under the same heading and should be concep­
tualized as the degree of politicalization of industrial production, a term elaborated by 
Herbert Kitschelt (1985).
The last aspect focuses on different political environments. One may assume that the 
Swedish political system gives more support for new politics, since it is more respon­
sive and integrating than the German system (Kitschelt, 1983; Kitschelt, 1986).
While the Swedish political system have integrated elements of new politics from the 
very beginning, the German system provokes open conflicts (B3a and B3d). This in 
turn may result in feedback loops: the more profiled alternatives become the stronger 
the influence is an - initially unresponsive - established actors such as trade unions 
(B3b and B3c).
1. THE ENERGY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SWEDEN AND 
WEST GERMANY AND THE ASSESSMENT OF NEW AND PRODUCTIONIST 
POLITICS
The Energy Policy in Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany 
In relative terms Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany make substantial use 
of nuclear energy. Of the 26 nations that use nuclear energy in 1985 West Germany 
is among the more average users of nuclear energy. Around 30 percent of the elec­
tricity production is generated by the 19 reactors at 16 sites. Six further reactors 
were still planned in 1985 [1]. The Swedish nuclear power program is much more 
ambitious. Only in a short time, Sweden increased its nuclear electricity share to 
around 43 percent. Per capita Sweden is the leader of all nuclear energy countries in 
the OECD and surpassed even France which is known as a nuclear power nation 
(OECD, 1987). The twelve reactors are very centralized and are located at only four 
different sites. Sweden is the smallest country in the world that possesses its own 
manufacturer of reactors. One reactor line (boiling water reactors, BWR) was desi­
gned and constructed by the Swedish company ASEA. 9 of the 12 reactors are 
BWRs (Swedish Government, 1987). Additionally, Sweden possesses substantial 
domestic uranium resources, so that it appears feasible to consider nuclear energy as 
a domestic energy resource.
Sweden, in contrast to West .Germany, was very effective in implementing its nuclear 
power program. The Swedish nuclear power program was less than half as much 
delayed as the German one (Kitschelt, 1986). Most interesting is the fact that Swe­
den became a leading nuclear power nation, after the parliament had decided in June 
1980, as a consequence of the consultative referendum, to phase out nuclear power 
in 2010. Within the scope of this decision, nuclear power is to be phased out at the 
fastest feasible pace giving due regard to the electric power needed to maintain em­
ployment levels and the general welfare. The parliament decided that the last reactor 
in Sweden must be shut down permanently no later than the year 2010. Different 
than in Germany, the Swedish nuclear program seems to follow rational political de­
cisions. After the parliament had decided on twelve reactors, this program was effec­
tively implemented. Whether or not, Sweden will stick to the phasing-out plan is still 
left open. In particular, the trends of recent debates (1990) give some doubts 
whether nuclear energy will have disappeared in Sweden by 2010 [2].
In West Germany, the nuclear program seemed to have reached a phase of stale­
mate. But that occurred rather unplanned. In the 1980s, the industry was mainly 
concentrating on the completion of facilities already under construction. No reactors 
have been newly ordered in recent years. The industry feels the financial risks of the 
nuclear technology. For monetary cost-benefit reasons, some German nuclear indu-
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stries abandoned the reprocessing plant project. The only fast breeder reactor which 
is under construction in Germany has an unclear future after the increasing hesitation 
of private industry to invest into this project. The disagreement between the Social 
Democratic local government and the Conservative-Liberal Federal government also 
adds to the uncertain future of the fast breeder.
In more general energy political terms, Swedish energy consumption has increased 
during the last decades. The Swedish energy demand per capita is the highest 
among all European OECD countries and also the increase of the energy requirement 
is very high (second after Norway). This stands in sharp contrast to the thesis that 
Sweden might have changed its productionist policy (Undberg, 1977; Kitscheit,
1983; Sahr, 1985; JSnicke et al., 1986). West Germany takes a more average 
position in both terms. For instance, the energy requirement increased in Sweden 
approximately 20 percent from 1973 to 1987 (1970 = 100). In the same time, the 
energy requirement increased in West Germany by 2.1 percent. Cheap energy is 
almost a cultural issue in Sweden (Jahn, 1987; Jahn 1988a). Tom Burns summarizes 
the Swedish view on energy:
... even in relatively energy-conscious Sweden, the ‘ industrial complex* is not prepared to propose or 
to accept radically increased electricity rates ... (this has to do) with the fact that entire industries 
which have been and continue to be very heavy energy users • such as paper and pulps, alloy and light 
metall production - are of great importance to the Swedish economy. Indeed, such industries are clo­
sely associated with Swedish national identity. (Bums, 1985: 18) —
Nuclear energy in Sweden is often associated with cheap energy. Probably one 
reason for that is the extreme dependency on foreign energy supply. In 1970, before 
the nuclear program was conducted, Sweden was to more than 75 percent depen­
dent on imports in contrast to 50 percent in West Germany (OECD, 1987). Apart 
from water power, Sweden has no substantial national energy resources. The further 
exploitation of water power, however, is limited by the public protest that started in 
the 1970s. Consequently, nuclear energy was considered to be an appropriate alter­
native. As a consequence of the development of nuclear power, the energy import 
decreased in Sweden to around 37 percent in 1985, while it remained stable by 50 
percent in West Germany. However, West Germany could always rely on the 
domestic coal industry. Table 6-1 summarizes some indicators that give a picture of 
the development of the energy policy in both countries and serves as data resource 
for the following analyses:
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Table 6-1.: Some Data about the Development of Energy Policy in 
Sweden and West Germany
Year Energy Development of
Requirement (a) Nuclear Energy (b)
Absolute Increase (c) Absolute Increase (c)
SHED. FRG SWED. FRG SHED. FRG SHED. FRG
1973 47.3 266.2 6.5 6.9 0.5 2.6 60.0 30.0
1974 44.7 258.5 -5.5 -2.9 0.5 2.7 0.0 3.9
1975 46.8 241.2 4.7 -6.7 2.7 4.8 440.0 77.8
1976 49.6 262.6 6.0 8.9 3.6 5.4 33.3 12.5
1977 48.6 261.9 -2.0 -0.3 4.5 8.1 25.0 50.0
1978 48.9 272.2 0.6 3.8 5.3 8.0 17.8 -1.2
1979 51.3 286.5 4.9 5.3 4.7 9.5 -11.3 18.8
1980 47.7 274.5 -7.0 -4.2 5.9 9.8 25.5 3.2
1981 49.3 261.5 3.4 -4.7 8.4 12.0 42.3 12.5
1982 46.9 252.3 -4.9 -3.5 8.7 14.2 3.6 18.3
1983 48.5 252.7 3.4 0.2 9.2 14.7 5.8 3.5
1984 51.2 262.4 0.2 3.8 11.4 20.7 23.9 40.8
1985 55.0 268.5 7.4 2.3 13.1 28.1 14.9 35.8
1986 55.3 270.6 0.6 7.8 15.6 26.7 -4.6 19.1
1987 56.4 271.7 2.0 0.4 15.1 29.2 9.4 -3.2
(a) Total Energy Requirements (TER) in Mtoe (millions of tons of 
oil equivalent). TER are made up of indigenous production + 
imports - exports -international marine bunkers 1 stock changes. 
For further details see OECD, 1987: V-XV.
Source: OECD, 1987: Energy Balances of the OECD Countries 1970- 
1985. For 1973 to 1985. OECD, 1989: Energy Balances of the OECD 
Countries 1986/1987. For 1986 and 1987.
(b) Primary energy (fossil fuel) equivalent needed to produce the 
given output of nuclear electricity in Mtoe.
Source: see (a) .
(c) Percentage change from previous year.
The perception of nuclear energy may be dependent on the increasing rates of the 
energy requirement and/or the development of nuclear power. By and large, we can 
conclude that the increase in the energy requirement was high for Sweden in the 
1970s, while the German energy requirement has mostly increased since 1983, fol­
lowing a decrease in the 1970s and early 1980s. By comparing the increase rates of 
the energy requirement and the assessment of new and productionist politics in the 
trade union newspapers as documented in table A6-1 through A6-17, we cannot find 
any larger correlation [3]. However, that does not mean that trade unions do not 
consider the general national energy demand, when they evaluate nuclear energy. 
The fact that the energy demand is an important factor within the argumentation has
been outlined above. However, it indicates that the energy requirement does not cor­
relate strongly with the assessment of new and productionist politics of trade unions.
This seems to be different for the development of the nuclear energy program. In 
both countries, the development of nuclear power started on a larger scale in 1975 
and had strong annual increase rates in the 1970s until the accident at Three Mile 
Island (see table 6-1). Particularly in Sweden, the energy supply from nuclear energy 
decreased by around 11 percent in comparison with 1979, the previous year. How­
ever, it is important to note that the efforts to increase the amount of nuclear energy 
became real in the 1980s. By the turn of the decade, both countries had developed 
only one-third of their present amount of nuclear energy. In only eight years, this 
amount was tripled. This happened despite other impressions given in the public. In 
particular for Sweden, this is an interesting fact since the referendum conducted in 
March 1980 decided to have nuclear energy only for a limited period. In 1980, the 
Swedish nuclear industry was still rather small. In only five years, this picture 
changed completely when the last reactor was completed in 1985. A complex and 
large Swedish nuclear industry became reality and this will make an intended 
phasing-out difficult. This development falsifies hypothesis formulated at the turn of 
the 1970/80 decade that the Swedish nuclear energy policy indicates an end of pro­
ductionist politics (Kitschelt  ^1983). Helena Flam (1991) makes this strikingly clear 
by comparing the anti-nuclear movements in several West-European countries. In so" 
far, Sweden may only differ from other industrial countries in that it has not decided 
to further develop its nuclear program. In contrast, the German energy policy has not 
given up the option of a further development of nuclear energy; although at the end 
of the 1980s it seemed unlikely that nuclear energy may have a growing future 
(Joppke, 1990). As outlined in chapter three, in the first half of the 1970s, all unions 
expressed a productionist stand, when the basic decisions in favor of nuclear energy 
were taken. However, more important than the annual energy requirement rates may 
be the data of the national economy for the assessment of new and productionist 
politics.
The Economic Development in Sweden and West Germany 
Both countries, Sweden and West Germany, managed the crisis of the 1970s and 
1980s relatively well. While Sweden gave more preference to ensure full-employment 
than to keep inflation low, the opposite may be true for Germany (see table A6-18 
and A6-19). The average growth rate over the whole period from 1973 to 1989 was 
2.1 percent for Sweden and 2.6 percent for Germany. The average consumer price 
increase was 8.5 percent in Sweden and 3.8 in Germany and the average unem­
ployment rate was 2.3 percent in Sweden and 4.7 percent in Germany.
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In most of the trade union literature in Western countries, Swedish and German 
unions are taken as the prominent examples of responsible trade unions (e.g.: Taylor, 
1989; Gourevitch et al., 1984; Muller-Jentsch, 1985; Flanagan et al., 1983). That 
means that trade unions care about the national economy. A common argument in 
this context is that the employees are best served when the economy booms and 
productivity increases. This attitude may lead to the conclusion that trade unions in 
both countries stress productionist aspects in the debate on nuclear energy, when 
the economy is down. However, if they turn to elements of new politics, they do 
that in periods of relative unproblematic economic development.
For the Swedish unions, we find a moderate negative correlation between the 
increase rate of the consumer prices and the assessment of productionist and new 
politics [4]. This is in particular true for TCO and the energy unions, SF, Metall, and 
less so for ST and SEF. However, the inflation rate was highest in Sweden between
1974 and 1981. As we will see later that was also the time when the issue was poli­
tically most controversial. Therefore it is fair to conclude that the economic situation 
may have been just one factor that is responsible for the assessment of productionist 
and new politics. This conclusion is even more true for the West German case. For 
the German unions, the correlation between economic factors and the assessment of 
new and productionist politics is even weaker (5]. These results are in accordance 
with the findings of Heinrich Siegmann (1985: chapter three) who rejects the hypo­
thesis that a good labor-environmentalist relation correlates positively with the eco­
nomic well-being in West Germany and the USA.
2. THE POLITICIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
The concept of the politicization of production will here be approached by combining 
two aspects: the development of public opinion towards nuclear energy, on the one 
hand, and the development and character of the anti-nuclear movements, on the 
other.
Public Opinion Towards Nuclear Energy in Sweden and West Germany 
The presentation of some results of representative national surveys over time implies 
fundamental restrictions and difficulties. Questions are slightly different, asked in dif­
ferent contexts, etc. I cannot go deeper into these problems here. Nevertheless, the 
comparison of some survey results may illuminate some trends and relations between 
public attitudes at least in global terms.
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Figure 6-1.: The Public Opinion Towards 
Nuclear Energy in Sweden 1973-1988
1973197419751976 19791980 1982 1985 1988
Pro Nuclear Energy -®~ Anti-Nuclear Energy •■©■ No Opinion
Explanations'. Data for 1973-75 from Sahr, 1985: 41, table 12. The question was: 'Today the que­
stion about nuclear power's future development is discussed. Some are for and some are against a de­
velopment of nuclear power as an energy source. What do you think?” I summarized the answers 
"Completely for nuclear expansion” and ’ For expansion with som^hesitation” to pro-nuclear energy; 
'Completely against nuclear expansion" and ”Against expansion with some hesitation” .to anti-nuclear 
energy; "Equally for and against" and 'Don't know, no opinion" to no opinion. Sahr took the data 
from: Holmberg et al., 1977: 55, table 6. For other years see explanation from table 4-1.
Figure 6-2.: The Public Opinion Towards 
Nuclear Energy in West Germany 1974-1988
Pro Nuclear Energy Anti-Nuclear EnerQy *©* No Opinion
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A very first look at the development of the representative surveys shows that in 
Sweden the attitude towards nuclear energy remained relatively stable from the mid- 
1970s to the late 1980s. In West Germany, in sharp contrast, public opinion shifted 
from a rather indifferent and positive attitude towards an anti-nuclear opinion [6]. 
Most interesting is the fact that the public opinion in both countries was rather simi­
lar until the early 1980s. After that the Swedish curve shows a decrease of people 
disfavoring nuclear energy, while in West Germany critical attitudes remained stable. 
However, Chernobyl was the watershed in West Germany. Anti-nuclear opinion 
dominated by two-thirds. The Swedish population that was heavily affected by.the 
radioactive fall-out of Chernobyl also reacted quite strongly and favored a fast 
phasing-out of nuclear power shortly after the accident. However, less than half a 
year after the Chernobyl accident, the Swedes went back to their less critical attitude 
towards nuclear energy (Jahn, 1988a: 45-47). And probably even more important:
70 percent of the Swedish technical elite wanted to keep nuclear energy even after 
2010 (WesterstShl and Johansson, 1987: 8-11; 37/8). As we can see from figure 6- 
1, in 1988 the public opinion was rather similar to the time before Chernobyl in 
Sweden. The interesting fact for West Germany is that Chernobyl was not the peak 
of anti-nuclear opinion. In contrast to the accident at Three Mile Island, the German 
public became even more critical towards nuclear power during the following years. 
According to the survey data not much more than 10-percent stIH supported nuclear 
power in West Germany in 1988. Important for these fundamental differences is 
most probably the character of the new social movements and their social and politi­
cal consequences in both countries. Before I come back to this point, I wish to pre­
sent a brief summary of the public debate on nuclear energy in Sweden and 
Germany.
The Anti-Nuclear Protest in Sweden and West Germany [7]
The anti-nuclear protest was perhaps the largest oppositional movement in postwar 
Swedish society (Flam, 1990). However, even at the very beginning, when the 
debate exceeded the inner circles of expert groups, nuclear energy was also debated 
in the parliament. This debate was initiated above all by the Center Party (Nelkin and 
Poliak, 1977; Holmberg and Asp, 1984; Sahr, 1985). However, in 1970 and 1971 
the parliament approved of the development of eleven nuclear power plants by 1980. 
In 1972, an environmental group took legal action against a nuclear plant at 
Ringhals. Friends of the Earth collaborated with local groups to obstruct plans to 
build a plant 20 miles south of Stockholm. In 1973, the Center Party had already 
attacked the nuclear power program, and called it a "symbol of bureaucratic centrali­
zation". However, the oil supply was interrupted in the winter of 1973/4. In 1974, a
survey suggested that around half of the Swedish population opposed the construc­
tion of nuclear energy. The government concluded that the population should be bet­
ter involved in the decisions on nuclear power and initiated that the issue should be 
debated in "study circles", a system of study groups managed by the political parties 
and interest groups such as trade unions, temperance groups, and religious groups 
and financed with government funds. Between 1973 and 1975, the Swedish mass 
media took up the issue of energy policy and, according to Holmberg and Asp, were 
important in the opinion making process on nuclear power. The debate on nuclear 
energy was most heated between 1974 and 1976 with demonstrations for a referen­
dum on nuclear power in spring 1975-and in spring 4974* tnAugust -1976, a demon­
stration against the nuclear power plant in Barseback took place. A first political 
climax was reached in the so-called nuclear power election in 1976, where the Social 
Democratic Party lost its government majority for the first time in 44 years. The 
Social Democrats had difficulties with nuclear power as soon as the issue was 
translated into moral terms which did not fit into their traditional party ideology 
(Nedelmann, 1984: 1042; Sahr, 1985). However, being in power the bourgeois 
prime minister Falldin had to approve that the BarsebSck reactor could operate which 
brought him a loss in credibility. In 1978, finally, the bourgeois government resigned 
because of the nuclear power issue and the next Swedish election should take place 
in September 1979. However, on April 4, 1979 the Harrisburg accident occurred. On 
the same day the Social Democrats suggested that a referendum should be held in 
the spring of 1980. It seems to be that the Social Democrats wanted to disconnect 
the nuclear power issue from general elections (Holmberg and Asp, 1984). However, 
also in the 1979 election, the second election in which the Social Democrats could 
not gain government control, nuclear energy was the most important single issue 
(Holmberg and Asp, 1984: 54; Gilljam and Holmberg, 1990). The heated debate 
went on until March 1980, when the referendum was conducted. In 1979, the 
People's Campaign Against Nuclear Power was established. In that time the Social 
Democrats were eager to translate the question on nuclear energy into a question of 
left and right. Instead of voting for or against nuclear energy, three alternatives were 
presented to the Swedish people. This made it possible to translate the question into 
the party political logics. The conservatives and the Swedish Employers' association 
(SAF) stood for the line 1 which was most positive towards nuclear power. Line 3 
was represented by the Communists and the Center Party and demanded a phasing- 
out within the next ten years. The Social Democrats, the Liberal Party and the blue 
collar trade union LO stood for line two. Rune Molin, member of the LO board and 
current industry minister was the spokesman for this line. Michele Micheletti sug­
gests one reason for the existence of not two but three referendum alternatives:
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parties; D.J.l, SAF, and the Federation of Swedish Industry was out of the question. The presence of a 
rather large group of social democratic party sympathizers who were undecided about (or even nega­
tive to) nuclear power quite possibly also promoted the formulation of a third referendum alternative, 
an alternative which made the issue a question of left and right. (Micheletti, 1985: 128)
The majority for the "working-class line" 2 was as small as one can imagine. It 
received 39.1 percent, only .4 percent more than line 3, that was for a fast phasing- 
out. It was the first and, until then, only point in time that nuclear energy had a sup­
portive majority among the Swedish people, when it was politicized (see figure 6-1). 
However, this marginal defeat of the alternative line against nuclear energy had fun­
damental consequences for the anti-nuclear power movement. Within two years, the 
campaign against Nuclear Power lost more than half of its membership and at a 
demonstration against BarsebSck in summer 1982 only 6 000 people participated (in 
contrast to 20 000 before in 1976) (Rubert, 1985). Although environmental issues 
remained important, the fight about nuclear power was settled. At the election in 
1982 only two percent of the voters announced that nuclear energy is the most 
important issue of the election in contrast to the 26 percent of 1979. In 1985, this 
number even decreased to one percent and reached three percent in 1988 (Gilljam 
and Holmberg, 1990: 33). However, environmental issues increased steadily in this 
time from 6 percent in 1979 to 46 percent in 1988. In this context, it is difficult to 
say whether nuclear energy can be subsumed into energy political or environmental 
questions. Nuclear energy was revitalized in 1986, when the Chernobyl accident oc­
curred and at the end of 1989, when the Finance Minister at that time, Kjell-Olof 
Feldt, initiated a debate on the phasing-out plan of nuclear energy. The reorganiza­
tion of the government also shows the problems with nuclear energy today and in 
the foreseeable future. Brigitta Dahl, the environmental minister, was quite deter­
mined that she wanted to begin with the phasing-out in 1995. In 1988, the Swedish 
parliament passed the closing down plan. According to this, two plants are to be 
closed down between 1993 and 1996. However, organized interest groups in Swe­
den mobilize for a new battle on nuclear power. At their congress in September 
1990, the Social Democratic Party postponed the start of the phasing-out plan and 
left more doubts than ever whether Sweden will have phased out of nuclear energy 
in 2010.
As in Sweden, the debate on nuclear energy in Germany started to become contro­
versial in the early 1970s. Unlike Sweden the conflict began outside the established 
channels of politics. This may be one decisive reason why the German new social 
movements appear to be more obvious and more powerful and radical (Roth, 1985; 
Brand, 1985; Rucht, 1990). Anti-nuclear power movements and "citizen initiatives" 
expressed their disagreement by demonstrations and other means. In 1973-1974, 
protests consisted of a few local struggles over planned nuclear reactors. In particu-
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lar, the struggle over the site of Whyl, on the upper Rhine, was significant because a 
peaceful occupation of the site lasted several months. The movement gained sub­
stantial support from the local population and made the conservative county govern­
ment (Landesregierung in Baden Württemberg) uncertain of its energy policy. The 
Wyhl conflict had a signal function for other grass-roots and more conventional 
movements. In particular, engaged scientists and clerical groups played an important 
role in the mobilization of the new social movements in Germany. Protest was not 
only directed against the individual project but rather against the state itself. In parti­
cular, left-oriented groups felt alienated by the government policy of the Social 
Democratic Party [8]. The citizen initiatives were~considered äs the only democratic 
expression of people's opinion by some critical groups. Others, however, saw in the 
trade unions the actor of change. They believed that the unions were more radical 
than the SPD (von Beyme, 1990: 348-360). The local demonstrations gained national 
attention in 1976 and 1977. The anti-nuclear power movement organized several 
demonstrations with thousands of participants. At Brockdorf and Grohnde, two other 
sites of planned nuclear plants ended in direct and violent confrontation with the 
police. The police was prepared to react in a paramilitary fashion (Rucht, 1990) and 
confirmed by doing this the hostile attitudes to state authorities. In 1977, the 
movement mobilized a demonstration against the construction of the fast breeder in 
Kalkar. The police blocked highways to prevent the protesters from gaining access to 
the Kalkar district. _ * . ^  —
At that time within the DGB, there were two task forces which were to coordinate 
the member unions' positions on energy, science and research, and environmental 
questions. The anti-nuclear demonstrations often delayed or obstructed the construc­
tion and production of nuclear power plants and as a result the trade unions, in fear 
of losing jobs, tended to oppose them. In extreme cases, the issue was described as 
a dichotomy between "economy and ecology". In 1976-77 the conflict grew more 
sharply, when employees of the nuclear-power plants and other nuclear enterprises 
organized a pro-nuclear-power demonstration that took place at the same time as an 
anti-nuclear-power demonstration.
The opinion of the unions shifted towards a more critical stance after a meeting at 
the Ministry of Research and Technology (Bürgerdialog Kernenergie) in July 1977.
The DGB demanded a solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal as a precon­
dition for the further development of nuclear energy. This viewpoint was strictly op­
posed to by workers of firms in the nuclear energy and related sectors. In the sum­
mer of 1977, an increasing number of meetings were organized by the work councils 
[91 of these firms. Protest was often directed against critical voices in the Social- 
Liberal government, the Social Democrats and also the DGB. The peak of these
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actions was reached when the central work council of a large electricity company 
(Gesamtbetriebsrat der Vereinigten Elektrizitätswerke Westfalen, VEW) organized a 
congress that the invited boards of several DGB unions did not attend. The OGB posi­
tion was sharply opposed, and even speakers from company management received 
enthusiastic applause while the speaker of the DGB was met with expressions of 
displeasure. In fact, the very organizational existence of the DGB was endangered by 
the controversy over the nuclear energy issue. It seemed for a while that the work 
councils would establish a para-union organization (Grumbach, 1986: 200).
In a DGB meeting held in November 1977, the DGB board tried to unify the polarized 
groups. The official position of the union shifted towards the demands of the work 
councils and a debate on mAtomfilzm (atom nepotism) arose. This debate was initiated 
by an anti-nuclear power faction inside and outside the unions, which accused the 
unions of collaborating with capital (Mez and Wilke, 1977; Hallerbach, 1978). From 
the end of 1977 an organized group against nuclear power also existed in the DGB 
(Aktionskreis Leben) (Brandes, 1978: 205).
In this time, the political parties responded to the movements. The relationship was 
ambiguous. On the one hand, several hearings and meetings were organized that 
dealt with the issues of the new social movements. On the other hand, their was a 
warning that communist groups would undermine the aims of the movements and 
provoke violence. The closeness to the Communist East Germany facilitated stigmati­
zation of left-ideology from the very beginning. As in Sweden the public hearings 
were considered as serving the purpose to supply the audience with information. The 
political elites in both countries believed that the protest against nuclear energy was 
based on misinterpretations of technological facts. Once these misunderstandings 
were solved, the further development of nuclear energy would not be obstructed 
anymore. However, the protest resulted in substantial delays in the construction of 
nuclear power plants. The protest against individual projects had its social roots more 
and more in alternative or counter cultures in the cities of West Germany. In these 
places, the movements established networks and an infra-structure that made it to a 
strong counter force against the established policy makers. New forms of living were 
exercised and local and even national newspapers facilitated the communication and 
dissented alternative interpretations of social events (Huber, 1980; Roth, 1985). At 
the same time, the environmental movement was stabilized through the institutionali* 
zation of alternative projects, scientific institutes (Öko-Institute), election lists and 
finally the Green party.
In April 1979, there was a hearing in Gorleben, where experts gathered to debate 
nuclear energy. This hearing gained enormous public attention, because the reactor
- 166-
accident at Three Mile Island occurred at the same time. Pro-nuclear power experts 
had a difficult stand in this hearing. At the end of March, more than 100 000 people 
gathered for the until then largest demonstration in post-war Germany. At the same 
time a parliamentary expert group (Enquete-Kommission "Zukunftige Kernenergie- 
PoUtik”) met for the first time. The Enquete-Kommission had important impacts on 
German trade unions. The trade unions were represented in this group which, accor­
ding to Grumbach (1986: 217/20) initiated important learning processes. More 
important in general terms was the fact that the group investigated advantages and 
disadvantages of both nuclear and non-nuclear "energy paths". The conclusions, 
although ambiguous, contained the message that a non-nuclear future would be pos­
sible and not be associated with disastrous consequences for the labor market, eco­
nomy and wealth.
In 1979 and 1980, a new protest wave started against the reprocessing plant in 
Wackersdorf, a village in Bavaria. In this demonstration, some trade unionists and 
Social Democrats moved to the side of the critics. After some further demonstrations 
in Bonn (November 1979) and Brokdorf (January 1981), the protest against nuclear 
energy faded. However, the anti-nuclear movement remained alive although other 
ecological and social (e.g. acid rain, middle-range nuclear missiles) problems received 
higher priority. After the change from a social-liberal to a conservative-liberal 
government and the entry of the Green Party into parliament! environmental ~  
questions gained further importance. The counter-culture of the new social 
movements fertilized the ground for a broader eco-consciousness in the Federal 
Republic of Germany as one may conclude from figure 6-2. Against this background, 
the accident of Chernobyl triggered off a substantial re-orientation of the whole 
population that did not halt after the immediate influence of Chernobyl. Although the 
administrations in Germany did not react differently from the Swedish ones (Jahn, 
1988a) [10] contradictory information spread by government authorities led to an 
increasing loss of credibility and the anti-nuclear movement came to live again. Dieter 
Rucht summarizes the effects of Chernobyl:
The nuclear industry and regulatory agencies lost much credibility, the movement was revitalized, and 
new strata, among them many young mothers, joined the movement. Now, the large majority of the 
Social Democrats, the Liberal Party and the trade unions took an anti-nuclear stance. ... Even the con­
servative government, at least rhetorically, now agreed that nuclear power would be viable for a transi­
tory period of only some decades. (Rucht, 1990)
However, even before Chernobyl, the nuclear power program had reached a stale­
mate. No new contracts for nuclear plants were ordered and the rather surprising 
abandonment of the reprocessing plant by the industry for economic cost-benefit 
reasons added to the crisis of the nuclear industry in West Germany. Most significant 
for the decline of the popularity of nuclear energy are also economic crimes and ir-
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regularities with the handling of atomic material in a handful of chemical firms in 
Hanau close to Frankfurt. It seems to be that the social consensus in favor of nuclear 
energy of the 1960s has turned into a social consensus against it in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. However, it is important to note that despite the broad anti- 
nuclear power coalition of the Greens, SPD, FDP, churches, etc., the CDU/FDP coali­
tion government remains firmly pro-nuclear in terms that it supports the further use 
of the existing nuclear power plants during their entire life-spans (Joppke, 1990)
[11]. More important than the protest waves is the different character and strategy 
of anti-nuclear movements in Sweden and Germany.
The Cognitive Elements and Strategies of Environmentalism
The Swedish new social movements have institutionalized the general Swedish politi­
cal culture (Rubert, 1985: 201). They are pragmatic, reformative, consensus-oriented 
and their protest is not so much against public institutions but rather focus on speci­
fic issues. Different from Germany, new social movements in Sweden originated out 
of established interest groups, and so it is no wonder that the anti-nuclear protesters 
organized themselves as public pressure groups. In particular the youth groups of the 
older environmental organizations and political parties were the origin and most often 
also the organizational form of the Swedish new social movements (Flam, 1990; 
Jamison and Eyerman, 1990). In contrast, the German movements originated out of 
groups that are opposed to the state and its institutions in more general terms. The 
student movement and the Außerparlamentarische Opposition (left groups that were 
formed outside the parliament and mainly established in the period of the coalition 
government of the CDU and SPD) were the major roots for the new social 
movements in Germany. In so far, the term grass-roots movements is much more 
applicable to German than Swedish new social movements. The literature on compa­
rative social movement research also stresses the fact of the different state 
responses. The early response of Swedish parties and government incorporated the 
environmental movement at an early stage so that the movement was not able to 
articulate its demands in its own terms. In Sweden in the early 1970s, two parties, 
the bourgeois Center Party and the Communist Party took an anti-nuclear stand. In 
contrast, the Green Party in Germany was needed in the early 1980s as a voice of a 
clear anti-nuclear stance (Rucht, 1990). Most important was the "incorporation pres­
sure" (Jamison and Eyerman, 1990) and political response of the established organi­
zations and in particular the labor movement [12] for the "ideology" of the Swedish 
movement:
More than in other countries, the movement was listened to and allowed to participate in the making of 
energy policy. This meant, however, that environmental movement organizations consciously narrowed
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their focus ... the movement accepted the knowledge perspective and frameworks of the established 
political culture. (Jamison and Eyerman, 1990: 48)
In the 1980s, the authors see an even more growing institutionalization of the envi­
ronmental organizations in Sweden. Instead of generating broader ideological alterna­
tives to the established society, the movements in Sweden spread information and 
worked on a more pragmatic level. To be sure, elements of new politics like decen­
tralization, limits to economic growth, etc. are also alive in the Swedish environmen­
tal movement. But they are subordinated to more technical aspects of individual 
issues. In this the German movements differ fundamentally. The counter-cultural 
milieu was built upon alternative cbsmdporrticaT world-views that challenged the 
established value standards of industrial society and political institutions (Brand, —  
1982: 129-95; Raschke, 1987: 20-26; Offe, 1985c).
The political ideology and socio-political context also determine the political strate­
gies of the movements. Assimilative strategies, such as lobbying, petitioning 
government bodies, influencing public opinion through referendum campaigns, domi­
nate in Sweden, whereas the German anti-nuclear movement applied more confronta­
tional strategies, such as demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience, exemplified by 
occupations of nuclear plant sites and access roads (Kitschelt, 1986: 67-72; Joppke, 
1990). All that results in that the counter culture was a more limited affair in Sweden 
(Jamison and Eyerman, 1990). ~
Trade Unions Response to the Politicization of Production
Trade unions respond to the anti-nuclear protest to a rather different degree. The 
whole work here can be considered as an analysis of the response of trade unions to 
new politics. In this section, however, I wish to stress the response to the more con­
crete nuclear conflict in Sweden and West Germany. As an indicator, we can relate 
the periods of the politicization of production to the amount of publications in the 
trade union newspapers [13). The result based on inspection of table A6-1 and A6- 
17 is that Swedish unions respond much more directly to the politicization of the 
nuclear power issue than the German unions. In particular, the confederations, LO 
and TCO, and Metall responded quite strongly. In the middle field are SKAF, SIF and 
ST. The rest of the Swedish unions still have a high relation between their amount of 
publications and the politicization of production. Only SEF is an union which publica­
tions did not follow the public debate on nuclear energy. German unions responded 
much less directly. Only IGB has a score that comes close to the Swedish unions.
IGD and even the DGB have a rather low correlation between the frequencies of their 
articles and the public debate on nuclear energy. The other DGB unions lie in the 
middle.
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The politicization of the nuclear energy issue can take two different forms. On the 
one hand, the issue can be politicized because of occurrences such as accidents of 
nuclear plants. Examples are the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. On 
the other hand, the issue may be politicized in terms of a (party) political debate. 
Although both forms may correlate strongly with each other, the latter may be 
distinguished from the former. In Sweden for instance, the latter form of politicization 
existed at the 1976 election, the first legislation period of the bourgeois government 
and the referendum. In West Germany«j£he political debate was a major issue in 
1977, 1981, and in the post-Chernobyl period.
For Sweden, we can identify two different patterns along this line. LO unions debate 
nuclear energy more frequently, when it is politicalized in party political terms, while 
TCO unions give more attention to the issue at times of accidents. Most extreme is 
SIF in that. At the 1980 referendum, SIF published hardly more than in the annual 
average. However, this result is less true for the confederations although this trend is 
also clearly identifiable. This result again shows that LO unions are more open to the 
political debate than TCO unions. TCO unions, in turn, respond more strongly to cur­
rent events than taking up the (party) political debate. For the DGB unions, we can­
not make out a similar trend as for the Swedish unions (see tables A6-1 through A6- 
17). _______ _ - -  : -------- -
However, qualitative impacts of the politicization of production on trade unions are 
more important than quantitative responses. This aspect I wish to consider in the 
rest of this chapter.
3. NEW POLITICS AS A CHALLENGE OF TRADE UNION IDEOLOGY 
The preceding sections should have given evidence that the socio-political environ­
ment is rather different for trade unions in Sweden and the Federal Republic of Ger­
many. However, I concentrated only on the politicization of production, although the 
general political climate also favors the policy of pragmatic Social Democracy and 
trade unionism in Sweden while the rather conservative general political climate 
works more against Social Democratic visions of creating a fair society in West Ger­
many (Webber, 1983; Nedelmann, 1986; Hinrichs, 1988). But also the role of new 
politics in relation to the old cleavage structure is different in both countries. A look 
at the party systems in this respect is rather illuminating.
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Political Parties and New Politics in Sweden and West Germany 
A lot has already been said about the opinion of the political parties on nuclear 
energy in both countries. However, in this section, I wish to summarize the stands of 
the political parties, because they are relevant actors for the orientation of trade 
unions. In particular, the role and attitude of the Green and Social Democratic Parties 
has important impacts on the stand of trade unions in both countries. However, a 
first brief look at the political parties may be helpful in order to estimate the ideologi­
cal potentials for new politics in each party system.
The Swedish party system has had a very stable structure since the 1920s (Vedung, 
1988). There are two blocs: the socialist bloc consisting of the Social Democratic 
Party (s: Socialdemoskratiska Arbetarepartiet) and the Communist Party (vpk: Van- 
sterpartiet Kommunisterna) and the bourgeois bloc. The bourgeois bloc consists of 
the conservative party (m: Moderate Samlingspartiet), the Liberal Party {fp: Folks- 
partiet) and the former farmer party, the Center Party (c: Centerpartiet). Since 1981, 
there exists a Green Party (mp: Mil/dpartiet de Grdna) that succeeded in entering into 
the Parliament (Riksdag) for the first time in 1988. With the Green Party, the Swe­
dish party system for the first time in 70 years received a new party into Parliament. 
The Swedish party system is characterized by the predominance of the Social 
Democrats which have governed. sin^jh^m idjji30sonly to have been interrupted 
between 1976 thru 1982. However, even if the Social Democrats could establish a 
hegemony (Heclo and Madsen, 1987), it was almost always dependent on the sup­
port of other parties. This was above all the Center Party from the 1930s until the 
1960s. This "Red-Green Coalition" was the base for the creation of the Swedish wel­
fare state. The Communist Party was also loyal to the Social Democrats when they 
were needed. However, the vpk never participated in a formal coalition with s.
Above all, the strength of the Social Democrats in Sweden is grounded in two pillars. 
First, the Social Democrats were able to mobilize the support of the working-class 
better than in other countries and the Social Democratic reform policy created the 
ground for its re-election (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1985). The other factor for 
the strength of the Social Democratic power is a function of the bourgeois party 
disunity (Castles, 1978). The relative power of the parties can be seen from the data 
of table A6-20 in the appendix.
The post-war German situation is rather a reverse case for Social Democracy. For the 
first time, the Conservative Party (CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union) united all 
center-right forces in Germany and became the first German catch-all party 
(Katzenstein, 1987: 36). The closeness to the Communist world and the support of 
the West-Alliance created an anti-left atmosphere, which put the SPD 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) on the defense from the very beginning.
The Liberal Party (FDP) beside the CSU (the conservative complement of the CDU in 
Bavaria) has been in Parliament since the beginning of the Federal Republic of Ger­
many. The Conservative Party was in power from 1949 thru 1969. The last legisla­
tion in a coalition government with the SPD. From 1969 thru 1982 the SPD and FDP 
formed a government coalition. In 1982, the Liberal Party changed over to a coalition 
with the CDU/CSU which has remained the government for the rest of the analyzed 
period here. In 1983, the Green Party (Die Grunen) changed the stable German party 
system. Its first electoral success was repeated at the general election in 1987. Also 
in state elections (LSnderwahlen) the Greens could enter into the parliaments and 
they are today an additional political force in Germany. About the electoral strength 
of the individual parties consult table A6-21 in the appendix.---------------------------------
In broad terms, there are two political dimensions which are relevant in the context 
of new politics (Vedung, 1980; Cotgrove, 1982: 112-4). On the one hand, the par­
ties differ in their left/right ideology and, on the other hand, there are differences in 
the dimension of new and productionist politics. Although precise measures are 
missing, there are some analytical and empirical works done in both countries.
In Sweden the analysis of the left/right placement has a long tradition (SSrlvik,
1974). Political parties are placed on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). According to 
this measure, recent empirical investigations^(Holmberg, 1989b) come to the fol­
lowing results. Figure 6-3 shows the positions of the six parties which are in the 
Swedish parliament on a left/right scale. Over the last decade, there have been no 
substantial changes with the exception of the Center Party (c) and Liberal Party (fp) 
which changed positions several times and that their was a slight shift to the right of 
the whole party system. However, for our purpose it is sufficient to estimate the 
ideological position in relative terms. For West Germany, I have to rely on data from 
1979 for the SPD, FDP, CDU and CSU (Schmitt, 1987: 113-25).
For both Social Democratic parties, we come to amazingly similar results. The Ger­
man SPD scored 3.6 in 1978/9 and the Swedish (s) 3.4 in 1979 (and 3.8 in 1988 
indicating a shift to the right). We can also see that the Communist party (vpk) 
occupies the left spectrum in Sweden. The Social Democratic Party (s) stands in the 
middle between the vpk and the bourgeois parties. The Miijopartiet de Grona (mp) 
can be placed left of the bourgeois parties but right of the Socialist bloc. The 
left/right placement of delegates of the German Die Grunen differ fundamentally from 
their Swedish counterpart as data from 1985 suggest (Poguntke, 1989a: 329). The 
Green Party in Germany is clearly left of the established political parties. Its mean 
scores 2.5 and comes close to the left score of the self-placement of vpk party elites
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(1.8) in Sweden and differs fundamentally from the score of 4.2 in 1988 for the 
Swedish Greens.
Figure 6-3: The Swedish and West German Political Parties on a Left-Right Scale.
Left Right
vpk s mp cp fp m
0 I ------ +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------1 io
G SPD FPD CDU CSU
Explanations'. Abbreviations are the same as usual except G = Die Grunen.
Already the placement on the left right dimension gives doubts about the similarities 
of the Swedish and German Green Parties as has often been suggested (Poguntke, 
1989a and 1989b; Kitschelt, 1986b and 1988). It seems that the Swedish Green 
party has more of the characteristics of a "pure green reformist party” and the Ger­
man Greens come closer to the "alternative green radical parties" as suggested by 
Ferdinand Muller-Rommel. He points out that green parties may be classified into two 
different types:
• pure green reformist parties that do not reject free economic enterprise. These parties prefer to select 
genuine ecology issues that do not bring them deeply into policy conflict with the established parties 
over the social welfare state and foreign policy. In terms of coalition stands, the reformist greens seek 
an alliance with social democratic parties rather than with radical new left parties. Among these parties 
are the greens in Belgium, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, and France.
- alternative green radical parties that seek fundamental changes in social and political institutions and 
stand for a new alternative, social-radical, democratic paradigm. Most of these parties reject a coalition 
formation with social democrats. Rather, they seek alliances with radical new left parties. Among them 
are the green parties in the Netherlands, West Germany, Luxembourg, and Austria. (1985b: 491).
This has fundamental consequences. In the beginning of the 1980s the German 
Green party was the first possibility for the more radical German left to identify with 
a political party for more than two decades. In Sweden, this was always possible 
within the vpk or even the Social Democrats. The conclusion of Jamison and 
Eyerman is therefore plausible that:
... the Swedish Greens have little of the influence from the new left that has characterized the Green 
parties in some of the other European countries, in particular West Germany. Instead, most new leftists 
who have stayed active in politics have tended to gravitate to the social democrats. (Jamison and 
Eyerman, 1990: 55)
On the productionist/new politics dimension, it is more difficult to find data for the 
German parties. We can take for granted that the Green party is most radical in their 
positive stand on new politics. A study on "new politics in old parties" (Schmitt,
1987) comes to the conclusion that the SPD is most open to new politics among all 
the established parties in West Germany. In particular the "ideological" wing - in
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contrast to the pragmatic "trade union" wing - is most open for new politics con­
cerns. The trend suggested by data from the end of the 1970s may be reinforced by 
recent changes in the party's board. The Liberal FDP is also open for new politics, 
but It is split between "economic liberalism" and "citizen liberalism". Within limits the 
CDU is also open for new politics, but to a lesser degree. The CDU is split between 
more ecological openness of its "social religious" wing and a reluctant "law and 
order" faction. The only party that adopted no elements of new politics is the 
Bavarian CSU. In Sweden we can again make use of the 1988 election study survey. 
On a scale from 0 (no green elements) to 10 (strong green elements) Mikael Gilljam 
and Sdren Holmberg placed the Swedish political parties (see also Bennulf and —  
Holmberg, 1990). The Greens score highest (8.35) followed by vpk (7.06) and c 
(7.01). All these parties can be called the soft parties. They all gained votes in the 
1988 election which has been called the "environmental election” (Bennulf and 
Holmberg, 1990; Esaiasson, 1990). Then there is a gap until the s (5.29) and fp 
(4.36) follows. Relatively non-effected by green concerns is the Conservative Party 
m (2.42) in Sweden. As in Germany, there has been a shift towards environmental 
policy in Sweden. The Swedish Social Democrats also suffer from the split between 
a "trade unionist" wing that gives priority to material security and an "environmental" 
wing which places on ecological issues. In particular, the Environment Minister, 
Brigitta Dahl, stands for the environmental open faction in the Social Democratic 
Party. The recent cabinet change and the integration of the nuclear energy issue into 
the industry ministry may be a compromise that benefits the trade union wing. 
However, the SAP has suffered from fundamental vote losses in particular in strata 
that favor a more eco-conscious policy. It will be interesting to see in which direction 
the Social Democrats will move to in the nearest future. The Prime Minister Ingvar 
Carlsson, similar to the leader of Liberal Party Bengt Westerberg and the leader of the 
Conservative Party Carl Bildt stand for pragmatic technocratic types of leadership, 
attuned to the mass media and enamored by high-tech future.
All in all, there is a clear relation between left and new politics and right and produc­
tions politics 114]. The important difference between the Green Parties in both 
countries is the fact that the German Green Party closed a substantial vacuum within 
the German party system. It could create a distinctive political image as a progressive 
left party, on the one hand, and as an ecological party, on the other. Although the 
established political parties in Sweden failed in terms of their "material-growth" poli­
tics [15] and by doing so produced one major cause for the foundation of the Swe­
dish Green Party, the Swedish Greens had difficulties in occupying a genuine political 
niche in the Swedish party system. The vpk and s filled the left ideological spectrum 
which is so important for the German Greens. The new politics ideology was also 
covered by vpk and c. However, the ecological stand of the left vpk and the 
bourgeois c was subordinated to traditional left and conservative values. Therefore it
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is wrong to conclude that the Center Party would be a postmaterial party (Kitschelt, 
1986b). As Frauke Rubert (1985) points out the ecological policy of vpk and c never 
challenged fundamentally the industrial system. Also in the referendum campaign 
these two established parties harmed the development of grass-roots initiatives 
(Flam, 1990: 49-56) and the Swedish Greens have to compete with these two 
parties:
Figure 6-4: The Swedish and West German Party System on a 
Le ft/R igh t and New/Productionist Politics Dimension
N e w  Potrttcs---------- ---------- '
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... the Environmentalist party was exposed to tough competition on its own home turf, the field of 
ecological concern. That the Center party and, to a lesser extent the Communist party would marshall 
all their strength to fight the threat posed by the 'green* challengers could not have come as a sur­
prise. More astonishing was the strong competition from the Christian Democrats [a small party not 
represented in parliament; D.J.], which in the campaign came out as astute advocates of a clean and 
pristine environment. The Environmentalist party, consequently, had obvious difficulties in finding a 
philosophical niche it could claim as its own. (Vedung, 1988: 106)
This may also be one reason why the Swedish Greens came much later and with less 
electoral support into the Swedish parliament than the German Greens. In 
conclusion: the Swedish Green party stands only on the ecological leg while the 
German Greens have, in addition, a progressive left image.
The situation for the two Social Democratic parties is also different. The Swedish s 
was most of the time in the government and when it failed, it failed to a large degree 
because of a new politics issue. The official policy of the SPD under the chancellor-
ship of Helmut Schmidt was also rather opposed to the new social movements and 
the Green Party. The shift towards a more ecological view was mainly conducted in 
the time when the SPD was in opposition. Needless to say that large parties such as 
the Social Democratic parties in Sweden and West Germany have almost always had 
factions that were from the very beginning more open to environmental concerns. 
Only in recent years, the Swedish Social Democrats attempt to conduct a more con­
vincing environmental policy because of the threat of enormous potential vote losses. 
However, as described above, this revitalizes the old conflicts in particular concer­
ning the nuclear energy issue and it seems that the old politics factionxould gain _
ground at the latest congress of the Social Democratic Party.
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The Green Ideology Challenging Trade Unions
It seems fair to say that the Swedish political environment does not have many 
incentives which may initiate a change within trade unions towards new politics. 
From that point of view, the policy of GF and ST seems to be rather surprising and 
exceptional. The political environment may also explain why the German trade unions 
are much more effected by the new politics. Ecological issues are important in Swe­
den. However, they do not have the character of a counter-culture, but are rather 
managed on the elite level (Bennulf and Hoimberg, 1990). Therefore« environmental 
issues do not create conflicting cleavages to the same extent as in Germany.
The political environment has not only an impact on the formation of Green parties 
but also influences the politics of other political organizations. Green party vote may 
be one indicator for the degree to which the labor movement's ideology competes 
with the new politics ideology. For the Federal Republic of Germany Paul Windolf and 
Joachim Haas conclude:
The new "cleavage* which split the political landscape on the left in West Germany also penetrated 
union membership. The ideological challenge of the "Green’ members is likely to gain momentum in 
the near future. One way or another the unions will have to respond to new demands if they want to 
keep their members. (Windolf and Haas, 1989: 158)
LO has less problems concerning the competitive influence of an alternative ideology, 
because it has a clear political ideology to offer. Fair and equal pay in form of solida- 
ric wage policy is a leading and so far successful political ideology (Meidner and 
Hedborg, 1984; Swenson, 1989). LO can motivate its members not only by effective 
work-place and collective bargaining representation but also by an ideological com­
mitment (Swenson, 1989). One can say that LO is able to fill the room of a political 
ideology. This is not the case for TCO and DGB. Both unions leave an ideological 
vacuum. However, the two organizations deal with it in substantively different ways.
TCO does not offer an independent ideological stand. Either it refers to work-place 
issues in a rather technocratic manner and appeals to individual cost-benefit calcula­
tions or it copies - in a slightly different and less party-ideological profiled way - the 
LO ideology (Nilsson, 1985). TCO may be highly effective in work-place matters, but 
it can not bind its members by means of its own ideology [16]. That may also be one 
answer to the question why TCO comes into trouble when issues leave the technical 
level and get politicized. The ideology of the DGB unions suffers from the hegemony 
of a rather conservative state and legislative constrains of a dual labor market. This 
also leads to it that it can not handle its own tasks as successfully as LO. This, in 
turn, may have reinforced or even created the intra-organizational division as Peter 
Swenson (1989) points out much more elaborately than I can do here. The ideologi­
cal vacuum cannot only be explained as a consequence of corporatist politics 
(Streeck, 1981: 450). If this hypothesis was correct, Swedish unions would have at 
least as many problems with their ideology as German unions. However, as 
Wolfgang Streeck points out correctly DGB unions are challenged by different 
ideologies. The green ideology is just one that competes with pragmatic Social 
Democratic, social-religious, selective work-place (power of work councils), etc. 
ideologies. In sharp contrast to TCO, activist trade unionism in Germany intends to 
be ideological. And the advantage of the Green ideology in the form it has taken in 
Germany may be that it provides an alternative utopia which is attractive for certain 
trade unions. This is not so surprising as Peter Swenson believes when he 
concludes: "Astonishingly, IG Metall moved towards the view that Germany should 
consider bidding "farewell to the growth-society [Abschied von der 
WachstumsgeseHschaft].” (Swenson: 1989: 218) In so far, one can interpret the re­
orientation of some DGB unions towards a more sympathetic relation with Green 
groups as the beginning of the formation of a new alliance between two social 
progressive ideologies. This alliance may be a hope for the German left. Although the 
Swedish left is much stronger out of its own power position and policy outcomes, it 
needs - as many analysts suggest (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Swenson, 1989: 231) - 
new social alliances with elements of the new middle class. Of course, different 
elements of the new middle class lead to different alliances and priorities (Offe, 
1985c). In terms of new and productionist politics, it can be closer to either the one 
or the other side. However, it will be difficult to compromise these two groups of the 
new middle class. In particular when trade unions still wish to maintain the 
compromise with capital only the more productionist oriented middle class is 
available for trade unions.
The results of this chapter may also be interpreted in light of institutionalization and 
resource dependence theory. In this view, the impact of the organizational environ­
ment on the cognitive process of trade union organization becomes relevant. For
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instance the strong energy use of Swedish society can almost be seen as "cultural". 
The ten times higher increase rate of energy requirement In comparison to the 
Federal Republic of Germany over the last 20 years may be just one quantitative 
indicator. Safe energy supply is important in both countries. But the debate in Swe­
den still contains statements of the kind that without nuclear energy Swedish society 
would fall into misery, with high unemployment rates and a low living-standard. This 
way of arguing is rather outmoded in Germany, while it was frequently used in the 
1970s it seemed to have disappeared in the 1980s. In view of the low energy 
increase in Germany, these horror pictures of energy shortages became obsolete. 
These national differences are institutionalized into the views of the argumentation of 
trade unions in both countries. Swedish unions stress more the productionist aspects 
of energy policy, while German unions place less stress on productionist aspects. 
However, this conclusion is only true in relative terms and needs to be modified by 
organizational factors as outlined in the chapters above.
The institutionalization of (energy) world views within trade unions is influenced by 
the socio-political environment. The "alternative” interpretations of an "economic 
growth society” became established in Germany, although it is certainly too much to 
say that they are dominant. The Swedish movements and Green Party dissented 
more technocratic and pragmatic world views which have a lower profile and are 
therefore less powerful as alternatives to the existing productionist ones. One'oT the 
consequences is that the world view expressed by the alternative movement in Swe­
den is less likely to be institutionalized in trade union policy than in Germany. The 
lower level in organization environmental variation (in terms of evolution theory of 
organizations) in Sweden leads to it that alternatives appear to be meaningless or 
even unthinkable (Zucker, 1977 and 1987). The high ideological commitment to 
pragmatic Social Democracy of LO unions may lead to a unresponsiveness to ecolo­
gical issues and values in terms of new politics. At the first look, that may not be so 
important for LO unions because they are buffered from alternative world views 
through their own ideology, character of the membership, and the pragmatic com­
munication procedures. However, it can have an indirect effect. The Swedish labor 
movement is made by the Social Democratic Party and the blue collar trade unions. If 
the party needs to revise their politics, because they want to attract parts of the new 
middle class that favor ecological issues more than the productionist attitudes of 
most trade unionists, the latter could become a substantial obstacle. Although this 
danger seems not to be so presently acute, it can rapidly change when electoral for­
tune fades.
German unions institutionalized alternative world views to a larger degree than most 
of the Swedish unions. However, this was not only promoted by the general values
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in society but also because the Green movement in Germany occupied an ideological 
resource which is valuable for the labor movement in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. This challenge affected trade unions in Germany in a fundamental way.
4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the focus was on the organization environmental impact on trade 
unions' perception of new and productionist politics. Although it turned out that eco­
nomic and energy political factors do not have a very strong direct impact on trade 
union policy (A5); it should be recalled that these factors are very important in the 
argumentation of trade unions. That means that they are indirectly relevant for the 
perception of new politics (B3). However, the debate on nuclear energy is a symbolic 
struggle in industrial society (Gamson, 1988). This struggle seems to be much more 
pronounced in German society than in the Swedish. In particular the different charac­
ters of the new social movements and the Green parties have the strongest organ­
ization environmental impact on trade union policy in both countries.
The results give also some evidence for the interpretation of the tradition of institu­
tionalization and resource dependence theory (B3 and B4). Factions within the trade 
unions were attracted by the non-material values and used the ideological resource 
of the new social movements andfheGreeri party wfthirTthe trade union. Thii 
resource is much more available in Germany than in Sweden where the new politics 
movement is less ideological. German trade unions are challenged by the Green 
ideology, in contrast to Swedish unions. Helpful for the process of institutionalization 
of new politics in German unions was also the fact that the German Social 
Democrats were not in government position. This facilitated the experimenting with 
alternative world-views. In particular, LO and its unions formulated their own ideo­
logy which is based on pragmatic Social Democracy. This ideology is historically 
manifested and takes the form of a "Social Democratic hegemony". The function of 
this closed ideological milieu of Swedish blue collar trade unionism is a relatively un­
responsiveness to ideological trends that do not obey to the logic of the established 
ideology. As a consequence, resource dependence theory contributes much less ex­
planation for LO than for the DGB unions. TCO unions buffer themselves from the 
influence of the organization environment through a non-ideological stand. TCO tends 
therefore much more to symbolic policy. This fact is clearly expressed by the beha­
vior of the TCO trade union newspapers which publish articles in agreement with 
trends in the public opinion which, however, have little to do with congressional 
stands of TCO unions. On the socio political level, we can conclude that the pragma­
tic political culture in Sweden makes it difficult for elements of new politics to be 
adopted (B3b). In contrast, the conflict culture in Germany seems to be more open to
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new politics in the end (B3c). However, German political outcomes are based on con­
flict and different power distribution. This may alter when power relations change. 
Swedish political outcomes are based on consensus. As a consequence, changing 
power distribution do not challenge political outcomes as they do in Germany. As a 
conclusion, we can say that the environmental impacts are essential for the adoption 
of new politics in trade unions but that they are heavily filtered through intra-organi- 
zational factors.
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Footnotes:
1 In 1989, four of the six planned reactors were in operation. The two remaining are still plan­
ned. In 1989, the share of nuclear electricity increased to 34 percent in Germany and almost 4 / per­
cent in Sweden (Hoffman, 1990: 153). For the near future, one expects that Germany will increase the 
share of nuclear energy slightly while the Swedish program will stagnate (Economic commission for 
Europe, 1989).
2 Sdren Holmberg (1989a: 73/4) points out that about two-thirds of the Swedish parliament 
members have expressed their belief that nuclear energy will be phased out in 2010, but around 70 
percent of the population does not believe that the phasing-out plan will be conducted as announced.
3 The correlation between the increase rates of energy requirement and new and productionist 
politics is rather low. It never exceeds r -  .55 (highest values for SEF and ST .55 and .53 respectively) 
and the average of the absolute r is around .27. ft is .21 for DGB and .26 for LO unions. TCO unions 
score higher (.40). SIF and SKTF in the oredicted direction, i.e. the higher the energy requirement the 
more productionist statements, and TCO and ST in the other direction. The correlation is often positive 
indicating that a high energy requirement comes together with a preference of elements of new poli­
tics. Time correlates even higher (average of absolute r *.32). However this is rather different for 
German (.43) and Swedish unions (.24).
4 AH other correlations between the GNP and unemployment rate were rather low in Sweden 
(average of absolute r -  .28 and r -  .18 respectively). The average of the absolute r with consumer 
price increase is .45. K was hkriiect for TCO: r -  -.72; SF: r « -.61; Metail: r -  -.60; SKAF: r » -47; 
ST: r -  -.45; and SEF: r » -.42. The correlation did not increase when talcing the misery index (sum 
of the unemployment rate and inflation) as dependent variable.
5 The average of the absolute r is .27. It is only higher for IGD (-.58) and IGM (-.51). However, 
there is a moderate correlation between the rate of unemployment and the assessment of new and 
productionist politics (average of absolute r -  .40). However, this correlation is positive indicating that 
a high rate of unemployment goes together with a preference of elements of new politics. Since tne 
unemployment rate increased fundamentally in the 1980s when the German unions re-evaluated its po­
litics it is better to conclude that this reorientation was initiated by socio-political than economic 
factors.
6 The same trend is also confirmed by media analysis in West Germany. Hans Mathias Kepplinger 
(1988) points out that the German media shifted from a positive evaluation towards a negative one of 
nuclear energy already in the mid-1970s long before the substantial nuclear accidences happened.
7 More detailed analysis on new social movements and the anti-nuclear movements see for 
instance for Sweden: Nelkin and Poliak, 1977; Rubert, 1985: Sahr, 1985; Ram, 1990; Jamison and 
Everman, 1990. West Germany: Roth, 1985; Brand et al., 1986; Roth and Rucht, 1987; von Oppeln,
1989; Joppke, 1990; Rucht 1990. For a comparison of Sweden and Germany see Kitscheh, 1983 and 
1986a. The conclusions of this section have been taken mainly from the mentioned literature.
8 A case in point may be the introduction of the Radikalenerlaß (a law that did not allow citizens 
that are organized in extreme left or right groups to work in the public sector) by the first Social 
Democratic chancellor Willy Brandt. In practice this law is mainly applied to left ideological individuals 
and much less to people from the right wing.
9 Betriebsräte: worker interest groups in the firms which are not formally affiliated with the 
unions.
10 However, because of the centralized organization of Swedish authorities it could not happen 
that authorities announced contradictory evaluations and recommendations as some county govern­
ments and authorities did in Germany. However, the information itself released by the government was 
also in Sweden contradictory aimed to calm down the population (Anér, 1986).
11 It is also important to consider that this anti-nuclear power coalition is not so coherent as it 
seems from the description. For instance, factions of the SPD are more positive towards nuclear en­
ergy than others. They may also be prepared to compromise the ten-year moratorium scenario of the 
party congress in Nürnberg in 1986. Also the Greens and the anti-nuclear movement may have wings
that are more open for compromises in the question of nuclear energy in the way that they do not sup­
port the immediate phasing-out demand of more radical wings (Joppke, 1990). However, the overall 
picture, particularly in comparison to Sweden, is anti-nuclear in Germany.
12 Jamison and Eyerman stress this fact: ’ Finally - and perhaps most significantly of all - the envi­
ronmental movement, almost from the moment that it first emerged in Sweden, was subject to counter 
attack and incorporation pressures from extremely powerful and well-organized "old” social movements 
of the working-class." (Jamison and Eyerman, 1990: 35). This led to it that the movement seldom 
could take the initiative but rather had to react. The parliamentary and administrative incorporation 
functioned as a constant constrain and demobilization factor during the 1970s. Furthermore, the ideo­
logical response of the left split the movement into several groups.
13 The independent variable has been summarized on an ordinal scale reaching from 1 (no politici­
zation) to 4 (fundamental politicization). The estimations are taken from the reviewed literature in the 
preceding sections. The degree of politicization are the following:
Sweden FRG1973 1 1
12*74 3 11975 3 21976 4 41977 4 4 - 7 --------- . --------- ----------
1978 4 3
1979 4 4
i  i
1 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
4 4
2 3
2 I2 3
14 The figure is deduced from the data and literature mentioned in the text. However, slight modi­
fications have been made. This concerns mainly the German parties since the German survey dates 
from the time of the government coalition of the SPD and FDr. Therefore, the FDP is placed slightly to 
the right of the political middle and not as the data suggest more to the left. The new/productionist po­
litics placement of the German parties is an estimation deduced from the mentioned literature. It is im­
portant to note that parties are not as coherent as the figure may suggest (Schmitt, 1987).
15 The material growth failure of the established parties is described by Evert Vedung:
The material-growth failure of the political system, combined with the failure of the Center 
party to halt nuclear power and the failure to dismiss the issue once and for all in the 1980 
national referendum, created the condition necessary for the emergence of an ardently anti- 
nuclear, anti-growth, proecological, prosmall-scale and decentralist Environmentalist party in 
September 1981. (Vedung, 1988: 99)
16 This impression is easily confirmed by looking at the eye-catching publications to several 
aspects of the working life by TCO and its unions. A comparison of the unions’ headquarters is also il­
luminating. In contrast to the 0GB and LO headquarters, the TCO headquarter reminds more of a 
enterprise of a service organization than of a trade union office. That the physical image of an organi­
zation is an important indicator for organizational behavior has been stressed by Jeffrey Pfeffer (1982: 
chapter eight).
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CONCLUSION
The findings of this investigation are rather surprising in respect to trade unionism 
and the political opportunities for new politics in Sweden and Germany. Although 
scholars of trade union research emphasize the similarity of the trade union systems 
in Sweden and Germany (e.g.: Clegg, 1976; Taylor, 1989; Martin, 1989; Gourevitch, 
et al, 1984; Celia and Treu, 1987), both countries fundamentally differ in their trade 
union policy when, it comes to new politics. Not only is the outcome opposing but 
also the whole self-image of trade unions concerning political questions is different. 
Swedish unions come close to Selig Pertman-s idea-of pfagmatic unionism. German 
unions are much more political in the sense that they debate societal issues within 
the trade union which are not directly connected to the basic union tasks.
The second surprising finding has to do with the political consequences of this inve­
stigation. Although these interpretations are partly speculative, they are supported by 
most recent findings in the field. The responsiveness of the Swedish political system 
to new demands, which some authors connected with a detachment of productionist 
politics (Kitscheit, 1983; 1986a), cannot be confirmed on the organizational level 
when considering trade unions. The hypothesis formulated in the same context that 
institutional structure in Germany was closed must be rejected from the findings of 
my analysis. The consequences of the findings will be discussed in respect to politi­
cal alliances in section two and implication for representative democracy in section 
three. Before, however, I wish to summarize the major variables and their relation to 
each other according to the adoption of elements of new politics by the analyzed 
trade unions.
1. TRADE UNIONS AND NEW POLITICS IN SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY 
The findings of this investigation indicate that it is a difficult process for trade unions 
to adopt elements of new politics. More surprising is that some unions are rather 
open for new politics. This should not be mistaken that trade unions may be at the 
forefront of new politics, but that some unions are somewhat able to open their 
policy to new political demands. By and large Swedish trade unions are not very 
responsive to new politics. Either they favor productionist politics - most common 
among LO unions - or they aim to avoid the issue - most common among TCO unions 
(see also figure 3-1). The only exceptions are the printer union GF from LO and ST 
from TCO. While it is the exception that a Swedish union has adopted elements of 
new politics, many German unions are faced with the new cleavage of new and pro­
ductionist politics. This cleavage, however, reinforces first of all the ideological diffe­
rences between German unions. Representatives of productionist unions in Germany 
are IGC and IGB. However, there are more trade unions in Germany which have
similar attitudes. All other analyzed unions adopted elements of new politics into 
their official policies. Only German unions and GF institutionalized new politics in the 
way that they integrated substantial amounts of new politics and simultaneously 
"unlearnt" productionist politics. These unions are: IGM, IGD, HBV and GEW. 6TV 
and the DGB joined this group only after the reactor accident at Chernobyl. They, as 
does ST, have still productionist world views in their political statements. The adop­
tion of new politics was a lengthy process (proposition B5). In the 1970s between 
most of the "new politics unions" was a dividing line between a productionist leader­
ship and a part of the more critical membership. This dividing line diminished, when 
these unions moved away from productionist politics. However, what are the major 
organizational features of trade unions which adopted elements of new politics?
In order to single out the major important variables I wish to apply the Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) [1]. I included the most important variables into the 
analysis which can be easily measured in a dichotomized form (a condition for QCA) 
and which might have an impact on the adoption of elements of new politics. These 
variables are: membership characteristic, task environment, organizational structure, 
organizational potential, organizational conflict, organizational communication, ideo­
logy, and countries. The result of this analysis is that the eight trade unions which 
adopted elements of new politics can be classified into four types. Three aspects are 
necessary for the adoption of elements of new politics by the analyzed trade unions: 
first, the organizations need to enact elements of new politics, i.e. there must be an 
organizational potential for new politics. Second, the issue must be debated in a 
complex or dialogical manner. Third, the ideology of the trade union must be suppor­
tive for elements of new politics. These three factors are present in all trade unions 
that adopted elements of new politics.
The most frequent type of unions that adopted elements of new politics in addition 
to the necessary features also has the following characteristics: organizational 
conflict and they are German. 63 percent or five cases match this type (note that 
there are multiple classifications). These unions are the DGB, IGM, OTV, HBV, and 
IGD. The next most frequent type (38 percent) has the following characteristics 
(beside the necessary ones): latent membership potential (membership 
characteristic), not organized in the (nuclear) energy sector, and is German. Unions 
that belong into this category are the DGB [2], HBV, and GEW. The third type of 
union that adopted elements of new politics has also a latent membership potential, 
organizes in the energy sector, is not centralized, and experienced intra- 
organizational conflict. Unions in this category are the DGB and ST. Finally there is 
GF that has no membership potential, does not organize in the (nuclear) energy 
sector, is not centralized, has no organizational conflict and is Swedish.
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Another way of presenting a summary of the findings confirms the result that organi­
zational potential, communication and ideology are the decisive variables. This pre­
sentation relies also on the dichotomized variables and shows the percentage value 
to which the relations are confirmed by the analyzed trade unions. For instance, the 
relation between the three necessary variables and the adoption of new politics cor­
responds in 95 percent of the cases (only one case did not match in each instance). 
This strikingly confirms the propositions: B1, B2, and B7. Taking as a threshold value 
75 percent also organizational conflict (B6) and the country is important for the 
adoption of new politics by trade unions [31. For Germany the resource dependence 
proposition (B4) explains a lot. Particularly in connection with the impact of the diffe­
rent institutional environments, proposition B3 is plausible for both countries. In 
contrast, up and downs of the national economies have only little impact on union 
stands on new and productionist politics (A5).
Most surprising is the fact that the character of the membership (A1) matches only in 
about half of the cases. The task environment (energy sector; A4) matches with the 
outcome variable in three-quarters of the cases. However, this relation diminishes to 
57 percent, when we consider unions which adopted new politics. And also the 
organizational structures seem to have little effect on the political outcome (A7), 
although there are some indicators that organlzationat size and structural 
differentiation promote the adoption of new politics (A8). ~~~
However, all variables may not have a direct influence on the adoption of new poli­
tics but may influence and reinforce other variables. Figure 1 aims to summarize 
these relations.
The socio-political environment has an impact on both the union membership and the 
union ideology. The higher the degree of the politicization of production the higher 
the protest potential of union members. This in turn is very much dependent on the 
character of the membership. White collar workers in the public sector are most criti­
cal of the productionist development in society (latent membership potential). All 
unions with this kind of membership experienced a voiced membership protest either 
in their organization or at confederation congresses. On the other hand, the socio­
political environment has an substantial effect on the trade union ideology. However, 
this impact is much stronger in Germany, where Green ideology is a challenge for 
trade union ideology. Swedish blue collar unions are resistant to this challenge, 
because they do not need the resource "ideology” to the same degree as their Ger­
man counterparts. TCO unions buffer their organization through entering 
(organizational potential) and communication filters that aim at non-decision-making
(A6). TCO unions, however, are fundamentally challenged when political issues 
exceed their pragmatic-neutral policy.
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Figure 1.: Major Relationships of Most im portant Variables
Membership
Characteristic Org. Level of 
Conflict
Socio-Political
Environment
Org. Potential 
for New Pol.
Union
Ideology
Org. Level of 
>mmunicatior
Adoption of 
New Politics
Situational
Factors
Exp iên ittons: Major im portant Roi*tion«hip» i, Ç> Minor im portant R oio tionttitpt
Membership characteristics and union ideology have an impact on the organizational 
potential for new politics. The organizational potential, i.e. the degree to which 
nuclear energy is debated in terms of new and productionist politics within the union 
organization, is at its highest in white collar unions and/or above all in activist trade 
unions. Both factors may contradict their impact on the organizational potential for 
new politics. So it happens that unions with a membership potential have no organi­
zational potential because of the union's ideological stand. Examples for this are 
SKTF, SL, and SF. But, as in the case for IGM, IGD, and GF missing membership 
potential is counter-balanced by the union ideology. A strong organizational filter is 
the kind of intra-organizational communication. This intervening variable is closely 
related to union ideology. Activist unions or unions which are also critical of the pro- 
ductionist development of society in other areas allow a complex intra-organizational 
communication, while devoted Social Democratic (LO unions) and non-political trade 
unions (TCO unions) limit their intra-organizational communication to pragmatic 
aspects of an issue. In fact, only TCO is an exception. This exceptional situation oc­
curred through profound membership pressure at the union congress in 1979. How­
ever, TCO was able to limit the union policy again to the basic trade union issues.
In this context, it needs to be mentioned that situations can have a profound impact 
on political outcomes. As Marsh and Olsen (1976) suggest, organizations can be 
"garbage cans” where individual priorities use situations for desired decisions. This is 
in particular true for organizations that have no clearly defined organizational goal. 
Unions with an unclear goal came into trouble when the nuclear power issue was 
politicized, as in the case of the reactor accidents at Three Mile Island and Cherno­
byl. In this sense, the German activist and the Swedish neutral unions both have an 
unclear defined goal. The former because the goal of a trade union is deduced from a 
socially progressive ideology that aims not only to improve the material status of em­
ployees, but also to provide an utopia for a better society. In this perception, trade 
union activity is not limited to work-place issues. However, these goals are not the 
same for all members. One may conclude that the more issues are relevant to union 
policy the higher the probability that the membership is diversified on some of the 
issues. In this situation conflict between different factions arises that may be aired 
through different issues. On the other hand, ideological neutral unions have no refe­
rence point for what they should stand for, if they leave the genuine trade union 
task. Workers' interest is not clearly defined and in a situation of uncertainty, no 
guidelines are available. As the garbage can model suggests, these kinds of organiza­
tions tend to become organized anarchies in which decisions are taken by chance 
and determined by situations. In this view, problems are attached to solutions and 
participants struggle for control over organizational goals. The congresses of TCO 
and ST, about the time of the Three Mile Island accident, the DGB and, to some 
extent, IGD in 1986 are cases in point to illustrate just this. The communication got 
out of hand. Aspects which do not belong to the traditional trade unions policy 
emerged at the congressional decisions. Leadership and procedures were challenged. 
Decisions were influenced by chance. However, the outcome of the decision was 
less clear for German trade unions, because here two intra-union factions are well 
established. They possess more resources and an infra-structure, when problems 
appeal to the solutions of one of these groups. In TCO the intra-organizational pro­
test was not institutionalized. Through its non-political procedures, TCO never esta­
blished politically diverse intra-organizational groups. So when it came to protest in 
TCO, no infra-structure existed to voice deviant opinions in an effective manner. The 
board of TCO was able to overrule the protest and succeeded in limiting union policy 
to non-political aspects. LO, and also SEF, gives evidence for the garbage can argu­
ment from the opposite point of view. Both unions also had their congress approxi­
mately half a year after Chernobyl. Both union organizations did not suffer any fun­
damental intra-organizational conflict. It was even so that new politics arguments
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were hardly mentioned at all in this situation. This shows that these two unions have 
no intra-organizational factions in respect to new politics because their union goal is 
clear.
Intra-organizational conflict is also highly determined by the character of the union 
membership and above all union ideology. Both variables are mediated by the organi­
zational level of communication. With the exception of IGC, no union suffered from 
organizational conflict that applied a pragmatic communication. However, conflict 
must not be disadvantageous for an organization. As Karl Weick (1979: 220/1) 
points out conflict is a mean to remain responsive to organization environmental 
change. ______  _______  _________________________
Another important aspect that influences intra-organizational fragmentation has to do 
with the organization principles of employees. The separation of blue and white collar 
workers into two different organizations has consequences which can be explained 
within organization theory (A2; A3). Through a loose coupling, organizations can be 
sheltered from substantial problems (Thompson, 1967; Perrow, 1986; Weick, 1976). 
In empirical terms, this means that member groups which antagonize issues are 
organized in different organizations. Here again Swedish unions are in a privileged 
position. White and blue collar workers are organized in different confederations and 
in addition they are organized in smaller more coherent units (trade unions). A rough 
indicator for that is the number of trade unions. Except smaller union confederations, 
the DGB organizes its members in 17 (since 1989 16) union organizations. In Swe­
den, LO and TCO alone come to more than 40 individual trade unions and an inclu­
sion of SACO/SR unions brings this number to over 60. According to Charles Perrow 
(1984 and 1986) linear (here: homogeneous membership or pragmatic communica­
tion) and loosely coupled systems are less endangered by disturbances than complex 
and closely coupled systems. This interpretation is also applicable to the differences 
of the degree and status of conflict between new and productionist politics in Swe­
dish and German trade unions. In so far proposition A2 and A3 contribute to the 
understanding of intra-organizational conflict. However, loose coupling of competing 
interests has also consequences for society as a whole. To this point I wish to come 
back in the last section of the conclusion.
Most surprising is the fact that variables deduced from structural contingency theory 
are not as determining as expected. Membership potential (white collar workers in 
non-productive sectors) and the task environment (energy sector) is not essential for 
an union stand on new politics. Three (without the DGB) of the eight unions that 
adopted elements of new politics organize sectors that have to do with (nuclear) 
energy.
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Variables deduced from alternative organization theoretical approaches are more 
essential: organizational potential, communication and ideology are indispensable 
variables for the adoption of new politics. Intra-organizational conflict is also an 
important feature of this process. Only GF and GEW had no intra-organizational con­
flict of those unions which adopted elements of new politics. This leads to the 
conclusion that adopting elements of new politics is a social process.
What do the results have to do with the policy of the labor movement and the deve­
lopment of new politics in both countries?
2. THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL ALLIANCES
As outlined in chapter one, the labor movement may form an alliance either with 
elements of the political right or with elements of new social movements. In both 
groups, the elements of the new middle class are crucial. Gdsta Esping-Andersen 
(1985: 313) stresses that "... the rising new middle strata of white-collar and techni­
cal employees now occupy center stage and will determine whether social 
democracy can renew itself for a new era of mobilization of power.” However, it is 
important to keep in mind that the new middle class is a very heterogeneous group. 
As we could see from figure 1-1 in chapter one, elements of the new middle class 
are present in both social units that might form potential alliances with the labour 
movement. Chapter four strikingly demonstrated that the new middle class is stron­
gly divided concerning their preference of new and productionist politics. This clea­
vage within the new middle class implies fundamental restrictions for class alliances 
for the labor movement. Potential alliances depend on an essential degree on the 
stand the labor movement takes in this respect. In particular the role of trade unions 
are important in this context, since they are by tradition close to material concerns of 
their members. The preference of productionist politics of trade unions may facilitate 
the option to form an alliance with elements of the middle class at the Right. Not 
considering the arch-conservative part of this group, the majority of this new middle 
class segment, which might be a potential alliance partner for the labor movement, is 
devoted to liberal values of competitiveness and individual freedom on the ground of 
productionist politics. In contrast to this possibility, the preference of elements of 
new politics by trade unions opens the possibility to form a new alliance with seg­
ments of the new middle class which are close to values of environmental protection, 
etc. This kind of alliance implies a fundamental challenge to the continuation of the 
established development of industrial society.
The results of this study suggest that the economic growth consensus is not chal­
lenged in a fundamental way in Sweden as it is in Germany. Trade unions in Sweden 
are actors of stability in this respect. They prefer the continuation of quantitative 
economic growth. However, the Social Democratic Party in Sweden has problems in 
keeping its electorate. In consideration of this, it attempts to appeal to members of 
society that favor elements of new politics. This may have spill-over effects on trade 
unions. However, more promising for the Swedish labor movement is an alliance with 
liberal forces. Liberals in Sweden support a lot of elements of the Swedish welfare 
state and go along with the pragmatic Social Democrats which proclaim that an 
increasing economic growth Is necessary for social reforms. An alliance with the 
Liberals would also have the advantage for the Social Democratic Party not to con­
front the productionist policy of the trade union movement. In Germany, the political 
situation is different. The Green ideology challenges the Social Democratic ideology. 
Both ideologies have much in common and therefore an alliance between "red” and 
"green" is within the realm of possibility. As we have seen from the analysis, Ger­
man trade unions are also not an obstacle for a move towards Green politics. How­
ever, this conclusion is only true within limits. Certainly trade unions are not open to 
all kinds of Green politics. But in relative terms, one observes a certain responsive­
ness of German trade unions for a change away from the established economic 
growth policy. However, it is also important to note that there is a substantial oppo­
sition to this kind of policy within the trade unions. The faction of accommodationist 
trade unions in Germany would certainly oppose an alliance with elements of the 
new middle class from the new social movement segment.
The fundamental changes in recent times that happened in connection with the unifi­
cation of West and East Germany certainly enhance the status of productionist poli­
tics. This is so because of the much weaker position of both the SPD and the Greens 
due to the losses in the last national election and the increasing importance of eco­
nomic problems. However, as we could see from the analysis a re-orientation is a 
lengthy and prevailing process. Some of the German trade unions have institutional­
ized elements of new politics. They may remain alive in trade unions. To speculate 
about the future of new politics in Germany is a difficult undertaking in the present 
situation.
3. INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND DEMOCRACY
As has been pointed out in chapter one, relevant political actors such as trade unions 
are responsible for the definition relations in modern society. The mode of interest 
politics of trade unions leads to some critical reflections of the practice of democratic 
procedures. Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis to conclude that the pat­
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tern found in the context of the debate on nuclear energy is also valid for other poli­
tical areas, I wish to elaborate a bit on this point. Swedish trade unions in general 
and the mentioned trade unions in particular are not very keen on debating political 
issues such as nuclear energy that are not immediately related to traditional trade 
union tasks. This becomes strikingly obvious when we compare Swedish with Ger­
man unions. This political pattern is important for national politics in general. As 
mentioned in chapter one, Peter Katzenstein (1985) notes the importance of interest 
organizations in the small European states. This conclusion is in particular true for 
Sweden. Claus Offe (1981) points out that the public status of interest organizations 
may have fundamental consequences for representative democracy. Even when trade 
union representatives point out that an issue like nuclear energy is not a genuine^ob- 
ject for trade union debates, an attitude frequently referred to by Swedish union offi­
cial in interviews, it is highly interesting that this political abstinence does not seem 
to be valid for the elite level of these unions. With the exception of SL and GF, all 
the analyzed Swedish trade unions participated in expert groups and forums that 
define the future of Swedish energy policy (see for instance: LO, 1990: 5; ST, SIF, 
SKTF, 1990; Fabrik et al., 1990). The Swedish way of reaching political consensus 
favors interest organizations that have the resources to participate in the political 
process. Trade unions were always involved in this process. There is not any doubt 
about LO's engagement in energy political questions. After the parliament decision of 
an acceleration of the phasing out plan for Swedish nuclear power plants an expert 
group was created which consists of the prime minister, the energy minister and two 
LO representatives. This group gave guidelines for the future Swedish energy policy 
(SAP ed., 1990). LO again increased its influence on nuclear power, when the issue 
was taken away from the Ministry of Environment and given to the Ministry of Indu­
stry, the appointed minister of which is the deputy of LO.
However, Swedish trade unions, above all those of LO, participate to a fundamental 
degree in politics without being, on the one hand, representative and, on the other, a 
political forum for their members. Decisions and lobbying activities are limited to the 
union elite level. This conclusion is also true for TCO and its unions. Confining them­
selves to pragmatic strategies may strengthen the position of trade union organ­
izations but in the long run they cannot participate in many important political quest­
ions without becoming irresponsible (Offe, 1981; Olson, 1986; Schmitter, 1986; 
Scott, 1987: chapter 12). Participation in national politics demands democratic intra- 
organizational decision making. And that is not the case when debates on important 
issues are not promoted or even obstructed. Trade union's political activity can only 
be accepted, when trade unions are political trade unions otherwise they have to 
take the role as a representative of workers at the firm level.
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The separation of blue and white collar unions reinforces the trend of non-representa­
tive policy making in Sweden. The politically influential LO is sheltered from fragmen­
tation, because TCO integrates most of the heterogeneous groups which favor ele­
ments of new politics. Consequently, LO can go on with its traditional interest policy 
that favors economic and material aspects without paying attention to new needs 
which might emerge in society.
The national differences of the politicization of production and the different character 
of new social movement and the Green parties may be summarized that the Swedish 
political system is more closed than expected from previous investigations. The Ger­
man is more open (rejection of B3a and B3d and confirmation of B3b and B3c). 
However, this is a functional interpretation and not a statical one: the Swedish 
system is in the end closed because it is initially open and the German system is in 
the end open because it is initially closed.
The analysis of trade unions' standpoints towards elements of new politics in Ger­
many and Sweden suggests that the changes in favor of new politics are more likely 
in Germany than in Sweden. This conclusion is in contrast to most analyses in rela­
ted areas of the 1970s and 1980s (Lindberg, 1977; Kitschelt, 1983; 1986a; Sahr, 
1985; Jinicke et al., 1986). However, it confirms the finding of more recent studies 
which notice that changes in environmental policy are not so far reaching as origi­
nally expected in Sweden (Burns, 1985; Vedung, 1988; 1989; Jahn, 1988a;
Eyerman and Jamison, 1990; Ram, 1990; 1991).
We may also conclude from the comparison of the Swedish and German labor 
movements that labor, if left to its own remains in the tradition of industrial society 
(Touraine et al., 1987). The case of Swedish unionism shows that unions do not 
actively promote new politics [4]. However, the German case demonstrates that 
labor may react positively to new politics when there are social impulses for it in 
society.
Footnotes:
1 Ragin (1987; 1991) provides a detailed discussion of the rationale and logic of this method.
Here I only sketch an outline of it. QCA is both analytically formal and causal in orientation. Generating 
inferences is based on data reduction logic rooted in Boolean algebra. It is qualitative since it does not 
use or depend on probability, frequencies, or statistical inference. QCA is case oriented in that each in­
stance is considered in its entirety. For applications of this method see also the special issue of Interna­
tional Journal of Comparative Sociology, XXXII, 1 -2 (1991).
2 The DGB falls in more categories because, as a confederation, it has no organizational characte­
ristics that build upon membership that consists of employees (latent membership, task environment, 
structure). This condition has been coded as "don't care* values. The result is that this variables are 
treated as both values in the dichotomized variables.
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3 For the relations see the following matrix:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101 Lat. M. Pot. - 56 53 47 63 50 56 56 44 562 Task Env. - 60 40 61 56 75 75 63 753 Structure I - 0 53 33 47 47 20 474 Structure II - 47 67 53 53 80 535 Org. Pot. - 74 89 89 74 956 Org. Confl. _ 84 84 79 797 Org. Coran. - 100 74 958 Ideology - 74 959 Country - 7910 Adoptionof New Politics
For the specification and operationalization of the notions see the respective chapters. (1) has been co­
ded 1 if mere is an assumed membership potential, i.e. a substantial amount of white collar members 
in the public sector,etc.; (2) 1 *  not organizing members in the (nuclear) energy sector; (3) Structure I 
is coded 1 when the number of union departments is low in relation to the number of member 
(centralization) and (4) Structure II is coded 1 when the number of union departments is high 
(structural differentiation); (5) 1 -  there is an organizational conflict (6) 1 = there is a high degree of 
intra-organizational potential; (7) 1 = complex communication; (8) 1 -  activist or technically radical; 
(9) 1 « Germany: (10) 1 *  adopting new politics. For the inter-correlation of some similar variables in 
terms of Pearson s r see the appendix (table: conclusion A-1).
4 This does not mean that LO, for instance, is opposing new demands at all, but it will only ac­
cept them if it can fit them into its own outlook and attitudes. It is most likely that LO unions deal with 
new politics issues in a technocratic manner. For instance, the promotion of environmental protection 
and new energy resources is preferred as a high-technology growth industry, and it is unlikely to lead 
to a change from productionist to new politics.
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Appendix 1:
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON TRADE UNIONS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY
In the brief presentation of the research on trade unions and nuclear energy I distinguish between 
studies focusing on West German or Swedish trade unions, on the one hand, and international or 
comparative studies, on the other.
For the research on West German unions, we can distinguish two waves of publications which mainly 
concentrated on the conflict in the context of nuclear energy and trade unions. The literature of the 
first wave, published in the second half of the 1970s attacked the positive stand of West German 
unions on the nuclear energy issue. In particular, their unresponsiveness or even hostile attitudes 
towards the upcoming anti-nudear movements and citizen initiatives, on the one hand, and 
undemocratic intra-organizational procedures in general, on the other, have been in the focus of these 
articles. These articles stress factors such as ideology (industrial values such as nuclear energy as 
progressive productive force), social orientations (towards the Social Democratic Government energy 
enterprises), and the economic situation for the explanation of the positive attitudes towards nuclear 
energy of German trade unions. But these articles also concede that there are differences between the 
German unions: traditional conservative and unions organizing workers in nuclear power plants or 
construction of nuclear plants are more pro-nuclear, while more left unions have a more critical attitude 
towards nuclear energy (1 ]. But also trade unions expressed their opinion in form of articles primarily 
published in the trade unions' newspapers and readers edited by the Ministry of Research and 
Technology [2]. Although the conflict between trade unions and new social movements is mainly 
stressed some authors also point out that both movements are complementary. From the point of view 
of anti-nuclear arguments trade unions are also an emancipating social movement and have therefore 
points of contact with new social movements (Dyllick et al., 1978: 90). Leminsky from the union side 
concedes that the union policy is oriented towards economic aspects at the firm level, and faces 
difficulties as soon as the political debate leaves these areas (Leminsky, 1977: 288).
The first more coherent analysis has been presented by Barbara Klaus and Karl Stiller (1979). They 
compare printed material (member newspaper«, and printed statements) of the Deutschen —  
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), the German Trade Union Federation and five individual unions which 
organize workers in the (nuclear) energy sector: IG Bergbau und Energie (mining, coal, oil production), 
IG Bau Steine Erden (construction of reactors and buildings), IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik (enrichment of 
uranium, reprocessing, storage), IG MetaH (construction of reactors, instruments and fuel fabrication) 
and Gewerkschaft Offentiiche Dienste Transport und Verkehr (energy and special transport
1 In two readers (edited by Mez and Wilke, 1977; Hallerbach, 1978) rather spontaneous remarks 
than scientific analysis dominate. Nevertheless, the arguments in these readers identify conflicting 
dimensions which are still relevant in further analyses: (a) nuclear energy is perceived as a progressive 
productive force, (b) it is in accordance with the energy policy of the social democratic government, (c) 
nuclear power serves economic growth and social and technical progress, and finally (d) increasing 
unemployment makes the employment argument important (Brandes, 1977: 124/5; 1978). The first 
argument has been researched further by X>yllick et al. (1978): trade unions connect the success of 
their policy with the production system of industrial (capitalist) society which has to lead to a conflict 
with groups which oppose the destructive consequences of such a society. This conclusion leads to 
the dichotomy of economy versus ecology. Trade unions are not only ideologically associated with 
industrialist-capitalist society they also favor economic growth policy through personal interest 
networks. However, Brandes makes two further qualifications: (e) he points out the union enterprise 
interests which are to a certain degree dependent on the trade union involvement by co-determination, 
and (f) he describes the different attitudes of the individual unions (Brandes, 1977: 127-132). In 
particular traditional conservative unions (IG Bergbau und Energie, IG Bau-Steine-Erden) and unions 
organizing workers in nuclear power plants (IG Meta/I, IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik, Gewerkschaft 
Offentiiche Dienste Transport und Verkehr) or constructing nuclear power plants {IG Bau Steine Erden) 
are in favor of nuclear energy. Unions which have a critical stand on nuclear power (Gewerkschaft der 
Eisenbahner Deutschlands, IG Druck und Papier, Gewerkschaft Holz und Kunststoff), however, try to 
avoid expressing their view or doing it very moderately.
2 The authors of these articles (Leminsky, 1977; Mehrens, 1978; Pfeiffer, 1978) were convinced 
that economic growth was necessary and nuclear energy was essential to achieve this goal and to 
avoid a shortage of energy in the beginning of the 1980s. The fight against increasing unemployment 
had highest priority. However, the authors rejected an economic growth in quantitative terms of Gross 
National Product increases and preferred qualitative growth. This term, yet a bit unclear, stresses the 
importance of public services, environmental, housing and public traffic improvements, and the 
increase of welfare in developing countries. Above all they emphasize the importance of the 
replacement of the free market mechanism by a structured and steering state intervention. However, 
nuclear energy is also important for qualitative economic growth.
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enterprises). Their conclusions, however, more or less confirm the results mentioned above. They 
conclude that the investigated unions evaluated nuclear power positively, that intra-organizational 
debates took place in IG Metall and Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr, but it 
stopped after a decision in favor of nuclear energy was taken in 1976 and 1975 respectively. Amo 
Klönne in his foreword to Klaus and Stiller's book does not see a change of the pro nuclear energy 
position of trade unions after the reactor accident in Harrisburg. However, it seems to him that there 
might be a "slight correction of course* (Klönne, 1979: IV). In the years after the Harrisburg accident, 
there were a lot of publications concerning different aspects of the issue. It seems that in this time, a 
convergence of standpoints between trade unions and new social movements took place (Eisner and 
G rum bach, 1982; Grumbach 1986: 184).
The second wave of publications took place jnthe mid 1980s. These publications are of book length 
and analyze different aspects of the relationship between trade unions and nuclear energy or 
environmentalism in more detail. Jurgen Grumbach's (1986) interest lies in the question how German 
trade unions can formulate a employees' interest when a (energy) technology is still in the research 
phase. Grumbach concludes that organizational structure functions as a filter of interests that impede 
the perception of new problems or limit it to compatible known areas (25).
In order to operationalize the different aspects of interest in energy research, Grumbach deduces 
dimensions from the evaluative criteria of the Enquete-Committee of the German Bundestag on the 
Future of Nuclear Energy Policy ("Zukünftige Kemenergiepolitik") and above all a "value tree* of the 
DGB (3]. Grumbach analyzes congress material, reports, and trade union membership newspapers [4] 
of the four German "energy unions" IG Bergbau und Energie, IG MetaH, IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik, and 
Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr and presents the results separately for the 
period from 1954 to 1972 and from 1973 to 1984 (5). After an intensive debate on nuclear energy in 
the 1950s, unions seem to have lost interest and in times when crucial decisions are taken the German
3 This "value tree" (Wertbaum) has been deduced from interviews with trade union officials of 
the economic policy department of the DGB executive committee in a research project on Social ~ 
Acceptability CSoziafvertrSgJichkert) of Energy Supply Systems by the nudear research center in JOIich 
(Kemforschungsanlage Jofch) (Kenney et at., 1984). In this protect representatives of several 
organizations (parties, churches, unions, enterprises) have been interviewed. For each organization a so 
called "value tree” has been created in order to follow different paths (twigs and branches) to its 
ideological roots. The priorities have been identified under the heading of societal goals, indispensable 
conditions, and requirements for the energy system. For the unions, the most important aspects have 
been: peace, fuH-emptoyment increasing welfare (societal goals); protection of life and health, 
preservation of the environment, no restriction of democracy, preservation of free-choice options for 
future generations (indispensable conditions); security of supply, adjustability, economic, sufficient 
supply, and fulfillment of requirements for acceptability (requirements for the energy system). These 
dimensions were again divided into 35 sub-dimensions. Grumbach derives from his analysis to the 
following classification:
1) Reference to Energy Policy
2) Influence on Jobs
• in the Energy Sector
- in the whole Economy
3) Economic Political Dimension
- Structural Political Impacts
• Level of Energy Prices
- International Competition
• Status in the System of Social Production
4) Socio-Political Dimension
5) Environment and Security
6) International Dimension
- Reduction of Conflict over Resources
- Prevention of Military Proliferation
7) Security of Trade Union Organization
4 However, Grumbach does not analyze the membership newspapers of the individual unions
since that would not be possible for him because of limited research resources. Instead he 
concentrates on the analysis of Die Quelle (the monthly journal of trade union officials in the DGB), 
Gewarkschaftliche Monatshefte (a scientific and para-scientific monthly journal edited by the DGB), and 
WSI-Mittei/ungen (monthly scientific journal of the Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftltches Institut 
(WSJI, economic research institute run by the DGB; until 1971 Wirtschafts• und Wissenschaftliches 
Institut der Gewerkschaften (WWI) (64/5 and footnote 17).
5 I neglect here the digression on the congressional decision of the Deutschen
Gewerkschaftsbund after the Chernobyl accident because that chapter is only a descriptive appendix 
and does not belong to the actual analysis.
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trade unions were not involved. Therefore decisions appear to unions as unchangeable {SachzwSngeJ. 
With the first oil crisis in 1973, the union debate on nuclear energy started again. Then the different 
dimension showed shifting emphasis and change in evaluation. However, until 1977 the unions 
supported the pro nuclear energy course of the social-liberal government. Later, apart from !G Bergbau 
und Energie which expressed a positive stand on nuclear power, the unions formulated a more critical 
attitude towards nuclear energy. A discoupling of the positive relationship between energy supply and 
economic growth is even expressed. However, protest of the work councils changed the attitude again 
to a pro-nuclear stand. Although unions mainly rely on information of the government and industry, 
Grumbach sees learning effects through the participation in the Enquete-Commission of the Bundestag 
and the establishment of trade union energy experts and departments.
For Sweden, there are only very few studies that analyze the ecological attitudes of trade unions. In 
fact« there is no study addressing this question directly. Only one dissertation (Michele Micheletti, -*
1985) focuses on the debate on nuclear energy in TCO at the turn of the decade (1970/80). However, 
this study focuses on the organizational problems of the Swedish white collar union confederation 
TCO, to formulate a political stand on the nuclear energy issue. Micheletti analyzes in particular the
1979 TCO congress which took place after the reactor accident at Three Miles Island. She takes 
nuclear energy as an example to demonstrate (a) the mode of organizing white cotar interests and (b) 
the form of organized protest against official policies in white collar trade unions. The former aspect 
concentrates on the difficulties in representing white collar workers and the latter focuses, on the one 
hand, on protest within TCO and, on the other hand, on protest from outside TCO, i.e. mainly the 
mass media. Micheletti seeks to illustrate that TCO is not able to take a stand on highly politicalized 
issues. Her conclusion: TCO is - in the light of its internal structure, heterogeneous membership, and 
socio-political environment (blue collar unions and social democratic dominance, fragmented bourgeois 
parties) - not capable of acting politically. Michele Micheletti gives a lot of important empirical insights 
into the decision-making process of TCO on nuclear power which will be used throughout this work in 
order to illustrate the process.
In 1980, Rebecca Logan and Dorothy Nelkin (61 published an article on Labor and Nuclear Power in 
which they analyses trade unions in the United States. They found out that the nuclear issue has 
become a source of tension within the labor movement and that there has never been one consistent — 
opinion on nuclear energy in the trade unions in the USA. The strongest support for nuclear power 
within the AFL-CIO comes from the construction unions: "Construction workers dearfy benefit from 
employment in nudear industry, but they do not themselves face the radiation hazards experienced by 
operation and maintenance workers.* (Logan and Nelkin, 1980: 10/11) However, unions organizing 
workers in the nuclear sector feel the trade-off between safety versus jobs. The authors give quite 
impressive examples of industrial blackmailing and unions' dilemmas. Another interesting result of their 
analysis is that social unions, i.e. unions which have a broader ideology and the aspiration to change 
society towards more equality and justice have a more critical attitude of nudear energy whereas 
business unions which orient their politics at more short time material success support the 
development of nuclear energy. Social unions are also more apt to cooperate with anti-nuclear 
movements while the business unions often form alliances with the management of nuclear power 
plants. Logan and Nelkin conclude:
Yet the tradition of social unionism in the American labor movement demonstrates 
that union behavior is not based solely on economic self-interest: values and "world 
views” often shape policies. It is this persistent ideological thrust in the labor 
movement that creates the potential for a labor alliance with anti-nudear groups and 
gives hope to anti-nuclear activists. (Logan and Nelkin, 1980: 34)
In 1981 a comparative study of all nine EC countries was conducted at the Institute of Future Research 
at Berlin. In this project. Lutz Mez et al. (1981) [7] describe the standpoints of the governments, 
parties, and trade unions towards nuclear power. This thorough report, which has not been widely
6 Dorothy Nelkin published widely in the field of political dedsions and partidpation in the nuclear 
energy debate. In her collaboration witn Susan Fellow (1978) and Michael Poliak (1977; 1980; 1981) 
she compared energy politics in different Western nations.
7 I wish to refer to this report by Mez et al. 1981. This is a bit ambiguous because the report is 
designed as a cumulative report. The first report is dated with 1979. However, the first supplement of 
1981 contains the descriptions of the standpoints of the European trade unions.
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acknowledged (8], contains documents on decisions and debates from the 1950s to 1981. However, 
the report aims to describe and document rather than analyze the conflict on nuclear energy. To my 
knowledge apart from the works by Mez only one article used the data from this project. Michael 
Poliak (1981) who published before with Dorothy Nelkin on the nuclear debate in France, Austria, the 
Netherlands. Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany presents in his article an analysis of the 
debate on nuclear energy in the Western Europe trade unions. He noticed that the new social conflict 
may diversify the unity of trade unions. In particular, when unions participate in broader political areas 
as unions do within the neo-corporative pattern foremost in Scandinavia, Austria, and West Germany, 
they suffer from this conflict. In countries with a strong central union organization and a national 
interest in nuclear power (e.g.' strong own atomic industry, energy dependency from abroad, own 
uranium), trade unions take a positive stand. Furthermore, trade unions in the communist or socialist 
tradition see in nuclear energy a positive productive force whereas unions in the Christian tradition
emphasize negative aspects. In particular at the French unions, Poliak demonstrates_the different__
attitudes of C.G.T. and C.F.D.T. While C.G.T. remainsm the communist tradition and favors nuclear 
energy as long as it builds on French and not American technology, C.F.D.T. has a quite critical 
attitude of nuclear power. Finally, Pofiak also takes the social basis of trade union membership into 
account. Unions organizing white collar workers in the service sector are more critical of nuclear 
energy. Bringing together all these factors, Poliak concludes that unions' unity may suffer since it is 
increasingly impossible to define an objective worker interest. Since the nuclear issue separates 
important parts of the union membership, this conflict reveals cleavages which the unitary trade union 
ought to have overcome (Poflak, 1981: 134-6). In particular, he makes out this conflict in OTV and 
GEW in West German unions.
Heinrich Siegmann (1985) compares the relationship between trade unions and environmental groups 
in the United States and West Germany. His research interest lies in the compatibility of organized 
labor and environmental groups. For his research, he considers five explanations and evaluates them 
on a conflict-cooperation continuum:
(1) The perception of a built-in contradiction between employment and environmental 
protection goals necessitates conflicts between labor and environmentafism; (2) differences in 
demographic and socio-economic composition of the two movements prevent cooperation; (3! 
internal, organizational win formation and decision making processes favor the persistence of 
conflicts; (4) existing political/ institutional features in the two countries prevent increased 
labor-environmentafist cooperation; and (5) cleavages of values, ideologies and world views 
going far beyond those of the first explanation prevent changes of the LER [Labor- 
Environmentalist Relationship, D.J.). These explanations are complementarity rather than 
mutually exclusive ... (Siegmann, 1985: 7)
He rejects the explanation that there is a dichotomy between employment and environmental 
protection. This dichotomy, however, has been important for tension of both movements but the 
conviction that alternative energy production creates jobs rather than destroys them has become 
increasingly common within the labor movements in both countries (40). However, he concedes that 
nuclear power and the necessity of economic growth remains a conflicting issue and can still be 
labeled as a built-in dichotomy between labor and environmentalists (51). Second, Siegmann does not 
find support for "... the contention that economic crises conditions have affected the LER negatively.* 
(65) [9]. However, he finds out an important difference between US and West German unions: the 
cleavage between pro and con environmental attitudes in the former unions is vertical, i.e. along 
industrial sector lines, whereas the latter, despite of unions' differences, is horizontal, i.e. across the 
various unions but dividing the leadership from a good part of the membership (76).
8 Most of the literature on energy policy which has been considered here does not refer to this 
report. This is also true for comparative analysis (e.g. Kitschelt, 1983; 1984; Radkau, 1983; 
Grumbach, 1986; Siegmann, 1985).
9 He postulates two competing economic explanations: first, economic crisis increases the 
importance o f employment arguments whereas good economic conditions give more room for 
environmental concerns for labor unions and a better chance to implement them against the employers 
since unions' bargain power is stronger. Second, the opposite direction is also plausible. Based on 
empirical observations by Logan and Nelkin (1980: 8) there is a higher collaboration between 
management and unions against environmental regulation in times of economic prosperity. This refers 
more to business unions which "sell" this cooperation as a service in order to gain higher wages.
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Although he identifies substantial differences between unions, where white colter unions are more 
open to environmental demands and have a stronger anti-nuclear stand than their blue collar 
counterparts he rejects the hypothesis that demographic and socio-economic differences between trade 
unions and environmentalists result in incompatible attitudes of labor and environmentalists.
For the next explanation, Siegmann considers the internal decision making process at congresses, 
membership newspapers, and for Germany the role of work councils. His hypothesis is that democratic 
unions are more open to environmental demands except in cases where the leaders are already open 
for them. Relying mainly on the work of Klaus and Stiller (1979), he concludes for the German unions 
that the pro-nuclear leadership of the most influential unions controlled all decisions, even when there 
had been controversies at the congresses and in the union press. Furthermore, the strong influence of 
work councils on trade union policy - in particular pro-nuclear power demonstrations in 1977 - results 
in tensions between labor and environmentalists. He concludes: ”... the important consequence to note 
for the LER is that shortcomings of union democracy hindered official labor-environmentalists 
cooperation but fostered unofficial ties involving activist parts of labor. ’ (124).. . ____  _
The distinct political frameworks in the USA and Federal Republic of Germany are significant for the 
Labor-Environmentalist Relationship for Siegmann in his next explanation. In contrast to the USA, 
Siegmann concludes for Germany that unions are integrated into the political system in West Germany. 
They take part in political decisions and support the market economy and social order. The 
homogeneity of unitary trade unionism in Germany [10] has discouraged cooperation with 
environmentalism.
In his last explanation, Siegmann considers the conflict between new and old politics. This dimension 
contributes more explanation of the labor-environmentalist conflict in the Federal Republic of Germany 
than do the left-right patterns (160). Mainly drawing from election results and surveys, he concludes 
that the rise of the Green Party and ’ post material values* has elite challenging consequences. Apart 
from the conflicting values, this makes a lot of the labor-environment conflict since unions belong to 
the elite in West Germany. _ _ _  ___ _____ ________ —_-
The review of literature illuminates important aspect, however, none of them, except the study of 
Heinrich Siegmann, focuses explicitly on the treatment of elements of new politics by trade unions.
The latter analysis, however, does not apply a systematic analytical and methodological approach [11]. 
Probably as a consequence of that no investigations develops analytical and methodological tools for a 
systematic analysis that combines the aspects of the others. In order to come closer to both I wish to 
refer to elements of organization theory. However first I will formulate some broader hypothizes that 
will guide the empirical analysis.
10 Unitary trade unions or Einheitsgewerkschaft is a special feature of post war trade unionism in 
West Germany. The price for this unity is, however, the formal non-partisan stand of trade unions in 
Federal Republic of Germany (see for this term: Markovits, 1986: chapters 1 thru 3).
11 First, Siegmann gives no answer to his own thesis if labor and environmentalists could 
cooperate: "The main question, which this book will address, is whether and under what conditions 
the labor-environmentalist conflicts indeed are inevitable; or whether, and how, the two movements 
COULD cooperate more.” (1) What he suggests in his study is that economic and socio-demographic 
factors do not separate these movements but rather their value orientation and political and 
organizational variables. But what that means for the research question remains unanswered. Second, 
his theoretical framework is inconsistent. In a short theoretical remark, he states that he wants to 
follow an analysis that ”... breaks down vague generalizations into actual mechanisms and weigh the 
importance of one factor against another (not necessarily quantitatively) rather than trying to find one 
explanatory theory." (9) Although this might be possible, Siegmann could not isolate the different 
explanations sufficiently. This is a consequence of some methodological decisions. Siegmann often 
applies one model to the German case and the other to the American without ’ testing one model on 
both countries or to "control" some variables by others. For instance, ideological differences of trade 
unions are only considered in the American unions but not in the German. His comparison of issues, 
countries as well as unions, are not suited to come to the conclusions Siegmann makes. The union 
systems in the USA and Germany are so different that it is difficult to refer the differences of the 
"labor-environmentalist relationship" to the variables mentioned above. The American labor movement 
is also not the best case in point for a representative labor movement. The analyzed unions are 
exclusively unions involved in "polluting sectors" or directly benefiting from it. In order to find out the 
relationship between labor and environmentalism also unions in other sectors are important actors. For 
instance, Micheletti's study shows quite dearly the problems of white collar unions with the nuclear 
energy issue.
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Appendix 2:
A BRIEF POTRAIT OF THE ANALYZED TRADE UNIONS 
Deutscher Gawarkscbaftsbund (DGB)
The DGB organizes the whole spectrum of employees, i.e. white collar workers as well as blue collar 
workers, private and public sector, academics, etc. (11. In 1985 the DGB had 7 719 468 members (21. 
In the analyzed period there was just one change of the union's leader. Heinz-Oskar Vetter was 
chairman of the DGB from 1969 until 1982. He, as his predecessor Ludwig Rosenberg, are ”... both 
clear moderates in the labor movement...” (Markovits, 1986: 20/1). Since 1982 Ernst Breit is the 
leader of the DGB. He was previously head of the Postal Workers' Union. Recently, in 1990, Heinz- 
Werner Meyer from the IGB has become the chairman of the DGB.
The DGB and its member unions are social or political untonslh the“sw3«Thrnhey'iliTi io uuiiiUne the 
societal, economic, social and cultural interests of the employees (DGB, 1987: i  2). The DGB itself 
does not organize any employees but trade union organizations. The DGB obtains 12 percent of the 
fees charged by the member unions from their members. The average density rate of the DGB unions 
lies around 34.7 percent (number of members divided by the number of gainfully employed) in 1985 
(MOIIer-Jentsch, 1989: 68).
However, the DGB can be viewed as a weak confederation in comparison to the large member unions. 
One indicator for that is that the DGB chairman is often recruited from small, less important unions. In 
the post World War II period the strength of the large unions even increased over time (Armingeon, 
1988: 45-48).
IG MetaH (IGM)
The German Metalworkers' Union is the largest single trade union in the Western world. It organizes 2 
553 041 members in different sectors, such as steel industry, car industry, electronic industry, but 
also smaller industries like watch and toy production (Markovits, 1986:158-266; Streeck, 1981). 
Because of its size • it is more than twice as large as the second largest union • and its enormous 
political influence among the DGB unions the IGM hes been included into the analysis. The union 
density of IGM Res over the average of German trade unions by about 55 percent [3]. The union is 
directly involved in the production of reactors and other instruments for the nudear industry but does 
not organize workers in nudear power plants. However, because of historical reasons, IGM organizes 
workers and employees in the HEW {Hamburgerischa EhktrmtStswerke), the energy sector of the city 
of Hamburg that runs nudear power plants. The chairmen of IGM from the beginning 1970s was 
Eugen Loderer (1972 • 1983), Hans Mayr (1983 -1986) and from 1986 Franz SteinkOhler. Franz 
Steinkuhler is a charismatic type of leader and stands for a new trade unionism which opens trade 
unions for ecological issues (IG-Metall, 1989). IGM often takes the leading role in the annual collective 
bargaining and was a rather fighting trade union in the 1960s. IGM quite dearly belongs to the activist 
wing of the trade union movement in West Germany.
1 For more comprehensive overviews of West German unions see for instance: Bergmann et al., 
1976; Bergmann et al., 1977; Brandt et al. 1982; Leminsky and Oho, 1984; Esser, 1982; Markovits, 
1986; Muller-Jentsch, 1986; Armingeon, 1988. An important material collection is Niedenhoff and 
Pege, 1987.
2 In order to compare the number of the membership for all 19 trade unions, the year 1985 has 
been chosen. The data for the DGB unions have been taken from Muller-Jentsch (1989).
3 The membership density refers to the gross density (union members divided by gainfully 
employed persons) in 1985 and the data stem from Armingeon, 1988: table 4.5. For the calculation 
and implication between different gross and nett densities see also MOIIer-Jentsch, 1986: 84-89.1 do 
not go deeper into this debate because the union density should simply give an idea about the 
differences in the organization of employees in West German unions.
Furthermore I refer to arguments mentioned above Streeck, 1981: 43/4 and Markovits, 1986. 
Information about the involvement in the nuclear power industry is taken from Klaus and Stiller, 1979: 
35 and above all from letters of the individual unions of specific questions of the author. The following 
unions did not answer to my letters: LO, SF, GEW, IGC.
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Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr (ÖTV)
The Public Service and Transport Workers' Union is the second largest union in the DGB and its 
membership is constantly increasing. ÖTV is the German trade union that organizes most of the 
workers in the nuclear plants. However, these workers are only a minority among ÖTV's members (in
1987 approximately 5.5 percent work in the public energy sector and around 4.0 percent in the private 
energy sector and nuclear energy sector; ÖTV 1988: 602/3). The major groups organized in ÖTV 
belong to both the municipal and state public sector and the spectrum of occupation ranges from blue 
collar workers, for instance, in the local rubbish collection to administrative personnel in communities 
and state bureaucracies, social occupations in schools and hospitals to university professors. It is by 
no means a speculation to conclude that ÖTV has by far the most heterogeneous membership of all 
considered unions here. ÖTV has 1 168 254 members and a union density of only 24 percent. 
However, the numbers vary substantially among the different industries. The union density is 
fundamentally higher in the energy sector as in other sectors whichÖTV organizes (Bayer et al., 1981; 
Armingeon, 1988). All these are reasons enough to include ÖTV into this investigation. The chairman 
of ÖTV was Heinz Kluncker for 18 years (1964 -1982). Since 1982, the leader of OTV is a woman,
Dr. Monika Wuff-Mathies. ---- —r -
Sometimes OTV tries to get the leadership in the annual collective bargaining. ÖTV's role as an activist 
union is not quite clear. However, in the context of the ’ emergency laws" [4] ÖTV took an activist 
union stand (Markovits, 1986: 98/99; Weischer, 1987: 221-225) and it seems that ÖTV shifted 
towards the activist side in the last two decades (Markovits, 1986: 21).
!G Chemie-Papier-Keramik (IGC)
The Chemical, Paper and Ceramic Workers' Union is the third largest DGB union with 638 176 
members and a density-rate of 57 percent. It organizes blue and white collar workers in the private 
industry. The big chemical enterprises are the main sectors that IGC organizes. Members of IGC work 
in different nuclear sectors within the nuclear fuel cycle, above all in the enrichment process, fuel 
fabrication, reprocessing and the treatment of radioactive waste.
Apart from the industries which IGC organizes, it is very interesting to include this union because of its 
ideological shift from an activist towards an accommodationist union in the 1970s (Markovits, 1986: 
267-326). In particular, the chairman Hermann Rappe (from 1982; before Karl Hauenschild was 
chairman of IGC from 1969) stands for a modernist union policy. IGC tries to attract the highly 
educated technical skilled workers. Economic growth and the modernization of the national economic 
scores among the highest goals of the policy of IGC. IGC is relatively reluctant to include ecological 
politics and the Green Party is often considered as the enemy of Social Democracy and therefore for 
the IGC (Rappe, 1985). However, in contrast to IGB, IGC is an accommodationist union that organizes 
its members in booming industries.
!G Bergbau und Energie (IGB)
The Mineworkers' Union has the highest density (92 percent) of all German unions. However, a big 
amount of its 356 706 members are pensioners. In the IGB, traditional working-class elements are still 
alive, as Wolfgang Streeck puts it (1981: 43). The co-determination is a major ideological conviction 
that has been realized to a large degree in the mining industry. IGB organizes a homogeneous mainly 
male membership. However, IGB suffers from an extreme decline of the coal industry. The chairman of 
IGB was Adolf Schmidt (1969 - 1985). Since 1985 Heinz-Wemer Meyer leads the IGB who is the 
successor of Ernst Breit as DGB chairman in 1990.
The IGB is not directly involved in nuclear energy but is an important union concerning the energy 
sector in Germany. Coal is still an important energy resource in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 
order to settle the conflict of competition between nuclear energy and coal, a so-called "Century 
Contract", Jahrhundertvertrag, of the government has been proposed and is in power until the 1995.
4 The emergency laws, Notstandsgesetze, consist of a package of legislation and constitutional 
amendments which aimed at expanding the government's power in the event of severe internal unrest. 
This issue has often been taken as one indicator for activist and accommodationist unions in Germany 
(Bergmann, et al., 1976; Markovits, 1986; Weischer, 1988).
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In this contract, coal gains subsidies (Kohiepfennig). However, the coal sector is in a deep crisis. 
Challenged by cheaper import coal and the decrease of the oil price, the German coal sector fights for 
its survival.
IGB has been taken into the investigation since it is a traditional working-class union with an 
accommodationist ideology in the energy sector.
/G Druck und Papier (IGD)
The major reason to include the Printers' union into this investigation lies in the fact that IGD belongs 
to the "aristocracy of labor" (Markovits, 1986: 363-414). IGD has 140 725 members and reaches a 
density of 47.6 percent. The IGD has been shaken by the rationalization in the printing industry. The 
chairman of IGD was Leonhard Mahlein (1968 • 1983). tn 1983, Erwin Ferieman took over the 
leadership. In 1989, IGD merged with other smaller unions to /G Median.
IGD has also been taken into the investigation because it is an outspoken activist trade union~with 
communist elements. Because of its long and controversial tradition in German labor history, Andrei 
Markovits and Thomas Ertman conclude: "Although it is one of the DOB'S smallest members, the 
printers' union (IG Druck und Papier) must be included in any comprehensive study of the West 
German trade-union movement." (Markovits, 1986: 363). In so far, this study follows the advice of the 
above mentioned authors.
Gawerkschaft Handei, Bankan und Versicherungen (HBV)
The Commerce, Banking and insurance Workers' Union organizes 371 228 members, most of them are 
white collar employees. As the name suggests HBV organizes workers in three different areas. The 
union density-rate lies only by about 11 percent although it has doubled from the beginning of the 
1970s. The HBV is especially exposed to competition with the DAG. From 1970 to 1980, the 
chairman of HBV was Heinz Vietheer and Gtater \falkmat_wss the leaderof HBV from1980 to198fl. 
As of 1988, Lorenz Schwelger is HBV-chairman.
Ideologically HBV belongs to the activist trade unions. HBV has been taken into the investigation 
because it is a - more or less - pure white collar union in the private sector with an activist trade union 
policy.
Gawerkschaft Erziehung und \Mssenschaft (GEW)
The Education and Science Union organizes teachers and academics in the kindergarten, school, 
university, and other scientific and educational organizations. Since the GEW is organized more 
according to the occupational rather than the industrial system, it stands in direct competition with 
OTV. GEW has 194 028 members and a union density of 25 percent. Its Chairman was Erich Frister 
(1968 - 1981) and Dr. Dieter Wunder (from 1981).
Within the GEW exists a strong Communist wing which often leads to quite radical policies. In 
comparison to OTV, GEW is more radical but also more concerned with academic problems. The GEW 
has been taken into the investigation because it organizes those occupations that is said most likely to 
be open to ecological, green politics.
For Sweden, the selected trade unions are either a member of LO or TCO.
Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO)
In 1985, LO was the confederation for 24 blue collar trade unions (51. In 1985, LO had 2 262 931 
members in the private and public sector. The union density-rate of LO unions lies around 90 percent
5 For more comprehensive overviews of the post war period of Swedish trade union movement 
or the development of LO unions see for instance: Hadenius, 1976; Forsebick, 1977; Lewin, 1980;
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and is the highest in the Western world (Kjellberg, 1983: 278). LO has the right to intervene in the 
collective bargaining of its individual trade unions. Heclo and Madsen (1987: 133) stress the 
importance of the election of Stig Malm as the successor of Gunnar Nilsson (1973-1983) from the 
Metal union for the LO chairman. It was an important policy signal that private sector unions still play 
the leading ideological role in relation to the numerically increasing public sector unions.
Similar to the DGB, LO announces in article 1 of its constitution that it aims to represent the interests 
of the employees in the labor market and economy as well as their participation in the societal 
development on the ground of political, social and economic democracy. The historical development of 
the Swedish labor movement resulted not only in a strengthening of LO in relation to its member 
unions but also increased the power of the reformist and pragmatic wing of the Swedish blue collar 
trade union movement (Elvander, 1983; Martin, 1984; Swenson, 1989). In comparison to the West 
German unions, LO may be considered as a reformistic union in the sense of the accommodationist 
unions. This is only true in terms of the ideological strategy (modernization of the national economy, 
preference of economic growth policy, etc.). The term accommodationist, however, would be quite 
misleading in the Swedish context because LO is - in the very contrast to the German unions • a strong 
trade union which is even able to shape Swedish politics to a great degree. This for instance is true in 
the context of the solidaric wage policy and wage-earner funds. Essential for an understanding of LO's 
policy is its strong interrelation with the Sodatdamokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP), the Social 
Democratic Party.
What has been said here about LO is also valid - by and large - for the LO member unions, since LO is 
quite dominant concerning the ideological leadership over its member unions. However, LO's 
domination above its member unions should not be interpreted as suppression or as conflicting 
competition. LO's strength originates rather from the coherence of its unions. And even if LO 
dominates, it is the large or historically dominant unions that make out LO's power and it is therefore 
also necessary to look at individual LO unions. However, since the influential unions (metal workers' 
union, construction worlcers'union, factory workers' union) may have quite similar attitudes, I shall 
concentrate more on exceptional cases within the *LO family* concerning my thesis. Particularly 
interesting within the LO is the difference between private and public sector unions mainly between 
Metall and SKAF. The relation between both unions is not without tension and has certainly increased 
since 1978 when SKAF by-passed Metall in membership size caused by fundamental shifts towards 
public sector employment in the Swedish labor market (Elvander, 1988: 68/9).
Svanska Mata/findustriarbetarenfdrbundet (Metall)
The Swedish Metall workers' union is the most influential trade union in Sweden, because of the 
historical ideological leadership (Swenson, 1989; Tilton, 1990). With 457 937 members it is the 
second largest LO-union. Metall organizes its members according to the industry union principle. The 
largest sectors are the engineering industry [yerkstadsindustrin) and the metal and steel production in 
the private industry. Its members are involved in the production of reactors for nuclear plants. The 
chairman of Metall was Bert Lundin until 1981 and then Leif Blomberg.
Metall belongs to the more productionist unions although there might be trends of a change in that 
perception (Sandberg, 1984; Riegier, 1987). However, Metall mainly stresses labor market and 
economic aspects and questions of social justice and welfare, i.e. old politics issues. Ecological policy 
does not take a big place in Metall's outlook or is clearly subordinated to economic (growth) aims 
(Svenska Metallindustriarbetarefdrbundet 1989: in particular 34/5).
Svanska Kommuna/arbetarafdrbundet (SKAF)
Since 1978 the Swedish Municipal Workers' Union is the largest LO union with 632 941 members in 
1985. The number of its membership increases strongly with the expansion of the public sector. SKAF 
organizes blue collar workers in the communes and county districts Uandsting) of Sweden, although 
there are also some white collar workers among them. The major occupations organized by SKAF are 
low skilled nurses (virdbitrSdan, underskdterskor, skOtara, virdara, barnskdtara, etc.). SKAF does not
Korpi, 1978; Korpi, 1983; Himmelstrand, 1981; Elvander, 1983; Kjellberg, 1983; Martin, 1984; 
Frediksson and Gunnmo, 1985; Mofin, 1985; Nordin, 1988; Swenson, 1989.
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organize worker« in the nuclear power or energy industry. However, SKAF organizes around 6.000 
employees working for the distribution of electricity and heat in communes and county districts such 
as electricians, mechanics, and repair men. An outstanding feature of SKAF is the very high number of 
female members. The chairmen of SKAF were Bengt Blomdahl (1973-1978), and Sigvard Marjasin 
(1978-1989). Since 1989, a woman is chair-person: Lillemor Arvidsson.
As mentioned above, SKAF as the biggest Swedish trade union today and organizing members in the 
public sector is often in conflict with private sector unions, above all Metall. However, this conflict or 
disagreement between the two unions is mainly based on the conflict caused by the different 
developments of the two sectors rather than ideological differences. On ecological issues, SKAF seems 
to have a more half-hearted attitude. For instance, at its 1988 congress the claim to outline an 
environment political program was rejected.
SKAF is interesting for this investigation because it is the representative' of the increasing public sector 
trade unions in Sweden. However, being a LO union with material attitude but also having a high 
proportion of female members • who have significantly more negative attitudes towards nuclear energy 
than men in Sweden - makes it even more interesting, because one may expect some intra- 
organizational differences within SKAF.
StatsanstSUdas Fdrbund (SF)
The Swedish Union of State Employees is the third largest trade union within LO. It organizes 209 539 
members in the public sector. SF is a very heterogeneous union and is a result of the amalgamation of 
several public sector unions. The intra-union structures of SF still represent the characteristics of the 
original organization. That means that the individual sections within SF are rather independently. SF is 
interesting for this investigation because it organizes workers in the nuclear power plants and - for a 
LO union rather unusual - organizes a large amount of white collar workers (Wheeler, 1975; Visser, 
1989: 190/1). As far as the majority ownership of nuclear power plants lies in the hand of the state SF 
organizes these workers. This has been the major reason to include SF into the investigation. Other 
large enterprises which are organized through SF are the Swedish post railway, and army.
Svenska Ehktrikerfdrbundet (SEF)
The Swedish Electricians' Union organizes electricians in the private industry. Among these 
electricians, some also work in the nuclear power plants of Sydkraft, a private energy enterprise run by 
some South Swedish communes. Nuclear energy in Sweden is partiy run by state enterprises and 
partly by private or semi-private enterprises. In the first case, SF organizes the blue collar workers in 
the second case SEF. SEF is strongly male dominated and has 28 868 members. Sterner Samuelsson 
(1966-1976), Stanley Jftmtsved (1977-1987) and Hans Schoug (from 1988) are the chairmen of SEF.
SEF is interesting for this investigation, since it organizes blue collar workers in the nuclear power 
plants but also because it is a homogeneous blue collar, skilled, male workers' union highly concerned 
with energy policy. This means that SEF may be an ideal case for a materialist union with a deep 
rooted Social Democratic tradition.
Graftska fackfdrbundet (GF)
The Graphic Industry Workers' Union has 47 110 members. GF has been taken into the study because 
printers traditionally belong to the core of trade union 'intellectuals’ or the "aristocracy of labor". 
Printing unions normally have deep roots in the labor movement. However, GF only recently was 
founded (1973) by the merging of several already existing unions in the printing industry. Since then, 
the chairmen are Oile Astrand (1973-1976), Stig Nilsson (1976-1983), Ake Rosenquist (1983-1988), 
and Valter Carlsson (since 1988).
As its German counterpart GF has been heavily hit by the rationalization in the printing industry. 
However, it took a very active step in order to steer the development of the introduction of new 
technologies and by doing so moved quite drastically away from a mere material policy. GF is of 
interest in this study because it allows to compare the differences and similarities between printer 
unions in Sweden and West Germany which have similar traditions and problems.
TjinstemSnnens Centra/organisation (TCO)
The Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO changed its official English name from the 
Swedish Central Organization of Salaried Employees) is the confederation of 21 individual unions [6]. 
TCO organizes 1 108 463 members. The density-rate of TCO unions may lie around 75 percent and is 
the highest among all white collar unions in the Western world (Kjellberg, 1983: 278). The 
membership of TCO strongly increased in numbers during the last decades particularly in the public 
sector. TCO organizes white collar workers in both the private and public sector. In several areas, TCO 
competes with the academic trade unions of SACO/SR. The chairman of TCO is Bjfim Rosengren, 
former chairman of SKTF.
The major difference between LO and TCO and its member unions consists of the officially proclaimed 
party- political neutrality. Although TCO in fact follows a similar policy like LO, it does this less 
ideologically and more pragmatically (Elvander, 1983: 379*83; Nilsson, 1985). TCO's political influence 
is greatest when party-political involvement is at its lowest. Politicized issues are likely to divide and 
weaken TCO. This hypothesis has been formulated by Christopher Wheeler (1975) for the 
supplementary pension dispute and has been confirmed by Michele Micholetti (1985) for the wage 
earner funds and the nuclear energy conflict of the late 1970s. However, Nils Elvander (1983: 382) 
points out that TCO may be more interested in equality questions among the genders than LO, most 
likely an indicator for its character as a white collar worker union in which women are in majority. The 
self-understanding of TCO is that it represents the workers' interest ”... through collective bargaining, 
industrial action, and the public policy process.” (TCO (ed.) 1988: 2). In so far, all the considered 
unions are social unions in the sense that they do not aim exclusively to represent the members' 
interest at the job and labor market but also in more general political terms (in contrast to business 
unions, for instance). Because of the limited influence over its individual unions and its (party) political 
abstinence, TCO can be considered the weakest union confederation of this investigation.
Svenska IndustritjSnstemannafOrbundet (SIR — — -  ------------  -------------------------
The Swedish Union of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry is by far the largest and most 
influential trade union within TCO. In 1985, SIF had 276 800 members. Almost two thirds of SIPs 
members work as white collar workers in the ore-mining and metal, chemical, and construction 
industry, the three largest industries which SIF organizes. In SIF, male white collar workers are dearly 
in the majority. SIF also organizes white collar workers in both the nuclear power plants and in 
industries that produce equipment for the nuclear industry (above all ASEA). Similar to SEF, SIF only 
organizes those white collar workers in nuclear plants owned by private energy enterprises. The 
chairmen of SIF are Sture Lindqvist (1970-1978) and since 1978 Inge Granqvist.
SIF is the enfant terrible in the TCO family. In several situations SIF followed a policy that favored their 
members regardless of the attitude of TCO or other TCO unions (Wheeler, 1975). SIF is by far the 
most important union in TCO and has therefore - beside its involvement in the nuclear energy sector - 
been included into the investigation.
Sveriges KommunaitjSnstemannafdrbund (SKTF)
The Swedish Union of Local Government Officers organizes 166 968 white collar workers in the 
communes and county districts and is the second largest TCO union. SKTF organizes administrative 
personal, engineers, technicians and social workers. By and large, SKTF is the white collar counterpart 
of SKAF. Like SKAF, the vast majority of SKTF's membership is female. SKTF does not organize 
workers in nuclear power plants, however, part of SKTF's membership also works in communal energy 
enterprises. The chairmen of SKAF were Sven Ahlgren (1970-1976), the present TCO chairman Bj6m 
Rosengren (1976-1983), and Sture Nordh (since 1983).
6 The number of TCO unions varies a bit. In 1985. there were 21 unions. However Sveriges 
ArbetsledarefOrbund (SALF) is not a steady member and often changes the total number. For more 
comprehensive overviews on the white collar unions in Sweden see for instance: Nilstein, 1966; 
Wheeler, 1975; Micheletti, 1985; Nilsson, 1985. The data for the TCO unions refer - as for all other 
unions - to 1985 and stem from: TCO 1985 verksamhetsberSttelse.
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The reason to include SKTF is that this union is one of the most influential ones in TCO and the white 
collar counterpart of SKAF. As a white collar union in the public sector, we may expect that SKTF 
faces intra-organizational problems in the context of nuclear power.
StatstjSnstemannafdrbundet (ST)
The Union of Civil Servants organizes 120 989 members in administrative occupations in the state 
sector. Among the largest employers are the state owned telephone company, state authorities, 
universities and high-schools. ST is the third largest TCO union. ST organizes white collar workers in 
nuclear power plants which belong to the state owned energy enterprises (Vattenfaif). Also white collar 
workers in the state owned energy sector (Energiverket) are members of ST. The chairmen were 
Gunnar Petersson (1971-1979) and from 1979 Olle Sdderman. ST is the whrticollar counterpart of” ~ 
SF.
ST is also very influential among the TCO unions. This and the fact that ST organizes workers in the 
nuclear power plants are the reasons why ST has been included into the investigation. Furthermore, 
ST'S membership is very heterogeneous and in many respects the range of its membership is 
comparable with that of OTV.
Sveriges LSrarfdrbund (SL)
The Swedish Union of Teachers has 67 534 members who are mainly employed in public schools on 
the compulsory level. Especially in secondary level education there is a strong competition with the 
teachers' union of SACO/SR. There is also another teacher trade union within TCO Svanska 
FeckJSrarefdrbundet (SFL) or Swedish Union of Specialist Teachers that organizes teachers such as 
professional teachers, kindergarten teachers, sports teachers, etc. In the beginning of 1991 SL and 
SFL merged.
SL has been taken into the analysis because of the same reasons why the GEW has been included. 
Also in Sweden survey data often indicate that teachers belong to those groups that are most open to 
environmental issues.
Beside the selected unions, there may be other unions which are relevant in the context of this 
research. However, all research has its limits and all in all, I believe that the selected unions can be 
legitimated in the way that they are 8 reasonable compromise between theoretical implications, 
representativity, and research and financial resources [7],
7 Beside the unions mentioned above, there are further unions which organize workers in the 
nuclear or related industry (however, not workers in nuclear power plants). Because of limited research 
resources, these unions and other interesting unions could not be taken into the study. For instance, 
the construction workers' unions in both countries would have been interesting cases because they 
gain a lot (jobs for several years) but do not have to bear the burden of dangerous jobs in the sense of 
radioactive pollution etc. As Logan and Nelkin (1980) found out for the USA. these unions are 
especially positive towards nuclear energy. That seems also to be true for West Germany and Sweden. 
The Factoiy workers' union in Sweden would have been an interesting case for the comparison to IGC. 
However, it does not organize workers in the nuclear energy industry as does SEF. Among the TCO 
unions the Sveriges Arbets/edarefOrbund (Swedish Association of Supervisors and Foremen, SALF) 
would have been interesting to analyze because it organizes white collar workers in higher positions * 
also in the (nuclear) energy industry. However, SALF is very difficult to analyze because it is not a 
steady member of the TCO and material was difficult to gamer. Finally, a comparison between LO, 
TCO and SACO/SR would have been interesting as well. SACO/SR also has membership unions which 
organize energineers and teachers - mainly on tne higher and academic level. Therefore SACO/SR 
unions would nave met the analytical implications. However, research resources are limited arid it was 
simply impossible to include more unions. Furthermore, SACO/SR has not a self-understanding of being 
a union that is involved in general politics.
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Appendix 3:
THE LOGIC OF THE CONTENT ANALYSES
Content analysis has some specialities which make them different from other methods in social 
sciences [1]. Klaus Krippendorff (1980) demands explicitness when applying content analysis. This is 
important not only in order to meet certain scientific standards of a replicable data collection and 
analysis but also because of crucial inference from the data to the context:
Whereas all scientific research is motivated by the desire to know or to better understand a 
portion of the real world, a content analysis must show interest in two kinds of reality, the 
reality of the data and the reality of what the researcher wants to know about. In content 
analysis these two realities do not overlap so that the researcher will have to find ways of
regarding tho data ho r_an analyy« as ftymhofir manifAgtatinng y  inffjra tivft nf  fhfL___ __
phenomena of interest. (Krippendorff, 1980: 170)
However, inference never yields absolute certainties (2]. It can be related to different empirical 
phenomena [31.1 am here concerned with the adoption of elements of new politics by trade unions. 
Inference will be made from the content of the text and will be referred to the union organizations [4]. 
For that, I content analyze two kinds of printed material: congress material (motions and debates) and 
trade union membership newspapers. That means ail those congress motions, debates and newspaper 
articles, will be considered that refer to nuclear energy. For the articles, the headline is the deciding 
criterion, whether they are to be included or not. If the headline indicates that the article may contain 
statements on nuclear energy this article will be included.
Some other features of content analysis are quite advantageous for the purpose of my research 
interest. Content analysis is a method which is an unobtrusive technique, it is context sensitive, it 
structures diverse material, and it can cope with large volumes of data (Krippendorff, 1980: 29-31). In 
particular, the latter three aspects are of importance here. The advantage of being context sensitive - 
i.e. data are generated within the original context - Bes in the possibility to identify trends and patterns 
which are not manipulated by the intervention of the nssear^eir or through retrospecttas saase-making 
by an interviewee, for example. Content analysis is relatively explicit in its selective perception of 
reality in contrast to narrative research methods which are difficulty replicable, because they are
1 For that see: Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1985; Merten, 1983; FrOh, 1981; Lisch 
and Kriz, 1978; Rrtsert, 1972 just to mention some texts that either give comprehensive overviews or 
present stimulating and partly provocative insights.
2 This point has also been made by Krippendorff (1980: 99) and is confirmed throughout the 
literature. The main goal of a content analysis is the accurate registration of individual elements in a 
text. In order to obtain this goal a lot of rules and devices are developed and reJiabilfty is the key-word 
of the methodology of content analysis (Berelson, 1952; Holsti, 1969). Kracauer (1952/3) criticized 
the quantitative feature of content analysis but his concept of an alternative qualitative methodology 
was never convincingly realized. Furthermore the dichotomy of quantitative and qualitative content 
analysis caused a lot of confusion and was not very fruitful as most of the newer works on content 
analysis suggest. However, reliability has also been challenged in light of theoretical relevance. Jurgen 
Kriz, for instance, questions the entire concept of reliability Detween coders (Lisch and Kriz, 1978: 8 4- 
105). His argument is that texts are never perceived similarly bv the entire readership and that the 
coding procedure therefore must concede the same freedom. This point is certainly relevant but within 
limits. Most messages which are of interest are not manifest. Interpretation of latent contents of the 
text is necessary which gives room for disagreement. Reliability tests are helpful to control the process 
of data collection and the level of generalization of the findings.
3 For instance, inference can be made to the communicator, the recipient, or the situation and K 
can refer to the text (symbolical content analysis), the content of the text (semantical content 
analysis), or the causes and effects (pragmatical content analysis) (Krippendorff, 1980: 33-48; for a 
typology of content analyses using these elements see: Merten, 1983). The potential use of content 
analysis may be summarized bv the classical formulation by Lasswell, Lemer, and Pool (1952) 
(expanded by Holsti, 1968: 603-607): Who says What, Why (Holsti; D.J), to Whom, How, and with 
what Effect?
4 Krippendorff sees in the analysis of the communication in sotial organizations an important tool 
to make inferences on organizational policy and its consequences: ‘Content analysis of media in 
institutional context can lead to inferences regarding competition of communication modes of 
dominance, which social changes are speeded up or retarded, or how power is distributed in society.” 
And, in reference to the neglecting of issues: ’Within institutional contexts the activity of saying 
something is often more important than what is being said.” (Krippendorff, 1980: 45-47; quoted from: 
47)
-206-
immediately connected to the personality of the researcher. However, the shortcoming here is that a 
lot of latent aspects beyond the scope of the content analysis gets lost. Furthermore, content analysis 
selects the natural text under aspects of theoretical device and constructs an analytical "reality* under 
relatively clear defined criterion. This in combination with the possibility of coping with huge amounts 
of data makes it possible to come to relatively representative results. Patterns, trends, and differences 
between individual research objects can clearly be identified [5].
All major introductions of content analysis and also studies that have applied the evaluation assertion 
analysis (e.g.: Holsti, 1962 and 1969; Deetjen, 1977 and 1986) agree that it has a high degree of 
reliability. However, although I facilitated the method by looking only at evaluation referring to an 
Attitude Object (for the terminology see the text below) directly (the inclusion of indirect evaluation - 
i.e. where AOs takes the place of a common meaning • implies further methodological problems; see 
Lisch and Kriz, 1978: 148/9; Kriz, 1981: 206-246; Merten, 1983: 196) there are extensive coding 
instructions needed. In addition to Osgood's et a!, lengthy instructions, I also developed more specific 
fists in order to increase the reliability. We can conclude that the method is reliable in relative terms but 
cannot claim to be an absolute measure.
The recoding unit is the word or in the terminology of this method the attitude object (AO). In this 
study the attitude objects are several technical or conceptual aspect of nuclear energy. A general index 
reflects a summary of all evaluations. In order to obtain the 0-lndex (Evaluation Intensity) the following 
procedures are necessary:
For this analysis the attitude objects are underfined (red) in the text. In a second step the 
sentences with an evaluation of an attitude object are extracted from the texts and 
transformed in the way that the Attitude Object (AO) is at the beginning of the sentence 
followed by the Connector (C) which connects a common meaning (the evaluation) with the 
Attitude Object, mostly these are the verbs in a sentence. Finally, the Common Meaning (CM) 
is noted. This is an evaluative word or phrase which has a common meaning in the language. 
Since language feeling is necessary this method has been conductedby native speakers. This 
method, although very time costly, is a relatively reliable «vaiuatiwa method which is
acknowledged in social sciences in the field. However, to reduce the effort s o m e -------
simplifications have been applied in this analysis.
For instance the evaluative assertion analysis considers parts of the sentences which mention 
the term nuclear energy (AO) and which implies an evaluative statement. Both the connector 
(c) and common meaning (cm) are evaluated separately between *3 and +3. The stronger the 
connector between AO and cm the higher the value, e.g. is ( + 3), can ( + 2), seems (+1) etc. 
The cm is evaluated according to the positive or negative connotation it implies, e.g. very 
necessary (+ 3), very danoerous (-3), etc. In order to calculate the Evaluation Index (El) the 
relative sum of the common meanings is divided by the absolute sum of the connectors. In 
order to get reliable results the number of evaluative statements should be at least 3. Since a 
low N results in inflationary high evaluations all evaluations with N lower 3 are not allowed to
5 However, in recent years content analysis has been accused of being a method that looks at 
relations of isolated elements rather than grasping meaningful structures of the text (van den Berg and 
van der Veer, 1989). To compensate for mis deficiency, one can look at social discourses or cognitive 
maps of social actors. Van den Berg and van der Veer apply a method that builds on social discourse 
of a labor dispute in the Netherlands by utilizing different "ideal-typical* frames of reference 
(employers' versus employees' viewpoint). In my study an "ideal-typical* dichotomy of arguments that 
go along either with pro- or anti-nuclear attitudes is also applied.
A cognitive map is an aggregate of information which enables actors (individuals, groups, 
organizations, states, etc J to perceive large scale environments beyond the range of immediate 
perception (Axelrod, 1976; Shapiro and Bonham, 1973; Bonham and Shapiro, 1986). This method has 
also been applied to a large degree in organization theory that stands in the tradition of 
ethnomethodological and phenomenological tradition (Bougon et al., 1977; Weick and Bougon, 1986; 
Weick, 1979; Eden and Sims. 1979; Sneldon, 1980; Hedberg, 1981). Also for the analysis of 
environmental and energy policy cognitive maps have been a tool for analysis (Roberts, 1976; Bonham 
et al., 1978; Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978).
Both methods, social discourse and cognitive map approach, attempt to analyze the perception of 
reality by actors as coherent * world views*. The ANPE-lndex aims to grasp tne standpoints on a 
productionist/new politics dimension and may be considered as a measure for cognitive maps in 
respect to new and productionst politics.
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be higher than 1.5. These cases are indicated with * in the text. Osgood et al. describe at 
length how to evaluate the single statements. Nevertheless, a lot of rules must be applied in 
order to handle ambiguous evaluations.
Concerning the dimensional content analysis, Krippendorff points out that reliability increases when the 
categories are formulated in the language which is applied in the analyzed material. In order to meet 
this demand I formulated statements out of the theoretical and empirical literature on the social 
discourse on nudear energy. As much as possible I relied on statements already applied in similar 
content analyses (Asp et al., 1985; Braczyk et al., 1985) which is also a way of getting more reliability 
because statements are already supported by empirical analyses [6]. All statements are available in 
Swedish and German and the analysis has been conducted by native speakers. The recoding unit of 
this analysis is a theme or statement (an utterance that meets the criterion of a statement). Each 
statement has only been coded once in one context unit (article, motion, debate contribution). Similar 
to the evaluative assertion analysis each statement is always connected to an actor who makes the 
statement.
In order to refer the statements to specific actors an actor list is developed. This actor list is 
used for both the identification of the actor who made the statement (Actors) and other 
actors (Object Actors) who are evaluated by the actors. For a detailed analysis actors are, 
furthermore, specified (Actor Specification I) according to different departments or attitudes 
and policies (Actor Specification II). Furthermore, for the evaluation of the object actor an 
evaluation list is available. Figure 1 summarizes the coding possibilities: an actor makes a 
statement on nuclear energy (a) and/or evaluates another actor (b). First, the actor (or 
communicator) is identified (box A; e.g. LO, the Swedish trade union confederation for blue 
collar workers) including his available specification (box B; e.g. the union board). This actor 
expresses her or his opinion towards nudear energy, i.e. makes a statement (box C) [7]. In 
addition, or without making the above statement, the actor may evaluate another (object) 
actor (b and c). For that the evaluated object actor (box 0; e.g. the Social democratic Party) is 
identified with a number of qualifications (boxes E and F; e.g. the party leader and anti 
nudear policy). Finally, the evaluation needs to be noted (c) (box G; e.g. is realistic). The 
statement could look like the following example: 'The LO board warns that a phasing-out of 
nuclear energy today is a waste of natural and economic resources. Therefore, the decision of 
the social democratic party leader to phase out of nudear energy already in the mid 1990s is 
not a realistic way of tackling the problem of saving energy.*
6 In this phase of mv research I received indispensable help from Kent Asp and above all Per 
Hedberg. Both have experiences since more than one decade in conducting content analysis on nudear 
energy in Swedish mass media.
7 The statements were coded, first, according to their pro or con nudear energy tendency. 
Another code was used whether the statement refers to a 'fact’ Us expressions) or an "aim* {should 
expressions). A neutral code was used when the aspects were mentioned but without any evaluation.
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Figure 1: Logical Construction of Coding Instruction
Evidence about the empirical connection between data and the inference from them is important for 
content analysis. Typical sources of contextual knowledge are theories and models about the object 
under investigation. Furthermore, checks can be buBt in that rely on representative interpreters 
(Krippendorff, 1980:171/2). There are two kinds of representative interpreters I have used. First, I 
conducted several interviews with trade union officials and editors of the trade union newspapers. I d* 
interviews which focussed on special aspects which were concerned with the variables included in the 
investigation. For these interviews I applied a check list (Merton and Kendall, 1979). I also conducted 
similar interviews with researchers in the field. Second, I presented preliminary results at international 
conferences and at seminars at Swedish universities (8]. it is this contextual knowledge that enables
8 Presentations at Swedish Universities:
Making it Count: A Research Design For The Analysis of New Politics in Swedish and West German 
Trade Unions. Paper prepared for presentation in the Seminar on 'Comparative Politics* at the 
Department of Political Science, Gothenburg University at the 3rd May 1990.
Trade Unions and New Politics - A Framework for the Analysis of Trade Union Policy. Paper delivered 
at the Sociology Department of the University of Gothenburg, February 7, 1990.
Conference Papers:
Making it Count: Towards an Empirical Assessment of the Institutionalization of Ecological Issues in 
Established Politics, paper prepared for the ECPR-Wqrkshqo Session (European Consortium for Political 
Research) in Bochum (West Germany), 2.- 7. April 1990, in the Workshop on: Methodological Issues in 
the Study of Contemporary Political Activism.
Organizational Dilemmas of Political Trade Unions in Western Europe: An Organization Theoretical 
Analysis of the Debate on Nuclear Energy in Swedish and German Unions. Paper delivered at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in Atlanta, Georgia, USA, August 
1989 in the Section: Political Organizations and Parties.
Trade Unions and the *New* Middle Class: Challenges and Responses. Paper delivered at the JECPR- 
Workshop Session (European Consortium for Political Research) in Paris (France), 10.-1 S. April 1989, 
in the workjmop on: The New Politics and the New Middle Class.
Changes in the Logics of Trade Union Policy? Trade Union Response to the Ecological Challenge. Pape' 
delivered at the ECPR-Workahoo Session (European Consortium for Political Research) in Rimini (Italy)' 
5.-10. April 1 9h6 in tne Workshop on: Policy Change in Perspective.
the researcher to place the data in a suitable context and thus provides a ‘ logical bridge' for making 
inferences.
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Gibt es Soziale Grenzen des technischen Fortschritts als gewerkschaftliches Organisationsproblem? 
Paper delivered at the Congress of the Austrian Sociqlopv'Association in the Workshop on: 'Social 
Borders of Technical Progress' in Graz (Austria), 22.-24. October 1987.
The Greening of the Red? New Social Issues and Trade Unionism. Paper prepared for the protect on: 
'European Perspectives' of the United Nation University (Tokio) at the 'Gothenburg-Worksnop on New 
Social Movements in Europe', Septem ber 13. - 22. 1987 in Stenungsund (Sweden), organized by the 
University of Gothenburg (Department of Peace Research and Human Ecology).
Changes in the Political Culture - Challenging the Trade Union Movement: The Case of Nuclear Power 
in Swedish and German Unions. Paper delivered at the ECPR-Workshop Session (European Consortium 
for Political Research) in Amsterdam (The Netherlands), 9.-1 b. April 198/ in the Workshop on: Culture 
and Politics.
Challenges to the Political Culture in West Germany: Sources and Perspectives, Paper delivered at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in Washington D.C., USA, 28.- 
31. August 1986 (together with Ferdinand Müller-Rommel).
The Determinants of "New* Protest Potential and the Institutional Conditions for open Articulation •
An International Comparative Study. Paper delivered at the ECPR-Workshop Session (European 
Consortium for Political Research) in Göteborg (Sweden), 1.- 6. April 1986 in the Workshop on: 
Dynamics, Strategy and Efficacy of Political Protest.
See also my publications: Jahn, 1988a; 1988b; 1989; 1990a
Appendix: 4
A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY IN SWEDISH 
AND GERMAN TRADE UNIONS
In this appendix I analyze the congressional material of all 19 trade unions during the period of 1970 to 
1989. For the analysis of the material, I will present the content of the motions and congress debates 
under the aspect of their evaluation of nuclear energy, and their statements concerning productionist 
and new politics. The rather detailed and systematic documentation of the individual congresses should 
serve the purpose of clarifying the content of the applied indices which will be used in the more 
aggregated comparative analyses. Some footnotes also contain examples which I consider as especially 
helpful in the illustration of the indices. The analysis which is conducted by means of categories 
deduced from the literature on the discourse of energy policy as described in chapter two focuses on 
the cognitive elements of trade unions. The description of changes and developments over time may be 
an equivalent for more detailed case studies (Weick and Bougon, 1986; Pfeffer, 1985) (1). It is even 
superior to narrative case studies because it reduces the information systematically so that it makes a 
comparison between a larger number of organizations possible. The more formalized procedures also 
serves as a control against biases which the researcher may convey in his research subject when 
analyzing complex material [2]. However, a disadvantage of this method is that some peculiarities of 
the individual unions are neglected. At this point, detailed case studies are better suited.
1. NUCLEAR POWER AT THE CONGRESSES OF THE LO UNIONS.
Having taken a short look at the frequency of the motions dealing with nuclear energy, it leads to the 
result that LO and its five analyzed member unions never paid much attention to the nuclear energy 
issue at their congresses. This may be seen as sharp contrast to LO's political stand on this issue. It 
could be concluded that LO is highly involved in the nuclear energy question on the political level, and 
does have influence on Swedish politics without having much discussion on the organizational level of 
their own unions. Whether these discussions have not been necessary or if they have been 
systematically avoided, cannot be decided here. I would rather consider the congressional treatment of 
nuclear energy under the aspect of my thesis which is the adoption of new politics, on the one hand, 
and the intra-organizational conflict arising because of that on the other.
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Landsorganisationen / Sverige (LO) ---------
LO dealt with nuclear energy in six motions. Two of the motions were proposed at the 1976 congress, 
three in 1981 and one in 1986. The motions of the 1976 congress were proposed by a district branch 
of the TrSmdustrierbeterefOrbundet (Wood Industry Workers'
Union) and a district branch of SEF. The first motion was very critical of nuclear energy (El *  -2.63). It 
demanded that nuclear energy should not be developed before the problems of final waste storage 
have been solved. The second motion, however, was clearly positive about nuclear energy (El *  1.5) 
and stressed that nuclear energy is the only alternative for becoming less dependent on oil imports. 
Both motions agree in so far that nuclear energy should be state controlled or even nationalized.
The first motion had some elements of new politics (ANPE -  8.3) (3). SEF's motion, however, did not 
address questions of new or old politics. The statement over these motions of the LO board [4]
1 However, Karl Weick and also Jeffrey Pfeffer suggest that cognitions of actors in organization 
are analyzed by means of cause! meps. They put causal relationships in the foreground of the analysis.
1 will analyze tne debate on nudear energy with the El- and ANPE-lndices. These indices themselves do 
not reflect explicitly causal relationships. However, as outlined above, the indices, in particular the 
ANPE-lndex, imply causal cognitive relationships.
2 Narrative case studies often make sense of a situation by telling a story. This story, however, is 
heavily biased because the researcher often adjusts deviations so that they fit into the overall 
interpretation. Readers of those narrative case studies have seldom the chance to detect these biases. 
It is particularly difficult to find out whether facts contrasting to the researcher's interpretations are 
considered at all or are simply neglected or omitted. In this context, it is often fatal that the research 
shift focuses in order to make the overall interpretation more plausible. Furthermore this leads to the 
suppression of contradictory facts. As Karl Weick (1979) and Michel Bougon (1983) point out sense- 
making is often retrospective and unless something is attended to, it does not exist.
3 In particular the Wood Workers' union stressed the fact that the worries and fears in the 
general population should be taken into the account; an argument very seldom expressed by LO 
unions: The private energy enterprises have also no understanding at all for the well-grounded womes 
against the further development of nuclear plants.” (De [privata energifdrmedlare; D.J.j har heller ingen 
som heist fdrsttolse fOr mSnniskors berSttigade ridsla fdr en ytterllgare utbyggnad av kimkraftvericenl 
Also the chosen words expressed a quite critical attitude towards nuclear power: ’ We propose that tM
evaluates nuclear energy on a rather neutral basis (El *  0.45). Positive environmental and energy 
political aspects are contrasted with problems of waste storage and costs of nuclear energy. The final 
conclusion, however, was rather positive towards nuclear energy by demanding ”... a continuation of a 
careful development of nuclear energy.'' The board's statement also contained elements of both new 
and old politics. For instance, LO had already pointed out at this time that the costs of nuclear power 
would be rather unpredictable (osSkra faktorer). However, the productionist elements finally dominate 
(ANPE = -4.2). The debate and speeches over these motions and economic policy were in general 
mainly concerned with the demand of the nationalization of energy enterprises and the wage earner 
funds which were at that time hotly debated. Therefore the debate does not add much to our thesis. 
The congress decided to follow the recommendation of the board to approve SEF's motion with the 
exception of the demand of nationalization. The Wood Industry Workers' motion was considered as 
responded to (51. All in all one can conclude from the 1976 congress that productionist politics 
dominated in LO productionist. This is particularty true for the approved motions.
In September 1981, a year after the referendum on nuclear energy in Sweden, there had been three 
motions submitted to the congress and all of them were rejected. The Stockholm district of SF 
proposed a rather negative motion on nuclear energy (El -  -2.66). It stressed the fact that nuclear 
energy would create new dependencies from uranium instead of oil. Furthermore, uranium mining in 
Sweden would increase environmental problems and could endanger a phasing-out of nuclear energy 
because a new industry would have been established by the time when one wants to phase-out. It 
would be difficult to close down this industry. This motion integrated a few elements of new politics 
(ANPE =■= 4.2). The other two motions submitted by local branches of Livsmedalsarbetarefdrbundet 
(Food Workers' Union) and SEF rather mentioned than dealt with nuclear energy. By stressing the 
importance of the availability of cheap energy SEF's motion contained productionist politics elements 
(ANPE = -4.2). The LO board evaluated nuclear energy positively in its statements over the motions 
and also stressed the importance of productionist aspects (El ** 1.33; ANPE -  -4.2) (61. The board 
rejected the demand of the nationalization of energy enterprises. Furthermore, it explicitly supported 
uranium mining in Sweden. The board also supported SEPs motion but recommended to view it as 
responded to. After a debate which did not deeply discuss nuclear energy, the congress accepted the 
boards recommendation to partly reject the motions and to consider parts of the motion as responded
The 1986 congress took place in September, approximately five months after the Chernobyl accident. - 
The motion jointly proposed by local branches of Pappersindustriarbetarefdrbundet (Paper Industry 
Workers' Union), Byggnadsarbetaref6rbundet (Construction Workers' Union), and SEF, the unions 
effected most directly by energy prices or the construction of nuclear plants, stressed the trilemma 
between oil dependency, environmental effects of fossil energy sources and nuclear energy. Striking is 
the fact that the motion did not mention at all security aspects or the reactor accident at Chernobyl. In 
contrast, all alternatives to nuclear energy were seen as hazardous for the environment. Therefore it is 
not surprising that a positive evaluation of nuclear energy dominated (El « 0.92). A phasing-out of 
nuclear energy is considered as 'painful". The weighting of the pros and cons of nuclear energy 
showed a domination of elements of productionist politics (ANPE = -8.3). The unquestioned 
precondition for any energy policy and social welfare would be cheap energy [7]. The motion was
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congress may decide that no new nuclear plant should start its operation before the question of the 
life-dangerous waste has been solved." (Vi föreslär därför att konqressen beslutar att uttala sig fö r... 
att inga nya kärnkraftverk igängsätts förrän man löst frägan med det livshotande avfallet.)
4 The statement of the board was also concerned with another motion on energy policy that did
not consider nuclear energy. Therefore the concern with the analyzed motions and in particular with 
nuclear energy was rather limited.
5 Decision often refers in detail to different aspects of a motion. Here and in what follows I
attempt to summarize the decision for the whole motion. This sometimes turns out to be a bit 
problematic. However, it is necessary in order to obtain a picture of the congressional decisions at all.
6 However, the positive assessment of nuclear energy refers only to the time until the
referendum decided to phase-out of nuclear energy in 20 TO. LO and its unions almost always stress 
the fact that they will keep to this agreement. However, that does not stop them to stress all the 
advantages of nuclear power.
This evaluation of nuclear energy (positive but with the demand to phase-out in 2010) also implied 
some methodological problems since a statement that demands a phasing-out scores negative to 
nuclear energy. This problem has partly been solved in the way that this option received a^ special 
code.
careful in its formulation but attempted to make dear that a shut down of nudear energy in Sweden 
would be out of the question. The LO board's statement over the motion stressed the necessity to 
develop alternative forms of energy and is more critical towards nudear energy than the motion (El *  • 
1.5; ANPE *  4.2). However, the statement remained very much on energy political aspects and does 
not refer to security problems or any other aspect of nudear energy. It stressed to stick to the 
referendum decision to phase-out in 2010 but not before. LO expressed a critical opinion towards 
nudear energy but without revising earlier dedsions. Former dedsions should still be valid. Therefore 
the board suggested to consider the demands of the motion as responded to. In the following debate 
four out of five contributions evaluated nuclear energy negatively but stressed rather weakly aspects of 
new politics. Two speakers from Metall were rather critical about nuclear energy as were all other 
speeches made by LO officials among them a contribution by Rune Molin, later industry minister in the 
Sodal Democratic government. The only contribution giving a slightly positive impression concerning 
his judgement of a phasing-out was from Ame Angetof, a LO official. By summing up all elements of 
productionist and new politics of all debate contributions, we come to a MP of 20.8 and a NP of 20.8, 
resulting in a balance of both elements. However, the 'openness* to new politics is mainly based on 
the fact that alternative energy resources were accepted and should be developed. The statements did 
not refer to aspects that may imply a change of the economic growth and centralized policy. This will 
also be expressed in later discussions on the further exploitation of water power in Sweden. As an 
alternative to nuclear energy it is often suggested that Sweden should exploit its last untouched rivers 
in the north. This argument which is not only common for trade unions suggests to replace one big- 
scale technology by another and can only be interpreted as a continuation of productionist politics.
All in all the debate on nuclear energy at the LO congresses focuses on technical or economic aspects 
and is not concerbed with political or societal ones. The issue never fundamentally divides the 
congress members. However, there are some critical voices from unions that are not immediately 
affected by nudear energy (with the exception of SR. However, the energy unions clearly express a 
positive assessment of nudear energy. They also stress aspects of productionist politics. SEF is the 
union that of all three considered congresses stands behind productionist politics. LO also quite clearly 
supports the side of productionist politics. After Chernobyl, LO is careful not to change politics. 
Although some very critical statements about nuclear energy were expressed by important members of 
LO, no congressional stand has been taken that could commit LO to any policy. The exception is the 
commitment to the referendum decision. However, in light of Chernobyl the referendum decision 
serves - again - as a good excuse to postpone fundamental decisions into the future (or into non-public 
expert groups). In the next sections, I wish to look in more detail at the congressional dedsions of 
some of LO's member unions, in order to obtain a more detailed picture of processes of the adoption 
of new politics in LO unions.
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Svanska ElektrikarfOrbundet (SER
SEF held its congresses shortly before the LO congresses during the same years. There was one 
motion submitted in 1976, two in 1981, and one in 1986. All motions that deal with nudear energy 
evaluated it positively and contained mainly technical and energy political information.
The 1976 motion stated that nuclear energy is the only realistic alternative to oil. However, the motion 
pointed out that exaggerated security demands by a 'vociferous opposition” would obstruct further 
development. Conserving of energy was closely connected to negative employment effects (8]. With 
statements of this kind, the motion was stressing productionist politics (ANPE -  -8.3). All very short 
contributions to the debate on the motion spoke in favor of it as did the statement of the board. The 
board of SEF stressed the importance of state influence in the energy sector. Also its evaluation of
7 The following sentence may give a good example for LO's ‘ causal map”: 'Cheap energy is an 
important precondition for national competition as it is a precondition for higher productivity and 
therefore also for high welfare”. (Billig energi ir  en viktig konkurrensfdrutsfittning liksom en 
fdrutsJttning fdr den hdga produktiviteten och dflrmed for en hdg vfilfSrd.)
8 The two following examples should illustrate the material and determined attitude of SEF: 
"Nuclear power is the alternative to oil which seems to be most realistic today. But here the 
development is obstructed by a vociferous opposition and security demands which lack any parallel. 
(KSrnkraften ir  det altemativ till oljan som i dagslioet verkar vara mest realistiskt men hir begrSnsas 
utbyggnaden av en hdgljudd opposition och krav pi sdkerhet som saknar motstycke.) SEF also pointed 
out tnat saving energy would nave bad consequences: ‘ Another alternative for a decrease of oil 
imports is to decrease the energy use which, on the other hand, cannot be done without effects on 
employment”. (Ett annat altemativ fdr att s£nka oijeimporten dr att minska energifdrbrukningen, vilket a 
andra sidan ej kan ske utan Aterverkningar ffir sysselsattningen.)
nuclear energy was clearly positive (El = 2.0). SEF exclusively considered technical, energy political, 
labor market, and left ideological aspects when debating nuclear energy. Security and environmental or 
even political and social aspects were beyond the perception of SEF.
The 1981 congress did not change this positive picture of nuclear energy either (El = 1.0 and 1.5 
respectively). Both motions only stressed energy political, economic, and left ideological aspects and 
neglected all others. A short remark of the SEF board supported the motions. The board also expressed 
its support of the referendum decision. The debate contained six contribution all except one were in 
favor of nuclear energy and the proposed motions. If the contributions contained statements of 
productionist or new politics elements at all, they tended to be in favor of the former. The contribution 
that evaluated nuclear energy negatively (El = -1.5*) stressed the fact that nuclear energy would 
create new dependencies that would make a later phasing-out difficult. However, this debate 
contribution was short and not very specific. As the 1976 motion both motions were approved of by 
the congress.
At the 1986 congress one motion was proposed which was concerned with nuclear power. The 
motions confirmed the referendum decision that nuclear energy should be phased out in 2010. 
However, it stresses that it is important for Sweden as an industrial society to have cheap, safe, and 
environmental friendly energy. This motion even if rather moderate in its evaluation of nuclear energy, 
is quite clearly in favor of productionist politics (El *  .40*; ANPE -  -8.3). The congress also followed 
this time the board's suggestion that the motion should be approved and all of the debate contributions 
supported the motion. It was stressed that nuclear energy would have no alternative. In particular, the 
debate contributions emphasized the positive environmental effects of Swedish nuclear energy. A 
phasing-out of nuclear energy before 2010 would have negative economic, employment, and 
environmental effects. In particular it was expressed that Swedish nuclear plants are completely safe 
although it was acknowledged that the worries of parts of the population would be justified. However, 
all in all the contributions were rather positive towards nuclear energy (mean of El = 1.05) and 
contained a substantial amount of productionist politics (mean of ANPE = -2.8).
At the SEF congress of 1986 the motion also stressed productionist politics elements. The statements 
were limited to the energy political and economic areas. In the debate, productionist aspects dominated 
as well. However, shortly after Chernobyl SEF also referred to safety, environmental, and even social 
aspects. However, pragmatic arguments still dominated approximately two-thirds of all the statements 
consisted of pragmatic arguments. It was particularly common to place emphasis on the fact that 
nuclear energy has more positive effects on the environment than do fossil fuels. In SEF's opinion, 
however, the development of waterpower in the north of Sweden would be the best alternative to 
nuclear power.
Over the considered time SEF did not change its productionist perception of energy policy. This often 
goes along with a positive evaluation of nuclear energy but is also valid when the congress shortly 
after Chernobyl is a bit more critical of this technology. SEF prefers a large-scale energy production, 
preferably with nuclear energy. However, if this is not possible anymore after the phasing-out in 2010, 
SEF will promote a large-scale production with water power, etc. Throughout the years, all motions 
exclusively stressed pragmatic and left ideological categories. That Swedish economy needs cheap 
energy is the precondition for all decisions concerning energy politics. A unique characteristic of SEF's 
motions is the emphasis on state intervention and nationalization. With that SEF is a clearly leftish 
trade union. However, in terms of new and productionist politics, SEF gives no reason to doubt that a 
productionist development would be the only possible and feasible energy policy for Sweden.
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Svenska MetaHindustriarbetarefdrbundet (Metall)
At the last four congresses Metall dealt with nuclear energy. First at the congress in 1977, a motion 
submitted by a north Swedish district of Metall (Umed) demanded to take the initiative to debate 
nuclear energy in both society as a whole and in Metall. The board of Metall dealt with this motion in 
the context of several other motions so that it is impossible to refer the statements to this particular 
motion. However, nuclear energy played no role in the board's statement. The congress followed the 
recommendation of the board and considered the motion as responded to. There were no evaluations 
or statements that could be taken as an indicator for productionist or new politics.
At the 1981 congress, two motions were proposed which evaluated nuclear energy rather differently 
(El -  1.5* and -1.5* respectively). In particular the motion that was proposed by two members from
Sandviken, a town rather dose to a nudear power plant (Forsmark), evaluated nudear energy 
negatively and also contained some elements of new politics (ANPE *  8.3). The motion demanded 
that Metall should work on a phasing-out plan. The motion stated that the lack of such a plan could 
endanger the whole phasing-out idea and that the money used for nuclear energy would be better 
spent for alternative energy resources. The other motion proposed by the same district only mentioned 
that after the referendum the debate on nuclear energy had diminished and that it would now be 
possible to decrease the oil consumption through nuclear energy for a certain time. The board's 
statement dealt again with these motions in the broader context of other motions so that no evaluation 
of nudear energy can be identified in it. However, the board recommended to the congress to consider 
both motions as answered. No debate on these motions took place at the Metall congress in 1981.
The motions and the board's statement concentrated exclusively on energy political, economic and left 
ideological aspects. In so far, Metall debated nuclear energy at its congress in the same fashion as 
SEF. In sharp contrast to SEF, however, is the fact that two different attitudes concerning nuclear 
energy were voiced. Whether or not this also indicates a disagreement on productiontst and new 
politics remains undear. The mentioned objections to nudear energy fit into the categories of new 
politics.
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At the congress in 1985, two motions were again submitted to the congress that evaluated nudear 
energy very differently. One motion, submitted by the local districts of Norrkdping and Motaia 
demanded a phasing-out of the nudear power station at Barsebick as fast as possible. BarseMck is a 
very controversial nudear site situated just thirty kilometers from Copenhagen, the Danish capital. 
Furthermore the motion noted that Sweden would have a energy surplus after having started the 
operation of two new reactors (Forsmark III and Oskarshamn III). This energy surplus would lead to the 
fact that new energy technologies would not be tried out. This negative evaluation of nuclear energy 
(El -  -1.5*) was counter-balanced by a motion proposed by individual members from Osby in the very 
south of Sweden. This motion demanded quite strongly a further development of nuclear energy (El »
3.0). In contrast to the former motion, this motion stressed elements of productionist politics (the 
ANPE score is 4.2 and -4.2 respectively). It painted a bleak picture for the case that nuclear energy 
would be phased out. This scenario also included environmental aspects. Nuclear power would be 
much better suited to prevent damage to the environment than methods that "go back to grandfather's 
times" like burning peat »id similar things. The motion was very polemic in its judgement over 
alternative energy technology.
The board of Metall reconfirmed to stick to the referendum decision and was also optimistic that it 
would be possible to develop alternative energy resources until 2010 (the reason why the El is -1.0* 
and ANPE » 4.2). The congress followed the recommendation of the board and rejected the motion 
that considered nudear energy so extremely positively and considered the other as responded to.
Beside the board's statement there were four debate contributions. In his congress presentation on 
"industrial development" the Metall board member Hans Olsson pointed out that Metall will neither 
work for a faster phasing-out nor for continuation after 2010. In a broader context he stressed the 
importance of public control over large enterprises. Conny Wilander, a member from the district of 
Norrkôping, pointed out that a lot of Metall members were active in the referendum campaign and that 
nuclear energy would affect the vital interests of Metall members. She was quite dear that nuclear 
power should be shut down in 2010 and pointed out that energy saving measures would create jobs 
and save the equivalent of two to three nuclear plants. Although her evaluation of nuclear energy is 
rather negative she seldom referred to aspects of new politics (El = -2.21; ANPE » 4.2). In his 
concluding remarks, Hans Olsson from the board of Metall summarized his former arguments in that he 
stated that Metall should not take a stand on nuclear energy. This would be a political question. Within 
the energy political context Metall could only work for employment advantages of its members. And 
that would be possible in both cases with or without nuclear power.
Both motions and the debate stuck to statements concerned with energy policy. More than 85 percent 
of the statements referred to pragmatic aspects. The different standpoints towards nudear energy in 
the motions and the debate, however, also disagreed about the environmental effects of nudear plants.
The first Metall congress after Chernobyl was held in September 1989. Four motions contained 
statements about nudear power. At this congress, we can also identify two substantially different
attitudes in Metall. From the four motions, two evaluated nuclear energy positively and two negatively. 
The more critical motions were proposed by the district of Lulei in north Sweden, and by seven 
districts of central Sweden; among them • as in 1985 - the district of Norrkdping and Motala. The 
former motion stressed the economic and environmental advantages of nuclear power in normal 
operation. However, the risks are high and the worries of the population should be taken seriously. 
Since the 1980 referendum decision is unclear about concrete measurements of a phasing-out, the 
motions demanded that concrete steps should be taken so that Sweden develops national alternatives 
that take environmental and employment effects into the account. This should then lead to a new 
referendum in which one can decide about a faster phasing-out than originally planned. Although this 
motion is rather moderate in its negative evaluation of nuclear energy it contains some elements of 
new politics (El *  -.60; ANPE « 8.3). Also the other motion (El = -1.50*; ANPE = 4.2) stressed the 
fact that no concrete measures had been prepared for a phasing-out. The most positive motion 
towards nuclear energy came from the district of Sdderfors, a district close to a nuclear power plant 
(Forsmark). The motion referred to a recent parliament decision to speed up the phasing-out plan. The 
motion pointed out the negative consequences of that policy for energy prices, the national economy, 
energy shortages, and employment effects. The alternatives to nudear power would all have their 
disadvantages and were not able to substitute nuclear energy in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the 
motion demanded, that Metall should declare that it is against a phasing-out that would imply a threat 
to the living standard, employment and the environment and that nudear energy should be used until 
realistic alternatives will exist. This demand would have been a bianco cheque for nuclear energy. The 
motion scores high in both its positive evaluation of nuclear energy and productionist politics (El = 
2.54; ANPE = -12.5). The other more moderately positive motion came from the district of Trollhflttan 
(El *= 1.33; -4.2). Stressing the fact that large-scale wind power would be neither technically possible 
nor economically feasible, the motion demanded the further development of water power as the only 
alternative to nuclear energy. However, water power could only partly substitute nuclear energy.
Without making any statements of its own, the board recommended that the extremely positive motion 
should be rejected and all other motions should be seen as responded to. As usual the congress 
followed the recommendation of the board.
The debate was introduced by a contribution of the Metall deputy A m e Angeldf. He pointed out that 
Sweden was the only nation on earth that decided to phase-out of nuclear energy and that the national 
electricity amount is very high. This he considered to a great advantage for Sweden. In his speech, he 
was confident in the ability of Swedish industry to meet this challenge by developing new energy 
techniques. Although the evaluation of nuclear energy in his speech scores slightly negatively, the 
expressed statements about his firm belief in technological progress results in a productionist politics 
score (El = -1.0; ANPE •  -4.2). Another contribution of the district of TroJIhdttan in favor of the 
district's motion contained neither statements nor evaluations which could be coded.
As at the other congresses, the emphasis of the motions and the debate was on pragmatic categories. 
Around three quarters of all statements stress energy political, economic and labor market aspects. 
However, 16 percent of the statements stressed the positive environmental effects of nuclear power.
Metall also accepted at this congress an environment program (Svenska
Metallindustriarbetarefdrbundet 1989). Metall is the first LO union to formulate such a program. It 
debates global, regional and local environmental threats and formulates Metall's standpoints on it. The 
possibilities to influence the improvement of the environment have also been formulated. But also in 
this program Metall is firmly convinced that an environmental policy must be made that agrees with the 
industry. Metall has great hope that Swedish industry will solve the environmental problems through 
technological innovations. Most critique is devoted to the fact that clear guidelines for industries are 
lacking.
Two facts are most interesting in the congressional debate on nuclear energy in Metall. First there 
were two rather different motions submitted at all congresses of Metall [9]. The positive motions have 
been voiced from districts either close to nuclear plants or from south and middle Sweden. The more 
negative motions came from the north of Sweden and the districts of Norrkdping and Motala.
Secondly, the board was rather neutral in its evaluation of nuclear energy and often recommended the
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9 This can be seen in the relatively high STD of the El index: 1981: 2.1; 1985: 3.2; 1989: 1.8. 
However, it should be noted that 1981 ana 1985 only two motions were submitted and that therefore 
the index is a bit arbitrary.
rejection of the extremely positive motions. This is also expressed in the fact that Metall always 
hesitated to take a clear stand on this question. It is rather peculiar to consider motions as responded 
to (the decision most frequently chosen) when no stand at all was taken before. The policy in Metall 
shows some equivocalities: the new environment program stresses the importance of trade union 
engagement on societal questions. At the congresses, however, aspects beyond rather pragmatic ones 
are very seldom mentioned. In particular the conviction expressed by board member Hans Olsson 
seems to be typical for Metall: first of all, energy policy would not be made by Metall and, furthermore, 
Metall should just look at the employment consequences for its members. This conviction is very 
difficult to combine with an environmental responsibility of a union as expressed in the environment 
program of 1989.
However, the disagreement about the evaluation of nuclear energy did not result in a disagreement 
about the future development of society in terms of productionist and new politics. Even if there are 
some indicators of that in the 1989 congress it would be far too much to conclude that Metall would 
face a conflict between productionist and new politics in its organization. As mentioned above Metall 
follows an extremely pragmatic strategy in dealing with important societal questions. The leadership 
expresses a firm belief in technological progress and Swedish industry. These may be indicators that 
Metall • despite the fact of some intra-organizational disagreements on technical questions on nuclear 
energy - can be seen as a productionist trade union.
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StatsanstSlldos Fôrbund (SF)
Besides SEF, SF organizes workers in nuclear power plants among the LO unions. As we have seen 
above one SF district proposed a motion to the 1981 LO congress in which nuclear energy was 
evaluated negatively. However, at the congresses of SF nuclear energy played a minor role. In 1973, 
one local district from the north of Sweden (Porjus) already submitted a motion in which nuclear 
energy was mentioned as a technique that leads to big-scale energy production. However, this 
statement was not evaluated in any way.
In 1977 SF addressed nuclear power in one motion that demanded a more extensive debate on nuclear 
energy. However, the SF board did not see any particular reason for a more intensive debate on the 
nuclear energy issue and recommended to consider the motion as responded to. Neither the motion nor 
the board's statement evaluated nudear energy or expressed arguments that could be summarized 
under the heading of productionist or new politics here.
At the congress in August 1981 there was no motion on nuclear energy proposed. It had to wait until 
the next congress in August 1985 that SF addressed the question of nuclear energy again. At that 
congress, two motions on nuclear power were proposed. Both were very different in their evaluation of 
nuclear power. One motion was proposed by the district of Bispgârden. The positive evaluation of 
nuclear energy was supported by some arguments of productionist politics (El « 1.86; ANPE = 8.3).
A phasing-out before 2010 was considered to be a waste; rather the phasing-out plan should be 
oriented on the life span of the nuclear plants. The other motion proposed by the district of Gflvte, 
quite close to a nuclear plant (Forsmark) stressed the fact that nuclear energy would frighten millions 
of people and that most countries would have already limited their ambition to develop nuclear energy 
further. However, it was also stated that alternative energy technologies could not solve the energy 
problem as well so that only nuclear fusion (a technology not analyzed in terms of nuclear energy in 
this investigation) would be the only solution (El « -2.38; ANPE «■ 0).
The board expressed in its statement that SF will stick to the decision of a phasing-out in 2010. 
However, it criticized that there would be no concrete plans, for how the phasing-out should be 
conducted. It also stressed the fact that it should be ensured that the security investment pays for 
itself. Concerning the two motions, the board suggested to reject them both. This decision was carried 
out by the congress.
Nuclear power was debated in the larger context of economy policy and gained only spotlight 
attention. The debate contributions were diversified in their evaluation of nuclear power as were the 
motions (STD of debate: El *  2.0; motions: 2.99 motions). A worker from the nuclear power plant at 
Forsmark expressed his conviction that this technology is completely safe. He also stressed the 
employment effects of nuclear energy (El » 2.4; ANPE -  -4.2). The other contribution stressed similar 
aspects. In addition, some even emphasized that energy questions are too important to be decided 
upon by private enterprises. Therefore public intervention is necessary. However, SF gives more
attention to security aspects than for instance SEF does. The board of SF was very reluctant in taking 
a stand on this question.
At the congress in September 1989, the first to take place after the Chernobyl accident, SF had four 
motions that also included statements on new or productionist politics. If they evaluated nuclear 
energy or expressed arguments concerning productionist and new politics, they were positive about 
nuclear power and favored productionist politics (means: El » 1.67; ANPE = -5.6). The motions 
stressed the fact that energy consumption would still increase and that cheap energy for Swedish 
industry is essential. Most of the motions expressed their disagreement with the government proposal 
to already start the phasing-out of nuclear energy in the mid-1990s. The motions were proposed by 
several different districts (Vdstra Sverige, Mellersta Nonland, Norrbotten). The board sympathized with 
all of the motions; but it pointed out that one should stick to the referendum decision. Although the 
evaluation of nuclear energy is negative, due to the fact that it reconfirmed the phasing-out plans and 
considered some aspects of new and productionist politics, in end effect, the motion favors 
productionist politics (El = -1.65; NP = 8.33; MP = 16.7; ANPE = -8.3). Although the instrument of 
energy regulation through prices were considered, SF made it clear that the energy policy must be 
based on a large-scale production. In conclusion, the board suggested to accept two of the four 
motions. The congress accepted the board's recommendation. The debate contained four brief 
contributions. Three of them were negative to nuclear energy and one extremely positive. If there were 
arguments concerning new and productionist politics, they favored productionist politics. Above all, 
the debate contribution of the same worker from Forsmark who already expressed his opinion at the 
congress in 1985 was very much in favor of nuclear power. After Chernobyl, he argued filters had 
been installed and security had increased, and because of these new filters Swedish nuclear power 
stations were the safest in the world. However, the motion he spoke for had been considered as 
responded to. Although the debate expressed more critical aspects towards nuclear energy, it strongly 
favored productionist politics (means: El = -.86; ANPE *  -5.6). At this congress, SF also mainly refers 
to pragmatic categories (90 percent of the motions and 71 percent of the debate).
Over the years, we can conclude for SF that it very reluctantly started a debate at all. Although 
members of SF work in nuclear plants, the issue was raised very peripherally in 1973. Although the 
public debate in the mid 1970$ was very heated in Sweden, the SF board could not understand why 
nuclear energy should be treated differently than other technical aspects in the energy area at their 
1977 congress. Also in 1981, one year after the referendum on nuclear energy, SF did not deal at all 
with the issue. A controversial but pragmatic debate came up at the congress in 1985. Still SF did not 
see any reason to take a stand on this issue. It was only, when the government suggested to start the 
phasing-out period of nuclear energy in the mid 1990s that SF took a stand in which it claimed a 
careful conduction of this plan. Disagreement was not expressed in the motions, even though, the 
debate showed some different attitudes towards nuclear power. Throughout the years, the debate 
never addressed aspects beyond the pragmatic categories and questions of ownership. One can 
certainly conclude that SF belongs to the pragmatic and productionist trade unions in LO.
Up until now, we may conclude that even the LO unions which are involved in nuclear energy did not 
take a greater interest in the issue in a broader societal context. They dealt with nuclear energy as a 
primarily technical issue by referring to pragmatic aspects. This gives some doubts, whether unions 
more removed from nuclear energy deal with the issue at all.
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Sveriges Kommuna/arbetarefdrbund (SKAF)
SKAF dealt with nuclear energy only at the congress in 1978. Also at this congress nuclear power was 
only mentioned and not discussed in a motion that dealt with the exploitation of Baltic Sea gas. Their 
overall evaluation of nuclear energy was rather positive (El = 1.5*). The motion was very 
technologically optimistic and also scored on our productionist/new politics scale (ANPE = -4.2) (101. 
The board was rather positive concerning the message of the motion. However, it considered the 
demand that the government should start working in favor of this technology as already fulfilled. The 
congress followed the board's suggestion and considered the motion as responded to.
10 The sentence that mentioned nuclear energy illustrates the technic-optimism of SKAF: "The 
natural gas resources of the Baltic Sea could revolutionize the energy supply together with the already 
established nuclear power.” (... naturgasfdrekomster i OstersjOn ... kunna med sin fdrekomst 
revolutionera kraftforsOrjningen tillsammans med redan etablerad atomkraft.)
At ail other congresses in 1973, 1983, and 1988, nuclear energy was no issue for congressional 
motions or debates in SKAF.
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Grafiska fackfdrbundet (GF)
Considering the pragmatic treatment of the nuclear energy issue in the LO unions, analyzed so far, it is 
surprising that GF a LO union which is relatively distant from nuclear energy in its membership, dealt 
with the issue rather extensively. At three congresses nuclear energy was an important political issue.
At GF's 1978 congress, a motion proposed by the district of Stockholm evaluated nuclear power 
decisively negative (El -  -2.88). This motion is by far the one motion of all LO unions that considered 
nuclear energy in a broader social context and stressed a lot of aspects which may be subsumed under 
the heading of new politics (ANPE = 37.5). The motion started out with the conclusion that nuclear 
energy would not be just a technical or economic problem but also a moral affair that concerns human 
responsibility for future generations. The risk of radiation would be too high because all life in regions 
where nuclear power plants operate could be erased. The higher the amount of nuclear plants in 
operation, the higher would be the risk of a heavy accident. Besides technological problems concerning 
the waste disposal, nuclear energy is viewed as being in the interest of capitalist profit making. Nuclear 
power also leads to an undemocratic society and police state [11 ]. The only solution would be an 
immediate shut-down of the nuclear reactors.
The board of GF critically evaluated nuclear energy in its statement about the motion and made it dear 
that GF is not against the technological development itself but that it should be steered in the interest 
of the workers. The board also suggested some editorial changes and recommended to consider the 
motion as responded to but also to submit (dverifimna) it to the Social Democratic Party. The 
statement of the board had a quite dearly negative attitude towards nuclear energy as well (El -  • 
2.43) and also contained some elements of new politics (ANPE -  8.3). However, it is more open for 
technological developments in terms of productionist politics. The following debate showed a rather 
controversial character in which two speakers favored nuclear energy (El - 1.5*, and 2.5) and two 
disfavored it (El -  -1.5*, and -1.5). The critical contributions demanded to approve the motion and the 
two others spoke against it. The editor of GPs newspaper Michael Jemewall expressed in two debate 
contributions his critical attitude towards nuclear power. The two positive contributions, one of them 
from a member of the board of GF (Karl-Erik Aim), also contained elements of productionist politics. By 
summing up the elements of new (NP « 25.0) and productionist politics (MP « 16.7) there remains a 
dominance of elements of new politics (ANPE « 8.3). However, as already mentioned, the debate was 
not without disagreements (STD: El = 2.15; ANPE = 7.6).
The motions and also the debate differ fundamentally from those of other LO unions. Only around 40 
percent of the statements in the motions and 56 percent in the debate referred to pragmatic 
categories. The motion contained to nearly one third security aspects and to nearly 20 percent political 
and societal.
In the referendum debate, GF also took a critical attitude towards nuclear power. In sharp contrast to 
all other LO unions, it did not support line two but line three that demanded a shut down of nuclear 
plants within the next ten years. In particular, the district of Stockholm was strongly opposed to the 
pro-nuclear policy of LO and SAP (Grafiska fackfdreningen, 1980).
The congress in 1982 had the same pattern, however, in a weaker form. One motion was proposed to 
the congress which evaluated nuclear energy extremely negative (El = -3.0). It demanded an instant 
phasing-out of nuclear energy and a solution for the waste problem. As in the motion, it was also in 
the board's statement about the motion that new politics elements slightly dominated (in both cases is 
ANPE = 4.2). The board also evaluated nuclear energy negatively (El = -2.38). Without further
11 Since the statement on the undemocratic tendencies is very illustrative I wish to quote the 
motion in this point: "Nuclear power implies a danger for a democratic society. It is a technology which 
is difficult to steer democratically. It creates a vulnerable society which demands a strict control over 
its citizens. But we do not want a police state - we want a state of free human beings and a decent 
state under the rule of law.” (Karnfcraften medfdr faror fOr det demokratiska samhfiltsskicket. Den fir en 
tekndogi som fir svfir att styra demokrattskt. Den ger ett sfirbart samhfille, som krfiver en hfird kontroll 
av medSorgama. Men vi vill inte ha en polisstat - vi vill ha en stat f6r fria minniskor och ett hederligt 
rfittssamhaile.)
debate, the congress approved the recommendation of the board to hand over the motion to LO and 
the Social Democratic Party.
The treatment of nuclear energy at this congress was much more similar to the one in other LO unions. 
Pragmatic aspects dominated. However, the evaluation of nuclear energy was in sharp contrast to all 
other LO unions.
At the 1986 congress in August, no motion on nuclear energy was proposed. However, the board 
formulated a statement on nuclear energy and nuclear weapons in which nuclear power was very 
critically evaluated (El = -2.81). The ANPE-lndex also scored very high (20.8) clearly indicating that 
new politics elements are still dominant in GF. Five short contributions to the debate all supported the 
board's statement (El-lndex = -1.5*). After some editorial changes, the statement was approved by 
the congress.
The debate at the 1986 GF congress again stressed non-pragmatic aspects (around 46 percent). New 
politics elements also dominated in GF. With this characteristic, GF is clearly an exception among the 
pragmatic LO unions. It is interesting to see that GF has had an anti-nuclear stance from the mid 
1970s to the present day.
For the LO unions, it is fair to conclude that only GF has adopted elements of new politics. All other 
unions favor productionist elements of politics. This is especially true for SEF. It is also in LO and 
Metall that productionist elements dominate over elements of new politics. The public sector unions,
SF and SKAF, also do not show indications for a more favorable stand towards elements of new 
politics. The most striking results for the LO unions • with the exception of GF • is the fact that nuclear 
energy has never been controversially debated in ideological terms at the congresses. This does not 
mean that there has not been any disagreement on nuclear energy. In Metall, we can particulariy 
identify motions that favor and disfavor nuclear energy. Surprising is the passive role of SF which 
organizes members in the nuclear power industry. Only when the government concretized a phasing- 
out scheme, SF took a stand in favor of nuclear energy. The pragmatic treatment of the issue of all LO 
unions (exception GF) also leads to the conclusion that unions like SKAF are not at all interested in 
energy questions that concern the organization of Swedish society. Although representatives of LO 
unions are present in all important commissions on energy policy (see for instance: Socialdemokratema 
(ed.), 1990) and try to influence energy policy (LO (ed.), 1990; Fabriks, Gruv, Metall och Pappers,
1990), these unions are not very keen on debating the issue at their congresses. This might have some 
implication on democratic decision making in society in general. However, if nuclear energy does not 
diversify blue collar unions in Sweden what is then the attitude of white collar workers unions? This 
question I will pursue by looking at TC0 and some of its member unions.
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2. NUCLEAR POWER AT THE CONGRESSES OF THE TCO UNIONS.
TCO and some of its member unions have been dealing more extensively with the nuclear energy issue 
than the LO unions. This is particularly true for ST and TCO itself. Apart from the fact that TCO unions 
are very careful in taking a congressional stand on motions that only deal indirectly with nuclear energy 
(only 7.4 percent of all the analyzed motions were accepted in contrast to 23.3 of LO and 15.9 of DGB 
unions (12]) the approved motions are usually positive towards nuclear energy and the dominance of 
productionist politics is overwhelming. However, there is still some disagreement within TCO unions.
In order to specify this statement I wish to look at the congresses of some individual TCO unions.
TjSnstemSnnens Centra/organisation (TCO)
TCO dealt with nuclear energy at their congresses in 1979, 1982, and 1985. Before 1979 and at the
1988 congress nuclear energy was not an issue for a congress motion. However, the 1979 TCO 
congress stands out from all other congresses of Swedish unions because nuclear energy played an 
immensely important role at this congress. At later congresses nuclear power was treated within the 
framework of energy policy or environment policy and it only gained a marginal status within these 
motions.
12 This number of approved motions should not be confused with taking a stand on nuclear 
energy. Table 3-1 gives an account of the amount of approved motions that deal directly or mainly 
with a decision of nuclear power.
In the late 1970s, TCO attempted to take a stand on the nuclear energy issue which should have 
enabled TCO to influence Swedish energy policy but at the same time should not have divided its 
membership. TCO was careful in formulating a stand on nuclear energy which resulted in an energy 
report (EnergipoHtiskt program's that was submitted to the 1979 TCO congress. The report, quite in 
favor of nuclear energy and large-scale energy production, was part of the focus in a lot of motions 
(13). All in all there were 25 motions proposed to the congress which were dealing directly or 
indirectly with nuclear energy. Most of these motions were submitted by ST (nine), SHSTF (five), and 
SL (four). The following table specifies the motions and the expressed attitudes towards nuclear 
energy and new and productionist politics.
Table App4-l: Nuclear Power at the TCO Congress in 1979
-220 -
Motion
from
Cl HP KP ANPE TCO'• Board proposal 
and concessional 
decision **
sir -1.S6 12.5 4.2 t • 3 responded to
s i r 1.50* 0 16.7 -16.7 approval
SKTF -2.00 12.5 4.2 9.3 responded to
SKTF 1 . 0 0 0 0 - approval
ST • 0 0 - responded to
ST - 0 12.5 -12.5 responded to
ST •2.12 16.7 4.2 12.5 responded to
ST -2.33 20.a 0 20.6 responded to
ST -2.14 12.5 4.2 a .3 responded to
ST -2.00 12.5 «.3 4.2 responded to
ST -1.50* 4.2 0 4.2 responded to
ST -1.00* 4.2 0 4.2 responded to
ST 1.30* 0 12.5 -12.5 responded to
SALF 2.60 0 16.7 -16.7 approval
SHSTF -3.00 S.3 0 a .3 disapproval
SHSTF -3.00 9.3 0 a .3 disapproval
SHSTF -2.65 16.7 4.2 12.5 disapproval
SHSTF -1.95 16.7 0 16.7 disapproval
SHSTF -1•50* 0 0 - disapproval
SL •2J9 29.2 4.2 25.0 responded to
SL -2.40 • .3 0 a .3 responded to
SL -1.50* •. 3 0 a .3 responded to
SL -1.50* 4 e 2 0 4.2 responded to
SFL - 0 0 - disapproval
SFL -1.50* 4.2 0 4.2 disapproval
• indicates that the number of evaluations is lover than 3 and is 
not allowed to exceed «/-I.S.
• • Both are synonymous.
Four motions evaluated nuclear energy positively, eighteen negatively, and three did not evaluate it 
explicitly. The positive motions were submitted by SIF, SALF, SKTF, and ST. Apart from SKTF, all 
these motions contained arguments in favor of a productionist politics. In particular, SALF's and SIF's 
positive motions scored high on the productionist politics side. The motions sought to link the 
arguments of cheap energy supply, national economy, productionist welfare and employment [14]. 
Nuclear power was considered to be a cheap energy resource that would make it possible to decrease 
the dependency on oil. The negative motions were submitted by SIF (one motion), SKTF (one), ST 
(six), SHSTF (five), SL (four), and SFL (one). For most of these motions it is fair to say that they
13 See Michele Micheletti, 1985: chapters 3 and 4 for a detailed description of the process of 
creation and evaluation of TCO's endeavor to take a stand on nuclear energy.
14 This argumentation chain can be illustrated at the example of SALF's motion: *Sweden is a 
relatively smallcountry which is dependent on its trade with the rest of the world. In order to sustain 
the Swedish export it is necessary to keep a competitive Swedish industry. An energy price that 
fundamentally exceeds the costs for energy production in other countries influences our industry 
negatively so that Swedish production becomes more expensive than foreign products. The Swedish 
economy will face difficulties to manage employment if tne costs of energy increases.” (Sverige flr ett 
fdrh&llandevis Irtet land, som ir  beroende av sin handel med Ovriga vgrlden. F6r att uppritthilla svensk 
export behdvs en konkurrenskraftig svensk industri. Ett energipris, som starkt dversknder andra linders 
kostnad fdr energiproduktion, verkar hflmmande pfl v8r industri, dfl svenska varor blir dyra i ffirhfillande 
till utlflndska. Oet svenska naringslivet fir svirt att klara av sysselsfittningen om energikostnaderna blir 
hOga.)
contained elements of new politics. In particular this is true for the motions of SL, ST and SHSTF. 
Some of these motions challenged the link between cheap energy and positive employment effects 
(15). It was also doubted that nuclear energy is a cheap energy resource; and even if it was cheap the 
waste of a high energy consuming society was not seen as a desirable model for a future society. The 
safety of nuclear reactors was also questioned and the consequences of radiation for future 
generations were illuminated. Some motions also stressed the negative political effects of a 'nuclear 
society* (kSrnkraftssamhSlle) that would lead to undemocratic tendencies and control of citizens. 
However, one major point of criticism of most of these motions was that the TCO energy report was 
too biased pro-nuclear and that TCO had taken a stand without asking it membership or at least 
initiating a broader debate in TCO and its unions. The rather limited scope of the report, concentrating 
on technological and pragmatic aspects, was also heavily criticized. The motions ranged from the 
maximum values in their evaluation of nuclear energy and, in their majority evaluated nuclear power 
negatively (mean: El = -1.10; STD: El 1.8). In terms of new and productionist politics, the range was 
also quite wide (from *16.7 to 41.7). The motions mainly favored new politics elements and were 
highly diversified (mean: ANPE ** 6.7; STD: ANPE = 11.9).
However, in their statements on their members' motions the board of SKTF and SHSTF recommended 
a rejection of these motions and evaluated nuclear energy positively in their own statements and, as in 
the case of SHSTF, referred to elements of productionist politics (SHSTF: El -  1.84, ANPE -  -12.5; 
SKTF: El = 1 .5*, ANPE -  4.2).
In their statement the TCO board expressed the importance of Swedish energy autonomy. Nuclear 
power would be one option and one should keep this option open. The statement in itself is extremely 
positive towards nuclear energy and also favors productionist politics (El -  2.38; ANPE = -8.3). The 
recommendation of the TCO board can be seen from the table above.
The debate dealt mainly with the TCO report and the procedures taken by TCO to reach a stand on the 
issue [16]. The evaluation of nuclear energy reached from an El of 2.00 to -1.50 with a mean of -.08 
(STD -  1.5) [17]. The opening speech by Erik Wflngby, a representative of the TCO board and 
participant of the TCO expert committee on energy policy, contained a maximum of productionist 
politics elements (MP = 41.7; ANPE -  37.5). Statements about the necessity of cheap energy, the 
link to economic growth and employment, the importance of nuclear energy in industrial countries in 
order to solve the energy problems of underdeveloped countries, etc. are all present in his contribution. 
However, he emphasized that security aspects always have priority over economic aspects. In Erik 
Wflngby's view, however, the accident at Three Mile Island, which happened just one month before 
the congress, did not give any new insights so that a revision of the safety evaluation of nuclear 
energy could not be justified. If expert groups came to other conclusions, they would be taken into 
account. Among others, high ranking speakers from other TCO unions also participated at the congress 
debate. Inge Granquist, chairman from SIF, and Olle Sdderman, who became ST's chairman in 
November 1979, both spoke in favor of the TCO board's suggestion. However, they did not raise any 
new aspects on the issue. The other contributions from members of SKTF, SLF, SALF, and SIF were 
more concerned with the energy report and the manner TCO reached to a decision than illuminating
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15 The department of immigration within ST made this argument quite clear and furthermore 
stressed the instrumentaiization of employment blackmailing by the proponents of nuclear power: ‘The 
threat of unemployment is often used in order to make Swedish workers and employees accept the 
destruction of the environment, the development of nuclear power plants, the exploitation of rivers, 
and continued waste of energy. According to these theories mass-unemployment would occur if we 
stop the energy growth. It is self-evident that all work needs energy but it is not at all clear that there 
is a connection between employment and the degree of energy consumption." (Arbetsldshet anvSnds 
ofta som ett hot mot svenska arbetare och ti3nstem3n f6r att fa dem att acceptera miljOfdrstOrina, 
utbyggnad av kSmkraftverk och aivar samt fortsatt sldseri. Enligt dessa teorier skutle massarbetsldshet 
bli foljden av ett stopp fdr energianvdndningens tillvSxt. Att allt arbete krSver enerai Sr en sjaivklarhet, 
men nflgot klart samband mellan sysselsSttning och energianvSndningens storlek foreligger inte.) The 
motions argued further in favor of a restructunng of Swedish industry.
16 The problem of formulating a stand on nuclear energy is not my major concern here. As for the 
other congresses, I am mainly interested in how far productionist and new politics elements are 
presentedin the motions and debates. For more detailed information about the former aspect consult: 
Micheletti, 1985; in particular pp. 86-96.
17 The number of motions and contributions to the debate may sometimes vary to the actual 
number because only those items were considered that fit into the coding instructions. Motions and 
debates without reference to coding categories have been neglected. Since it was a coding rule to 
subsume the statements of the board to the debate these statements account for the more positive 
score of the evaluation of nuclear power.
substantial aspects concerning nuclear power. Interesting is the fact that the two contributions from 
SIF members, by Birgitta Furuhagen and Stig Sdderberg, differed in their evaluations. The former was 
critical of nuclear energy whereas the latter by using productionist politics arguments was in favor of 
it. The contribution by the member of SALF was in favor of nuclear energy by stressing the importance 
of cheap energy and the link to employment (El -  1.27; ANPE -  -8.3). He stressed the fact that a 
phasing-out or limitation of the nuclear program would result in negative employment effects in the 
affected areas. The contributions of the members of SKTF and SLF were slightly critical of nuclear 
power. However, they both voiced their support for the TCO board policy position. Ulla Eriksson (a 
member of the ST executive board) spoke against the TCO report. Her attitude towards nuclear energy 
was rather critical and she stressed some aspects of new politics (El = *1.50*; ANPE *= 4.2). She 
questioned the taken-for-granted concept of wage earner interest and the impact of nuclear energy on 
democracy (18). She ended her speech by recommending that the congress should give its approval to 
a number of motions that opposed the TCO report. Two other speakers, both from SIF, and again the 
TCO energy expert, Erik Wfingby, addressed the congress and urged congressional approval of the 
report.
From the statistics of the debate which also include the statements of the individual union's boards 
and the TCO board, it is fair to say that the debate was relatively balanced in terms of productionist 
and new politics but rather diversified (ANPE mean -  -.63; STD -  10.0). After alt the interventions of 
the individual union boards, the TCO board and speeches of influential trade union representatives it is 
not surprising that all the critical motions on nuclear energy were rejected and the more favorable were 
accepted. In all cases, the congress followed the proposal of the TCO board. However, four members 
of SIF and three of SHSTF submitted their reservation to the congress decision. This is a common 
Swedish way of letting a decision pass and simultaneously expressing one's deviant standpoint (19).
There is a clear correlation between a positive evaluation of nuclear energy, and a positive 
congressional decision, and the expression of elements of new politics: the more productionist 
elements, the more likely the approval of the motion and the more new politics element the more likely 
is the disapproval of the motion (20). The congress gained a lot of attention from the Swedish mass 
media. They questioned the democratic procedures of the TCO congress. Membership protests all over 
Sweden mainly initiated by individual local groups started shortly after the congress (Micheletti, 1985: 
96-99).
To sum up, in this congress we can identify some particular patterns. First there was a dear cleavage 
at the 1979 TCO congress between those favoring nuclear energy and productionist politics and those 
being against nuclear energy and in favor of new politics. The former attitudes were coherently 
represented by SALF and the latter by the teachers' unions SL and SFL. Secondly, the cleavage line cut 
across individual unions, above all ST, SKTF, and SHSTF but also SIF. Thirdly, the cleavage was 
vertical, i.e. the ‘ grass roots" members expressed anti-nuclear attitudes and favored new politics 
whereas the boards supported a pro-nuclear policy and productionist politics. This conflict was in 
particular strong in SKTF and SHSTF where the boards recommended disapproval of critical motions of 
their sections and proposed oppositional assessments in their statements. Finally, the two critical 
contributions at the debate were voiced by women, all other positive contributions came from men.
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18 It is most interesting that a higher TCO official questioned the taken-for-granted concept of 
wage earner interest: "It is said that the wager earner interest should be decisive for the TCO point of 
view on general political issues. But have we investigated which type of society wage earners want? 
What do we wage earners mean by terms such as good environment, a meaningful leisure time, a 
meaningful job and a fair alobal distribution." (Man sdger att löntaganntresset skall vara styrande d& 
TCO tar ställning i sam hänsfrdgor, men har vi utrett vilken typ av samhälle som löntagama vill ha? Vad 
menar vi löntagare med god miljö, meninosfull fritid, meningsfultt arbete och rfittvis fordeling globalt?) 
Concerning democracy she pointed out: Do we know today which "control society" we may get 20 
years from now if we continue the development of nuclear energy? That I do not know and neither do I 
know how much the wage earner interest is concerned with questions of control and supervision." 
(Vet vi vilket kontrollsamhälle vi kan f i  20 Sr fram&t med en fortsatt utbyggnad av kimkiraften? Det vet 
inte jag, och jag vet inte hur längt löntaganntresset sträcker sig i fräga om kontroll och övervakning.)
19 Thomas Anton (1980: 166) relates the possibility of placing a reservation to the political culture 
of the Swedish elite: "It is thus the perfect way to express individual preference without destroying the 
general consensus • the perfect Swedish device."
20 The correlation between the El-lndex and the congressional decisions is: Cramer's V -  .87; 
Contingency Coefficient *  .77. The correlation between the ANPE-lndex and decision is: Cramer's V
-  .73; Contingency Coefficient -  .72. The variable "decision" is ordinal scaled (approved -  1; 
submitted as matenal -  2; responded to -  3; disapproved = 4).
Although the motions and the debate frequently referred to pragmatic aspects, they also stressed more 
than 12 percent political and societal aspects. These latter aspects were mainly used to criticize 
nuclear power. Energy political, economic, and labor market aspects were used to support the 
application of nuclear energy. The striking difference between approved and the rest of the motions 
and the debate is that the former referred much less (less than half) to political and societal aspects. 
However, as we have seen before in the LO unions, environmental aspects were mostly used to 
support nuclear power. This is a striking fact, considering that the Harrisburg accident happened just 
one month before [21 ]. Also interesting is the fact that TCO did not refer to left ideological aspects at 
all confirming that TCO is an non-(partisan) political trade union.
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At the next TCO congress in 1982, only three motions dealt with nuclear energy. However, nuclear 
energy was never the major object of the motions and therefore very few statements have been made 
concerning our research question. Two motions were submitted by ST and one by SKTF. All motions 
evaluated nuclear energy negative (ST: El = -1.5* and *0.5 respectively; SKTF: El *  >1.5*) and 
contained some elements of new politics (ST's motions showed an ANPE of 4.2 and 8.3 respectively, 
SKTF had 4.2). This is mainly because alternative energy technologies were more accepted and their 
development promoted. The congress followed the TCO board's recommendation to consider the 
motions as responded to. However, the board's statement about the motions like the short debate 
contained no or hardly any negative statements on nuclear energy and no or very few statements 
concerning new politics. However, interesting is the fact that TCO mentioned left-ideological 
statements by demanding state or communal intervention in the energy sector.
All in all, one may conclude that a carefully critical but not negative attitude towards nuclear energy 
was expressed at the 1982 congress. No deeper disagreement was obvious. The smooth rejection of 
these motions also indicates that the issues were not at all hot at this congress. However, in reports 
TCO made clear that it still stuck to productionist politics [22].
This picture did not change at the 1985 TCO congress. One motion was proposed by the district of 
SKTF in Nybro. In the framework of environmental questions it was stated that the final waste storage 
would still be unsolved and environmental damages would be the cost of our welfare. The motion 
demanded that TCO should work nationally and internationally in order to protect the environment and 
to develop a report on environmental problems that can be used for the everyday trade union work. 
The SKTF board rejected these claims as did the TCO board (the first part was considered as 
responded to) because there would already exist enough general productionist that formulate a stand 
on environmental questions. A special report on environmental problems for trade unions would 
therefore not be necessary. Without any debate, the congress approved of the TCO board's proposal.
At the congress in 1988, nuclear energy was neither debated nor was any motion concerning it 
proposed. However, an environmental program was approved. The program demanded that conflicts 
about different social goals should be solved in the way that e.g. employment arguments should not 
hinder the improvement of the environment (TCO, 1989). Most interesting is the fact that such a 
program was considered as superfluous just three years ago at the TCO congress in 1985. In this time,
21 Safety aspects were not frequently mentioned. However, the debate revolved more around 
them (22.2 percent) but after all less than 10 percent of these statements were convinced that nuclear 
energy is dangerous. The fact of the low number of safety aspects in the motions is probably due to 
the fact that the motions were formulated before the accident at TMI (Three Mile Island).
22 In a report not analyzed here TCO expressed: "The reason why TCO is involved in the energy 
issue is explained by the same reason for TCO's involvement in other general political issues. ... One 
important union demand is that Swedish energy policy should be conducted in such a way that it helps 
strengthen the economy and, thereby, secures full employment and facilitates reforms of working life 
and general society. A good supply of energy for the competitive sector is essential for industrial 
development. (Secondly,) the union members are, and will in many ways continue to be, directly 
influenced and involved in work dealing with energy supply. They must be able to take advantage of 
their knowledge and experience and also be given good work opportunities." (Quoted from: Micheletti, 
1985: 141) This quotation is taken from a preliminary report published in 1981 (Energipolrtiskprogram 
f6r TCO. En dversyn infdr 1982 Srs kongress. TCO, 1981, Stockholm) and presented and accepted by 
the TCO congress in 1982 (Packet och den tekniske utveckJingen. EnergipoHtiskprogram. TCO, 1981, 
Stockholm). See also: HendUngsprogram f6r TCO 1983-1985 (TCO, 1982, Stockholm).
environmental concerns gained a much higher status in Swedish society so that TCO probably felt 
obliged to pay some lip-service to it.
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The TCO congresses during the last two decades demonstrated that TCO only took up the issue when 
it was brought into the organization through political pressure. TCO was taken by surprise that a 
technical issue such as nuclear energy should suddenly be so political. Similar to the 1986 DGB 
congress shortly after Chernobyl, the reactor accident of Harrisburg brought TCO into trouble. 
Membership protests, however, could not change the productionist politics of TCO. The board firmly 
stuck to a more favorable policy to nuclear energy and productionist concerns. In the 1980s, nuclear 
energy was not an issue for TCO anymore. Even after Chernobyl, no congressional debate emerged 
again. There is certainly something to the fact that TCO officials were not keen that this issue was 
brought up again in their organization. By comparing TCO with LO we may conclude that TCO avoided, 
not to say suppressed, an open debate on such a controversial issue like nuclear power. It may be fair 
to say that the membership of TCO unions may be more diversified on the issue than members of LO 
unions. TCO unions after all organize members in nuclear plants, high energy consuming industries as 
wed as employees in those sectors most opposing nuclear energy such as social and cultural workers, 
teachers, etc. (see also chapter seven).
Svanska Industrrtjinstemonnafdrbundet (SIR
SIF debated nuclear energy at two congresses: in 1978 and in 1981. In 1978 there were seven 
motions submitted to the congress. Five were extremely positive to nuclear energy and demanded that 
SIF should work for the development of fast breeder reactors. All these motions that scored between 
2.40 and 3.0 have been proposed by one and the same member: Bertil Persson [23]. Another motion 
from a member of the Helsingborg district was strongly opposing nuclear power and contained several 
dements of new politics (El *  *2.7; ANPE = 16.7). In particular, it pointed out that the risk to 
endanger the life of future generations by using nuclear energy would not be justified. This motion also 
heavily criticized TCO's and LO's policy on this issue. The board of the district where the motion came 
from indicated the dilemma of TCO unions: on the one hand, TCO would like to be a party-polrtically 
neutral organization, but on the other hand, TCO would like to take a stand on important societal 
questions [24]. The other motions did not evaluate nuclear energy so that the average score comes to 
a positive evaluation of nuclear power of 1.59 but also to a positive assessment of new politics: ANPE 
of 4.2. The statements of the local district boards and the debate did not concentrate on nuclear 
energy very much. The congress debated the question how SIF and TCO could take a stand on 
questions with societal and political relevance and simultaneously remain party-politically neutral. The 
congress did not make a statement on the energy issue but left this to the TCO congress in the next 
year. All motions were considered as responded to.
The motions and debate mainly referred to pragmatic aspects. However, 22.5 percent dealt with 
security risks. In contrast to the 15 percent environmental statements, the former were more critical 
than the latter (33 percent of the security aspects were positive towards nuclear energy but 83 percent 
of the environmental). The differences of attitudes concerning nuclear energy but also between new 
and productionist politics were rather pronounced (STD: El » 2.42; ANPE <=11.0).
At the SIF congress in 1981 two motions were submitted. Both again by Bertil Persson. Both motions 
were positive towards nuclear energy (El ~ 2.74 and 1.50* respectively). However, again like three 
years ago, they did not score much on the productionist/new politics dimension (ANPE = 0 and 4.2) 
although they express an extreme technology belief. Without debate the congress followed the 
recommendation of the board and rejected both motions.
23 Bertil Persson was an active union member and a member of the conservative party (Moderata 
Samiinqspartiet). He was also SIF's spokesman in Sydkraft, the South Swedish public owned power 
enterprise.
24 ”TCO is in the unenviable situation of being a party neutral organization but at the same time it 
cannot refrain from taking a stand on issues important for its members.* (TCO befinner sig di i den 
icke avundsvird Situationen att man skall vara en partipolitiskt neutral organisation, men lean samtidigt 
inte avsti frin att yttra sig i för medlemmama vlsentliga frflgor.)
At the following congresses in 1984 and 1987 nuclear energy was not debated again like it had not 
been debated at the SIF congress in 1972 and 1975.
SIF, although directly involved in nuclear energy through its members, did not debate nuclear energy to 
any large extent at its congresses. The dilemma of a party-politically neutral organization led to a more 
or less complete neglect of the issue. It is fair to say that one member of SIF stands for the positive 
motions in SIF. However, there are also more critical voices in SIF. This impression is also confirmed 
from the analysis of the 1979 TCO congress. The 1980s, however, did not openly diversify SIF on the 
nuclear energy issue.
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StatstjSnstemannafôrbundet (ST)
ST is probably the individual union in Sweden that debated nuclear energy most extensively. All in all
10 motions and 70 debate contributions were submitted to four congresses.
Already at the congress in 1975 a member of the nature conservation section of ST proposed a motion 
that strongly rejected nuclear energy and contained a lot of new politics elements (El =* -2.67; ANPE
-  41.7). Probably for the first time a motion of a Swedish trade union questioned the link between 
energy consumption, employment and living standard. The motion also focused on the extreme high 
security risk that would be a threat to human kind and the environment. However, by quoting the 
Industry Ministry on the decision of the parliament on energy policy, the board's statement evaluated 
nuclear energy positively by stressing productionist elements (El = 1.89; ANPE « -8.3). The board's 
proposal to the congress was that ST should not take a stand on the issue and that the motion should 
not lead to any concrete action (att motionen inte skall fôranleda nâgon âtgfird). A debate with six 
contributions followed. All contributions that evaluated nuclear energy were critical and contained 
elements of new politics. However, a member from the section ST-vattenfall, that organizes workers in 
the energy sector pointed out that ST has members in nuclear power plants. If the congress would 
approve of the proposed motion - which demanded a phasing-out - it would be impossible for those 
workers to remain members of ST.
All in all, the debate evaluated nuclear energy more negatively than positively. Including the positive 
statement of the board the diversity at this early ST congress was quite substantial which is 
documented by the standard deviation of the ANPE-lndex (means: El -  -1.24; ANPE « 5.2; STD: El 
« 2.16; ANPE -  14.2). The congress decision followed the proposal of the board that the motion 
should not result in any action.
The next ST congress took place in November 1979 several months after the turbulent TCO congress. 
At that time the decision had also been made that there would be a referendum in Sweden on this 
issue. Seven motions were proposed that dealt with nuclear energy. All motions evaluated nuclear 
energy negatively and were quite homogeneous in that (El -  -1.98; STD = 0.5). Elements of new 
politics also dominated (mean: ANPE = 10.4) and one motion even scored up to an ANPE of 33.3.
The motions containing elements of new politics originated from different ST sections; among others 
from employees of universities, the state owned telephone enterprise Televerket, and county 
administration divisions. More than a quarter of all statements referred to political and societal aspects. 
This is an outstanding high amount which indicates that ST-members considered this issue in a broader 
social context. However, the board's statement evaluated nuclear energy positively and contained 
elements of productionist politics (El *  2.33; ANPE = *4.3). It was stated that the nuclear energy 
option should still be kept open because it seemed to be the only alternative to oil by then (together 
with hydro power). The board proposed to consider all the motions as responded to. However, one 
member of the board, Ulla Eriksson, made a reservation to this decision. As we have seen at the TCO 
congress she had a more critical attitude towards nuclear energy than TCO board members in general.
The following debate was rather polarized. 31 contributions [25] could be coded that dealt with 
nuclear energy. 13 of them evaluated nuclear energy negatively, eight positively and nine were without 
or with balanced evaluations. The standard deviation also indicates that the debate was quite
25 The debate on nuclear energy came up several times in different contexts at the ST congress. 
Therefore it is difficult to draw a coherent picture here. It was also not without problems to detect all 
the debate contributions and it is possible that not all are included. However the general picture drawn 
here may reflect the debate rather realistically in terms of my thesis.
diversrfied (El: STD = 1.86; mean ■ -0.33). The chairman of ST, Gunnar Petersson, noticed that the 
members' opinion on this issue was not unified and that most likely it would be very difficult to unify 
it. However, he stood behind the decision of the TCO congress. He suggested to approve the 
recommendation of the ST board to consider the motions as responded to. He thought that it would 
not be good to debate the issue again before the referendum. However, due to the fact that ST needs 
its own generated material, he conceded that ST must work on it. His speech did not contain a clear 
evaluation of nuclear energy nor did it contain elements of new or productionist politics. However, the 
debate was also diversified in terms of productionist and new politics. Ranging from -25.0 and 25.0, 
the mean of the ANPE is 0.0 and the standard deviation is 12.0. Not surprisingly the positive debate 
contributions originated from energy sectors of ST and the critical from research, teaching, 
administrative etc. sectors of ST. Speakers from the Stockholm district (AB-distrikt), by far the largest 
district of ST [26], were almost always against nuclear energy and their speeches scored among the 
highest in terms of new politics. Members of SIPRI, a department of the peace and research institute, 
were also rather critical to nuclear energy and productionist politics as was a member of the 
department of county administration (115 ST-ISnsstyrelsen). The new politics aspects referred to reach 
over the whole spectrum of statements: Fear for the life of future generations, doubts about the 
democratic control of nuclear energy etc. etc. were expressed. The debate contribution which 
evaluated nuclear energy most positively and contained elements of productionist politics were 
expressed by members of the districts of Uppsala (C-distrikt), Vflstmanland (U-distrikt), and the 
department of fishing (223 ST-Fiske). They stressed the close link between cheap energy, living 
standard and employment. The capacity of nuclear energy to create meaningful jobs and positive 
environmental effects was also stressed. About 56 percent referred to pragmatic, a quarter to security, 
and more than 12 percent to societal and political aspects. These figures confirm the impression from 
the motions that ST members debated nuclear energy in a broader context than other union members.
However, besides the expressed polarized attitudes there was also a group of members from different 
departments that demanded that ST should refrain from taking a stand on such a politically 
controversial issue at all. Britt Uhrenius from the immigration department (429 ST-lnvandrarverket) 
proposed that *Statstj3nstemannaf6rbundet should work for it that TCO does not take a positive or 
negative stand on any referendum alternative.* The congress decided to follow the board's 
recommendation to consider the motions as responded to and to accept the proposal of Britt Uhrenius.
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In October 1981, ST held an extra-congress. One reason for conducting this extra congress was to 
decide on an energy program for ST. The board of ST proposed a "suggestion* for such a program 
(ST, 1981). The nine pages long paper dealt in 27 points with the future energy policy of Sweden. It 
illuminated several aspects of energy policy such as the meaning of energy policy for trade unions, the 
consequences of the referendum, social control of the energy sector, different energy resources, 
employment, environmental and political aspects. Nuclear power was one important element in the 
program. No doubt was left that nuclear energy should be phased out because of its risks and danger 
to the environment. Uranium mining in Sweden should also not be started, because it would make a 
later phasing-out too costly and, therefore, would bind Sweden to stick with nuclear power. The 
evaluation of nuclear energy was clearly negative (El = -1.82). New and productionist politics aspects 
were also considered but equalized each other (MP and NP *  8.3; ANPE =* 0). Interesting in this 
context was that ST did not play nuclear energy against water power as was frequently done by L0 
unions. The program noticed that one should first become clear about the real consequences of a 
phasing-out of nuclear power and a reduction of oil import. After a lengthy debate, some alterations 
were made which resulted in a slightly more negative evaluation of nuclear energy (El = -2.05) and 
gave new politics elements a higher priority (ANPE « 8.3). The changes mainly concerned a more 
determined stand against the uranium mining in Sweden. The higher new politics score results from the
26 The Stockholm district of ST is four times larger than the next biggest district of Malmdhus in 
the south of Sweden. ST's organizational principle is rather complicated. There are local districts and 
departments. There are 24 districts, one in each county of Sweden. The districts organize contacts and 
co-operation between the members of the different government agencies. The departments or sections 
(avaaningar) organize employees in the different government agencies. The size of these departments 
differs considerably: for instance the largest department organizes almost 16 000 members whereas 
the smallest just 14. The biggest departments with more than 10 000 members are ST-Televerket 
(telephone enterprise), ST-Postverket (post), and ST-ATF (university). ST organizes workers of energy 
sectors in two departments: ST-Energi (157 members) and ST-Vattenfall (3.097 members). Members 
from the energy sector account for around three percent of the membership. The 101 departments or 
sections are divided into about 700 branches ana local units (all data apply to 1989; for an overview 
see: Statstjflnstamannen (without date); StatsijSnstamannen, 1990).
newly included demand that energy consumption should be lowered through price and tax intervention 
and the stronger emphasis of decentralized organization of energy supply. The use of coal was also 
more strongly supported than in the original suggestion. Furthermore, a new point was included that 
demanded that communes should be mainly responsible for the energy policy in the country but that 
should not result in an obstruction of the phasing-out of nuclear power.
The debate was diversified but less so than two years ago. 25 contributions to the debate have been 
coded. They were mainly critical of nuclear energy and favored elements of new politics (means: El = - 
1.04; ANPE = .3) 127]. The proponents of new politics came again from the Stockholm district (AB- 
distrikt), and the telephone company (ST-Televerket). However, they never put much stress on the 
new politics aspects. The stronghold of productionist politics that was much more outspoken than 
their new politics counterparts came from the districts of Halland and Uppsala. Of particular interest 
were the contributions of the district of Halland where the nuclear plant of Ringhals is situated, 
because they were clear in their emphasis on productionist politics (ANPE -  -12.5 and *16.7 
respectively). In one of the speeches, it was pointed out that communes (Varberg) where nuclear 
plants are situated could reduce taxes and increase the living standard in the town. If a phasing-out 
would be conducted these benefits should still be guaranteed for the commune. The other contribution 
which stressed productionist aspects made it clear that ST's energy policy is unrealistic: ”... we say no 
to nuclear power, no to oil, no to water power, no to everything. But we cannot do that. We need 
some sort of energy.” Both contributions stress the importance of further research in the nuclear 
energy sector ("research is not dangerous”). As pointed out earlier, the degree of diversification was 
not as strong as two years before (STD: El = 1.36; ANPE *  6.5). One reason for that may be that ST 
accepted a relatively critical energy program towards nuclear energy that satisfied the demands of the 
biggest part of its members.
The approved energy program of ST is outstanding not only because a Swedish union clearly took a 
stand against nuclear energy but also because it stressed approximately only 57 percent pragmatic 
aspects. Apart from labor market aspects in which context nuclear energy was evaluated positively, all 
other categories referred to nuclear power in a more critical manner. About 15 percent of the 
statements in the program stressed the negative environmental effects of nuclear power and almost a 
quarter of the statements was devoted to societal and political aspects. The debate differed from this 
pattern because the speakers of productionist politics voiced their opinion more strongly than before. It 
was also here that the pragmatic categories were as much emphasized as in other Swedish unions 
(around 70 percent), but security and environmental statements still have a higher status in the pro- 
nuclear contributions in ST than in other Swedish unions (around 15 percent)..
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At the 1983 regular congress, the energy action program was only shortly debated. Seven 
contributions debating this issue and addressing nuclear energy were coded. All evaluations of nuclear 
energy were critical of it and, if the contributions contained elements of new or productionist politics, 
they stressed the former. However, the debate kept a very low profile in all of these categories and 
controversy was also low (STD: El = .67; ANPE = 2.1) [28]. Even when the controversy of this issue 
decreased, ST's debate was quite non-pragmatic. 60 percent referred to the pragmatic categories but
10 percent stressed societal and political aspects.
At the congress in 1987, only one motion was submitted that demanded an accelerated phasing-out of 
nuclear power. However, this demand was framed into a motion that spoke for an environmental 
program for ST and 16 other demands were also made. The board of ST proposed to consider the 
motion as responded to. However, it agreed on the demand that ST should develop its own 
environmental program. Without further debate, the congress approved the recommendation of the 
board.
27 The low ANPE score results in the fact that most debate contributions were short and did not 
contain any statements referring to new and productionist politics.
28 The debate was rather superficial. All evaluation indices for this congress have less than three 
evaluations. As pointed out in chapter three on the methodology the index requires at least three 
evaluative statements. Therefore tne measures are rather unreliable and it is only possible to conclude 
that the contributions tended to be more critical than positive of nuclear energy. Although the 
new/productionist politics index has no frequency restriction, it should be noted that apart from one 
contribution, never more than one statement has been mentioned. In this area, interpretation of the 
data should also be done with caution.
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To conclude: Since 1975, ST has been involved in an extensive congressional debate on nuclear 
energy. Up until 1983, the issue was very controversially debated. Although the majority of the 
proposed motions and the debate contributions were negative towards nuclear energy, the board 
refrained from taking a stand on the issue until 1981. When the issue was politicized, we can identify 
all controversial attitudes in ST. Groups stressed new politics elements to a very high extent as other 
groups stressed elements of productionist politics. The demand not to take a stand at all was also 
voiced. However, over time ST changed its attitudes from trying to avoid a decision to taking a stand 
against nuclear power. ST is unique in the fact that it also debated the issue at the elite level in a very 
complex manner (i.e. on the decision-making level). The anti-nuclear energy program of 1981 is just 
one example of this. With this program, ST is the only analyzed union in Sweden that took a negative 
stand on nuclear energy. However, during the latter part of the 1980s the issue did not receive much 
congressional attention anymore. Nevertheless, all measures indicate that ST quite clearly favors a 
more non-productionist politics.
Sveriges KommunahjinstemannafOrbund (SKTF)
As we can see from the TCO congresses, SKTF members did not get tired of proposing motions which 
contained a quite substantial amount of elements of new politics and evaluated nuclear energy 
negatively. The SKTF board, however, was also very eager in rejecting those member motions. What is 
then the picture of the SKTF congresses?
At two congresses SKTF dealt with nuclear energy: at the congress in 1980 and 1984. In September
1980 three motions, all evaluating nuclear energy negatively were proposed (mean: El *  >1.36; ANPE
-  0). There was only some disagreement concerning the evaluation of nuclear energy and also in the 
emphasis on new and productionist politics (STD: El -  0.99; ANPE » 5.9). Quite a substantial 
amount of the statements (about one third) of these motions referred to political and societal aspects. 
Among others, the motions demanded a revision of SKTF's and TCO's energy policy and a stronger 
support for alternative energy resources. However, one motion demanded that TCO should refrain from 
expressing an opinion on nuclear energy at all (291. This motion had been criticized by the local district 
board. It stressed the importance that TCO also addressed politically important and controversial 
questions such as energy problems'. Otherwise the local district boards expressed no other statements 
that could be coded. The SKTF board pointed out that the issue had been extensively debated at the 
last TCO congress in 1979 and that there was a broad consensus on that issue ("Kring det beslut som 
fattades fdreJ&g en bred enighet vid kongressen"). The board regretted that SKTF members at the local 
level were not especially interested in debating the issue in the study circles. In other words, the SKTF 
board noticed a membership passivity. The SKTF board supported the demand of one motion to 
increase the debate in SKTF but recommended to reject all other demands or to consider them as 
responded to. At the debate two contributions spoke in favor of one of the motions two against them. 
Otherwise, the debate did not express a lot of statements or evaluations. The congress accepted the 
recommendation of the board.
At the 1984 congress, there was one motion proposed by a member of the district of Nybro on 
'Swedish environment" that only very peripherally touched upon nuclear energy in the way that it 
indicated that the waste problem was still not solved. It also brought to notice that it would be very 
urgent that trade unions become concerned with environmental questions and that they should not 
only concentrate on the work environment. However, no statements were made that score on the
29 The motion by the local district of Stockholm should be quoted on this point because it 
represents a typical problem of TCO unions: "However, the future application of nuclear power is to a 
high degree a politically controversial question. We think that the proper behavior of union 
organizations is that they should stay neutral and leave it to the members to form an opinion on their 
own. They can then exercise their influence through political parties or other interest organizations. 
The involvement of TCO spokesmen in the referendum has had a negative impact on the solidarity and 
identification of big membership groups with their organization and has made it more difficult for them 
to engage in trade union work. (Den framtida anvSndningen av kflmkraften Sr diremot i hög grad en 
samhallspolitiskt kontroversiell frftga. Vi anser att den riktiga roltfördelningen i denna friga ir  att de 
facklipa organisationema hiller sig neutrale och överlflter nil sina medlemmar att sjilva gora sina 
ställningstagaganden och utöva sin pflverkan genom de politiska partiema eller andra 
intresseorganisationer. Företrfidare för TCO har inför folkomröstningen agerat pA ett sfttt som har haft 
negativ inverkan p i stora medlemsgruppeligars soiidaritet och identrfikation med Organisationen, och 
har försvagat deras engagemang för det fackßga arbetet.)
dimension of productionist/new politics. The motion was supported by the district board. The SKTF 
board expressed its sympathy for the general concern of the motion but did not see reason for any 
concrete actions. It recommended to consider the motion as responded to.
Only very few speeches of the debate addressed the nuclear issue. One member of the Nybro district 
spoke in favor of the motion. He accused TCO of hesitating to take a stand on the problem of waste 
disposal even though they supported the decision to develop nuclear energy further. The chairman of 
SKTF, Sture Nordh, pointed out that it is important that SKTF has a leading idea (huvudinriktning) on 
this question and therefore the congress should support the recommendation of the SKTF board. The 
congress followed the board's recommendation to consider the motion as responded to.
SKTF is a most peculiar union in the question of nuclear power. There are some indications that the 
board is not very much interested in a discussion about the issue of nuclear energy and that it 
attempts to avoid a stand by means of congressional procedures and redefining reality. Indicators for 
this are, for instance, that the SKTF board in 1980 proclaimed that the debate at the TCO was unified 
and that members were passive about that question. It may be that SKTF members were not 
particularly active in the study circles but no other TCO union was as diversified at the TCO congress 
in 1979 as SKTF (and SHSTF). Member motions were put down by the board. To maintain, just one 
year later, that the decision was unified is really confusing the facts. In 1984 the procedures at the 
SKTF congress were also peculiar. The board takes a stand in the way that it agreed on the importance 
of environmental questions and that TCO would keep an eye on it. This 'non-decision* is then taken 
by SKTF chairman Sture Nordh as a guideline in this question. By analyzing the congress material, it is 
fair to make the conclusion that it is more than doubtful that the board of SKTF attempted to define a 
stand on nuclear energy in cooperation with its members.
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Svariges LSrarfdrbund (SL)
The Swedish Teachers' union dealt only in one motion with nuclear energy. That was at its congress in
1977. The north Swedish local district of Ume3 submitted an extremely negative motion on nuclear 
energy that contained a quite substantial amount of elements of new politics (El = -2.78; AN PE =
25.0). The motion stressed the danger of nuclear energy and the unsolved problem of waste-handling. 
The negative environmental effects and the negative consequences for future generations were also 
emphasized. It doubted the efficiency of nuclear plants and also stressed the general problem of energy 
waste (energisldseri). The motion demanded a referendum on this issue. Although the motion also 
addressed pragmatic aspects of almost 60 percent it strongly emphasized political and societal aspects 
(17.6 percent). Security aspects also played a large role in the negative evaluation of nuclear energy 
(17.6 percent).
SL's board, however, pointed out that the motion is - according to the union's constitution 1 1 -  
beyond the union's tasks [gir utdver fdrbundets indamih. SL's board noticed that societal and political 
questions can only be treated by TCO and not by SL. The congress decided - without debate - that the 
motion should not lead to any action (motionen inte skall fdranteda nSgon ¿tgSrd av kongressen). That 
was the end of congressional treatment of nuclear energy at SL congresses.
For TCO, it seems to be clear that there is a contradiction between the politics of the board(s) and the 
union members. This, although true for other unions as well is strikingly clear when the majority of 
motions that are against nuclear energy are rejected and the ’ hard-liner* motions of further industrial 
development are accepted. The disagreement between the boards and the membership is in particular 
strong in TCO and SKTF. Furthermore, it is fair to conclude that TCO and some TCO unions • above all 
SKTF, SL, but also SIF - try to avoid dealing with this issue at all. They aim to narrow union politics 
down to the "bread and butter* issues of the job. However, among TCO unions ST is a union that 
stands out from the rest of TCO unions. Initially, it was very hesitant to take a stand but later it 
formulated an energy program that seems to be rather critical of nuclear energy and productionist 
politics. ST is also different from other TCO trade unions because it deals with political and societal 
aspects at the higher organizational level as well, i.e. it includes ideological aspects of the development 
of future society (in programs and approved motions).
3. NUCLEAR POWER AT THE CONGRESSES OF WEST GERMAN TRADE UNIONS.
In West German unions, nuclear energy was strongly debated from the mid-1970s until the end of the 
1980s. Significantly more motions on nuclear energy have been proposed at trade union congresses in 
West German unions than in Sweden. Table 3*1 shows that OTV accounts for approximately one third 
of ail motions and debates on nuclear power. In general, one can conclude that in the Federal Republic 
of Germany the major debates took place in the individual unions instead of the mother organization, 
although the DG8 took up the debate as well.
Nuclear energy was often the major issue of the motions proposed to the congresses of the 'energy 
unions' OTV, IGM, and IGC. IGB, in sharp contrast to the mentioned energy unions, preferred to 
debate nuclear energy in the context of energy policy in general. Already from this first look at the 
data, it is striking that HBV and IGD were quite engaged in this issue. The former union even 
outnumbers the amount of motions of IGC and * including the debate contributions - comes close to 
IGB.
When it comes to congressional decisions, we can see that most German unions took an explicit stand 
on nuclear energy - in some cases these decisions have even been revised later. Only IGM and IGB 
decided on nuclear energy in the context of motions that deal implicitly with nuclear power or put 
nuclear energy in a broader context. However, when the issue was politicized the DGB often dealt with 
it and its stand has been decisive for other German unions as a compromise of the union movement on 
this issue. This is in particular true for the DGB decision in 1986.
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Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)
The DGB dealt with nuclear energy at its last four congresses: in 1978, 1981, 1982, and 1986. In
1978, six motions were submitted to the DGB congress. Three of them evaluated nuclear energy 
negatively and the other three were positive. However, only one motion, from the youth department of 
the DGB, contained elements of new politics (ANPE -  12.5; El -  >1.79). In particular, the motion 
questioned the link between increasing energy supply and positive employment effects. The other 
motions which evaluated nuclear energy negatively were submitted by the postal workers' union (DPG) 
(El -  -2.13) and the district of Baden-Württemberg (El =* -.80). The motion that most clearly favored 
nuclear energy and elements of productionist politics was proposed by the ÖTV (El -  2.42; ANPE *  •
12.5). The motion expressed the conviction that the final waste storage has already been solved, a 
fact that was later always a point of conflict. Furthermore the motion urged the congress to work for it 
that the reprocessing plant should be constructed as fast as possible. Nuclear power was seen as a 
safe technology that would produce cheap energy and create jobs.
The motions by the youth department and the Baden-Württemberg district were considered as 
responded to (erledigt1 whereas the ÖTV and DPG motion were taken as material to the approved 
motion. The approved motion was rather moderate in its evaluation of nuclear energy but was clear in 
its preference of productionist politics (El -  .36; ANPE =- -33.3). The seven pages long motion was 
proposed by the DGB board. It stressed the importance of economic growth, the relation between 
energy supply and employment, and a preference for large-scale production. Although the motion 
mentioned probable risks of nuclear energy, it gave many solutions to how this risk could be handled.
In addition, a motion was approved that evaluated nuclear energy positively in the context of coal and 
energy policy (El -  2.0; ANPE «= -8.3). This motion was submitted by the district of Nordrhein- 
Westfalen.
The debate contained four contributions. One by the chairman of DPG Ernst Breit (later DGB 
Chairman), two by members of IGM, and one by the DGB youth department. The speech of the DPG 
chairman was moderate in its evaluation of nuclear energy but contained several elements of new 
politics (El = .61; NP *  16.7; ANPE « 8.3). He stressed the point that nuclear energy should not be 
applied as long as there are any doubts about its safety. The speeches by one of the IGM members 
evaluated nuclear energy clearly positive and contained a lot of elements of productionist politics. It 
stressed the importance of economic growth and positive employment effects of nuclear energy (El = 
2.1; ANPE -  -25.0). The more moderate contribution by IGM's chairman Eugen Loderer stressed some 
technical and political problems of nuclear power (El = .8; ANPE « 0). In particular he focused on the 
decision-making processes and acceptance of nuclear power. He also expressed his dissatisfaction 
with the progress of the safety of waste storage. The contribution of the member of the youth 
department quite clearly opposed nuclear energy (El = -1.29) but it did not refer to any element of 
new or productionist politics.
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From this DGB congress where nuclear energy was first debated and decided upon, one can conclude 
that both sides of politics were already represented in 1978. The OGB decided to take a quite 
outspoken stand on the productionist side. In that, it was supported by its strong trade unions IGM 
and OTV. The new politics elements were voiced by the youth department and - more surprisingly - the 
postal workers' union expressed its criticism of nuclear energy. This motion was even backed up by 
OPG's chairman Ernst Breit who also stressed some new politics elements. About two thirds of the 
statements in the motions and debate referred to pragmatic aspects. However, all contributions 
stressed the importance of the societal implication of nuclear energy. In particular, this is true for the 
approved motions. This indicates clearly that the debate at the 1978 congress was also rather 
complex. However, most of these statements were quite positive to nuclear energy.
In 1981 the DGB conducted its fourth extra congress. At this congress, the DGB formulated a general 
program. Nuclear power was part of section 14: energy policy. In this context, six proposals were 
submitted. Four were more or less neutral towards nuclear energy and contained only few elements of 
productionist politics (El ■ -.29; -.06; .57; ANPE » -4.2; .0; -4.2). The former were submitted by IGM 
(approved of with changes), the second by GEW (rejected), and the latter was the final approved 
version of the OGB board. The fourth proposal by the district of Baden-Württemberg (rejected) did not 
contain any evaluation or elements of new or productionist politics. However, there were also two 
motions that evaluated nuclear energy more positively but which did not refer to our categories of new 
and productionist politics. These positive motions were submitted by the DGB board (responded to or 
erledigt) and OTV (approved of) (El = 1.67 and 1.33 respectively).
The debate did not focus very much on nuclear power. One contribution by the DGB board supported 
the motion of the GEW (El « -.67; ANPE = 4.2) and the youth department stressed the importance 
that unions must attract the youth through its policy. However, the speech is neutral concerning our 
measures.
As in 1978 the DGB accepted also in its extra congress hi 1981 the slightly more positive proposals 
towards nuclear power (mean El = 1.18 in 1978 and .95 in 1981). The change in the ANPE from - 
20.8 to -4.2 cannot be interpreted as a substantial change of politics but can rather be explained by 
the very infrequent references to those statements that we defined before as elements of new and 
productionist politics. The conclusion is that the DGB still stuck to its positive evaluation of nuclear 
energy but that the conflicting elements were not acute at this congress.
In 1982, the next regular DGB congress took place. Four motions were proposed to the congress that 
dealt with nuclear energy. The picture is the same as at the former congresses. The approved motion 
proposed by the DGB board was positive towards nuclear energy and contained a few elements of 
productionist politics (El = 1.0; ANPE = -4.2). This motion was opposed by a rejected motion of the 
youth department (El = -1.77; ANPE = 16.7). The latter motion pointed out that nuclear energy is 
unacceptable since it endangers future generations in a way it was never known before in history. It 
also stated that society will reach limits of technological progress. The two motions from DPG were 
rather moderate (El = .86; .0; ANPE = -8.3; -4.2). Both were supplemented as material to the 
approved motion. There was no debate on these motions at the congress. Pragmatic aspects made 
again about 60 percent of all statements. Security aspects also scored relatively high as at the other 
congresses at well. The left-ideological statements were mentioned particularly often in the approved 
motions (around 14 percent) and were concerned with the public ownership of energy enterprises.
The last DGB congress that has been analyzed here is the 1986 congress. This congress is of special 
interest because the DGB officially changed its positive stand on nuclear energy and proclaimed to 
work for a phasing-out of nuclear power. The important question, however, is whether the DGB also 
changed in terms of new and productionist politics.
The 1986 OGB congress took place just four weeks after the reactor accident at Chernobyl. However, 
the congress had been planned a long time before and motions on nuclear energy were also already 
prepared. After the Chernobyl accident the proposers of the “leading motion" [30] themselves - DGB
30 A leading motion (Leitantrag) aims to summarize the opinions of different attitudes of different 
unions and should serve as an orientation of trade union policy in the future. In particular, a leading
board, IGC, IGM, and OTV • suggested substantial changes in the original motion. In the form of an 
Initiativantrag (31] the mentioned unions and in addition IGB suggested a phasing-out of nuclear 
energy. This alteration of the original m otion should take the changed situation after Chernobyl into 
account. However, it could not prevent a controversial debate at the congress in which the chair­
persons of concerned unions expressed their opinions. The motion committee suggested some changes 
in order to balance the motions in accordance to other suggestions voiced at the* congress. This final 
version of the motion was carried by just one vote against it. In formal terms of my analysis, the 
motions had the following characteristics: The leading motion formulated before the Chernobyl 
accident evaluated nuclear energy clearly positive and stressed productionist aspects of politics based 
on the already known argumentation chain that energy supply, economic growth and employment are 
positively related (El ** 1.5; ANPE -  -20.8). Another motion proposed by the district of Nordrhein 
Westfalen was also formulated before Chernobyl. It criticized the fast breeder and further expansion of 
nuclear energy but stressed the importance of the high temperature reactor for the coal industry. 
However, the motion is rather moderate in its evaluation (El -  -.84; ANPE -  4.2).
At the congress, there were several suggestions how to change the original motion. All these changes 
refer to S 5 (the peaceful use of nuclear energy; die fnadh'cha Nutzung dar Kernenargie) and were made 
in form of IrutiativantrSge [32]. First OTV chair-person Monika Wulf-Mathies and colleagues proposed 
substantial changes for the original motion (El = -1.07; ANPE *  0). The negative evaluation was 
based on the conviction that Chernobyl had demonstrated that nudear energy must be abandoned. The 
other two InitiativantrSge which suggested alterations of the original motion were less negative 
towards nudear energy and stressed fewer elements of new politics (Heinz Putzhammer from GEW: El 
“  -.86; ANPE = -4.2; Siegfried Weiss: El « -1.0; ANPE -  -8.3). Changes which were made by the 
motion committee in Monika Wulf-Mathies' Initiativantrag made the motion appear more negative 
towards nuclear energy but moderated the motion in terms of new politics (El -  -1.20; ANPE « -8.3). 
For instance, the motion committee changed the formulation that the energy policy should be changed 
to a more general statement that nuclear power should be utilized for just a limited time. The congress 
accepted the motion with the suggested changes of the motion committee.
Apart from motions which suggested changes of the leading motion two further independent motions 
were proposed. First, one motion by the youth department that was formulated before the Chernobyl 
accident and that mainly dealt with the reprocessing plant. It rejected this plant completely and by 
doing so the motion also referred to some elements of new politics (El *  -2.6; ANPE -  12.5). The 
second motion was submitted by Lorenz Schwegler et al. a board member of HBV (chairman since 
1988) and was formulated after Chernobyl (initiative motion). He evaluated nuclear energy negatively 
and demanded a change of the energy policy. This motion also contained elements of new politics (El
-  -1.86; ANPE -  12.5).
The debate was controversial about the way and the pace of a phasing-out. However, all contributions 
verbally evaluated nudear energy negatively. The mean of the El of all debate contributions is -1.66 
but the differences are still quite substantial (STD -  .93). Nine contributions spoke in favor of the 
version that finally was approved of by the congress and two expressed their disagreement. Those 
contributions which disagreed with the later accepted motion evaluated nuclear energy more negatively 
than the average. However, in terms of productionist and new politics no such difference can be 
identified.
As mentioned above many influential members of the German union movement participated in the 
debate. In what follows, I wish to summarize the contribution in the light of their evaluation of nuclear 
energy and their attitudes towards new politics. First, Kart Heinz Hoffmann, deputy chairman and 
energy expert of the OTV expressed his opinion. Although he evaluated nudear energy rather 
negatively, his speech was balanced in terms of new and productionist politics (El =* -1.39; ANPE =
0). Heinz-Wemer Meyer, chairman of the IGB (chairman of the DGB since 1990) was more moderate in
-232 -
motion summarizes results of expert groups etc. which worked between the congresses and translates 
these (new) insights into unions policy.
31 An Initiativantrag (initiative motion) is a motion which is formulated shortly before a congress 
because of special reasons.
32 Since the more productionist statements were also expressed in the unchanged parts of the 
motion, the evaluation of those statements were not affected by the alterations. That means in 
analytical terms that all suagested changes also receive the values of the statements of the unchanged 
parts of the motion. Therefore the whole motion still has a quite "productionist* trend.
his negative evaluation of nuclear energy and balanced his argument on new and productionist politics 
(El “ *.64; AN PE « 0). Both speakers pointed out that the compromise expressed in the motion is 
quite difficult to accept for some members of the unions because it affects their vested interests as 
wage earners in the energy sector. The next speaker, Ernst Haar chairman of the Railroad Workers' 
union (GdED), evaluated nuclear energy more negatively and stressed elements of new politics (El = - 
1.5; NP ■» 16.7; ANPE *  12.5). He demanded a phasing-out of nuclear energy because this 
technology would be impossible to handle (unbeherrschbar). Furthermore he stated that nuclear energy 
had demonstrated that society believs too much in technological progress. The next speaker, Franz 
SteinkCihler, current chairman of IGM, is quite radical in his rejection of nuclear power. He expressed 
the conviction that the unsolved situation of the final storage of radioactive productionist endangers 
the mankind for several thousands of years and under the applause of the congress audience, he 
concluded that nuclear energy is only possible, if we would accept a police state (331. These strong 
expressions are also reflected in the indices which are more negative to nuclear energy and contain 
more elements of new politics than the average (El -  *2.15; NP -  16.7; ANPE « 12.5). Also Lorenz 
Schwegler, chairman of HBV since 1988, was strongly against nuclear energy and stressed aspects 
such as the endangered lives of future generations through nuclear energy (El « *2.39; ANPE =
12.5). However, Franz SteinkCihler as well as Lorenz Schwegler both suggested to approve of the 
recommendation of the motion committee.
The other contributions which were more negative to nuclear energy than the average have been 
expressed by members of the GEW, HBV, the youth department, and a member of the DGB board. The 
two contributions by the GEW evaluated nuclear energy rather negatively and stressed new politics 
elements (El » -2.76, *2.64; ANPE « 8.3, 12.5 respectively). The most negative evaluation of nuclear 
energy stemmed from a member of HBV who also rejected the suggested version of the motion (El = - 
2.88). The contributions of the 0GB board member (El = -2.06) and the youth department (El « - 
2.37) were not distinct in their emphasize of elements of new politics (ANPE -  4.2). The contributions 
that still contained the most elements of productionist politics and /or evaluated nuclear energy less 
negatively came from two members of the DGB board (El -  -0.5; ANPE = -4.2 and ANPE = -4.2), 
the motion committee (El « -.60), the food processing workers' union (Gewerkschaft Nahrung- 
Genuss-Gaststétten; NGG) (El -  *.24), and the Artists and Musicians' union (Gewerkschaft Kunst) (El
-  -1.0; ANPE -  4.2).
The decision of the congress had to be seen in the light of the Chernobyl accident. If the accident at 
Chernobyl would not have happened, the motion committee would have accepted the original motion. 
The motion committee would have also taken the motion of the Nordrhein Westfalen district as 
material and would have rejected the motion of the youth department. (Grumbach, 1986: 277). 
However, after Chernobyl and the congress debate, the congress accepted the leading motion in the 
version mentioned above. The motions of the Nordrhein Westfalen district and the youth department 
were considered as responded to as were the suggested changes of the original motion by the other 
motions. Not surprisingly, the motion and debate was rather complex by stressing security, left- 
ideological, and political and societal aspects.
Over time, we have identified a cleavage within the DGB congresses. On the one hand, there are the 
influential groups and unions that favor nuclear power. In particular, ÔTV and IGM took a quite clear 
positive stand on nuclear energy. These groups also stressed productionist politics. On the other hand, 
there was a relatively small group that had opposed the main stream of productionist politics, namely 
the postal workers' union, the district of Baden-Württemberg, and the youth department. These fronts 
are persistent in the DGB up until the beginning of the 1980s. The exceptional situation of the 
congress in 1986 led to a more critical estimation of the productionist social development. Interesting 
is the fact that the leaders of IGM and HBV took relatively clear positions in favor of new politics. 
However, during all the years the DGB has discussed nuclear energy in relatively complex terms when 
the issue had been politicized. This was true for the congress in 1978 and 1986. At the other two 
congresses in 1981 and 1982 political aspects were less relevant. In order to get a more detailed 
picture of the shift in attitudes of the German unions, I wish to look at some individual trade unions of 
the DGB.
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33 In his own words: "In this country, nuclear energy can only be pushed through by means of a 
police state.* (Die Kernenergie ist in diesem Lande nur noch mit polizeistaatlichen Mitteln 
durchzusetzen). See congress protocol: 389.
IG Metall (IGM)
IGM dealt with nuclear energy at four congresses: in 1977, 1980, 1983, and 1986. In 1977 there 
were eleven motions which dealt with nuclear energy submitted to the congress. The mean of the 
evaluation of all motions [34] is rather balanced *.11. However, the standard deviation of 1.73 shows 
that the motions were very different in their evaluation of nuclear power. However, the mean of ANPE- 
Index indicates that productionist politics elements were dominant in comparison with elements of new 
politics (mean of ANPE *  *2.3). There existed also on this level substantial disagreement (STD: ANPE 
= 12.7).
In eight motions, nuclear energy was the major issue. All of them were responded to (erledigt) and an 
Entschließung on energy policy was approved of. Four of the motions were negative to nuclear energy 
and three were positive (one without evaluation). The most negative motion also contained a lot of 
elements of new politics (El -  *2.30; ANPE « 20.1) and was submitted by the youth department of 
IGM. In more than four pages, the youth department stressed that nuclear energy will threaten citizen 
rights and democracy. Important for the union's self-understanding is the fact that the youth 
department challenged the suggested and frequent argument that energy increase is more or less 
directly related to positive employment effects. In contrast the youth department concluded that 
achieving full-employment at any price would be inappropriate for union policy. By weighing the 
employment and security aspects, the youth department came to the conclusion that the risks of 
nuclear energy are too enormous. The other motions which evaluated nuclear energy negatively 
originated from the north German districts (Wilhelmshaven and Emden: El» *2.29, *1.5*; ANPE -  
8.3, 4.2 respectively) and from a district in the industrial Ruhr area (Dortmund: El -  *1.5*, ANPE 4.2). 
The positive motions were quite moderate in their positive evaluation (El -  1.0*, .86, 1.50*) and • 
except from one • did not contain a lot of productionist politics elements. The motions that scored 
highest on the productionist politics scale came from the local district of Mülheim an der Ruhr, a site 
where equipment for nuclear reactors is produced (Kraftwerks Union, KWU) (ANPE -  *12.5). This 
motion postulated that it is common knowledge that energy demand, economic growth and 
employment are positively correlated. This chain of arguments were also presented in the approved 
Entschließung that even exceeded the positive evaluation of aH other motions which were positive 
towards nuclear energy and also contained many elements of productionist politics (El *  1.61; ANPE
*  *16.7). A further development of nuclear energy was seen as unavoidable. Measurements of 
conserving energy or the development of alternatives should not lead to an increase in energy prices. 
Furthermore, the Entschließung demanded that administrative and technological procedures should be 
developed that would make misuse of nuclear technologies impossible and so that it would be possible 
to export nuclear equipment also to third world countries.
The debate included 13 contributions. Eight of them rejected the Entschließung, seven of them 
suggested the acceptance of the motion of the youth department instead. Five contributions spoke in 
favor of the Entschließung. Not surprisingly, all contributions that supported the Entschließung 
evaluated nuclear energy positively. Surprising, however, is that the evaluation of these contributions 
was so strongly positive (El -  2.68, 2.82, 2.75, 2.04 respectively; one contribution could not be 
evaluated). Those in favor of the motion from the youth department scored between *1.5* and -2.52.
In terms of new and productionist politics there was also a clear dividing line between the 
contributions of the debate ranging from NP *  37.5 (ANPE *  33.3) to MP *  20.8 (ANPE *  -20.8). 
The attitudes expressed in this debate of the IGM were extremely diversified (El Std -  2.3; ANPE Std
*  14.2).
One can conclude that the motions stressed positive economic and energy political aspects, on the one 
hand, and the security risks, negative environmental and social effects, on the other. However, the two 
latter aspects played only a minor role so that the conflicting line on nuclear energy at the IGM 
congress in 1977 was represented by positive economic versus negative security effects. The positive 
stand for the approved Entschließung resulted from its firm positive stress of energy political (33 
percent of statements), economic (17 percent), and labor market (8 percent) aspects. However; it was 
also pointed out in the Entschließung that nuclear energy might be safe or that sufficient safety 
standards could be reached (25 percent). Environmental aspects had been completely neglected in the 
Entschließung. Political and societal aspects, however, also played a fundamental role in the approved 
Entschließung. The debate reflected the same trends as the motions, however, in a weaker form.
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34 The calculation of the statistics also includes an original version of an altered motion.
Instead of stressing political arguments, positive environmental effects of nuclear energy were 
mentioned.
In summation: the congress of IGM in 1977 contained both elements of productionist and new politics. 
The actors of the different viewpoints were from the work councils of enterprises that produce nuclear 
power equipment and the official power holders, on the productionist politics side, and from the youth 
department and some local districts (above all Wilhemshaven), on the new politics side. However, their 
decision clearly preferred productionist politics and accepted nuclear power.
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It was also at the IGM congress in 1980, that nuclear energy was controversially debated. There were 
five motions dealing directly with nuclear energy in the context of energy policy. Another motion only 
mentioned nuclear power (this was the second accepted motion at this congress containing statements 
on nuclear power). We can again identify the same pattern of congressional treatment as in 1977. 
However, this time the Entschließung moderated the evaluation of more determined motions (El = - 
.05). Although the overall ANPE-lndex shows that productionist politics were favored (ANPE = -4.2) 
the Entschließung also contained several elements of new politics (NP -  8.3). This is due to the 
statements that energy policy should be changed in favor of alternative and renewable energy sources. 
However, productionist politics elements still dominated (MP = 12.5). The Entschließung was 
particularly careful in pointing out that security problems may exist. Nevertheless, there was optimism 
that these problems could be solved. A motion from the work council of the reactor producing 
enterprise KWU in Mülheim an der Ruhr quite clearly indicated that the workers' interest in cheap 
energy was to guarantee economic growth and increase in the standard of living. The highly positive 
evaluation of nuclear energy (El *  2.30) is connected with a rather productionist argumentation (ANPE 
= -16.7). The opposite is again true for the motion of the youth department (El ~ -2.46; ANPE = 
20.8). In more than three pages, the motion indicated, for example, that democratic freedom has 
already been endangered through the security measures. Nuclear power was seen as unnecessary and 
obstructing a reform of energy policy. The other two motions, slightly more positive and productionist, 
did not add much to the understanding of the different opinions at this IGM congress.
Eight speakers participated in the debate. Four disfavored the Entschließung, and three of them 
suggested to accept the motion of the youth department instead. A contribution, which had been made 
by a member of the local district in Darmstadt, was especially strong in its negative evaluation of 
nuclear energy and stressed elements of new politics (El -  -3.0; ANPE = 16.7). The three 
contributions in favor of the Entschließung, all favored nuclear energy and partially contained elements 
of productionist politics (up to ANPE = -12.5). Like the motions, the debate was rather diversified in 
terms of new and productionist politics (STD: motions ANPE *  15.7; debate ANPE = 10.9).
In 1977, the motions and debates were not only very diversified in terms of the evaluation of nuclear 
energy but also in their preference of productionist and new politics. However, in 1980, after the 
experience of the reactor accident at Three Mile Island, the Entschließung was very balanced in its 
evaluation of nuclear energy, in contrast to a clearly positive Entschließung in 1977. The positive 
evaluation in the motions mainly came from statements that stressed the advantage of nuclear energy 
for the economy. The Entschließung, however, also pointed out that nuclear energy had positive 
technological and labor market effects. The conviction was also expressed that the security could be 
improved to acceptable standards. Some of the motions and the contribution to the debate stressed 
the fact that nuclear energy could have negative effects on the employment situation. In the debate, 
critical voices also stressed the negative political and social aspects of nuclear energy. The actors of 
pro and con opinions were still the same: work councils of nuclear power enterprises, on the one hand, 
and the youth department, on the other. At this congress, IGM also did not limit the discussion about 
nuclear energy to pragmatic categories. In particular, security and political aspects of nuclear energy 
made nearly one third of all statements. However, the effect of nuclear power to the environment was 
only very seldom mentioned.
At the IGM congress in 1983, two very different motions were submitted. It was again an 
Entschließung and a motion by the youth department. The former was slightly positive towards nuclear 
energy (El » 1.0) whereas the latter was clearly negative (El = -2.14). The different evaluation of 
nuclear energy was also connected with different attitudes towards productionist and new politics 
(ANPE = -4.2 and 12.5 respectively). The approved Entschließung stressed the known aspects: 
positive energy (44 percent of all statements), labor market (11 percent) and security aspects (22
percent). However, more than ten percent of the arguments demanded the nationalization or state 
control of nuclear energy. The motion of the youth department based its negative evaluation on 
negative employment and security arguments. At this IGM congress, the positive nuclear energy 
/productionist attitudes were also in conflict with negative/new politics attitudes (STD: El « 2.22 and 
ANPE » 11.8). The actors were the same ones as earlier: the established power holder against youth 
department. The shift from clear positive attitudes towards nuclear energy to a more neutral evaluation 
of it in 1980 leveled off in a slightly positive evaluation in 1983. For the first time, the motion 
contained less political aspects than at the former congresses. Nevertheless, IGM gave quite a lot of 
attention to security and left-ideological aspects at this congress. However, there was no debate on 
nuclear energy at this congress.
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In 1986 the next IGM congress took place five months after the DGB congress in May 1986 where the 
DGB had taken a critical stand on nuclear power. In a relatively short time IGM experienced two 
changes in leadership. After 13 years, Eugen Loderer had resigned in 1983 and Hans Mayr took his 
place. Franz Steinkühler, charismatic and dynamic, was a new type of trade union leader. In 1983, he 
was deputy chairman, and would have the option to become chairman at the next congress. This 
became true at the IGM 1986 congress. As we wiN see the new chairman contributed quite 
substantially to the debate on nuclear power.
21 motions dealing with nuclear energy were submitted to the 1986 IGM congress. All of them were 
negative towards nuclear power. Most of them contained elements of new politics. None stressed 
productionist politics. A motion by the local district of Darmstadt was strongest in stressing elements 
of new politics (ANPE « 20.8), pointing out that a nuclear accident may erase whole continents, 
making life impossible for future generations. Other motions that scored quite high on the new politics 
scale were proposed by the youth department, and the districts of Augsburg and Amberg in Bavaria, 
where the controversial reprocessing plant was to be built. The former motion was taken as material, 
(with two others) the latter motions where seen as responded to (erledigt1 as 17 others. The approved 
Entschließung also evaluated nuclear energy negatively and contained elements of new politics (El » - 
1.4; ANPE = 12.5). The elements of new politics consist of: a réévaluation of the risk perception as 
unacceptable, the demand of a change in energy policy towards decentralization, and an international 
abolition of nuclear energy. By looking at the mean values, we can see that the Entschließung was 
more moderate in its critical evaluation of nuclear energy than the average of the motions but that it 
was above the average in terms of new politics (mean of all motions: El « -2.02; ANPE -  7.6).
Nine debate contributions were made. Three in favor of the Entschließung, three against it. One 
contribution wanted the more radical motion by the Darmstadt district to be accepted. All the 
contributions speaking against the approval of the Entschließung disfavored stronger nuclear energy 
than the rest of the debate contributions. In a lot of the speeches the Entschließung was seen as a 
confirmation of the phasing-out demand of the DGB. The DGB decision was seen as a compromise, a 
common dominator. The critical contributions questioned whether it could be the policy of IGM to 
remain on the level of this compromise or if it would be better to develop the DGB decision further. 
These contributions expressed the wish that IGM would become active in further political action 
against nuclear energy. If IGM would not attempt to act further in a progressive way, these 
contributions stressed, IGM could not be a political union. A member of the work council of the nuclear 
enterprise KWU, however, pointed out that an immediate phasing-out was not possible because due to 
a lack of alternatives. Furthermore, he stressed that the Entschließung was a compromise which he 
could accept, but he and workers in the nuclear industry could not go further. The last speaker was 
the new chairman Franz Steinkühler. Although his speech did not contain any elements of new or 
productionist politics, he was quite determined in his phasing-out demand with which he evaluated 
nuclear energy more negatively than the average of the speakers at the congress (El « -2.09; El mean
-  -1.54).
The motions (both approved and responded) differ from former years in that they stressed stronger 
than before the negative political and societal aspects and relied even less frequently on pragmatic 
aspects. Furthermore, it is interesting that the 1986 IGM congress had the lowest diversity rate in 
terms of the evaluation of nuclear energy and the conflict between productionist and new politics 
(STD: El -  1.0; ANPE -  4.8). It seems that the long existing intra-union opposition to nuclear energy 
could gain ground and that there was no pro nuclear faction which strongly voiced its opinion, in IGM 
in 1986. In so far this is only true as we rely on the presented material here. Certainly, there were 
workers in IGM whose job was directly dependent of nuclear energy and who have had difficulties in
accepting the anti-nuclear stand of their union. However, Over the years IGM has become a union that 
is relatively open to new political concerns. The potential for new politics has been already present in 
IGM since the mid-1970s, expressed mainly in motions by the youth department but also supported by 
larger groups in IGM represented by certain local departments. However, important is that also the 
power holders in IGM seem to have changed there attitudes. This is also connected with a generational 
change in the leading positions in IGM. The new chairman, Franz SteinkGhler, may represent a new 
kind of union leader who creates a new type of political union for modern society. In this context, it is 
also important to note that IGM intends to be a political union which is a sharp contrast to most of the 
Swedish unions.
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IG Bergbau und Energie (IGB)
A special feature of IGB is that it has a smaller union congress {Ge werkscha ft stag) every year. 
However, the following analysis includes only the bigger union congresses (GewerkschaftskongreS) 
which are held every forth year. Although energy policy is one of the major interests of IGB and has 
been debated throughout the years, nuclear energy was a subject in only several motions at the 
congresses in 1980, 1984, and 1988. Another unique feature of IGB concerning IGB congress motions 
is that they are relatively short and IGB is very careful not to reject motions.
In 1980, there were five motions proposed, three slightly critical to nuclear energy, one neutral, and 
one positive. The positive motion was slightly altered (to a more positive assessment of nuclear power) 
before it was to be accepted by the congress. The negative statements toward nuclear energy referred 
to the unsolved waste storage and the competition between coal and nuclear power. Coal was 
presented as the more reliable and national energy source. However, when it came to the high 
temperature reactor, the evaluation of nuclear power was more positive. The high temperature reactor 
makes coal refining possible. The high temperature reactor is often considered to be the only 
technological possibility to produce such high temperatures which are necessary for the coal refining. 
No motion gave any hint of new politics elements including the one that considered nuclear power 
more critically. In contrast, some motions stressed elements of productionist politics. For instance, it 
was stated that people who are against the peaceful use of nuclear energy are also against progress in 
general. Three motions were approved of at this congress, one with a slightly negative evaluation of 
nuclear energy (El « -1.0), one clearly positive (El = 1.77) and one more neutral (El = .14). The 
motion which was positive towards nuclear energy also contained elements of productionist politics 
(ANPE = 8.3). There was no debate about these motions.
Although there was some diversity concerning the evaluation of nuclear power, (STD: El = 1.44) there 
was none in respect to new and productionist politics (Std: ANPE = 0). IGB followed a clear 
productionist politics which was also expressed in the categories which were referred to. More than 90 
percent of the statements focused on pragmatic aspects.
This did not change much at the congress in 1984, where eight motions were proposed that contained 
statements on nuclear power. The evaluations (two slightly positive, four slightly negative, one clearly 
negative, and one without evaluation) were based on the same arguments that had been made four 
years ago. However, the most negative motion contained one statement of new politics. It demanded 
that costs for reprocessing and final waste storage should be included in the calculation of atomic 
electricity. Furthermore, it challenged the argument that electricity from nuclear energy is good for the 
environment and is cheap. The motion pointed out that filters for coal power stations would be cheaper 
than all the by-costs of nuclear energy. However, it would be too much to conclude that IGB is on its 
way to become a new politics union (ANPE of 4.2 is still rather marginal). All these motions were taken 
as material for a motion on energy and resource policy that itself did not contain any argument 
concerning nuclear power. However, the motions and the debate also focused more on the negative 
employment effect of nuclear energy for the coal sector. In particular, in the three debate 
contributions, approximately half of the arguments addressed this aspect. All in all, the treatment of 
nuclear power was a bit less pragmatic than four years ago although the vast majority still 
concentrated on pragmatic aspects (around 80 percent).
In 1988 16 motions contained arguments on nuclear power. All except one evaluated it negatively. 
However, the evaluation was rather moderate. Five motions also contained elements of new politics. 
Apart from the already known arguments of the other congresses, the motions stressed the 
unacceptable risks of nuclear energy and demanded the development of alternative energy resources.
As in most other unions, the motion of the youth department was extremely against nuclear energy
and contained more arguments of new politics than most of the other motions (El » -2.0; ANPE » 
8.3). However, all motions were taken as material for the approved motion proposed by the board. 
This motion did not contain any argument of productionist and new politics but was clear in its 
refection of nuclear energy (El « -1.33).
The debate included five contributions that evaluated nuclear energy or contained arguments for or 
against nuclear power. Like the motions also the debate contributions were moderate in their 
evaluation. Productionist politics was never really challenged, as one contribution pointed out: "we are 
certainly all for progress".
In all motions and the debate, labor market arguments played an important role. These arguments were 
more frequent in IGB than in any other union (around 20 percent). One can get the impression that the 
accident at Chernobyl revealed the latent conflict between coal and nuclear energy which had been 
concealed through government intervention. Coal was declared as the alternative for the German 
energy policy. Coal would be not only more reliable than other energy sources such as nuclear energy, 
but also less dangerous and more suitable for the environment. However, this conflict between coal 
and nuclear energy has never been a conflict between new and productionist politics in IGB.
If we consider the attitude towards new politics in IGB through time, we may conclude that IGB 
belongs to the more productionist trade unions In Germany. The positive attitude towards productionist 
politics did not change through the re-evaluation of nuclear energy after the Chernobyl accident and 
the OGB congress in 1986. The relation between nuclear energy and coal was never without 
reservations. The threat of nuclear power was too strong for the jobs in the floundering mining 
industry. There was never much enthusiasm about the development of nuclear energy in IGB as in the 
other energy unions. Only the high temperature reactor was considered as a technology that may open 
new possibilities for coal-refining. The shift from a positive assessment of nuclear energy to a negative 
one was not difficult for IGB. Now coal could increase its status in the energy policy in West Germany 
and the Jobs in the coal sector would become more stable. Coal should gain the reputation of being a 
reliable, national but also dean alternative to nuclear energy and also to other alternatives. However, 
the criticism of nuclear energy was still moderate. Probably because IGB did not want to endanger the 
current c6mpromises. A conservative government in Germany was still quite reluctant to prolong the 
contract for electricity production through coal. Furthermore, it was more than doubtful that a 
conservative government would initiate a phasing-out of nuclear energy. In terms of my analysis there 
are not many hints that there was a stable opposition against the productionist politics in IGB. The few 
new politics arguments did not challenge the productionist politics in any fundamental way. The 
pofitical and societal arguments were seldom referred to and if that had happened as at the congress 
debate in 1988, they were more in favor of a productionist development. At the congress in 1988, 
more than 80 percent of all statements referred to pragmatic categories.
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/G Chemie-Papier-Keramik (IGC)
Although IGC organizes workers in nuclear industries in the area of reprocessing and enrichment (larger 
sites are in Hanau: Nukem, Alkem, RBU, and Transnuklear), it came relatively late to a congressional 
decision on nuclear power, if one compares it with OTV (1972) or IGM (1977). At the congress in 
1980, IGC faced six motions dealing directly with nuclear energy and in the context of energy and 
economy policy. The motions were very diversified in both their evaluation of nuclear energy and their 
preference of new and productionist politics (STD: El = 2.0; ANPE = 16.2). As in IGM, the youth 
department was responsible for a motion that contained a lot of new politics elements (NP -  33.3) 
and evaluated nuclear energy very negatively (El » -2.57). Besides stressing the unacceptable risks 
inherent with the use of nuclear energy, the youth department elaborated the argument that nuclear 
energy would lead to a police state (351. Furthermore the motions pointed out that conserving energy 
would not lead to a decrease of "so-called welfare". Rather, new jobs would be created through
35 A quote from the motion of the youth board: "Our biggest worry about the further development 
of nuclear plants is the development of our democratic state towards a police state. Barbed wire, 
guarding around the dock, political examination of all employees that have direct or indirect access to 
nuclear plants are necessary in order to ensure a perfect supervision of nuclear plant." (Unsere größte 
Sorge bei der Weiterentwicklung von Atomkraftwerken ist aber die Entwicklung unseres
«em okratischen Staates zum Polizeistaat. Stacheldraht, Bewachung rund um die Uhr, politische iberprOfung aller Arbeitsnehmer, die direkt oder indirekt Zugang zu Atomkraftwerken haben, sind 
notwendig, um eine lückenlose Überwachung von Atomkraftwerken und Entsorgungsanlagen zu 
gewährleisten.)
insulation of flats etc. The immense high costs of research and development of nuclear energy would 
also hinder any attempt of the development of alternative energy technologies. Another motion from 
the shop stewards of BASF, Siegle, Stuttgart-Feuerbach of the district of Baden-Württemberg also 
stressed fundamental elements of new politics (ANPE = 29.2). The motion contains most of the 
arguments already mentioned in the one from the youth department but it also stressed the point that 
nuclear energy has been made to a myth in modem society that originated from a time in which 
unlimited growth seemed to be possible. Even more the motion said that this picture had only been 
instrumentalized to make profits. However, the board of the Baden-Württemberg district submitted a 
motion containing some elements of productionist politics and in contrast, to the former motion from 
the same district, it evaluated nuclear energy positively. The other motions came from the ‘ industry 
committee chemistry” (IndustriegruppenausschuB Chemie) that evaluated nuclear energy positively (El
*  1.5; ANPE = -4.2) and the district Hannoverisch-MOnden from the tyre firm Continental that were 
clearly negative towards nuclear power (El = -2.11; ANPE — 4.2). Following the motion committee all 
motions except the motion of the district board of Baden-Württemberg were responded to (erfedigt). 
The latter was included at material for the approved motion proposed by the board of IGC. The 
approved motion stressed the connection between energy supply and economic growth that would 
lead to the regaining of full-empk>yment. This motion contained some elements of productionist politics 
(ANPE -  *8.3) and evaluated nuclear energy dearly positive (El = 1.78).
The debate was also diversified (STD: El = 1.76; ANPE 11.7). Eleven contributions were made, five in 
favor of the board's motion and two against it. The motion of the board was not only criticized by 
contributions opposing nuclear energy but also by a speech which proposed that the motion of the 
Baden-Württemberg district board should be accepted (this speech did not come from the districtof the 
motion). This contribution pointed out that the motion of the board was rather unclear in its demands 
on waste storage and the necessity of nuclear power. Other contributions such as the one by the 
district of Saarhrücken contained new politics elements (ANPE » 12.5). This speech was extremely 
negative towards nuclear energy (El -  -2.89). In sharp contrast to this contribution, the speech of the 
chairman of the industry committee was most pronounced in its emphasize of productionist politics 
(ANPE *  -20.8; El « 1.27). Hermann Rappe, who would be later chairman, also contributed to the 
debate. He spoke as a representative of the board and pointed out that a limited extension of nuclear 
energy was necessary for a needed limited economic growth. In terms of the analytical aspects, his 
contribution scored clearly pro nuclear and productionist politics aspects dominated (El = 2.0; ANPE
-  -8.3).
The approved motion based its positive evaluation of nuclear energy on energy political (44.4 percent) 
and economic aspects (33.3). Security and environmental aspects were completely neglected. 
However, the approved motion conceded negative political and societal aspects. The debate and the 
other motions also stressed the other categories, in particular security aspects. We may conclude that 
the debate and general discussion on nuclear energy was rather complex at the 1980 IGC congress but 
that the approved motion stressed the pragmatic categories more. Furthermore, we can also see that 
IGC had a diversified membership in terms of new and productionist politics. The promoters of new 
politics were the youth board and lower levels of the Baden-Württemberg district. Other individuals 
also voiced their opinions in favor of new politics. However, strong and influential groups in IGC 
(industry committee, board) were in favor of productionist politics and nuclear power. As it was at the 
IGM congress in 1977, the approved motion proposed by the IGC board was decisively more positive 
towards nuclear energy than all other proposals. Also the personal engagement of the future chairman 
Hermann Rappe influenced the decision of IGC towards productionist politics.
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At the congress in 1984, one motion of the board on economic policy that contained some evaluations 
on nuclear energy was approved of without further debate. The motion only stressed pragmatic 
categories. It emphasized the importance of an economic growth policy. In terms of the evaluation of 
nuclear power and productionist politics, there were no changes in comparison to the approved motion 
of 1980 (El -  2.0; ANPE -8.3).
How did IGC interpret DGB's phasing-out decision at its congress in September 1988? There were 
twelve motions proposed to the congress. Some were very definite in their rejection of nuclear power. 
Most surprising was the extremely negative evaluation of nuclear energy by one of the three motions 
proposed by the union local of Hanau (El = -2.82). The nuclear firms in Hanau had been shaken by 
scandals because of their treatment of nuclear material. Often they faced the threat of closing down
due to corruption. Th« motion stemming from a firm of the union local demanded a step by step 
phasing-out because scandals throughout the years had proven that nuclear energy was impossible to 
control and to master. The other two motions of the board of Hanau's local union were much less 
opposing of nuclear power. However, they stressed that the fast breeder and the reprocessing plant 
were not necessary. They demanded a thorough investigation of the scandals at the nuclear firms in 
Hanau, and they also pointed out that a fast shut-down would not be possible. The most radical 
motion in terms of new politics was proposed by the union local of Schwandorf (ANPE -  20.8). At 
Schwandorf, a German reprocessing plant (Wackersdorf) was to be constructed. The motion demanded 
a phasing-out as soon as possible. The reasons given for this were manifold: nuclear energy would 
lead to conditions similar to a civil war ibOrgerkriegsihnliChe ZustSnde). The police had misused its 
competence and proved that the "atomic state" with police supervision is close. The incidents in Hanau 
were also said to have proven that nuclear energy is neither technologically nor humanly possible to 
control. The proposed motion by the district Nordmark-Berlin also contained several elements of new 
politics (ANPE » 16.7). The motions of the Baden-Württemberg district, the youth department, and 
the union local of Bielefeld contained several elements of new politics (ANPE -  12.5). All these 
motions except the most negative motion of the Hanau union local (responded to) and the one of the 
board of the Hanau union local (approved of) were taken as material to the energy commission of the 
IGC board. The motion proposed by the K3C board evaluated nuclear energy very moderately (El -  
.03). In linguistic terms, it is interesting that the motion avoided to speak of a phasing-out {Ausstieg) 
but rather referred to a conversion (Umstieg) from nuclear energy to other energy resources. The 
motion stressed the importance of energy and cheap energy prices for the economy of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Furthermore, it pointed also out that nuclear fusion would be based on nuclear 
technologies. Therefore, the motion concluded, it would not be feasible to give up nuclear energy at 
the present time. Nevertheless, IGC would also stay behind the decision of a step by step phasing-out 
of the nuclear energy "... in the form we know it today* (Kemtechnohgie gegenwärtiger Prägung). 
Words dearly against nuclear technologies were only said against the fast breeder and the 
reprocessing plant. This motion (MP *  8.3) was accepted, which like two others were very moderate 
in its evaluation of nuclear energy. It did not contain any statements of new or productionist politics (E! 
= .4 and-1.0).
At the congress in 1988 we can also identify substantial differences between all proposed motions and 
the approved ones, and this in both their evaluation of nuclear energy and new and productionist 
politics (means of all motions: El « -1.75; ANPE « 9.7; means of approved motions: El *  -.19; ANPE 
•4.2). Without any debate, the congress followed the suggestion of the motion committee.
In summation: the divergence between approved and other motions in IGC is very extreme. The 
motions did not only differ in their judgement of nuclear energy and new and old politics but also in 
their communication. The approved motions restrict their argument to more than 70 percent on 
pragmatic levels, whereas all motions refer to this level only at 55 percent. In particular, considering 
the approved motion of the IGC board, it seems to be doubtful that IGC supported a phasing-out of 
nuclear energy, although it literally used the phrase of "phasing-out as soon as possible". Doubts come 
up when expressions are used like "we need substitutes for nuclear technology as we know it today*. 
This phrasing can lead to all kinds of interpretation. These doubts are confirmed by the fact that IGC 
still sticks quite firmly to productionist politics strategies for the further development of industrial 
societies. Throughout the years, there has been no substantial change in IGC's productionist politics. 
There might be some changes concerning alternative energy resources which were more accepted by 
all political actors in the 1980's than in the 1970's. But the ANPE-lndex shows that IGC still belongs 
to the productionist trade unions in Germany. However, there was a deep cleavage within IGC 
between some districts and the youth board, on the one hand, and influential occupational groups and 
the board, on the other. In particular the union leader Hermann Rappe stood firmly for a productionist 
politics of his union.
Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr (ÖTV)
ÖTV had nuclear energy quite early on their congressional agenda. Firstly, ÖTV dealt with nuclear 
energy in a motion at the congress in 1972 and at all following congresses in 1976, 1980, 1984, and
1988, nuclear power gained congressional attention. At three of these congresses ÖTV specified its 
attitude to this issue in the way that motions concerning nuclear energy were approved of.
Even before the politicization of the energy policy, the ÖTV board proposed a motion more than ten 
pages long to the congress in 1972. This motion on energy policy exclusively stressed positive aspects
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of nuclear power. It evaluated nuclear energy clearly positive (El = 1.90) and also contained a lot of 
elements of productionist politics (ANPE = *25.0). It was the first time that the connection between 
economic growth, energy supply, and employment was made explicit in a congress motion on nuclear 
energy. In order to reach this goal, cheap energy was considered necessary. The motion also criticized 
the obstruction and the delays of the nuclear plant construction through protest actions. However, no 
word was said about the reasons of the protest. The motion was accepted only with minor editorial 
alterations and it was not debated (36).
The issue was debated in a rather complex manner. Pragmatic statements made only around 40 
percent of the statements. In particular, nuclear energy was seen as an energy resource that was safe, 
reliable, environmentally safe and supportive for a desired social development. For instance, nuclear 
power was also considered to be an appropriate technology for further desired centralization and 
technological development. In environmental terms, nuclear energy would also be superior to fossil 
energy resources and the risks of accidents were viewed as lower than those of other technologies. 
The conclusion was that the governments on the federative and county levels as well as the European 
commission should promote nuclear power. However, ÖTV demanded state supervision in the energy 
sector and even nationalization of energy enterprises when necessary. Simultaneously, it also 
demanded free competition in the energy sector.
In 1976, an approved Entschließung on energy policy evaluated nuclear energy positively (El = 1.67), 
however, it did not mention elements of new or productionist politics. This motion conceded that a 
'dialogue with the population” would be necessary in order to activate the energy program as soon as 
possible. This motion expressed the conviction that the protest against nuclear energy was based on a 
misinterpretation of the protesters which could be easily resolved. The motion also contained a 
statement that was often repeated in formulations of other trade unions • in modified versions even 
after Chernobyl: if the security of the employees and the population (in this order; D.J.) is guaranteed 
during the construction and operation of nuclear plants nuclear energy could receive priority. However, 
the motion • like the later mainstream argumentation - did not give any clues how this vague statement 
should be used in practical policy. It made interpretation possible for a wide range of attitudes.
The debate consisted of only one contribution from a member of the energy sector. He pointed out that 
the formulation above mentioned concerning the security of nuclear energy may lead to the impression 
that nuclear power has safety risks. He pointed out that the workers in nuclear plants are completely 
convinced of the safety of nuclear power which could be guaranteed through the strict - the strictest in 
the world * examinations of the German administration.
As in 1972, ÖTV debated nuclear energy in relatively complex terms in 1976. Even if the safety of 
nuclear plants was perceived as guaranteed, it was conceded that nuclear energy needed a social 
dialogue. However, the debate in the unions was very unified. Nobody voiced critical opinions towards 
nuclear energy or the concept of a productionist society. This was to be changed at the next ÖTV 
congress.
In the 1980s, ÖTV faced an intra-union conflict like most of the other German unions. 20 motions 
were proposed at the 1980 congress which contained very different standpoints (STD: El = 1.94; 
ANPE = 13.0). The district of Siegburg (three motions with the highest score of El = -2.75; ANPE = 
16.7), Göttingen (El = -2.75; ANPE = 16.7) and Hannover (four motions: El *  -3.0; ANPE = 16.7) 
most strongly favored elements of new politics and opposed nuclear energy. All these motions 
originated from county districts (Kreisdelegiertenkonferenz), basic organizational units of the union at 
the local level. Of the thirteen motions proposed by the county districts, only two evaluated nuclear 
energy positively (Lübeck and Düsseldorf). In contrast, the higher union level of the district 
conferences (Bezirkskonferenz) evaluated nuclear energy positively. Only one out of six 
(Niedersachsen: El ~ -1.4; ANPE -  16.7) evaluated nuclear power negatively. On the district level 
{Bezirke), ÖTV also had it strongest promoters of nuclear energy. In particular, the district Nordwest (El 
= 2.13; ANPE *  -12.5), Niedersachsen (El *  1.69; ANPE *  -12.5), and Hessen (El *  1.9; ANPE = 
•16.7) belonged to the strongholds of productionist politics. An Entschließung on energy policy was 
proposed by the district of Baden-Württemberg. Its evaluation towards nuclear energy was also 
positive (El -  1.21) and it contained no element of new politics (ANPE = -12.5). However, this 
version of the Entschließung could not gain the approval of the congress. A supplement (Ergänzung) to
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36 The congress material of this congress was not complete at the archives. The accessible 
material gives no hint that there was a debate.
the Entschließung was included that pointed out that ÖTV takes the concerns of many people 
seriously, and that ÖTV is not biased or ideological, and not on the side of those who make their profit 
through nuclear power. Furthermore, it stressed that the discussion on nuclear energy should take new 
scientific results into consideration and should be continued. This left the decision open for further 
alterations. The modified version of the Entschließung contained some elements of new politics 
although elements of productionist politics dominated over elements of new politics (NP •  4.2; ANPE 
= 8.3). In terms of the evaluation of nuclear energy evaluation, the approved version was not as 
positive as the original Erschließung (El = .93).
The debate counted 15 contributions, four in favor and five against nuclear energy (the rest without 
evaluations). As one can expect from the motions, the debate was very diversified in its evaluation of 
nuclear energy and new and productionist politics (STD: El -  1.95; ANPE -  11.5). Speeches against 
nuclear energy spoke against the trend of accepting this technology because one is afraid to lose jobs. 
Nuclear power would have the potential to destroy the base for the biological existence of human-kind 
(Heinrich Halberstadt). On the other hand, we can find nearly ideal-typical statements of productionist 
politics that stress the connection between full-empk>yment, economic growth, increased energy 
supplies etc. (37). Heinz Kluncker, chairman of ÖTV, also contributed to the debate. His long speech 
(four pages) outnumbered all other debate contributions in its emphasis of elements of productionist 
politics (ANPE = -25.0): The overall evaluation of nuclear energy was also clearly positive (El *  1.82) 
(38). At that time, Heinz Kluncker was a member of the board of the nuclear counci (Nuldearrat). He 
reported of an investigation trip to the USA which he took in order to assess the accident at Three Mile 
Island. He stressed the fact that trade unions in other countries would support nuclear power. 
According to Heinz Kluncker, the Swedish trade unions would support nuclear power in their majority 
as do the American unions. He pointed out that the visions of an 'Atomstaat* (Atomic State) is based 
on emotions which in turn would not be a good alternative for rational actions. He also considered the 
security risks of nuclear power to be acceptable.
The comparison of all motions (and the debate) and the approved Entschließung shows that it 
evaluated nuclear power positively, contrasting to the majority of the expressed opinions at the 
congress. The Entschließung also focuses much more on economic aspects than the rest of the 
contributions. In particular, environmental and societal aspects are completely neglected in the 
approved Entschließung. At the 1980 congress of ÖTV, we can conclude that the major opposition 
against nuclear energy and the potential for new politics is located at the lowest union level, the 
county districts. On the higher level, more productionist attitudes exist. In particular, the chairman of 
ÖTV influenced the congress towards a productionist politics.
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Four years later at the 1984 congress, eleven motions were submitted which contained statements on 
nuclear power. Again they were very diversified in terms of both their evaluation of nuclear energy and 
new and productionist politics (STD: El -  1.31; ANPE » 10.2). Although at this congress no motion 
that focused on nuclear energy was approved of, one can identify a fundamental shift of the motions 
which were proposed by the districts. In 1980, these motions were mainly positive towards nuclear 
energy and contained elements of productionist politics. In 1984 in contrast, except from one motion 
(Rheinlandpfalz), all motions of the districts evaluated nuclear energy negatively and contained more 
new politics elements than productionist. However, the motions which were more positively decided
37 One member, Hans Kaifer, made this connection explicit: 'Full-employment, dear colleagues, is 
the base for our demand of the right of work. ... In order to reach the aim of full-employment, 
however, an active and qualitative growth policy is necessary. But, more growth means simultaneously 
more energy. People demanding less growth or even zero-growth because of increased energy 
demands may have solved the social question personally but for our society we risk the social peace.* 
(Vollbeschäftigung, liebe Kolleginen und Kollegen, ist die Grundlage des von uns immer wieder 
geforderten Rechts auf Arbeit. ... Um allerdings das Ziel der Vollbeschäftigung zu erreichen, ist eine 
aktive und qualitative Wachstumspolitik die Voraussetzung. Mehr Wachtstum heißt aber auch zugleich 
mehr Energie. Wer wegen des steigenden Energiebedarfs weniger Wachstum oder gar Nullwachstum 
fordert, für den mag zwar persönlich die soziale Frage gelöst sein, für unsere Gesellschaft hingegen 
gerät der soziale Fneden in Gefahr.)
38 Heinz Kluncker was heavily criticized because he gave his speech after the list of speeches had 
been closed. He announced that his just wanted to contribute for clarification. These contributions are
Rossible according to the constitution of OTV even when the list of speakers is already closed, owever, as some delegates saw it, he misused this right and held a devoted speech in favor of 
nuclear power.
upon by the congress [39] were in favor of or less critical towards nuclear power and contained fewer 
elements of new politics. One of the two motions that contained new politics elements was altered 
from a NP *= 25.0 in its original version to a version with a NP of 4.2 which was passed on as 
material.
The motions with the most elements of new politics came from the district of Niedersachsen (ANPE = 
25.0), and Bayern, and the county Nürnberg (both ANPE = 20.8). The motions of the districts of 
Hessen, the county of Darmstadt and the youth board also contained elements of new politics. 
However, the youth board did not play an outstanding role in ÖTV as in some other unions. The 
positive and more productionist motions came from the district of Rheinland Pfalz and the county of 
Salzgitter. The statistics of all motions show that negative attitudes towards nuclear energy were 
dominant and that elements of new politics were clearly preferred over elements of productionist 
politics (means: El = -1.53; ANPE -  12.5).
The debate was also diversified (STD: El *  1.44; ANPE = 9.3). However, the debate contributions 
contained more elements of productionist politics than the motions. In particular, the contributions of 
Kart Heinz Hoffmann, deputy chairman and energy expert of ÖTV, and of Monika Wulf-Mathies, the 
new chair-person of ÖTV, contained elements of productionist politics (El =* 2.0; ANPE = -8.3; and El
-  .64; ANPE -  -16.7 respectively).
At the 1984 congress, the motions and debates also contained quite a lot of non-pragmatic aspects so 
that it seems fair to say that ÖTV is not fixed to a pragmatic communication on the nuclear power 
issue. However, this trend weakened in 1984. An important change between the 1980 and 1984 
congresses is the shift towards elements of new politics in higher union levels. This may have been 
one important precondition for the more substantial shift in 1988.
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At the congress in 1988, ÖTV had to translate DGB's decision to phase-out of nuclear energy into its 
union policy. The congress had to deal with 34 motions (35 versions of motions). In most of them, 
nuclear power was the major concern. Although the statistics are not very impressive in terms of the 
diversification of this congress there was a fundamental cleavage between new and productionist 
politics in ÖTV (STD: El -  1.10; ANPE = 8.0). Except two, all motions evaluated nuclear energy 
negatively. However, in terms of new and productionist politics they vary substantially. The motions 
with the highest degree of new politics elements were proposed by the county of Wiesbaden and the 
district of Nordrhein Westfalen I (NP = 29.2 and 33.3 respectively). In particular, the former motion, 
which was considered as responded to, was very concrete in its formulation of an immediate phasing- 
out by stressing the negative genetic effects, high costs, and risk of nuclear energy among others. 
Within ÖTV there was some confusion and disagreement about DGB's decision to phase-out of nuclear 
energy as in other unions. They did not know what the phasing-out would mean in concrete terms. In 
particular, the timing of a phasing-out caused a lot of disagreement.
The two motions which evaluated nuclear energy positively both contained elements of productionist 
politics and were proposed by the county of Düren (MP = 8.3). The motion from the youth 
department was again not more critical to nuclear energy or productionist politics than the other critical 
motions (El = -2.0 and -3.0; but only ANPE = 0). The average evaluation of nuclear energy of the six 
approved motions was more critical towards nuclear energy than the average of all motions (El means: 
approved *  1.97; all « 1.73). The approved motions also contained more elements of new politics 
than the rest of the motions (ANPE mean: approved = 14.6; all -  9.6). For instance, the approved 
motion from the ÖTV board postulated that a phasing-out of nuclear power would be necessary and 
possible. No further subsidies for nuclear energy should be granted and the atomic laws (Atomgesetze) 
should be changed so that a precondition for a shut-down would be established. For that ÖTV would 
support a re-orientation of the energy policy. More radical is the previously mentioned and approved 
motion from the district Nordrhein Westfalen I that addressed the question of nuclear energy and the 
Third World. The motion stressed the negative function of nuclear energy for these countries: nuclear 
energy would threaten and diminish life chances in developing countries and - through possible 
accidents of nuclear plants - not only there but also in Germany. A phasing-out in Germany also would 
not damage life and working conditions in the Third World countries but rather improve them. A
39 No motion that contained statements over nuclear energy was approved of at the congress. 
However, five motions were taken as material to an approved motion that did not contain statements 
on nuclear energy. The other six were rejected or responded to.
phasing-out of nuclear energy would finally create less problems for future generations. The motion 
also stressed that nuclear energy would be the most expensive method of electricity production when 
one takes the waste (Entsorgung) costs into the account. The approved motion of the Berlin district 
pointed out that the risks of nuclear power as demonstrated by the catastrophe at Chernobyl would be 
no longer acceptable and that a German phasing-out would be important to set a worldwide signal. 
However, the congress followed the suggestion of the motion committee and considered more radical 
motions as responded to (no motion was rejected). However, that was also true for the motions that 
were less negative towards nuclear energy.
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Among others, the debate circled around two versions of a motion of the board. The two motions 
were quite similar in their evaluation of nuclear energy. However some delegates wished for an 
approved motion that would be more concrete for further political steps (40]. Contributions more 
critical of nuclear energy were quite emotional (see for instance the contribution by Heiner Halberstadt 
or Ingeborg Schulz). All contributions more in favor of nuclear energy considered the original version of 
the motion as suggested by the board as a compromise. These contributions stressed the necessity 
that the employees in nuclear plants also need the solidarity of their union. What these members need, 
would be a longer phasing-out period as suggested by many others. However, it was dear that these 
motions opened the floor for different interpretations. For instance, one contribution pointed out that 
the phasing-out suggestion would not affect certain kinds of reactors such as the high temperature 
reactor. Other contributions stressed that a shut-down of nuclear plants could only happen when 
alternatives are available - and that would not be the case by now. From the 20 contributions, thirteen 
were against and three in favor of nuclear power. In eight contributions, elements of new politics 
dominated and in three, elements of productionist politics. Karl Heinz Hoffmann, the energy expert of 
ÖTV, and Monika Wulf-Mathies also contributed to the debate. Both speeches were (slightly) against 
nuclear energy but were rather modest in their adoption of elements of new politics (El -  -.93; and - 
1.5; ANPE » 4.2; and 0). Karl Heinz Hoffmann confirmed the decision of the DGB to phase-out of 
nuclear energy. However, he pointed out that the ÖTV would have to take into the account the worries 
of those who wish to shut-down nuclear power immediately, and those who would be worried about 
their jobs. He also mentioned that ÖTV must see the political constraints. National (conservative 
government), international (the European Common Market) but also organizational factors (compromise 
with other unions) would obstruct a more radical policy of ÖTV. Monika Wulf-Mathies also stressed 
the necessity of the solidarity of ÖTV with the members who are employed in nuclear plants. These 
employees had made enormous sacrifices in order to make a compromise possible. The chair-person of 
ÖTV also stressed the poGtical constraints mentioned by Karl Heinz Hoffmann. However, in her 
demand she was determined that it would be necessary to phase-out of nuclear energy, but she 
befieved that this way would only be successful if it was made in agreement with the employees in the 
energy sector.
At this congress, ÖTV also kept to its complexity in communication. Security, societal and political 
aspects played an important role, p articu larly  in the approved motions. Although the decisions taken by 
ÖTV still left a wide range of interpretations open, it is astonishing how critical ÖTV became of nuclear 
energy through the years, considering the fact that members of OTV are directly affected by a shut­
down of nuclear energy. ÖTV is a trade union that changed its policy from a clear protagonist's 
position concerning nuclear power and productionist politics to the viewpoint of a more radical union 
opposing nuclear energy and adopting elements of new politics. The proponents of new politics in ÖTV 
were originally in the counties. They first voiced their opinions at the 1980 congress. At the 
congresses in 1972 and 1976, no indication of new politics could have been identified before at the 
congresses of ÖTV. However, new politics penetrated into higher union levels, and at the 1984 
congress the majority of the districts expressed in one way or the other their sympathy for new politics 
concerns. This was the precondition for a "radical* change in 1988. It is a bit surprising that the youth 
department of ÖTV were rather passive in promoting elements of new politics. Of course, the motions 
of the youth department were negative towards nuclear energy and contained elements of new politics 
but they were not as outstanding in this as the motions of the youth departments of other unions. 
However, the board expressed through Karl Heinz Hoffmann and also Monika Wulf-Mathies that it was 
not eager to become a protagonist of new politics. In that, ÖTV differs fundamentally from IGM whose
40 That can also be seen from the statistics. The proposed version by the board and the version 
with the suggested alternations scores relatively similar in their evaluation of nuclear energy but differs 
more strongly in terms of the adoption of elements of new politics (El -  -1.35 and -1.29; ANPE = 8.3 
and 12.5 respectively).
chairman expressed rather clearly his sympathy for elements of new politics. One reason for this 
hesitation of OTV board members may be that ÖTV's members in the energy sector are better 
organized than members in other sectors of OTV, and that their density rate has declined over the last 
decades (Armingeon, 1988: 80, 167-68, 210). Nevertheless, this group which makes around 10 
percent of the membership of ÖTV may still be a group that favors nuclear energy. Like the ST union in 
Sweden, ÖTV settled the conflict between productionist and new politics by shifting towards a 
preference of new politics. Whether that will lead to further intra-organizational tension, cannot be 
decided at this point in time.
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Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen (HBV)
We address now the question if and how those German unions whose members' occupation and 
industries are not directly affected by energy policy deal with the issue of nuclear power. To start with, 
I wish to have a closer look at the German Trade, Banking and Insurance union. HBV had motions that 
dealt with nuclear energy at three of its congresses. The first time in 1980 the debate was hot and 
especially diversified. 16 motions were submitted. Four of them were relatively balanced in their 
evaluation of nuclear energy or did not express an evaluative statement (El = -.31 and .25), three 
were very moderate in its negative evaluation (twice -1.0* and -1.25), while the rest expressed more 
dear criticism of nuclear power (from -1.5 to *2.44). The motion committee suggested to approve of 
the Entschließung of the union board (Gewerkschaftsausschußi. Although this Entschließung was 
critical towards nuclear energy, it contained a lot of productionist politics elements (El = -.31; ANPE
-  -20.8). The motion conceded that nuclear energy would be associated with ecological, political and 
social risks but this may not lead to a rejection of nuclear energy because that would result in a very 
high damage of the national economy. A precondition for solving the problem of unemployment would 
be an active economic growth policy. However, if investigations may prove that nuclear energy is not 
sufficiently safe, the operation of nuclear power should be stopped in Germany and abroad. The 
motion was challenged by most other motions at this congress. In particular the motions of the state 
district of Baden-WQrttemberg, Hessen, and the Hamburg district contained elements of new politics 
(ANPE = 33.3; 20.8; and 29.2 respectively). The motions referred to already known arguments. 
Nuclear energy is too expensive, when waste and reconstruction costs are induded. It is a burden for 
future generations, and it also implies the problem of state surveillance and control of workers. 
Furthermore, they also questioned the necessity of nuclear energy for the improvement of the living 
standard and made associations to the destructive forces of atomic bombs. One aspect, however, that 
had not been stressed so much in motions of other unions was the problem of nuclear plant 
reconstruction. The motion of the youth department was quite clear in its rejection of nuclear energy 
and its preference of elements of new politics (El = -2.0; ANPE = 12.5). The congress experienced a 
very hot debate. Eight of the 18 contributions explicitly rejected the boards Entschließung and only 
three spoke in its favor. The contribution of the youth board (Rudiger Beins) contained the most 
elements of new politics and was one of the most negative evaluations of nuclear energy (El = -2.10; 
ANPE = 25.0). On the other hand, a speaker from the Nordrhein Westfalen district and the chairman 
of another district were in favor of the Entschließung. Their contributions also contained several 
productionist politics elements (ANPE -  -12.5; -4.2 respectively). The debate led to a revision of the 
motion committee's suggestion. The issue should be further debated in the union committees. In order 
to do that, all motions and the debate should be taken as material. However, one motion of the Baden- 
Württemberg district was approved of. The Baden-Württemberg district was very active in proposing 
motions on nuclear energy to the congress (from the 16 motions six and additional five of local 
districts came from Baden-Württemberg). However, the approved motion was rather unclear in both its 
evaluation of nuclear energy and political statements (El = -1.0*; ANPE = none).
The motions and debate in HBV were quite complex and did not stick to pragmatic categories. They 
especially referred to security but also to political and social aspects. However, there was a strong 
disagreement between the motions about productionist and new politics and not so much in terms of 
the evaluation of nuclear power (STD: El = 0.69; ANPE = 14.9). The conflict line was between the 
union board whose proposed Entschließung contained many elements of productionist politics and 
several state and local districts. However, the pressure of these districts led to a revision of the 
committee board's proposition. Although the youth department belonged to those strongly opposing 
nuclear energy, it did not play a major role in the debate on new politics in HBV. This was mainly done 
by individual districts.
At the congress in 1984, nuclear energy played only a minor part in the motion Unitiattvantrag) on 
environmental and energy policy. The motion stressed the necessity of renewable energy resources, 
but in terms of nuclear power it pointed out that it should be limited to a very small amount, which 
was to be seen as absolutely necessary (41]. This motion mainly argued on the pragmatic level [42]
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The next congress took place in October/November 1988. Five motions were proposed to the 
congress. All extremely negative towards nuclear energy and all contained several elements of new 
politics (means: El = -2.55; ANPE -  12.5). Apart from one rejected motion, which demanded in brief 
and provocative terms a phasing-out, all other motions were responded to. Most of these motions 
came from state districts (Niedersachsen and Baden-Württemberg) but one was also proposed by the 
women's committee. This motion was extreme in its negative evaluation of nuclear energy but did not 
concern itself with new politics more than the average (El — -2.71; ANPE -  12.5). After several 
editorial alterations, the motion proposed by the Nordrhein Westfalen district was approved of. From all 
proposals, it contained the most elements of new politics {ANPE -  16.7). It demanded the immediate 
phasing-out of nuclear energy. After the 1986 DGB congress, it was clear that a phasing-out should 
take place. As mentioned above in the following opinion making process in the trade unions, 
disagreement occurred about the time range of the phasing-out. HBV took a more radical stand in this 
debate. It demanded an immediate phasing-out. In 1988, this attitude was not challenged very much in 
HBV (STD: El -  .37; ANPE = 5.3). As in other unions conflict diminished, when the board gave up its 
strict pro-nuclear stand and its preference for productionist politics. The debate contained only one 
contribution by the district of Nordrhein Westfalen that supported the motion which had evaluated 
nuclear energy negatively (El = -2.33). However, it contained no statement concerning productionist 
and new politics.
In summation: HBV changed its opinion concerning new and productionist politics over the last decade. 
However, nuclear energy was always seen in a critical light. When HBV took up the debate in the early 
1980s, there was a disagreement between board members and individual districts, above all from 
Baden-Württemberg. This disagreement led to heavy internal debates. However, the HBV board 
attempted to compromise. At the next congress the issue was not as prevalent as four years ago and a 
motion mainly concerned with environmental and energy policy was approved of, that evaluated 
nuclear energy rather neutrally. This motion had no profile concerning new and productionist politics.
In 1988, the union was then quite clear in both its negative evaluation of nuclear energy and in its 
preference of elements of new politics.
IG Druck und Papier (IGD)
At three conferences IGD dealt with nuclear energy in a quite controversial manner. In 1977 eight 
motions had already been proposed that dealt with nuclear power. Three of them were positive and 
five negative towards nuclear energy. The positive motion also contained some elements of 
productionist politics. For instance, it was stressed that energy supply and economic growth would be 
necessary for employment. The originally proposed Entschließung by the district of Rheinland-Pfalz- 
Saar were altered through a supplement motion as a result of the congress debate. These alterations 
led to a slightly more moderate version of the still positive motion (El *  1.11; ANPE *  -4.2). 
However, the five other motions were partially extreme in their rejection of nuclear energy by stressing 
new politics aspects. For instance, the motion of the youth board pointed out that the accidents in 
German nuclear plants between 1972 and 1976 were reason enough to phase-out. The motion that 
was considered as responded to, stressed the negative employment effects of nuclear power and
41 This formulation has often been used in all trade unions. However, its interpretation is difficult 
in the political practice and has most often been used as a support of nuclear development. In ironic 
terms one may say - and probably one comes quite close to the real stand of DGB unions at this time * 
that the union took a "clear yes-but” standpoint. The following sentence from the HBV motion makes 
this ambivalence clear: "The government is asked to work for an energy political program that 
contains: ... The reduction o f  the use of nuclear energy to an absolutely necessary level, the 
improvement of safety in the application and solving of the nuclear waste problem." (Die 
Bundesregierung wird aufgefordert, ein energiepolitisches Programm zu entwickeln und umzusetzen, 
das insbesondere gekennzeichnet ist: ... Reduzierung der Nutzung der Kernenergie auf das 
unumgängliche Ausmaß, Verbesserung der Sicherheit bei deren Verwendung und Lösung des Problems 
der nuklearen Entsorgung.)
42 There was no debate available in the congress protocol.
emphasized that if the money had been spent for other energy resources, it would have cheaply 
created more jobs.
In the debate, two speakers opposed nuclear energy and the suggested Entschließung and 
recommended the approval of the motion of the youth department. The contribution from the district 
that proposed the Entschließung defended their motion against the one of the youth board. The main 
argument was that the Entschließung had a broader political view than the motion of the youth 
department that only looked at nuclear energy without seeing the whole energy political context. With 
only a few votes against it, the congress supported the suggestion of the motion committee and 
accepted the Entschließung with the above mentioned alterations.
We can recognize that the opinion in IGO was quite diversified about the issue. However, it was never 
expressed in very strong terms as, for instance, in IGM, IGC or ÖTV (STO: El « 1.75; ANPE » 8.4). 
On the one hand, there was the majority of IGO in favor of nuclear energy (however with certain 
reservations). On the other hand, several state districts and the youth department opposed this official 
strategy by stressing new politics aspects. In all motions no matter whether positive or negative, IGO 
stressed the importance that nuclear energy should be controlled by co-determination and through 
society. Labor market effects also gained surprisingly strong attention. However, more than two thirds 
of the statements focused on pragmatic aspects. In sharp contrast to the Swedish printer union, IGD 
did not debate nuclear energy in a more complex and critical manner at the 1977 congress. The 
approved motion was rather productionist and did not contain any elements of new politics.
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At the congress in 1980 two motions were proposed. Both evaluated nuclear energy negatively and 
both contained elements of new politics. The motions stressed the danger of nuclear power and the 
risks for future generations. However, the motion by the district of Nordrhein Westfalen was more 
moderate and demanded a stop of construction and operation of nuclear plants until clarification was 
reached about its safety (El « -1.71; ANPE *  4.2). The other motion by the youth department was 
more extreme (El = -2.54; ANPE ~ 8.3). It demanded a shut-down of all nuclear plants. The reasons 
given stressed security risks and environmental problems, which even occur when nuclear plants run 
without complocation because radiation is also released during normal operation. Other reasons given 
were profit interest of capital, the rationalization effect for jobs and the unsolved final waste storage.
In seven speeches, these motions were debated. Three in favor of the motion of the youth department 
and two were in favor of the motion of the Nordrhein Westfalen district. However, all contributions 
that evaluated nuclear energy were negative and no productionist politics statement was voiced. But 
vital disagreement existed about the degree to which IGD should disfavor nuclear power. At the end, 
the congress accepted a revised suggestion of the motion committee and approved the more moderate 
motion of the Nordrhein Westfalen district.
Like three years before, IGD decided for the more positive motion and opposed the suggestion of the 
youth department that most strongly challenged the majority opinion in IGD. But this time the 
evaluation was negative. Elements of new politics also dominated but to a lesser degree in the 
approved motion (mean: all motions ANPE -  6.3; approved motion ANPE = 4.2). The disagreement 
on nuclear energy and new and productionist politics in the motions was rather moderate (STD: El = 
.58,; ANPE = 2.9). However, the debate was a bit more diversified in these terms but it would be too 
much to say that the issue created a cleavage in IGD (STD: El = .36; ANPE = 6.4). Again property 
and societal control over nuclear energy was one of the major concerns of IGD. Security, political, and 
societal aspects were also important so that it is fair to say that IGD debated the issue in a rather 
complex manner this time. IGD seems to have shifted from a committed productionist union to a 
moderately open union for new politics concerns. In particular in the debate, elements of new politics 
were often mentioned (mean: ANPE = 11.1). However, the approved stand was least penetrated by 
new politics concerns. At the next congress in 1983, nuclear energy was not on the agenda.
In October 1986, IGD experienced a dramatic dispute over the six proposed motions. All motions were 
extremely negative to nuclear energy and clearly on the new politics side (mean of El = -2.47; mean of 
ANPE -  13.2). However, the motion that was suggested to be approved of by the motion committee 
was too moderate for some congress delegates. Although this motion did not differ so much in terms 
of its evaluation of nuclear energy and new politics from the other motions (El = -2.73; ANPE =•
12.5), several congress delegates criticized that the would-be accepted motion was not concrete 
enough. In particular, one speaker pointed out that other motions focused on further aspects, for
instance, the misbehavior of the police during demonstrations against nuclear plants, discrimination 
against demonstrators, etc. The motion committee, the IGO chairman and other higher trade union 
officials were also accused of reinterpreting the 1986 DGB decision in their interest. Elements of new 
politics also clearly dominated (means: El *  -1.92; ANPE 10.4). The debate ended with the withdrawal 
of the would-be-approved motion by the district of Nordrhein Westfalen. Instead, the congress 
approved of a motion that stressed the more general political aspects by the district of Hessen. Of 
course, this motion was also negative towards nuclear energy and contained elements of new politics 
(El -  -2.6; ANPE 12.5).
At this congress, IGD also debated the issue in a relatively complex manner. More than ten percent of 
the approved motions and around 15 percent of the debate referred to political and societal aspects. 
The anti-nuclear faction within IGD took advantage of the situation shortly following Chernobyl and the 
DGB congress to bring their union to a clearly anti-nuclear stand. However, although the debate was 
hot, there were no fundamental disagreements (STD: ANPE «6.1  (motions), ANPE -  7.2 (debate)). 
No motion or debate contribution expressed preferences for nuclear energy. The disagreement existed 
in political terms. It was exactly on this level that the more radical wing could gain ground at the 1986 
congress in contrast to the congresses before.
To this extern, IGD changed its attitudes towards nuclear energy from a positive evaluation in 1977 to 
a moderately negative decision in 1980, and to an extremely negative decision in 1986. Like in other 
unions, the youth department was one of the major challengers of the established policy in IGD.
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Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW)
The last German union which I wish to analyze here is the teachers’ union. GEW dealt with nuclear 
energy at three congresses: in 1977, 1980, and 1986. As early as in 1977, the GEW dealt with two 
motions on nuclear power. One motion was clearly against this technology and contained several 
arguments of new politics. For instance, we can find statements like: there is no positive relationship 
between economic growth and employment; even under normal operation the radiation of nuclear 
plants cause high death rates of babies, cancer risks and genetic damages; nuclear power is expensive 
and paid for by public spendings, this is particularly true when considering the costs for waste storage 
which would make nuclear energy the most expensive kind of energy; the massive police and army 
(Bundesgrenzschutz) control of nuclear power plants is a threat to democratic rights, etc. However, the 
congress decided to approve of a motion which only required that the DGB revise its stand on nuclear 
energy from 1977. No evaluation or other statements were made. The extreme motion (El « -1.93; 
ANPE « 25.0) mentioned above, was seen as responded to (erledigt) through this one-sentence 
motion (431.
Although approximately two thirds of the statements refer to pragmatic categories, GEW debated the 
issue in a rather complex way as seen in the mentioned motions. Social, political and above all security 
aspects played a big role in the argumentation of the motion.
At the next congress in 1980, there were four motions proposed by the state districts of Hamburg, 
Berlin, Bayem, and Bremen respectively. All motions were extremely negative towards nuclear energy 
and contained a lot of elements of new politics (means: El » -2.45; ANPE = 17.7). This time the 
motion with the highest amount of elements of new politics was approved of by the congress (El = - 
2.38; ANPE » 37.8). With this approval the standpoint of GEW on nuclear energy was clear.
In terms of the communication level, we can identify that the approved motion less often focuses on 
pragmatic aspects than the rest of the motions. However, social and political aspects have a lower 
status in the approved motion than the average. With about 6.5 percent, it stressed only half as much 
political and societal statements as did all motions. Disagreement in terms of new and productionist 
politics existed only, in so far that some motions were more radical in preferring new politics elements 
than others. Productionist politics played only a minor role in the motions (mean: MP » 1.0). At the 
GEW congress in 1983 nuclear energy was not on the congressional agenda.
43 Unfortunately, I could not analyze the debate of this and the other GEW congresses. The 
material is not available at the DGB archive and GEW did not cooperate in this question.
At the congress in November 1986, GEW had one motion on nuclear power. It was proposed by the 
district of Berlin. With some alteration, this motion was approved of by the congress. The motion was 
quite clear in its rejection of nuclear energy (El = -2.32). In terms of new politics, it also left no doubts 
that it favored elements of new politics over productionist politics (ANPE = 16.7). However, the 
motion was not as detailed as the motion six years before. Besides the demand of a step-by-step 
phasing-out of nuclear energy, the motion made associations between nuclear energy and the atomic 
bomb and claimed that there is no peaceful nuclear energy. The motion also heavily stressed non­
pragmatic categories, above all security aspects.
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Through the years, GEW made its stand on nuclear energy relatively clear. In the beginning, already in 
1977, it seemed that GEW hesitated to take any stand on the issues, although there were clear 
indicators that GEW had a group of strong proponents of new politics in its union. In 1980, the union 
formulated its most elaborated congressional stand in terms of new politics. For GEW standards the 
relatively moderate expressions shortly after Chernobyl were a bit surprising. However, this less 
concrete stand also did not give any doubt that GEW belongs to those unions that are the promoters of 
new politics in the Federal Republic of Germany. GEW has always debated nuclear energy in a rather 
complex and ideological manner. Above all, security aspects played a very central role in the evaluation 
of nuclear power. This does not mean that pragmatic categories did not play any role in GEW. In 
particular, in 1977 and 1980 more than half of the statements referred to aspects of energy policy, 
economy and labor market.
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Unions political activist tech-radical confederation suaaary Ideologyversus versus versus indexneutral accoaao- tech-opti-
dationist aistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) («)
0GB 1 0 0 1 1
IGM 1 1 0 - 2 1
IGB 1 -1 0 - 0 0
IGC 1 -1 0 - 0 0
ÖTV 1 0 0 - 1 1
HBV 1 1 0 - 2 1
1GD 1 1 0 - 2 1
G BW 1 0 0 - 1 1
LO 1 -1 -1 1 0 0
SEP 1 -1 -1 - -1 0
Metall 1 -1 -1 - -1 0
SF 1 -1 -1 - -1 0
SKAT 1 -1 -1 - •1 0
GP 1 0 1 - 2 1
TCO 0 0 0 1 1 1
SIP -1 0 0 - -1 0
ST 0 0 1 - 1 1
SKTP -1 0 0 - -1 0
SL -1 0 0 - -1 0
E x p la n a t io n s :
(1) political unions scoro 1, neutral -1, weak political 0;
(2) activist unions scora 1, accoaaodationist *1, not claarly to decide 0;
(3) technically radical unions scoro 1, technically optiaistic unions -1, no claar information 0;
(4) LO and TCO obtain a bonus because they art aainly rasponsibla for their unions political stand
(5) sue of rows 1 thru 4.
(6) Dichotomized Ideology index.
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